

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Flow of Arms - Limitations

SE 948-7-14

Question: How can you say we are not fomenting arms races when we export about six times as much military material as our nearest competitor, the Soviet Union?

Answer: In the first place, during the 1964-66 period, the export of arms from the U.S. has been nowhere near six times that of the Soviet Union. It is about two times if we exclude our assistance to NATO members and similar Soviet aid to Warsaw Pact members; the total amounts from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to the rest of the world have been roughly equal. Furthermore, the bulk of Soviet aid has gone to troublemakers such as Nasser, Sukarno, Castro and Ho Chi Minh. In the Middle East, since 1954 the total Soviet deliveries have been about 6 - 8 times more than U.S. deliveries.

Question: Isn't the Israeli-Arab conflict illustrative of the arms race we have fostered in the Horn of Africa?

Answer: We have not fostered any arms race in the Horn of Africa. Our military assistance for Ethiopia has been designed to increase its internal security capability. In recent years the Soviets have provided large quantities of arms to Somalia (\$35 million) which have increased the concern of the neighboring countries for their external security. It is a condition which we alone cannot control, but the thrust of our efforts is to stabilize the situation in the Horn. Our major emphasis therefore continues to be directed toward internal security improvement.

Question: Do you believe it would be wise to limit arms sales in developing areas?

Answer: Yes, it would be extremely wise. All the nations in the area could agree not to purchase certain weapons, or the major suppliers could agree not to deliver certain weapons. It would not be wise to cut off sales in the absence of some agreement of this kind.

Question: If such agreements are sound, why haven't we made more progress on this matter?

Answer: We have conducted discussions with other governments on this matter, but they have not yet agreed with us that such limitations would be in the best interests of everyone. The negative positions of France and the U.S.S.R. have been especially disappointing. I hope they will agree in the near future, as this would be a major step toward peace and stability.

Question: Some people have suggested publicizing the international arms traffic. Why do you object to publicity on this matter?

Answer: We do not object to reasonable reporting of these sales. We have regularly reported to Congress and the public on these sales; in fact, we report more fully than any other nation in the world. I understand there have been some UN resolutions considered asking all nations to report such sales. We have no objection to such reports. I hope that others would report as fully and completely as we do.

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17 JUL 1967

CRITICISMS BY SENATOR FRANK CHURCH OF US MILITARY-SALES  
AND MILITARY-AID PROGRAMS, AND ANSWERS TO HIS CHARGES

Senator Church attacked the US military-sales and MAP programs in a lengthy Senate speech on June 26, 1967. In a colloquy that followed, Church elaborated his charges, and general agreement with his views was expressed by Senators Clark, Gruening, McGovern, Gore, Cooper, Young of Ohio, Pell, and (less strongly) Byrd of West Virginia. The material in Church's speech had previously been presented in substantially identical form in an article by him in the July 1967 issue of Esquire; the only significant difference between the article and the speech arises from the fact that the former was written prior to the Middle East war. The following is a synopsis of the principal charges made by Church in the Senate, together with suggested answers to those charges.

1. THE MIDDLE EAST

Charges by Senator Church:

Church gives heavy emphasis to the ME crisis as alleged proof that the US policy on arms sales and military aid in the ME has been a failure. In a nutshell, his attack is directed against our "giving of arms to Arab nations which have vowed to wipe Israel off the map," and which have now used our arms in trying to do so. More specifically, he makes the following charges:

-- US Arms for Arabs. "Since the end of World War II, the United States has doled out \$322 million in military aid to the Arab nations which joined in the most recent attempt to obliterate Israel." "Egypt and Sudan are the only Arab nations missing from our arms sales and giveaway list." Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Morocco have all received substantial amounts, and Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen "lesser amounts."

-- Limited US Arms for Israel. "Under a policy which assumes that we can exercise a restraining influence by judicious distribution of our weapons, we have also sold Israel \$28 million in arms. Events of the last month have proven that this misguided attempt to prevent 'polarization' of western arms in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab hands, and still keep on friendly terms with both sides, called for omniscient qualities of judgment which our Defense officials, or indeed any mortals, do not possess."

-- US Identification with Israel (Church in colloquy after speech, Cong. Rec. S. 8826). "Anyone familiar with the birth of Israel knows that the United States played a role there that identifies



this country as midwife at the birth of Israel, and that the bonds that exist between some 6 million Jewish citizens of this country . . . constitute a tie with Israel that all the world recognizes exists, and particularly so the Arab countries. When the moment of truth came, a few weeks ago, all the Arab countries arrayed themselves against Israel, proclaimed the Soviet Union as their champion, and then marched forth into a military debacle swiftly administered to them by the Israel armies in 4 days of brilliant military achievement, following which they then proceeded to blame the United States for their humiliation. All that our arms aid policy accomplished was to add to the sum total of the warmaking potential of the Arab countries, helping to embolden them to mass against Israel, thus contributing in a very direct and undeniable way to the war itself. . . ."

-- Use of US Arms in ME War. Israel and Jordan both used US tanks against each other, just as India and Pakistan had done. Both wars show "folly of the thesis that the US can defuse arms [races] by supplying weapons."

-- US Policy for Future. "I propose that the United States announce -- unilaterally and unequivocally -- that it will no longer give or sell arms to the Arab world."

-- US-USSR Policy for Future. USSR should agree to do same. US should make every effort to get agreement "on an arms embargo or a stringent limitation applicable to Arab and Israeli alike." USSR, though, has already resumed arms shipments to ME. Moscow should now have learned that arms buildups such as it has sponsored in Egypt and Syria "can only lead to disaster." "Fortunately, this explosion was contained," but next time result may be "thermonuclear disaster for the entire world."

#### Answers to the Charges:

-- US Arms for Israel. Church in his Senate speech and the subsequent colloquy takes the position that we were wrong only in supplying arms to Arab countries, and that this is what we should unilaterally stop for the future. In his Esquire article, written before the ME blew up, he took a different view. He then appeared to argue that we should keep out of the ME arms race altogether, and should have refused to sell Israel even the limited amount of arms that we did sell her. Thus, he criticized us for efforts "at balancing the armed forces of Israel and her Arab neighbors," and he applied to the ME his principle that "we should avoid export sales into troubled regions where war hangs in the balance" and his charge that we have been "needlessly involving the prestige of the United States in local quarrels by selling arms . . . ." Church no longer says we should have followed his Esquire policy of complete US uninvolved in the ME arms race. He now recognizes that, in the real world, the US

does not have the power to stop an arms race such as that in the ME all by itself, and that US efforts "at balancing the armed forces" in the area -- as by selling Israel some of the arms she needed to offset the huge and threatening buildup of Soviet arms in Egypt, Syria, and other Arab countries -- may well become, unfortunately, the only realistic way to help maintain peace.

To be sure, we did not succeed in maintaining peace in the ME. But few reasonable men will say that the fault lay with us. And the outcome could have been much worse if, adopting Senator Church's Esquire policy, we had discounted the Soviet power-play and refused to sell arms to Israel or any of the other countries threatened by the buildup of Soviet arms. Church apparently recognizes this when he exults in Israel's "4 days of brilliant military achievement," whereupon, "Fortunately, this explosion was contained . . . ."

