

~~SECRET~~Independent ROK Naval Capability (for multilateral regional roles)

The fourth alternative continues existing force improvement objectives mentioned above. In addition, by the end of FY 74, the ROK fleet would be expanded from 105 units to 144 under this alternative. The primary objective of this program is updating and replacement of obsolete ships and carefully staged expansion of both combatants and support craft so that the ROKN forces could operate in conjunction with Japanese, Republic of China, or other regional forces. As rapidly as funds permit, the FF's, PC's and PCEC's in the existing inventory will be replaced by PCE/MSF conversions. The LSMR will be decommissioned and additional LSM's will be added to enhance versatility and troop lift capacity. An additional AO, AKL, and ARL will be added to meet expanding logistical support requirements. Thirty-two LCPL's will be added to the fleet to provide adequate in-shore patrol capability. The investment cost of this program is \$22.2 million in FY 70-74 MAP funds. ROK budget costs would be about \$25.1 million per year and operating costs (foreign exchange) would range from \$11 to \$14 million.

A summary of the ships involved in these four programs is shown in Table 8-4 below; costs are shown in Table 8-5 on the next page.

TABLE 8-4

ALTERNATIVE ROK NAVAL STRUCTURES

Ship Type	Present Force Alt A FY 74	Present Force + Min. Improve. Alt B FY 74	Present Force + anti-infil. Alt C FY 74	Present Force + CIGFIR Alt C ₁ FY 74	Optimum Force (Multilateral Force, Alt D FY 74
General Cmbt DD/APD	5	5	5	5	5
Patrol Sur- veillance Ships: PG/DR/PF/PC PCE/PCEC	26	26	26	26	26
Boats: LCPL/SB/ PB/LPB/PGF	32	31	45	76	56
Amphib. Ships LSMR/LSM/LST/ LCU	20	20	26	26	21
Minasweepers MSC/MSC(O)/MSB	11	11	11	40	20
Auxiliaries ARL/AKL/AO/ ATA/AOG	12	12	12	14	16
Total	106	105	125	187	144

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TABLE 8-5

ROKN COSTS: MAP AND ROK BUDGET

<u>ROK Costs (Annual) (\$US million)</u> ^{1/}	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Alt. A</u>	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Alt. B</u>	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Alt. C</u>	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Alt. C₁</u>	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Alt. D</u>
Personnel, Maint. & Management					
Pay and Allowances	9.8	9.8	10.7	10.7	9.8
Subsistence	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.3
Clothing & Indiv. Supplies	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.5
Unit. Maint. and Oprs.	6.1	6.1	7.0	7.5	6.1
Procurement of Materiel, Equipment and Maint.	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Const. and R/EN	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7
R and D	--	--	--	--	--
Total ROK Costs	22.9	22.9	25.0	25.8	22.9
<u>Foreign Exchange Costs (MAP, FMS, or DOD) (\$US million)</u>					
Investment	0	10,271,789	19,126,966	62,885,788	4,300,000
Operating					
Ship Ops.	9,503,331	9,485,553	10,142,315	10,777,321	9,176,025
Base Support	2,766,363	2,766,363	3,176,075	3,922,022	2,766,363
MAP Training	120,000	120,000	120,000	120,000	120,000
Total Operating Costs	12,389,694	12,371,916	13,438,390	14,819,343	12,062,388
Total Foreign Exchange Cost	12,389,694	22,643,705	32,565,356	77,705,131	16,362,388

- ^{1/} Constant prices - FY 70 basis. Increase in costs estimated at 3% per annum.
^{2/} FY 70 costs at the present foreign exchange. Item furnished from MAP funds or DOD (CIGFIR) funds. Increase in operating expenses extended at 3% per annum.
^{3/} Includes operating cost of the DD and ARL which is not included in the JSOP.
^{4/} For comparative purposes the cost of the CIGFIR alternative with only anti-infiltration costs is provided as Alternative C₁.
^{5/} 1970 CINCPAC MAP Plan + "I" Cost of Force Improvement.
^{6/} Operating Cost CINCPAC MAP Plan.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE INFILTRATION PROBLEM

Contents: Summary, p. 317; History, p. 321; The Response to the Infiltration Threat, p. 326; The CIGFIR Program, p. 331 ; Arming the Homeland Reserve, p. 339; Retaliation, p. 341.

SECTION 1: SUMMARY

North Korea's infiltration of agents and commando groups into South Korea is a major source of tension on the peninsula today. In coping with this problem the USG has taken responsibility for stopping infiltration on that section of the DMZ guarded by the Second Division, has operated some air patrols (looking for agent boats), and has given the ROKG a certain amount of advice and material aid. But the primary effort, especially in the interior, has been left in the hands of the ROKG itself. This approach has the advantage of encouraging Korean independence and responsibility, and avoiding the image of freedom fighter vs. imperialists and their stooges with which the North Koreans would like to cloak their infiltration efforts. The DMZ has been strengthened to the point where infiltration across it into the interior of the ROK has been substantially reduced (although serious armed encounters between patrols still occur along the DMZ), but much remains to be done if we wish to strengthen the defenses against infiltration from the sea. Catching infiltrators before they penetrate deep into the ROK may be important, not only to prevent their carrying out their missions, but also to clearly label infiltration activities as a North Korean aggression rather than indigenous ROK insurgency.

