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Presidential Directive PD/NSC

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of The Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Energy
 The Director, Office of Management & Budget
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Modifications in U.S. National Strategy

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC-18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy and to elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased likelihood of major local or regional conflict involving key US interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations.

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC-18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased

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~~Review on December, 2000~~
~~Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)~~

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substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. ^(omitted) Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference. At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. East Asia will have third priority for resources and wartime operations. This priority calls for maintaining improved relations with the People's Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan's defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, and improved relations with the ASEAN states. (S)

which is higher - first or highest?

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba's assistance over the past two years has created another area of

security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/NSC-52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region. This should be done not by an increase in our general purpose force levels but by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirements, we must make more effort and devise better ways of sharing the economic and military burden with our allies. We must insist that our European allies take up the slack on the NATO front while we give greater priority to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf. At the same time, our NATO allies, particularly the British and French, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf.

Germany, other members of NATO and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid -- as well as of military aid from selected donors -- would be Turkey and Pakistan.

Our European and regional allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances.

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces -- strategic and general purpose -- and particularly to

limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC-_____ elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region. (C)

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Presidential Directive/NSC

TO: The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of The Treasury
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Secretary of Energy
 The Director, Office of Management & Budget
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Security Framework (U)

In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January, 1980, I called special attention to our interests in the Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I declared that:

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force." (U)

Subsequently, I have directed action to protect the Strait of Hormuz and strengthen our key friends in the region in the face of risks stemming from the Iran/Iraq war. It is U.S. strategy to meet these commitments and to defend our vital interests in the region as a whole by:

-- building up our own capabilities to project force into the region while maintaining a credible presence there.

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- developing a broad range of military (and related) response options in and outside the region against the Soviet Union, including U.S. force projection into the region, to (compensate) for the current Soviet regional advantage in conventional forces;
- making the Soviet Union aware that it will also face a wide range of economic and diplomatic sanctions on a worldwide basis if it intervenes in the region. *how arrange?*
- assisting countries in the region: to deter and diminish internal and external threats to stability; and to contribute to deterring and resisting Soviet penetration -- political, economic, or military;
- diminishing radical influences in the region by working for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement;
- improving access to facilities in the region while remaining sensitive to the special historical experience of the region and not placing in jeopardy our relationships or the internal stability of the countries concerned by insisting on formal basing arrangements where they are not desired; *?*
- taking a regional approach to securing our economic and political interests rather than basing their defense wholly on drawing a line to protect specific countries in the region. (S)

There has been considerable progress in improving our security posture in the region and in shaping an effective security framework. In order to ensure that this trend continues, I direct that the Persian Gulf Security Framework be pursued in terms as follows:

I. The Military Component

The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for initiatives in this area consistent with the responsibility of the Department of State. This component will include greater effort in the following areas:

- A. U.S. Force Capabilities, including forces, lift, facilities access, ^zoverbuilding and prepositioning of supplies, exercises, and presence in the region.
- B. Local Defense Capabilities, improved through security assistance, advisory programs, and enhancement of local facilities and military capabilities in order to support U.S. force projection and local defense developed by joint planning, combined exercises, consultations, and other appropriate means. In particular we must strengthen Turkey's capabilities to serve as a "threat-in-being" on the flank of any Soviet intervention in the Gulf region.
- C. Getting our Allies to Carry more of the Burden of coalition deterrence/defense in Europe and Northeast Asia, as part of a rational division of labor, in order to permit greater allocation of U.S. resources to the security of the Persian Gulf in the event of a simultaneous crisis there. (S)

II. The Foreign Policy Component

The Department of State has principal responsibility for this component, which will be carried out in terms of:

- A. The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as rapidly as feasible.

- B. The Northern Tier, including Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, in which improved security relations are the objective.
- C. The Arabian Peninsula in which we will assist the countries concerned to enhance their internal stability and counter Soviet influence.
- D. The Allies, in Europe and Asia, from whom we seek diplomatic, military, economic, and political assistance in meeting our mutual security objectives in the Persian Gulf region. (An early focus of effort with these allies and with regional powers will be establishing procedures to assure quick processing of overflight, refueling and staging clearances required for the US to project and sustain forces in Southwest Asia.) (S)

III. Economic Issues

The Department of the Treasury, State, and Energy will share responsibility in this area. Economic subcomponents are:

- A. Oil Policy, to ensure availability of oil at reasonable prices and to reduce Western dependence on Gulf oil.
- B. Western Economic Assistance, in which our goal will be to help address economic problems in the region through multilateral and unilateral efforts.
- C. Saudi and Other Gulf State Financing of Regional Security Needs, in which we seek a more comprehensive, region-wide use of Saudi and other peninsular wealth to meet regional security needs. }
- D. Economic Stability which is crucial to both the internal and external security and to the political stability of states in the region. It should be an integral component of the security review process and taken into account in any U.S. decisions concerning military and/or economic assistance. (S)

IV. Intelligence Issues

The Director of Central Intelligence has the principal responsibility for developing an effective regionally integrated intelligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and objectives in the military, diplomatic, and economic components. (S)

Resources Considerations

Each agency will be responsible for and will identify the programs in its area which are required for implementing this directive. In addition, each agency will propose appropriate priorities for these programs. (C)

The Office of Management and Budget will monitor agency programs in support of this directive, will insure that such programs are identifiable, and will insure that they are receiving an appropriately high priority in all agencies. (C)

Coordination

Interagency coordination for the security framework shall continue to be accomplished by the SCC. (C)