-- Limitation of US Arms for Israel. Church now goes to the other extreme and apparently objects, not to our having supplied arms to Israel, but to our having limited that supply. (We indeed did so. In contrast to Church's claim that "we have permitted our short-range concern over balance of payments to override more fundamental interests," we have successfully sought to avoid becoming the major supplier of arms to Israel. We turned down many millions of dollars worth of sales to Israel, and urged her whenever possible to look elsewhere for her defense needs -- for example, to France, where she purchased most of her air force.) According to Church, we should not have engaged in this "misguided attempt to prevent 'polarization' of western arms in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab hands . . . ." He reasons that, inasmuch as the US was "midwife at the birth of Israel" and has 6 million Jewish citizens, we were bound to be identified with Israel anyway, so our attempts to steer clear (so far as possible) of the Israeli military effort were useless and a failure.

In view of the stakes involved, this would seem a rather casual and reckless view. It is true that, despite our efforts, the Arab countries in general "proclaimed the Soviet Union as their champion" and, after their defeat by Israel, "proceeded to blame the United States for their humiliation." But it would seem rather important for the US and the world that, notwithstanding such talk by the Arabs, the USSR and the US were both able to keep out of the armed conflict and, in fact, to work together to some degree to bring it to an end. Who is to say that the fortunate result whereby "this explosion was contained" was not due in some measure to what Church calls our "misguided attempt to prevent 'polarization' of western arms in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab hands. . . . "?

-- US Arms for Arabs. Church takes the blanket position that we were wrong in the past to give or sell arms to any Arab nation -- an error proved by the fact that in the recent war "all the Arab



countries arrayed themselves against Israel" -- and that we should consequently now make the unilateral policy declaration that we will no longer give or sell arms to "the Arab world." This call for an identical US policy toward all Arab nations is no less unrealistic, and contains no less potential for damage to US interests, than the comparable contention that we should make no policy distinctions in dealing with "Communist" nations. While the Arab nations were compelled to fall into line against Israel under pressure of the recent crisis (just as all Communist countries band together on some issues), there remain among the nations of "the Arab world" obvious and substantial differences in policies and alignments, which it would be foolhardy for the US to ignore.

The military aid the US has given to Arab nations in the 22 years since World War II (the value of which is less than \$250 million, not \$322 million as stated by Church) has gone generally to such moderate, pro-Western countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. These nations are poles apart, politically, from such radical, pro-Soviet countries as the UAR, Syria, and Algeria, which have received in recent years an overwhelmingly greater amount of Soviet arms. (Church omits to mention Algeria as an Arab nation to which we have never given or sold arms; he also omits to note that the amount we have supplied to Syria is not only "lesser" but minimal, totaling some \$100,000 over the past 16 years.) Church ignores the fact that our modest military aid to the moderate Arab nations has been based on their legitimate security fears and needs, caused principally by the vastly greater buildup of Soviet arms in the hands of their radical and threatening neighbors.

Even under the unifying stress of the recent crisis, the differences between the moderate and radical Arab nations were apparent and significant. It is a superficial reading of recent events to ignore the instigating role of the Soviet-supplied Nasser and to allege that our modest aid to the moderate Arab countries -- incomparably less than that supplied by the USSR to the radical instigators of the crisis -- had a significant role in emboldening "all the Arab countries" to "mass against Israel" and thus contributed "in a very direct and undeniable way to the war itself . . . ." At the end of the war as well as at the beginning, the intra-Arab differences were clear and important, and are becoming more so daily. Church's statement that "all the Arab countries . . . then proceeded to blame the United States for their humiliation" ignores the fact that such countries as Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia have conspicuously refused to support Nasser's lie that the US fought on the side of Israel. Church would have the US blind itself to the basic political divergence within the Arab world that this refusal illustrates, and to the considerable significance of that divergence for US interests and for the future of the ME and the world.

-- US and USSR Roles in the ME. Church recognizes that international agreement on arms limitations for the Middle East, especially between the US and USSR, represents "the only effective way to put out the smouldering sparks in this tinderbox." The USG of course agrees, and is doing whatever it can to bring about such an agreement, which represents one of President Johnson's five points for solving the ME crisis. As Church points out, however, "recent reports indicate that Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East have already been resumed." As stated in a Philadelphia Bulletin editorial commenting on Church's speech (6/30/67): "At present, like it or not, it is Soviet action which will in large part determine how the arms situation shapes up in the Middle East." What Church fails to recognize is that the same has been true in the past. He does his country a disservice in implying that the US arms-supply policy and that of the USSR were equally to blame for the crisis that has occurred.

## II. AMOUNTS OF US ARMS SALES AND AID

### Charges by Senator Church:

-- a. During the past 16 years, the US has given to foreign governments "a staggering total of \$37 billion" worth of arms, which Church enumerates by numbers and types of equipment.

-- b. "Today, the Federal Government is the principal arms dispenser of the world; giving away, advancing credit and promoting the sale of a volume of arms over six times that of our nearest rival, the Soviet Union."

-- c. The total of our combined arms-sales and MAP programs is increasing: "As if to augment these massive gifts of arms, the Defense Department is now engaged in a mushrooming sales campaign. . . ." "The fact is that our total addition to the armament inventory of other nations is now higher than for any period since the Korean war."

-- d. MAP is "a runaway program that has yet to be effectively checked." The Administration would like to see MAP increased: The military-aid request for FY 1968 "is greater than the amount Congress voted last year." (In the Esquire article but not the Senate speech, Church also asserted: "Excluding Vietnam . . . , the military aid request presented to Congress for FY 1967 was larger than for 1966.")

### Answers to the Charges:

-- a. Despite Church's talk about a "staggering total" of US arms aid and his enumeration of all the weapons sent abroad during the past 17 years, he actually objects to only about 10% of our arms sales and to less than one-half of our total sales-and-MAP programs. He states in his speech:



"I concede that it makes good fiscal sense to sell arms to such developed nations as Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Canada, or Australia. Rich nations which enjoy the protection of our defense umbrella should help offset the costs we incur by maintaining so many American troops abroad . . . by purchasing weapons from us."

He also concedes that these "entirely proper" sales "to industrial countries which can afford to pay" represent "at least four-fifths of our arms sales for this year." In fact, the percentage of US arms sales going to the developed countries of Europe and Asia in recent years has been about 90%, with about 80% going to our NATO allies in Europe. The sales criticized by Church thus represent about 10% of the total sales. And since the sales program is now twice as large as MAP, the military assistance to which Church does not object represents well over half of the combined sales-and-MAP programs.

-- b. Church's statement that the amount of arms dispensed by the US is over six times that dispensed by the USSR cannot possibly be correct. It is unclear what figures (if any) the Senator is referring to, but if you consider the amount of arms the USSR has dispensed since 1950 to such areas as the Warsaw Pact countries, the Middle East, Communist China, Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, etc., the resulting figure is well into the tens of billions. Nor can the current ratio be anything like six to one.