The question of what level of aid should be given to counter-infiltration activities is a difficult one, especially in view of the fact that many activities which may be labelled "counter-infiltration" are more related to building capability to defend against a conventional North Korean attack.

There are three basic approaches which may be taken in counter-infiltration operations: (1) Catch the infiltrators as they enter the country (i.e., maintain a barrier); (2) Catch the infiltrators in the interior of the country; (3) Dissuade the enemy from infiltrating by taking suitable retaliatory action against him. These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; any combination of the three may be appropriate under certain circumstances. In Korea both the barrier approach and the build-up of interior capabilities have been applied. Apart from some minor reconnaissance missions by ROK forces there

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317

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has not been an attempt to deter infiltration efforts by means of retaliatory strikes.

Further aid to improve the "barrier" approach could be channeled into either the sea barrier, the DMZ barrier or both. Roughly three levels of aid have been proposed: (1) A "total" program which would buy lighting for the whole DMZ fence, APC's and M-16's for selected forces along the DMZ (which, of course, overlaps with proposals for general force improvements), a complete coastal radar system for the East and West coasts, a mobile "Market Time"^{*} operation, improved air patrol against agent boats, harbor patrol with minesweepers, and so on; (2) a "partial" program which would buy just lighting for the DMZ and a slightly reduced coastal radar system; and (3) a "Phase I" program which would furnish enough lighting for the DMZ and enough of the coastal radar systems so that the effectiveness of the two systems could be determined, training carried out, and the concepts refined so that if it appears necessary at some future time to implement the complete systems, this could be done quickly and effectively. It must be stressed, however, that the "Phase I" program in itself would not substantially improve the quality of either the DMZ or the coastal barrier system. The costs of these three levels (which are discussed in more detail in Section 4) are as follows:

Table 1-1

ALTERNATIVE BARRIER PROGRAMS ^{1/}

	<u>DMZ Barrier</u> (000s)	<u>Coastal Barrier</u> (000s)	<u>Total</u> (000s)
"Total Program"	26,076	84,227	110,303
"Partial Program"	8,466	32,219	40,685
"Phase I" Program	738	13,448	14,186

^{1/} The 108.1 million dollar package proposed by DOD for a 1969 MAP supplemental includes an allocation for the Coastal and DMZ Barrier intermediate between the "Phase I" and "partial" programs, and for internal defense roughly equivalent to the total program shown on Table 1-2.

"Market Time" is the name given to an anto-sea infiltration program in South Vietnam; it involves the use of large and small craft in concert, good communication to enable slower craft to "close in" an faster infiltrating craft, and aggressive boarding and search of possibly hostile vessels.

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In addition to the barrier build-ups in the ROKC capability to catch intruders in the interior of the country may require the following forms of assistance (roughly in order of priority): (1) arms for the homeland reserve; (2) improved communications equipment; (3) improved mobility (trucks and helicopters); (4) improved arms for counter-infiltration and Ranger battalions; (5) improved protection of key internal points. The last area overlaps strongly with improvement of conventional defenses, since hardening against guerrilla mortar attacks may also protect against conventional air attacks, and vice versa; from the standpoint of conventional defense, improving protection of key internal points deserves a very high priority, (see Chapter III, Sections 4 and 6). The costs of these programs would be as follows:

TABLE 1-2

INTERIOR COUNTER-INFILTRATION PROGRAMS
(Cost in \$ US 000's)

<u>Programs</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cumulative Cost</u>
Arms, HRF	26,140 <u>1/</u>	26,140
Communications	9,010 <u>2/</u>	35,150
Mobility	7,650 <u>2/</u>	42,800
Arms, Rangers, etc.	3,265 <u>2/</u>	46,065
Protect Key Internal Points	27,969 <u>2/</u>	74,034

1/ See Section 5.

2/ See Section 4.

From Tables 1-1 and 1-2 it is possible to put together a spectrum at counter-infiltration and package ranging in cost from zero to \$184 million. Eleven such programs are present in order of cost in Table 1-3 on the next page; at each cost level an effort has been made to include what appears to be the most cost-effective counter-infiltration program.

The pros and cons of adding retaliation to our responses against North Korean infiltration are discussed in Section 6 below.

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TABLE 1-3
OVERALL COUNTER-INFILTRATION PROGRAM
(Cost in \$ US 000's)

<u>Arms for^{1/}</u> <u>Howland</u> <u>Reserve</u>	<u>Communi-^{2/}</u> <u>cations</u>	<u>Mobility^{3/}</u>	<u>Arms for</u> <u>Rangers,</u> <u>etc.</u>	<u>Protection of</u> <u>Key Internal</u> <u>Points^{4/}</u>	<u>DMZ</u> <u>Barrier^{5/}</u>	<u>Coastal</u> <u>Barrier^{6/}</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Cost</u>
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3,068	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,068
3,068	9,010	-	-	-	-	-	12,078
3,068	9,010	7,650	-	-	-	-	19,728
3,068	9,010	7,650	-	-	-	13,448	33,176
3,068	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	-	13,448	36,441
26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	738	13,448	60,251
26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	8,466	32,219	86,750
26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	8,466	32,219	114,719
26,190	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	26,076	32,219	132,329
26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	26,076	84,227	184,337

/ The US has 400,000 M-1 carbines which would cost \$3,068,000 and enable the ROKG to arm up to 1,071,000 militia. If another 929,000 weapons are furnished, thus arming 2,000,000 militia, a rough estimate of the total cost for all 1,329,000 weapons is \$26.14 million.

/ See Table 4-2 and discussion in Section 4 below.

/ Trucks amount to \$2,477,000 and helicopters \$5,203,000: See Table 4-2.

/ See Section 4.3.

/ See Section 4.1. About 60% of the total \$26.1 million would strengthen ROK conventional defenses. The small program is experimental and includes Phase I limited expenditures for 24 kilometers of the DMZ. The \$8,466,000 is very lighting of the entire DMZ force, but no searchlights -- See Table 4.1.

/ Phase I, partial, and complete programs are shown.

320 ~~SECRET~~

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SECTION 2: HISTORY

In the immediate post World War II period, the small Korean Communist Party emerged from the underground with considerable prestige and was able to exercise an important influence in South Korea based on its anti-Japanese, nationalist credentials. Its activities soon brought it into conflict with the US occupation, however, and its willingness to subordinate Korean interests to those of the Soviet command in North Korea led to a decline in its fortunes. The Party was forced increasingly to operate covertly and by 1947 it was preparing for armed insurrection. These outbreaks of violence in the cities and several guerrilla bases were established in mountainous regions of the country. But the movement did not command widespread popular support, and the newly formed Rhee administration, despite its weakness, was able to contain the communist threat. Communist insurgency reached its peak in 1949; by the outbreak of the Korean War the remaining communist guerrillas (probably not more than 5,000) were isolated and largely inactive.

The net result of the Korean war was to destroy most of the remaining communist apparatus in South Korea and to turn the populace decisively against the Party and the North Korean regime. Thus, in the years after 1953 the North Koreans were left with the task of attempting to rebuild a clandestine apparatus and a populous following in the South under highly adverse conditions.

During the period 1953-1965 North Korea infiltrated agents into the ROK at rates (estimated by ^{50X1} [redacted] of 50 or 60 successful entries per year. In addition, they were able to recruit some agents from within the ROK population. During times of political instability and relaxed security these agents emphasized subversion; during periods of tight security, they emphasized collection of information. Basically, North Korea was following a policy of "peaceful coexistence", hoping that if they could demonstrate superior economic and political stability eventually reunification would occur on terms favorable to Pyongyang.

By 1965, however, it began to appear that this policy would not be successful: the ROK had survived the period of political instability which followed the ouster of Syngman Rhee, and was achieving economic growth rates much greater than those in the North. Kim Il-sung decided to move toward a more adventurist policy. It is possible that Kim was concerned with the growing apathy among his own people and hoped, by stimulating a war psychology, to stir them to greater economic efforts, particularly in the realm of heavy industry. Developments in Vietnam probably also played a role. Kim may have believed that a highly level of defense readiness and a more belligerent posture would not only provide aid and comfort to Hanoi, but might help deter US military action elsewhere in East Asia. With the US becoming more heavily engaged in Vietnam, he may have felt that the risk of US and ROK retaliation to a more aggressive campaign against the South had been reduced.

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Whatever the original motivation, Kim's growing commitment to revolution in South Korea has given the North Korean program of violence a momentum of its own. This is not to say that he could not curtail or even abandon his now heavily publicized campaign if it seemed advisable. Nor is the North Korean regime tied to any firm timetable nor to any particular sequence of moves. The Communists probably believe that the development of an effective movement with a political apparatus and a guerrilla capability will require many years. Their theoreticians emphasize that the basis for revolutionary action in the South is still inadequate and that considerable time and energy will be required to develop one; the phrase most often used is "within our generation." Kim Il-sung, however, has apparently decided not to wait for objective conditions to develop spontaneously, but to utilize violence and intimidation in the belief that this will somehow serve to create a revolutionary potential in the South.

Kim seems to have decided to try a variety of tactics, exploiting whatever breaks may occur. He may hope that one of his infiltration operations will uncover a pocket of exploitable dissension in some rural area. In his view, a few successful and flamboyant sabotage, assassination, or terrorist missions might cause serious civil unrest, severe political bickering, and upset the economic stability upon which the Pak government is building its acceptance. He may also calculate that his new tactics, coupled with the continuing Communist effort to build a covert political apparatus in the South, will generate substantial civil unrest there. In any case, he seeks to exploit the political maneuvering likely to precede the 1971 South Korean elections -- maneuvering that will intensify as Pak's supporters seek to amend the ROK Constitution in order to obtain him a third term as president.

Meanwhile, of course, the tactics of violence may be intended to serve other, less visionary, purposes: to embarrass and distract the ROK Government; to undermine the confidence of the ROK populace in its leaders; to impair the presently favorable climate for economic growth and foreign investment; to encourage Communist agents in the South; and to gain support for propaganda claims of serious political unrest there. Pyongyang also hopes to exacerbate South Korea's relations with the US. In addition, Communist operations in the DMZ area provide useful intelligence on ROK and US defenses, while rear-area activities gain information on ROK capabilities and vulnerabilities in the countryside.