-- c. The total of the combined US arms-sales and MAP programs is not increasing. The earlier ratio of two dollars of grant-aid for each dollar of sales is now reversed, but for the past five years the aggregate of the two programs has been stable at about \$3 billion annually. It is expected to approximate \$2.5 billion in FY 1967, and to remain below \$3 billion for the foreseeable future. The total value of US military exports over the decade 1962-1971 is not expected to be measurably higher than for 1952-1961. Taking account of inflation, the real value of our arms exports will have diminished appreciably between these two decades.

-- d. MAP is not a "runaway program" and is not expanding. The annual MAP appropriation has declined from \$5.7 billion for FY 1952 to \$792 million for FY 1967. The amount requested for FY 1968 is either \$596 million or \$838 million (depending on the proposed transfer of certain programs).

### III. STANDARDS GOVERNING MILITARY SALES POLICY

#### Charge by Senator Church:

In making sales, we permit balance-of-payments considerations to override our more fundamental foreign-policy interests. We don't turn down proposed purchase contracts often enough.

Answer to the Charge:

In fact, we never permit concern over balance of payments to override foreign-policy considerations. No arms sale is approved by the USG until a positive determination has been made that, balance-of-payments considerations aside, the transaction is in the best interests of this country. Such determinations are made only after a thorough Executive Branch review -- joined in by State, AID, Defense, and other agencies -- of the legitimacy of the recipient country's requirement for the arms, its ability to pay for them, the potential effect of the sale on the peace or stability of the area, and all other pertinent foreign-policy considerations.

As a result, the amount of potential military sales turned down by the US each year in underdeveloped or arms-race-prone areas of the world far exceeds the amount of sales consummated. For example, one country recently asked to buy over \$200 million worth of military equipment; we have mutually agreed that its purchases will be reduced to \$5-15 million spread over several years.

IV. LATIN AMERICA

Charge by Senator Church:

We contributed to the LA arms race last year by agreeing to sell Argentina 50 A-4B subsonic planes (only 25 of which were actually delivered). Chile "reacted by" purchasing 21 Hawker-Hunters from the UK for \$20 million. Peru is negotiating for even more-advanced fighters. McNamara argues that Argentina otherwise would have bought more expensive planes elsewhere, so that our action helped to control a potential arms race and dampen it down. Church disagrees:

"I think we must face down the argument that if we do not sell to poor countries they will buy elsewhere. This is nothing less than a demand for prostituting our own principles. If our announced policy of curtailing arms races has any validity, then we must resist the temptation of the opposite course, simply because other countries may choose to follow it. . . ."

Answer to the Charge:

In the real situation presented by Argentina's request, the simplistic policy advanced by Church would have been the least likely means of curtailing a LA arms race. Argentina, Chile, Peru, and other LA countries were all seeking to replace pre-Korean war aircraft which were difficult and uneconomical to maintain. They preferred the US-manufactured F-5, a supersonic jet. The US, however, declined to make supersonic jets available. We offered Argentina instead the subsonic, reconditioned, and cheaper A-4B. If Argentina had not bought these from us, she would probably have accepted the offer of another nation to sell her more-advanced planes at a higher price. Chile, when we subsequently



became unable to supply more A-4B's because of the Vietnam war, did precisely that. In the circumstances -- given the fact that Argentina was going to buy replacement aircraft somewhere -- our sale of the A-4B's had the purpose and effect of minimizing the diversion from her economic resources and of helping to control a potential arms race.

While Senator Church may talk about "prostituting our own principles," the fact is that, in the real world, our "policy of curtailing arms races" is not always necessarily furthered -- and may in fact be contravened -- by his proposed policy of primly turning away a country in the position of Argentina last year.

This point came up in the colloquy on the Senate floor following Church's speech. Senator Clark referred to "the recent announcement that the Government of Peru is purchasing from the French modern, up-to-date military aircraft"; expressed the view that "the purchase of this equipment from the French by the Peruvian Government is almost certain to escalate an arms race on the west coast of Latin America"; and asked Senator Church "how he thinks the United States could deal with [this situation] constructively." Citing Church's statement about "prostituting our own principles," Clark pointed out that "it is rather cool comfort to think that we stand up for principle, yet cannot influence the countries of the free world when they move into the vacuum we have created." Church's answer was that, "although we have no control over French, British, or Russian policy, we do have control over our own"; that "when we use the argument that if we do not sell arms, others will, we throw away the one opportunity we have to set the right kind of example"; and that, when we make a sale as we did of the A-4B's to Argentina, such a policy is "inconsistent with our long-term objectives in Latin America."

Church's answer remains, in Clark's words, "rather cool comfort." It ignores the fact that "our long-term objectives in Latin America" will not be furthered, but rather injured, if we stand on abstract principle as he suggests and compel Latin American countries to use more of their resources to purchase more-advanced arms elsewhere -- and if we thereby forfeit, in addition, the continuing influence that we would otherwise be able to exert toward limiting the arms purchases and expenditures of these nations (the ability to effectively say "no" that we can possess and maintain only if we occasionally say "yes").

Senator Church's position also ignores, in general, the fact that we are dealing with independent, sovereign nations, and that the United States has neither the right nor the power to decide for such nations what their defense policies should or will be. Our own arms-export decisions must be made within the framework of the desires and intentions of the potential-recipient nations and of their ability to acquire arms elsewhere if not from us. While we would often prefer that a particular nation acquire no additional arms, our policy decision in practice must often be that of choosing the course which will most effectively limit, in

both military and financial terms, the acquisition that the nation is determined to effect. Senator Church would abstain from this decision, and the result would generally be to bring about the greater rather than the lesser evil.

## V. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM

### A. In General

#### Charge:

MAP "ought to be terminated in most cases. The giveaway arms program should be drastically curtailed."

#### Answer:

The military-aid program, in its reduced scale, is still needed to serve purposes vital to the national interest. Its principal purpose today is the same as it was when we were rearming Western Europe after World War II: To strengthen the capability of selected allies, especially in countries bordering the USSR or Communist China, to defend themselves against the external military threat. The program's other purposes are to help friendly nations protect the fabric of their society against internal violence, to obtain access for the US to strategic bases and facilities, and to dispose nations favorably toward the US in their diplomacy, their public sentiment, and the direction of their internal development. (With respect to this last purpose, however, we are aware that political gains expected to result from MAP must be weighed against the possible tendency of such aid, in some cases, to strengthen the position of undemocratic military regimes.)

The country-composition of our present military-aid program is closely consistent with its principal purpose. Of the proposed program for FY 1968, about three-quarters of the total amount is allocated to five nations (Greece, Turkey, Iran, Nationalist China, and Korea) that directly confront the Soviet bloc or Communist China. The forces of these nations are vitally important to our "forward strategy" for the common defense of the free world. Less than one-fifth of the proposed program is allocated to countries not directly exposed to the threat of aggression by Communist neighbors.

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### B. Level of Forces

#### Charge:

" . . . We agreed to support force levels totally devoid of strategic reality, as though it were possible for Turkey or Iran, without American intervention, to defend themselves successfully against a major Russian attack, or for Taiwan to resist an all-out invasion from the mainland of China."

#### Answer:

The levels of forces supported by MAP in recipient countries are generally in accord with the Force Objectives, or Force Guidelines, determined for the respective countries by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of their estimate of the strategic realities. This is true, for example, in Iran.