Thus, while Pyongyang's longer range strategy may be heavily influenced by the degree of success achieved in its various operations, in the short term, tactics of violence are likely to go on whether operations are successful or not. Pyongyang seems willing to live with a situation which involves substantial casualties and presents a continuing danger of retaliatory attack. Kim is apparently confident that he can control the situation, stopping short of actions certain to provoke a full-scale ROK reaction. He almost certainly expects the US to act as a restraint on the South Koreans. And he probably relies on his treaties with Moscow and Peking to deter the US.

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Table 2-1 shows how violent incidents and casualties increased from 1964 through 1968; note the quantum jump in incidents between 1966 and 1967, and the sharp increase in North Koreans "killed in action" in 1967 and 1968.

During the first five months of 1969 there were 68 incidents along the DMZ, compared with 157 during the same period of 1968. Throughout South Korea there were 6 US/ROK killed and 18 wounded during the first five months of 1969, compared with 46 killed and 81 wounded in the same period last year.

TABLE 2-1

INCIDENTS IN KOREA

	<u>Incidents</u>			<u>US</u>		<u>ROK</u>			<u>NK</u>	
	<u>DMZ</u>	<u>Rear</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>CAPT</u>
1964	32	UNK	32	0	0	4	0	9	2	1
1965	42	17	59	0	3	40	0	16	13	51
1966	37	13	50	6	1	34	1	34	18	2
1967	452	277	729	16	65	137	0	282	200	33
1968	542	219	761	15	53	184	7	257	321	13

There have been two main methods of infiltration employed: by land (through the DMZ) and by sea (landing on the east or west coast of South Korea). Infiltration by air, perhaps by dropping parachutists from a low-speed, low-altitude airplane, would be possible, given the present limited low-altitude radar coverage in Korea, but there is no evidence that it has been, as yet, attempted.

The Blue House raid took place in January, and was aimed at the assassination of President Pak Chong-Hui. The assassination team consisted of thirty-one men disguised as ROKA officers. They cut through the US Second Division wire barrier, and then repaired the cut, all within thirty meters of a US troop position. Proceeding south, they captured some South Korean wood cutters. Evidently supposing that the peasants of South Korea were hostile to the ROKG, they let the wood cutters go. The wood cutters, however, reported the infiltration to the police. The assassination team, however, was not intercepted until it was in the city of Seoul, only a short distance from the presidential palace. All of the team, with possibly one exception, were killed or captured. In a sense, the raid was a dismal failure; but it came so close to success that it stimulated considerable concern about the strength of the DMZ counter-infiltration measures.

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The Ulchin operation began between October 30 and November 3 when a force of about 120 North Korean commandos landed in several groups near Ulchin, a small town half way down the east coast of South Korea. This large landing was evidently not detected until fifteen of the infiltrators entered a small village, rounded up 46 of the inhabitants and gave them a propaganda lecture and 138,000 (counterfeit) won. One villager attempted to flee; he was beaten to death in front of the other villagers, and they were warned that a similar fate awaited them if they reported that North Koreans had been in their village. As soon as the infiltrators left, the villagers contacted the Korean National Police. By November 5 more than 5,000 security forces (including 2,600 soldiers, 400 police, and 2,100 Homeland Reservists) were in the area. The true scale of the infiltration gradually became apparent, and the security forces to counter it rose to between 30,000 and 50,000. Over the period November - December 1968 of the infiltrators were killed, seven were captured, and it is to be supposed that some others perished in the bitter cold and isolation of the mountains. Sixty-three ROK citizens were killed and sixty were wounded during this operation, many of them civilians, murdered for no apparent reason. The Homeland Reservists demonstrated their mettle in this operation, despite the fact that there were only 17,000 rifles (with ten rounds of ammunition for each) to be divided among more than 30,000 reservists mobilized. Coordination and communications were generally poor. It must be considered disturbing that these infiltrators were able to land and escape detection until they took overt action. This demonstrates that the barriers to sea infiltration are less effective than they could be.

There was only one instance during 1968 in which a North Korea high speed boat was apprehended at sea. This was the result of a clever trap set by ROK
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When the agent boat arrived ROK police, soldiers, aircraft, a destroyer, and a destroyer escort were waiting for it. After a fifty-mile chase the boat was caught. Twelve North Koreans were killed and two were captured; the ROKs suffered just four wounded. This operation was, for the North Koreans, a humiliating disaster and reflects great credit on ROK coordination and efficiency. But on the other hand, the fact that the boat was finally captured only after a fifty-mile chase shows how difficult it is to catch these high speed boats with the naval vessels and level of naval proficiency available to the ROK.

The net effect of North Korean provocations so far has been to strengthen rather than weaken the existing ROK government. The American Embassy in Seoul cables (070500Z Dec 68):

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"...Prevailing mood is one of support for government and acceptance if not enthusiasm for programs undertaken for internal security... There are no dissident groups of any consequence in Korea and as far as embassy has been able to discover there has been no support anywhere for infiltrators. To the contrary, civilians have repeatedly risked their lives and endangered their families to cooperate with security forces. As result of two major N. Korean intrusions during past year nation is more unified politically, better prepared militarily and better equipped psychologically to meet continued N. Korean provocation than it was at end of 1967."