With respect to Turkey and also Greece, the force levels presume that in case of Communist aggression NATO would act, and that Turkish and Greek forces would be a part of the NATO forces. The force levels support NATO strategic concepts, and do not envisage Turkey or Greece fighting alone. Were the latter the case, much larger forces would be required.

In general, the force levels of the "Forward Defense countries" where we have treaty commitments are designed, not to enable successful defense against an all-out Communist attack "without American intervention," but rather to provide a capability for initial resistance allowing the US time to determine the nature and intent of any hostile threat and to take appropriate counteraction. Without the capabilities of these MAP-supported allied forces to provide immediate resistance to hostile aggressive actions, US forces would have to be substantially larger and more dispersed throughout the world, at much higher cost, or else there would be substantially more points of weakness and pressure at the perimeters of the free world.

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### C. Taiwan

#### Charge:

" . . . [O]n the island of Taiwan, where the real protection has always been furnished by the American 7th Fleet, . . . we were induced to give over \$2.5 billion in injections of military aid to equip an army twice too big for its tactical role in any future defense of the island but not a tenth big enough to ever threaten the mainland."

#### Answer:.

The US recognizes that air and naval forces are the first line of defense for Taiwan, and accordingly the majority of our military assistance during the past two years has been for the GRC air force and navy. Communist China has constantly held that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Communist Chinese territory and will be "liberated" at some future but unstated date. In light of this standing challenge, the Communist Chinese armed forces, with the largest army and one of the largest air forces in the world, plus a growing navy and a rapidly developing atomic-weapons capability, pose a formidable military threat to the GRC. While the US is committed by treaty to support the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores if attacked, the GRC with the necessary weapons is willing and able to provide a very large part of its own defense. The military assistance provided by the US emphasizes the modernization of air and naval weapons which the GRC needs and cannot provide for itself.

The US economic aid program for Taiwan was terminated in mid-1965. The GRC self-financed military budget as a percentage of its total budget is one of the highest in the world; by this means the GRC is financing a very large and increasing part of its total defense costs. A rapid phase-down of US MAP for Taiwan would force the GRC to raise its defense expenditures to an even higher level, and could jeopardize the viability of the GRC economy and the \$1.5 billion US AID investment in Taiwan.

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#### D. Overburdening of Economies

##### Charge:

" . . . Such unrealistic force levels, fed by our military assistance programs, have inevitably imposed top-heavy burdens on the fragile economies of many of these underdeveloped lands, with the result that we have had to prop them up with high financial transfusions just to prevent their collapse. Accordingly, we have had to use some \$10 billion -- from a total of \$27.5 billion in economic aid -- just to provide budgetary support to sustain the very military levels we ourselves encouraged."

##### Answer:

The Senator is apparently referring to the device of defense-budget support, whereby resources generated from local-currency receipts from the sale of commodities provided through US economic aid are used in support of the recipient country's defense budget -- thus giving such aid a dual purpose. The principal countries in which the device has been used are Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Philippines, and Iran; of these countries, all but three -- Vietnam, Turkey, and Korea -- have now reached the point of economic viability where budget support is not needed to support their military establishment. Such economic progress by these countries negates Senator Church's assertion that "we have had to prop them up with high financial transfusions just to prevent their collapse." The force levels being maintained by these nations are, as noted above, not "unrealistic" but based on the strategic assessment and advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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#### E. Waste of MAP Articles

##### Charge:

" . . . Many a country on the periphery of the communist world has been turned into a dumping ground for American military equipment. General Accounting Office investigation reports . . . have decried the excesses: rows of tanks inoperative for the lack of trained mechanics; parking lots filled with rusting vehicles that have no protection from the tropical sun and rain; huge quantities of random supplies and spare parts piling up unused."



Answer:

The Department of Defense has not received in more than two years any GAO reports citing significant excesses of tanks or vehicles furnished under the Military Assistance Program. (This may be due to effective Defense enforcement of Section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits delivery of MAP articles valued over \$100,000 unless the MAAG chief in the recipient country certifies that the country is capable of utilizing the articles effectively.)

Spare parts are not dumped into MAP countries. GAO reports cite almost as many examples of insufficient spare parts as of spare part excesses. It is a problem of having the right quantity of spare parts for the right equipment at the right time -- which is not always easy to accomplish in countries remote from the US as forces are being modernized and older equipment replaced. The MAAGs are continuously engaged in teaching effective logistical procedures and supply controls to recipient-country forces, to assure that unneeded spare parts are not requisitioned and that spare parts for obsolete replaced equipment are purged from the country supply systems. To avoid piling up unused spare parts, DOD is enforcing a strict cutoff policy under which unrequisitioned or unused balances of prior-year MAP spare part program lines are cancelled when the current-year program is issued.

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F. India-PakistanCharge:

" . . . [R]ather than contributing to an effective defense against the communist threat, as we conceived it, the actual result of our arms aid was to foment war between two non-communist governments, both of which were friendly to the United States."

Answer:

The quarrel between India and Pakistan is deep-seated, based largely on religious differences and antedating the partition of British India. We provided arms aid to Pakistan -- which lies on the frontier of both Communist China and the USSR -- for participation in CENTO and SEATO, with assurances that such aid would be utilized only in that context or in legitimate self-defense. India in 1962 appealed to the US and the UK for military assistance to help meet the Chinese Communist threat, as evidenced by the India-China border clash in October of that year. Our resulting military

assistance to India consisted primarily of equipping mountain divisions and providing ground-air defense systems and construction equipment. We demanded and received assurances that the equipment we provided would be used only against the Chinese Communists; it is not clear that it was in fact used to a significant extent against Pakistan.

Our provision of military equipment did not "foment" the war between India and Pakistan. Indeed, the more significant aspect of the US role was our ability, as the major supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, to help bring the fighting to an early halt by cutting off the supply of spare parts.

Since our suspension of military assistance to both India and Pakistan in September of 1965, Communist China has supplied military equipment to Pakistan, and the Soviet Union has become a major supplier to India. US influence on the subcontinent has been substantially reduced.

#### G. Korea

##### Charge:

"The flaw in the argument [for MAP-supplied foreign armies, in preference to US troops, as a shield against external Communist aggression] . . . is that in the one place where we might really have deferred to a foreign army to hold a defense line -- in Korea at the 38th parallel -- we have been unwilling to do it. . . . [W]e still insist, 14 years after the truce in Korea, on stationing more than 50,000 American combat troops near the 38th parallel."

##### Answer:

Senator Church might have considered how many more American troops would have to be stationed in Korea now if our military aid had not helped that country to develop a large and capable military force of its own (in addition to a healthy economy and a stable, democratic government). The 50,000 US troops currently guarding the truce line in Korea compares rather favorably with the 302,000 who were stationed there at the height of the Korean war and with the 142,000 who were killed or wounded in that conflict.

Senator Church might also have taken note of the fact that Korea now has 46,000 capable troops fighting in South Vietnam. To withdraw US forces from Korea would lead to bringing these Korean troops home and increasing the requirement for US troops in Vietnam by a similar number. In view of the situation in Southeast Asia and of attitudes resulting from Chinese Communist nuclear developments, such withdrawal -- especially at a time of increased tension along the 38th parallel -- would also remove important moral support which our presence in Korea provides for the entire East Asian area.