However optimistic we may be about the futility of N. Korean operations in the past, it must be recognized that she has the capability of increasing the scope of these operations. Estimates of the number of trained agents available to North Korea vary, but it appears reasonable to suppose that they may have as many as 5,000 trained agents available as of the end of 1968, and that this force is increasing at a rate of about 1,000 a year.* They have about thirty fast boats suitable for agent operations, and infantry units are capable of generating an arbitrarily large number of fire fights, aggressive encounters, and so on along the DMZ to mask agent activities. In the next section we shall discuss South Korean responses to the infiltration threat of the immediate past, and in the following section we shall discuss responses appropriate for the immediate future.

* This estimate includes the 124th AU, the 695th AU, and Chosen Soren agents. It does not include support personnel such as the 448th AU (Sea Guidance Center); the various foot reconnaissance stations whose personnel cause numerous DMZ incidents but do not attempt to infiltrate into the interior of the ROK; the 4,500 members of the 17th Reconnaissance Brigade (which appears to be similar to the U.S. Special Forces); or the 13,000 members of the "Provincial Guerrilla Units" which seem to be more of a defensive force than an infiltration threat.

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SECTION 3: THE RESPONSE TO THE INFILTRATION THREAT

Due to the long period of time in which the threat of raids on or sabotage within the ROK was minimal, the sudden growth of North Korean sponsored incursions against the South found the ROK very poorly prepared in many respects. The internal security forces were small and ill-equipped to deal with highly trained guerrilla raiders. Most ROK citizens did not carry identification cards, and checks on internal travel were of such a mild nature that an agent could easily evade them. Security facilities at vital points were in disrepair or, in certain cases, had never been truly adequate. For example, consider the situation at Kunsan Air Base in late 1967: 20,000 feet of the 53,000 foot perimeter was protected by only a four-foot high five-strand barbed wire fence; there were no tactical vehicles assigned to security police forces; and the only weapons available for base defense were rifles, pistols, and a few shotguns. Communications were inadequate: certain ROKA coast watchers had to report any sightings they made by runners; many ambush positions along the DMZ lacked either telephone or radio and communications within the interior were lacking. The defenses along the DMZ had been designed to cope with a conventional attack, rather than with infiltration. Night vision devices and illumination systems were in short supply, and much of the DMZ was protected by a primitive woven sapling fence which obstructed the vision of the defenders and was in constant need of repair.

During the past two years very strong internal defense forces have been organized by the ROKG. The ROK Army has organized 20 special Counter-Infiltration Battalions, and the National Police have trained and deployed 37 Combat Police Companies. A national identify card system has been established. A Homeland Reserve Force of over two million men has been established as a militia force. The equipment for the latter group is inadequate in quantity and inferior in quality, but nevertheless they performed with distinction against the Ulchin raiders.

The keystone of effective resistance to the infiltration effort has been the loyalty of the South Korean people and their willingness to run considerable risks to turn in North Korean agents when these are detected. The North Koreans have killed some informers, and they may be expected to attempt to assassinate others. If the belief that it is extremely dangerous to inform on North Korean infiltrators becomes widespread in the ROK, then the ROKG may lose one of its strongest assets in resisting the infiltration effort. It is very hard to apprehend an agent whose mission is to assassinate a given informer once the agent is in the interior of the ROK, since the agent will usually make no overt acts until he executes his victim. Thus, it is important to maintain the image and reality of good barriers (sea, air, and DMZ) if you want to maintain, over a long period of time, the willingness of ordinary citizens to inform on North Korean agents.

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Building better barriers, like building better communications, requires better equipment in addition to better organization. For this reason, the United Nations Command drew up a plan called Counter Infiltration Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan (CIGCOREP) in late 1967. This plan called for the expenditure of about \$37,600,000 to acquire equipment to increase the counterinsurgency capabilities of the forces in Korea, most of this going to the ROK Army.* There were four basic purposes to the CIGCOREP program:

3.1 Improve the DMZ barrier.

The following is a partial list of some of the more significant items requested to strengthen the DMZ barrier against infiltration:

Table 3-1

CIGCOREP DMZ BARRIER PROGRAM 1/
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Starlight Scopes	1,155	4,042
Seismic detectors	970	582
Jeep-mounted Xenon searchlights	165	1,650
Chain-link fence	306 mi.	7,202
Barbed-wire fence	52 mi.	963
Armored Personnel Carriers	95	2,660
Helicopters (UH-1D)	25	6,000
Night Observation Devices	186	1,767
Hardening, fencing, mines for guard posts, observations posts, check points	--	3,700
Vegetation and erosion control	--	<u>1,514</u>
TOTAL		30,080

1/ This table shows the originally proposed program. Actual deliveries were as follows: starlight scopes, 1,575; seismic detectors, 1,080; jeep-mounted Xenon searchlights, 265; helicopters, 12; night observation devices, 189.

*The plan called for about \$5,700,000 additional for maintenance and other purposes, and mentioned MAP CI expenditures of about \$20,800,000 for counter-infiltration (some of these expenditures were programmed for as late as FY 73). Thus the total "CIGCOREP Package" might be said to value \$64.1 million, although the service-funded portion came to only about \$43.3 million. This included expenditures for both US and ROK forces.