H. AfricaCharge:

The US has been "instituting new military aid programs" in "the most unlikely place of all, Africa." "Here the favorite rationalization is that the gift of arms may gain us favor with the restless young African armies which have either seized, or threaten to seize, political power."

Answer: Rather than instituting new programs in Africa, the number of programs there has been reduced.

US military assistance for Africa is only about 5% of the worldwide total. More than 80% of this small African program is allocated to North Africa and Ethiopia. In North Africa the substantial flow of Soviet arms to Algeria in recent years has led to a decided imbalance between Algeria's forces and the defensive strengths of her moderate Arab neighbors (Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya). In the Horn of Africa also, Soviet arms shipments to Somalia have increased the concern of neighboring Ethiopia for her security. The limited assistance that we have provided in both these areas has been designed to assist in the development of modest defensive forces that will contribute to stability in the area and thus to a sense of security essential to economic and social progress. The remaining small amount of military assistance for countries in sub-Saharan Africa includes principally civic action equipment for two countries (Congo and Liberia) and training in the US for limited numbers of African military personnel.

I. US Military TrainingCharge:

"Today some 12,000 Americans are engaged abroad in training, advising and supervising the armed services of no less than 35 foreign countries. . . . Invitations are issued to participate in military training within the United States or at special schools operated for this purpose abroad. To date, some 277,000 foreign soldiers have been trained in this manner, with millions more receiving American training inside their own countries. In addition, about 1,400 senior foreign officers enjoy a free 'orientation' trip to the U.S. each year.

"Naturally, out of this exposure, comes an appetite for the sophisticated weaponry we have developed. . . ."

Answer:

US military training is a necessary and beneficial concomitant of our total military-assistance programs -- with respect to more than one-half of which, as noted above, Senator Church has expressed approval. Our training groups overseas (of the 12,000 men referred

to by Senator Church, about 5,500 are military advisers in South Vietnam) have been markedly successful in helping the foreign military forces under their advice and training to develop to a point where they are capable of successfully deterring aggression and of anticipating, preventing, and defeating subversive insurgency. Training for foreign military officers in the US (CONUS training) has additional purposes and benefits; it would seem much less than a fair and accurate appraisal to say, as Senator Church does, that the men experiencing this program have taken away from the US primarily "an appetite for the sophisticated weaponry we have developed." There are strong presumptions that attendance by foreign officers at military schools in the US redounds to the long-range political benefit of this country. When these officers are brought into the American environment they are directly exposed, not only to our military power, but to life in the United States and to the people and policies of this country. (The DOD information program assures that the foreign officers do not remain exclusively on military installations but have opportunities to tour nearby communities and meet people in civilian life; a number are also brought to Washington, where they talk with Congressmen.) The visitors thus have an opportunity to discover that the American people actually control the US Government, and that US foreign policy generally reflects the popular will and is rooted in a genuine desire for world peace and stability. They can observe at first-hand our civilian-military relationships, and thus acquire an understanding of the appropriate political posture for military officers in a functioning democracy.

Inasmuch as these young officers are destined to be leaders of their countries' armed forces and, in many cases, to have important political roles as well, their exposure to life in the US would seem no less desirable than comparable visits to this country by foreign students in non-military fields. Among the foreign military personnel who have received CONUS training, 35 are cabinet members, ministers, or ambassadors; 17 are heads of foreign industries; 11 are chiefs or deputy chiefs of their armed forces; 192 are key commanders in their armed forces; and 448 occupy important high-level staff positions in their armed forces. The US military training received by members of the Indonesian armed forces is thought to have been an important contributing factor in those forces' resistance to Communism.

#### J. Effect of Military Aid on Political Alignment

##### Charge:

Pointing out that a foreign army's "allegiance can never be bought by the gift of arms," Senator Church cites such events as the military coups in Iraq and the Dominican Republic against



governments receiving military assistance from the US and the ousting of Soviet-supported leaders by Soviet-supported armies in Indonesia and Algeria (Ben Bella). He concludes that "the argument that we must give arms to some foreign government 'or else the Russians will do it'" is "fallacious," and that our reaction to the argument should be: "Please let them, for our sake!"

Answer:

Our military-assistance program is not designed to buy the allegiance of foreign armies. We are also aware that links between the US and a foreign army may prove counterproductive where that army supports an undemocratic regime. The fact remains, however, that for the US to provide a foreign nation with military assistance that it requests and needs, often works to dispose that nation favorably toward the US in its diplomacy, its public sentiment, and its internal development -- and that for the US to turn the nation away, forcing it to seek assistance from Communist countries instead, often has the opposite effect. This is not to say that political influence resulting from military assistance is the most important factor affecting a country's political development; only that it is one such factor. The cases cited by Senator Church simply illustrate the greater role that can be played by other factors (although Soviet influence has scarcely been purged from Algeria). On an overall basis, it is difficult to see how the peace of the world and the other foreign policy objectives of the US would be promoted if, adopting the proposed reaction of Senator Church, we simply sat back and smiled upon the massive entry of Communist arms and accompanying Communist influence into every country which, having no alternative, might accept such aid. The results that have followed from the influx of Soviet-bloc arms into the UAR and other radical Arab nations in recent years should dispel any such notion. And current indications that the Soviets do not contemplate altering their arms policies, despite the recent events in the Middle East, should underline the conclusion that the US cannot further its own objectives by espousing the Church policy of giving the Soviets a free hand to extend their arms program into as many countries as possible.

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GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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## Reduce Bilateral Aid Because of South Vietnam

Question: Because of the \$25 billion spent annually on Vietnam to finance the war, the U.S. must sharply reduce its outlay for economic and military assistance. Therefore, as a way to prevent future Vietnams, why not turn over all foreign aid funds for administration by the World Bank and the U.S. Development Fund? (Fulbright and Morse)

Answer: Military Assistance is being reduced. The amounts planned for countries remaining in the program are less than allocated last year. The total amount requested is about one-half of that requested when I first appeared before this Committee. However, the U.S. forces cannot be responsible for maintaining peace everywhere at once. It is more important than ever that small amounts of U.S. aid be available to equip and maintain the armed forces of friendly nations.

But to answer your specific question:

First, the major purpose of military assistance is to promote the foreign policy and security of the United States. The primary responsibility for this is in the Departments of State and Defense; it would be completely inappropriate to turn over to the World Bank or the U.S. Development Fund the administration of a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy and security.

Second, military assistance to certain countries is tied into our own defense planning. Its administration requires close coordination with our own military plans and policies, which in turn support our defense treaty commitments. Neither of the agencies mentioned would have the capabilities of so coordinating military assistance.

Finally, the planning and execution of military assistance must be done by experienced military and DoD civilian personnel. It would be unrealistic to have the World Bank administering a program which required such an extent of military expertise.

## Racial Violence not Caused by Foreign Aid

Question: There is a definite relationship between aid expenditures and the racial violence manifested in the riots and looting in Newark and elsewhere - such racial explosions can be traced to neglect or under-financing of domestic programs aimed at making the "ghettos" better places in which to live. (Fulbright). How can you justify these billions for foreign countries when we need so much at home?

Answer: There is no direct relationship between our foreign aid expenditures and the racial violence in this country. The neglect which caused the latter, and for which all Americans must share the guilt, predates our aid program by many years. I do not wish to minimize the seriousness of Newark, but our domestic difficulties, tragic as they are, should not cause us to abandon our foreign commitments or our allies.

Further, it is questionable whether, if we were to abandon our foreign aid tomorrow, the Congress would devote equivalent resources (about \$3.1 billion) to our acute domestic problems. Finally, as I have said many times before, were this program to be eliminated, the expense to the American taxpayer would be much greater than the current military assistance request, since our own defense expenditures would have to be increased. We get a greater return for our dollar in MAP than we do from a like amount placed in the regular Defense Budget.



Foreign Beneficiaries Voting Against US Position In the UN

Question: The UN debate on the Middle East has shown the valuelessness of our aid policies. Ten of the largest benefactors of U.S. generosity consistently voted against the U.S. position. (Drew Pearson)

Answer: With regard to MAP, the purpose never has been, nor will it ever be, to create colonies or vassal states. Sovereign countries pursue independent policies. The purpose of our military assistance is to create an indigenous military capability which directly improves the security of the United States and the Free World. MAP has done this. As the Chairman of the JCS has repeatedly said, and as I have told you, the dollar spent for military aid buys much more in terms of the Free World military posture than the equivalent dollar spent for U.S. forces.

### MAP Suspensions

1. Question: When is the U.S. going to resume arms shipments to Israel, its only true friend in the Near East?

Answer: The question of arms shipments to the Near East states, including Israel, remains under intensive review by the Executive Branch.

2. Question: Since we have already suspended part of our military aid to Greece, would this not be a good opportunity to cut off all further aid to Greece and Turkey?

Answer: As a result of the Middle East hostilities, Greece and Turkey are of increased military and strategic importance to the United States. In addition to meeting NATO requirements, our aid is provided partly as a quid pro quo for our facilities and overflight rights in both countries. Since neither country is in a position to purchase its military requirements, a cut-off of U.S. aid could lead them to a neutral position and would severely weaken the political and military position of NATO on the southeastern flank.



### Free World Shipping to North Vietnam

Question: I see by Defense Department reports that 28 free world vessels have been to North Vietnamese ports in 1967. While we are losing American boys in South Vietnam, and aircraft and pilots over North Vietnam, how can we let this pipeline remain open? How can you just wring your hands and watch the ships sail by?

Answer: We haven't succeeded in closing the pipeline entirely, but we have reduced it markedly through diplomatic approaches to shipping countries and by U.S. legislation to withhold aid from countries assisting North Vietnam, or having ships engaged in North Vietnam trade (unless they are taking steps to eliminate this trade). For example, 402 free world ships called in 1964, 256 in 1965, 74 in 1966 (30 of these during the first two months). As you stated, only 28 in 1967. Of these 28 ships, 23 were of British registry from Hong Kong, the remainder were Cypriot and Maltese.

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Rationale for U.S. Military Assistance in the Middle East

Question: Secretary Rusk, in his testimony last week, said that the Soviet Union has sent very large quantities of arms into certain Arab countries -- Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and that we have tried, along with other Western countries, to provide limited quantities of arms to some of the other Arab countries and to Israel to achieve some sort of balance against massive intrusions of arms from the Soviet Union. Does not this just mean that we have added to the arms race in the Middle East?

Answer: Over the years, the U.S. has followed a policy of restraint in supplying arms to the Near East. Basically, we have sought to avoid becoming the major arms supplier to either side in the Arab-Israeli disputes, or to any particular Arab country, deferring instead to European nations. U.S. decisions to sell arms to certain countries in the area at various times were aimed mainly at preventing the creation of a dangerous imbalance which would threaten to bring on hostilities. Our sales were a direct consequence of massive Soviet arms deliveries, valued at more than \$2 billion, principally to the UAR, Syria and Iraq since 1955.

From time to time we have made limited quantities of arms available to certain Arab states, as well as to Israel, in order to strengthen friendly governments. U.S. military shipments have been principally to Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Equipment which has been sold to Israel includes HAWK missiles for air defense purposes and Patton tanks. We concluded an agreement in 1966 to sell Israel a number of jet aircraft, but there have been as yet no deliveries under this agreement.

In consequence of the recent hostilities between Israel and the Arab nations, our military supply policy for the Near East is under intensive review. One result of that review is that deliveries of equipment have been suspended for those nations that have broken diplomatic relations with the U.S.

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Resuming Arms Shipment to Jordan and Saudi Arabia

Question: I understand Mr. Rusk is considering resuming military arms shipments to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both of whom have openly expressed their antagonism to the U.S. Are we in the habit of arming our enemies? Even to consider such an unwise and unsound move is incomprehensible.

Answer: First, let me say that it is not correct to refer to either Jordan or Saudi Arabia as our "enemies" who are antagonistic to the United States. Neither country has broken diplomatic relations with the United States, and King Hussein felt friendly enough to be entertained by President Johnson despite Nasser. The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in Saudi Arabia, which represents one of the largest U.S. overseas investments, has not been harmed in any way nor have employees been molested by locals.

Second, no decision has been made to resume shipments to either country, though the whole question is under active consideration. When a decision is reached to alter the overall current policy on Middle East arms shipments, Congress will be properly consulted.

### Middle East MAP Equipment

Question: Is there not a serious risk that U.S. equipment provided to the Arab states will fall into Communist hands or at least be available for exploitation by Communist military advisors in the Arab states?

Answer: U.S. equipment has normally been provided to the moderate Arab nations, particularly Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. These states have no Communist military advisors. Any equipment lost by Jordan during the recent hostilities fell into Israeli, not Communist, hands. Certain limited quantities of U.S. equipment were also provided in prior years to Iraq. None, however, was of a classified nature. Syria has not received any U.S. equipment.

Question: What happened to the F-104 jet fighters, M-48 tanks and other classified equipment that our taxpayers provided to Jordan?

Answer: No F-104 aircraft were in Jordan at the time of hostilities. Although Jordan received F-104 training, no deliveries have been made of F-104s purchased by Jordan. A number of M-48 tanks were provided to Jordan under grant aid and purchase programs. Certain of these tanks were captured by Israel during hostilities. However, they contained no classified equipment.

Question: I heard that Tunisia sent MAP provided equipment to the UAR. What did we do about it?

Answer: Tunisia did not send any equipment (irrespective of source) or personnel to the UAR. There were reports that Tunisia had dispatched a small contingent of troops as far as Benghazi, but they were erroneous reports.



### Middle East Training

Question: Why have we continued to provide training, especially pilot training, to certain Arab states in spite of their obvious decision to side against Israel in the recent conflict?

Answer: U.S. military assistance policy toward those Near Eastern countries which have broken relations with us is under continuing review. But we have absolutely stopped (on June 8) the flow of military material to such countries, and we have decided not to offer them any training in FY 68. We have agreed to permit those already in the U.S. to finish their current courses. As of today, the only students remaining from such countries are 12 Iraqis and 12 Sudanese.