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It is clear that the strengthening of the DMZ barrier claimed most of the materiel supplied under the CIGCOREP program. Note that, with the exception of the APCs and helicopters (which were supplied in order to permit reinforcements to be rushed to areas where intruders had been spotted), all of the above equipment is essentially defensive in character.

A comparison of DMZ mortalities in 1967 with those in 1968 would seem to indicate that the CIGCOREP program has been rather successful in that area:

Killed in Action, DMZ Area

	<u>US/ROK</u>	<u>NK</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1967	91	89	1.02
1968	95	163	.58

It would also appear that fewer Communists penetrated the DMZ in 1968 than in 1967. The "Blue House" raid took place before the CIGCOREP improvements had been implemented.

3.2 Improve Communications

Much of the improvement in communications was DMZ-oriented, but much of it was also directed toward the interior of the country, as can be seen in the next table:

TABLE 3-2

CIGCOREP COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Radios (various types)	235	719.4
Communications for 8 counter-infiltration battalions + HQ	--	838.5
Communications for ROK Marines	--	29.1
Telephone and Wire	400	69.6
TOTAL		1,656.6

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3.3 Improve Protection of Key Interior Points.

Next to the improvement of the DMZ barrier, the improvement of security at key interior points was the most expensive part of the CIGCOREP program. A partial list is at Table 3-3.

TABLE 3-3

CIGCOREP POINT DEFENSE PROGRAMS

(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<u>For 10 Hercules Sites, 24 Hawk Sites, 158 isolated communications points:</u>		
Concertina Barbed Wire	672 mi.	783.5
Security Lighting	224 mi.	2,800.0
Dogs and kennels	104 dogs	95.0
<u>For Kimpo, Kunsan, Osan, Taegu Air Bases</u>		
Perimeters (fence, lighting, etc.)		1,043.7
Vehicles (jeeps, APCs)		365.9
Arms (rifles, shotguns, machine guns, etc.)		157.7
Communications (radios, telephones, etc.)		33.8
<u>For Korean Air Force Bases, Radar Stations, Relay Sites</u>		
Revetments	22 concrete + many sandbags	549.9
Perimeters (fence, lighting, etc.)		570.1
Arms (rifles, shotguns, machine guns, etc.)		220.4
Communications (radios, telephones, spares)		<u>170.9</u>
	TOTAL	6,790.0

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3.4 Improve Barrier to Sea Infiltration

There were three major aspects to the CIGCOREP program to beef up the barrier to sea infiltration: build five additional coastal radar stations, buy eight 82' patrol boats, and support the ROK C-46 counter-infiltration air patrol. The costs are as follows:

Table 3-4

CIGCOREP SEA BARRIER PROGRAM
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>
5 Radar Stations (including facilities, equipment, communications, etc.)	575.6
8 82' CG patrol boats	4,000.0
Support for C-46 Patrol (communications, equipment, improved maintenance)	<u>408.0</u>
TOTAL	4,983.6

The total expenditure looks impressive, but the immediate effectiveness of the program is very low. Due to long procurement lead times, the eight coast guard cutters take over two years to deliver. The system of coastal radars has very large gaps, especially on the east coast. The aged C-46's rely only on eye-balls to find enemy boats: on a clear, moon-lit night they can spot a boat proceeding at high speed fairly easily, but if the boat goes slow or stops dead in the water it is very difficult to spot. The ROK MND felt more fast boats and coastal radars were required, but CINCUNC evidently felt that a build-up of DMZ capabilities and protection of vital installations was more urgent. At any rate, the inadequacy of the sea barrier was demonstrated during 1968 by the fact that only one agent boat was apprehended (which was due to good intelligence work rather than an effective barrier) during the whole year, and the Ulchin landing of about 120 commandos was not detected until they began to propagandize villagers.

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SECTION 4: THE CIGFIR PROGRAM

In the previous section we discussed the CIGCOREP program. In January, 1969 the United States Forces, Korea, forwarded a study called Counter-Infiltration/Guerrilla and Force Improvement Requirements which contained a long list of items to improve the capability of the ROK for dealing with the infiltration threat and to begin modernization of ROK conventional forces. Much of the CIGFIR program was simply more of the same sort of thing which had been provided for under the CIGCOREP program. It is accordingly convenient to discuss the counter infiltration/guerrilla portion of the CIGFIR proposals under the functional headings similar to those used for discussing the CIGCOREP program. The relationship between the "force improvement" portion of the CIGFIR proposals and the force modernization programs developed in this study, is discussed in Chapters II - IV (although it is obvious that the line between counter-guerrilla improvements and general force improvement is often very hard to draw).

4.1 Improve the DMZ Barrier.

The following is a partial list of some of the more significant items requested to strengthen the DMZ barrier (including the Han estuary) against infiltration. Cost includes acquisition of one year's O&M costs, where relevant.

TABLE 4-1

CIGFIR DMZ BARRIER PROGRAMS
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
M-16 rifles ^{1/}	17,427	3,466
Armored Personnel Carriers ^{1/}	113	4,011
Lighting (for fence, searchlights, etc.)		9,584
Alarms, flares, barbed wire		1,491
WODs, Starlight Scopes, Binoculars		504
Communications Equipment ^{1/}		665
Grenades, "Bee Hive", Mines, Armored Vests		3,429
Defoliation Equipment, Tree-dozers		1,112
Equipment as above for Han Estuary		<u>1,814</u>
	TOTAL	26,076

^{1/} See Section 6, Chapter II, for a full discussion of these specific items, and the relationship of CIGFIR to the ROK modernization program.

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Although the total expenditure on the DMZ barrier program is almost as great as it was in CIGCOREP, the "profile" is quite different. The chain-link fence has been built, and now it is to be lighted. Only a few additional starlight scopes and night observation devices are required. Higher quality armament (many claymore mines, M-16's, bee-hive artillery rounds) should make the hostile/friendly casualty ratio still higher. The CIGFIR program has the desirable property that about 60 percent of its expenditures along the DMZ would strengthen the ROK against full-scale attack as well as against infiltration.

4.2 Improve Internal Counter-Infiltration Capability.

In the CIGCOREP program about \$1,700,000 was devoted to improving communications to build up the ability of the ROKG to coordinate the apprehension of commando teams who had succeeded in penetrating to the interiors of South Korea. The CIGFIR program would buy even more communications equipment, and other types of equipment as well, so that the next major infiltration may be dealt with more efficiently than the Ulchin landing was.

TABLE 4-2

CIGFIR INTERNAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Communications Equipment <u>1/</u>		9,010
UH-1 Helicopters and related equipment <u>1/</u>	13	5,203
Trucks, related equipment, road-building equipment		2,447
M-16 rifles <u>1/</u>	10,423	2,197
Starlight scopes, trip flares		453
Hand grenades, recoilless rifles		615

1/ See Section 6, Chapter II, for a more complete discussion of these items, and the relationship of CIGFIR to the ROK modernization program.

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The communications equipment would go to equip seven new counterinfiltration and ten Ranger battalions which the ROK is forming, would also provide reliable communications between the capital and remote areas, and would also overcome the communications difficulties which were experienced in mountainous terrain during the Ulchin operation. The UH-1 helicopters would complete the equipment of an airmobile company which would be deployed rapidly to whatever spot in the ROK most needed its services at a given time. The ROK troops used for this counter-infiltration task have, in the past, had to attempt to engage troops armed with AK-47s; the provision of M-16s to some land force battalions used for this task would assure ROK firepower superiority (see Sections 5 and 6, Chapter II).

4.3 Improve Protection at Key Interior Points

Despite the improvements brought about by the CIGCOREP program, airfields and some other key points in Korea are still vulnerable to a determined guerrilla assault. The CIGFIR calls for a fairly massive program to further harden these key points, to provide redundancy in the system (e.g., a mobile radar system so that the fixed radar system will no longer be a vulnerable weak link in the air defense of the ROK), and to provide fire protection and recovery equipment so that any damage done can be quickly repaired. Most of this reduces vulnerability to direct, conventional attack as well as to guerrilla attack.

TABLE 4-3

CIGFIR POINT DEFENSE PROGRAMMING
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Fencing, lighting, small arms, APCs, communications (for security) <u>1/</u>	4,996
Six helicopters and related equipment <u>1/</u>	2,274
Mobile Radar System <u>1/</u>	2,503
Air Base Recovery Equipment <u>2/</u>	3,970
AGE, Communication & Navigation aids (required for dispersed air operations)	4,496
Air Base Hardening <u>2/</u>	3,630
Three Dispersal Airstrips <u>2/</u>	1,934
Revetments & Shelters for Personnel, Communications <u>2/</u>	2,105
Miscellaneous Airfield Improvements (especially water for fire-fighting) <u>2/</u>	2,061

1/ See footnote 1, Table 4-2.

2/ Discussed in detail in Chapter III, Sections 4 and 6.

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4.4 Improve Barriers to Sea Infiltration

The second least expensive part of the CIGCOREP program dealt with sea infiltration; but this area is the most expensive part of the CIGFIR program (see Table 4-4).

TABLE 4-4

CIGFIR SEA BARRIER 1/
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<u>Coastal Radar System</u>		
Radar Sites	21	1,156
Radars	37	529
WPB (95' Cape Class Cutters)	19	14,634
50' FAST Patrol Craft	18	3,960
Communications Equipment, Generators, Misc. El. Equip.		2,292
AOG (light tankers for POL)	2	10,800
LCU (utility landing craft)	6	6,060
Misc. logistics (trucks, docks, etc.)		1,482
Personal equipment, lighting, Security for Sites		<u>2,106</u>
Total Coastal Radar System		43,019
<u>Project Drink</u> (locating agent boats by passive detection of radiation, 6 sites)		668
<u>Mobile "Market Time"</u>		
LCPL	8	462
APD (to carry 4 LCPL each)	4	16,800
LCPL (for new APDs)	16	<u>907</u>
Total		18,169
<u>Improved Air Patrol:</u> P2V aircraft	12	10,100
<u>Harbor Patrol:</u> Minesweepers	29	9,135
<u>Improve General C&C</u>		
Modernize Fleet Communications Sector Command Centers (equipped)	4	2,773 <u>363</u>
Total		3,136
	GRAND TOTAL	84,227

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Note that the cost of a coastal radar system to give continuous coverage to both east and west coasts is high, not because of the cost of the sites and radars themselves, but because of the cost of the boats required to check out suspicious contacts, and because of the cost of logistic support to some of the very isolated sites. The utility landing craft are expensive, but they apparently offer the most cost-effective means for bringing supplies to certain sites on the east and west coasts. The light tankers will increase the "on-station" time for the patrol boats by enabling under-way replenishment and minimizing trips into port.