The military plays a key role in many Arab societies. They are the only significant educated groups. By training the future military leaders from Arab countries, we have provided exposure of the younger officers to U.S. military doctrine and to life in the United States. We have also given them an opportunity to associate with our own military personnel - a cross section of U.S. people from every social and economic strata and every creed. We believe that these programs, limited though they have been, have served to provide a useful offset to the Soviet influence in the Arab military establishments. As in the case of Indonesia, the long-term results may well prove beneficial to the U.S. A long-term solution in the Middle East requires Arab-Israeli understanding.

Pilot training has been provided by the U.S. to selected, friendly Arab states and Israel for a number of years. However, press reports of the amount of this training have been exaggerated. Pilot training has been provided primarily on a reimbursable basis. A small amount has been provided on a grant basis. Even here, however, the foreign government pays a portion of the cost. Pilot training has accounted for 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ % of the total training provided.

The provision of training assistance represents the end product of carefully coordinated study and action by appropriate agencies of the Executive Branch, particularly the Department of State. It reflects our judgment as to what will best serve the interests of the U.S., in both the short and long term.

### Middle East Training

Question: Why do we give training to pro-Communist officers, particularly Syrians, and how much of the taxpayers' money has been spent on Syrian officers?

Answer: It would not be correct to say that the Syrian officers are necessarily pro-Communist. What we are witnessing in the Middle East, as well as in many other less developed posts of the world, is an upsurge of virulent nationalism. The USSR has merely seized upon this phenomenon and fanned its anti-Western aspects. The Syrian policies and the Soviet policies are thus only parallel in some facets.

We believe that the exposure to U.S. military doctrine and U.S. life provided under the training program is of value in creating empathy for the U.S., and that it provides an important offset to Soviet influences.

The total value of training provided to Syria has been less than \$50,000 per year - \$78,000 in all since 1957. The courses provided have been primarily in non-operational fields such as medicine, logistics and maintenance. No classified information was involved.



### Middle East Training

Question: Why is the U.S. continuing to maintain a training mission in Saudi Arabia? The Saudis have no apparent desire to benefit from its presence, and Saudi Arabia sided with the other Arab nations even if it did not actually participate in hostilities.

Answer: The U.S. Military Training Mission is in Saudi Arabia in response to a specific request by the Saudi Government. They definitely want the mission to continue. In addition to its advisory role, it serves the important function of maintaining a U.S. military presence in a country whose relations with the U.S. have remained characteristically friendly. Like Jordan, Saudi Arabia exerts a moderating influence on its radical Arab associates.

Question: How much classified information did officers from Arab countries who were enrolled in U.S. military training programs pass on to the Russians?

Answer: None. They were provided no classified information whatsoever in the courses in which they were enrolled.

Question: Did we stop MAP to Sudan when they broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.?

Answer: The Sudan program is limited to training. Twelve students currently undergoing training in the U.S. are being permitted to complete their training. The last student will depart at the end of the summer. Scheduled FY 68 U.S. training has been suspended indefinitely.

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Middle East Bases

Question: How long will it take us to get out of Wheelus?

Answer: No timetable for withdrawal has been established. During discussions in 1964 we agreed to the principle of withdrawal by 1971. We have reaffirmed to the Government of Libya our earlier assent to the principle of withdrawal and our willingness to continue discussions. Ambassador Newsom has been instructed to make himself available to Libyan officials for discussion on Wheelus. Discussions are scheduled to begin 10 August.

Question: What alternatives are available to the US if we lose Wheelus?

Answer: We are looking into possible relocation of the important training (air gunnery) function at other available facilities. No combination of alternate locations, however, is a wholly satisfactory solution. Training effectiveness will suffer to some extent and costs will increase.

Question: What would be the effect of loss of Wheelus?

Answer: We would lose, as indicated, a gunnery range of importance to our European air forces which would be most difficult to duplicate. Our departure could also adversely affect the ability of King Idris to continue to resist Nasserist pressures; and it might weaken the British resolve to meet its treaty commitments to Libya.

Question: Why shouldn't the U.S. establish military bases in Israel and withdraw its facilities in the Arab states?

Answer: Despite the recent hostilities, the U.S. continues to have strategic and economic interests in the Arab states. The establishment of U.S. bases in Israel would result in the termination of all our investments, military facilities and overflight rights. It would serve to polarize the Middle East between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

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Classified Equipment Sales to Jordan

Question: How many F-104 aircraft, M-48 tanks and other classified equipment have been supplied to Jordan between 1960 and the outbreak of the Middle East war? What has happened to them? Has not U.S. classified information been exposed to the USSR?

Answer: The U.S. concluded an agreement in March 1966 to sell 12 F-104 aircraft and related equipment to Jordan, but none of these has been delivered. The configuration of this aircraft, except for the air-to-air SIDEWINDER missile, has not involved classified equipment. The SIDEWINDER missile has not been delivered.

The M-48 tanks sold to Jordan were unclassified models. One hundred of these, the total sale, were delivered prior to the recent hostilities.

The only classified equipment sent to Jordan was 670 rounds of 105mm. H-HEPT (M 327), delivered in December 1965.

Technical training manuals have been provided to Jordan in connection with grant and sales material. These manuals have all been unclassified. These have covered such matter as the operation and maintenance of vehicles, C-47 aircraft, armored personnel carriers, small arms, and recoilless rifles.

Any battle losses of U.S. equipment incurred by Jordan were inflicted by Israel and not the USSR. Classified U.S. equipment has thus not been exposed to the Soviets.

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### Transshipping MAP/Sales Equipment

Question: I understand that, of the F-86's we sold to West Germany, 90 were subsequently approved by us for resale to Iran, but ended up in Pakistan despite our arms embargo on that country. Don't we have any control over these arms once we sell them?

Answer: The F-86's you are speaking of were Saber VI's of Canadian manufacture which Canada sold to Germany. The Canadians asked us if we had any objection to the FRG resale to Iran. We stated we did not, provided assurance was obtained from Iran that the aircraft would not be transshipped. The FRG advised Canada that they considered that they had obtained such assurance from Iran at the time of the sale. We exercise very tight controls over transshipment or resale of Grant and Sales through specific Government-to-Government agreements.

Question: I thought we had strings on MAP equipment to preclude its use in other countries --- then I heard that Morocco used C-119G's to ferry Moroccan volunteers to the UAR. What did we do about it?

Answer: All MAP equipment provided on a grant or sales basis is covered by selective use limitations which preclude transfer to a third country without USG approval and limits use to civic action, internal security, UN and self-defense purposes. The Moroccans were told that any use of MAP equipment to support UAR would violate our agreement. The C-119G's did not reach the UAR; therefore, no violation occurred.

Question: Are we going to permit any more U.S. equipment to be transshipped by Iran or other Middle East nations to Pakistan, as in the Saber VI case?

Answer: The Saber VI case involved Canadian rather than U.S. equipment. However, any proposed third country transfer involving U.S. equipment will receive the most searching policy review at high levels of our government.



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Aden/South Arabia

Question: Is the U.S. going to get involved in the deteriorating situation in Aden and South Arabia?

Answer: We are carefully watching the situation in Aden and South Arabia and consulting with the United Kingdom on this subject. The UK has announced its intention to withdraw from Aden in early 1968 in recognition that no outside Western power can any longer play a useful role in the developing nationalism of that area. The U.S. has no intention whatsoever to supplant the U.K. in that area.