Project Drink is an attempt to locate enemy boats by detecting their electronic radiations. Even if it doesn't succeed in catching any boats, it makes it more difficult for the enemy to navigate or detect approaching patrol boats by denying him "free" use of his radar and radio while close to the coast of South Korea.

The "mobile market time" concept would give the ROKG the capability of initiating a "market time" operation in any area where it was suspected that the North Koreans were smuggling in agents or arms on innocent-appearing "low performance" boats. The cost of this concept, and the unavailability of the craft to implement it, make it highly unlikely that it will be approved in the near future, however. Indeed, JCS has deleted it from the program.

The C-46 air patrol has been quite unsuccessful so far, due to low in-commission rates for the old aircraft, poor visibility, and the lack of electronic means of detection. The replacement of the C-46 in this role by the P2V would make the air patrol considerably more effective in detecting enemy boats. However, any aircraft is inherently rather ineffective in determining whether a boat, once detected, is an agent boat or not (unless the boat is travelling at unusually high speed). Because of this problem, the high cost of the aircraft (especially when operated as a daily patrol), and the short supply of ROK pilots, it is unlikely that the improved airborne patrol will remain in the JCS proposed program.

The general improvement in Command and Control has been deferred by CINCPAC.

Although the coastal radar system is expected to be quite effective against a certain sort of infiltration, it will not be effective in sorting out an agent boat which mingles with a large number of fishing boats and enters a major harbor. To counter this tactic, it is necessary to have a fairly large number of harbor patrol boats. Minesweepers may be used for this task, and have the added advantage of reducing the vulnerability of the harbors to offensive mining. This task could also be performed by boats which cost an order of magnitude less than minesweepers, but which would do nothing to counter the mine threat.

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4.5 Summary

Let us summarize the total cost of the counter-infiltration portion of the CIGFIR program in comparison with the cost of the CIGCOREP program:

TABLE 4-5

COUNTER-INFILTRATION PROGRAM
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

	<u>CIGCOREP</u>	<u>CIGFIR</u>
DMZ Barrier	30,080	26,076
Interior Security	1,657	19,925
Protecting Vital Points	6,791	27,969
Sea Barrier	4,984	84,227
Miscellaneous & Other	<u>20,639</u>	<u>13,105</u>
TOTAL COST	64,151	171,302

The high cost of the CIGFIR program and the questionable effectiveness of some items in it has lead to the conclusion that it could not be implemented in its entirety. Some are particularly skeptical about the cost of the sea barrier system, and one could argue that the ROXG could kill "more agents per dollar" by building up the internal security system than by trying to catch the agents before they land. However, it is obviously undesirable to permit relatively easy access to the interior of the ROK which North Korean agents have enjoyed in the recent past. If we reduce the CIGFIR program to those aspects which are likely to be remunerative from a strictly counter-infiltration standpoint, we come out with a program such as the following:

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TABLE 4-6

"PARTIAL" CIGFIR 1/
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Lighting DMZ fence	\$8,466
Communications Equipment for Interior	9,010
Coastal Radar System (minus light tankers)	32,219
Helicopter, Trucks, etc. for interior	<u>7,650</u>
TOTAL	\$57,345

1/ If only the Phase I portion of the proposed programs (barrier only) are funded, the cost of the "partial" CIGFIR would come to \$30,846,000.

Many other portions of CIGFIR (such as provision of more M-16s for ROK forces, a mobile radar system for the ROKAF, and covered shelters for aircraft and POL) are undoubtedly justified by their enhancement of ROK conventional capabilities, but are addressed in other sections of this study, where such items are more appropriately considered. From the standpoint of counter-infiltration alone, however, the "partial" program sketched above seems capable of meeting the more obvious vulnerabilities and deficiencies of the present situation.

Because of the high cost of the sea barrier, the long lead-times associated with some of its essential components, and the extensive training which will be required if the Koreans are to operate it effectively, it might be advisable not to buy the whole sea-barrier package at once. "Phase one" of the sea-barrier package would buy a barrier for a portion of the coast, and would enable training and operational experience to be built up so that if it is later deemed necessary to go to the complete package it will be possible to make the complete barrier operationally effective in a shorter period of time than if nothing was done at all. Similarly, a case could be made for not lighting the whole DMZ fence at once, but rather lighting just a portion of it to test the concept under realistic conditions. The decision to light the whole fence would then depend on what this practical experience showed.

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TABLE 4-7

"PHASE I" SYSTEMS
(Cost in \$ US 000s)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<u>Coastal Radar System</u>		
Radar Sites	10	550.5
Radars	15	214.5
WPB (95' Cape Class Cutters)	9	6,932.0
50' EAST Patrol Craft	9	1,980.0
LCU (utility landing craft)	2	2,020.0
Communications, Logistics, etc.NA		<u>1,751.4</u>
	SUBTOTAL	13,448.4
<u>Lighting DMZ Fence</u>		738.2
	TOTAL	14,286.6

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