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Latin America

Question: Why is it unrealistic to expect Latin Americans to give up supersonics?

Answer: Brazil has a population of over 80 million; a tradition of fighting two World Wars; participation in UN and OAS peacekeeping operations, including the Dominican Republic; U.S. is asking Brazil to take increasing international responsibilities. In summary, Brazil is a major nation to be congratulated for having given first priority to transport (C-130s) and training aircraft (T-33 and T-37) but can't be expected not to replace some of the pre-Korean inventory with modern aircraft. Argentina and Chile are smaller countries, but also leading nations in Latin America. Jet aircraft, particularly supersonics, are symbols of a modern nation.

There are over 450 jet aircraft in Latin America now. 166 are British Meteor, Vampire, Hawker-Hunter or Canberra types. Another 140 are of the U.S. Trainer variety. At least half of the jets are almost 20 years old. Replacements in 1969-70 coupled with the reduction of the number of jet aircraft in Latin America would be a reasonable solution to the problem.

Question: Will you comment on recent newspaper stories about Peruvian purchase of Mirages and possible U.S. sale of F-5 aircraft to Peru?

Answer: Peru is negotiating with the French for Mirage purchase in spite of fiscal crisis caused by \$200 million current deficit. U.S. is offering the first \$15 million of a \$40 million program loan (economic aid) provided Peru does not purchase supersonics, institutes tax reforms, and keeps 1968 military budget to 1967 level. After Peru fulfills the above conditions, the U.S. is prepared to discuss armed forces modernization in context of Peru's ability to finance. This could include possibility of F-5 delivery in 1970.

Question: I have heard that U.S. "green berets" are fighting guerrillas in Bolivia. Could this not become a second Vietnam?

Answer: No U.S. soldiers are fighting guerrillas in Bolivia, nor are they in the operational area. Insurgent group of 60 - 100 is being contained in a remote area by 9 companies of Bolivian Army. A U.S. Special Forces team is assisting in training a recently activated Ranger Battalion which Bolivians plan to commit in September in the area of insurgency.

Question: Chile has purchased Hawker-Hunter jet aircraft from Britain. Will this not spark an arms race in Latin America?

Answer: In 1966 Chile desired to purchase F-5s to modernize Air Force; U.S. offered F-86. Chile preferred purchase 21 Hawker-Hunters from Britain. Hawkers are subsonic and replace 18 worn-out F-80s. These aircraft are not sparking any competitive arms acquisitions.

Question: Won't the Venezuela purchase of F-86Ks from Germany spark an arms race in Latin America?

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Answer: In 1965 Venezuela sought F-5s to modernize the Air Force. U.S. offered F-86. Venezuela is purchasing at a very low price 74 F-86Ks (1/3 for cannibalization) from Germany to replace 2 squadrons of worn-out Venoms and Vampires.

Question: Why not take more direct action against Cuban subversion efforts than loaning millions to Latin American countries for arms purchases?

Answer: A Special Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers is convening in August, at Venezuelan initiative, to consider additional measures to curb Cuban subversive efforts.

## U.S. Planes to the Congo

Question: Every time there is an eruption in some part of the world, Uncle Sam puts on his uniform and rushes to the place of disorder. All this does is get us involved in some other nations affairs and possibly new Vietnams. How can this impulsive and irrational intervention, such as sending USAF planes to the Congo, be condoned?

Answer: We did not intervene in the Congo. We responded to a request for logistical assistance in the context of our continued support for the Central Government of the Congo. This action by the U.S. is consistent with UN resolutions on the Congo. Our planes were restricted to providing logistical support and performing evacuation and mercy missions. We carefully circumscribed and restricted the use of these planes so as to be certain that we would not become involved in any military actions. The personnel who accompanied the aircraft were only those necessary for their operation and the security of the planes themselves. From the outset we have made it clear that the planes would be there only for a very short time.

Question: I hear that Ethiopia, or some other country in Africa that we've supported with military aid equipment and training, is sending some U.S.-made jet or U.S.-trained pilots to help the Congolese. Is this so? Did we agree to this? Isn't this asking for another Vietnam?

Answer: The Government of Ethiopia has made available to the Congolese Government four F-86 jet aircraft to assist in bringing under control the rebellion of mercenary troops and mutinous Katangan gendarmie units. These aircraft, and the training for the pilots who fly them, were provided Ethiopia under the Military Assistance Program. We welcome this tangible evidence of Ethiopia's willingness to assist other friendly African nations in their efforts to protect their territorial integrity and political independence. Military assistance and, indeed, all types of assistance to the Congo has been a genuinely multi-nation effort for several years. The contribution of Ethiopia is further evidence of this fact. The U.S. effort has always been limited and designed to supplement that being provided by Belgium, the UN and other donors.



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British Withdrawal East of Suez

Question: The British have said they are going to pull out of Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Singapore in the next few years. Are we going to have to fill that gap, too? What are we doing to insure that we are not left to hold the bag by ourselves out there?

Answer: The British have said, in substance, that they will withdraw from the area in the mid-1970s depending on security conditions existing at that time.

They have in the past shown a very great sense of responsibility in these matters. The fact that they have qualified their statement of intentions indicates very clearly that they intend to continue to act responsibly in the future and that no final decision has been made. Moreover, there is no firm date for a British withdrawal, and many things can happen between now and the mid-1970s.

The British have always consulted very closely with us on their plans. I am sure they will continue to do so. In addition, we are in continuous close touch with other governments having responsibilities in the area, including, for example, the Philippines and Australia.

FYI The Healey Statement was made just prior to the annual Labor Conference and traditionally has been softened after the conference.

Senator Dominick's Charge

Question: I notice that we are exporting electronic equipment to Russia and that MIG fighters are being used in North Vietnam against our planes. Are these fighters equipped with our own communications equipment?

Answer: There is no evidence that these fighters carry any U.S. electronic equipment. There is, however, a large international market for various small electronic components such as tubes, resistors, etc., including items of U.S. manufacture, but it is highly unlikely any of these items would be adaptable for fighter aircraft use. It is true that U.S. manufactured airborne communication and navigation equipment has been approved for export to Russia by the Department of Commerce for use in civilian aircraft, but it has been in small volume and of a type that could not be used in fighter aircraft.



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Sale of M-16 Rifles

Question: Are we still letting Colt sell M-16 rifles abroad while we still need them for our troops in Vietnam, and what about the recent report that the Viet Cong obtained M-16 rifles from Singapore?

Answer: By a contract revision with Colt in May 1967, the Department of Defense now has exclusive right through April 1970 to make foreign sales of M-16 rifles. Colt may submit requests for exceptions to make commercial sales to DoD for approval. The DoD contract delivery schedule has been set at 25,000 per month to rise to 27,500 beginning September 1967, rate estimated as maximum reliable output from Colt's capacity. DoD currently plans to continue this rate of delivery through April 1970.

Other than 5,000 to the UK in 1965, the only recent sale and export authorized has been to Singapore. We have been able to obtain no verification of the report concerning the Viet Cong obtaining rifles from Singapore. The Minister of Defense there has assured us that none of this recently authorized shipment will be allowed to get out of their hands and re-exported.