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SECTION 5: PRELIMINARY PROGRAM EVALUATION

In order to underline some strengths, weaknesses, and risks associated with the two major program alternatives already outlined, and to develop further the relationship between the goals and programs, a preliminary evaluation would be useful. In doing this, the following areas are examined: (1) the basis for the supporting analyses; (2) general problems of implementation; (3) possible North Korea, Chinese, or Soviet responses; and (4) other risks somewhat beyond our control. Variations of the program packages are discussed in Section 6.

5.1 The Supporting Analyses

In looking at requirements to keep South Korea out of hostile hands, a range of land, air, and naval North Korean infiltration and conventional threats were examined. Possible reinforcement of the NK forces by the Chinese or the Soviets was also considered. Then ROK/US force postures were developed that would permit the Koreans to defend north of Seoul. This process is carried through in Chapters II, III and IV for land, air and naval requirements respectively. The threat presented by Kim Il-Sung's "revolutionary struggle" and specialized means to meet it are examined in Chapter V.

By approaching force requirements in this way, our evaluation of NKA capabilities and the likelihood of Chinese or Soviet support of a NKA operation becomes the basis for the posture decisions. Our assessment of these threats derives from official DIA figures on enemy strength. Because intelligence evidence is meager, there has been a tendency in official statements to insure against uncertainty by assuming larger threats. For example, we have normally credited the North Korean Army with a full complement of modern equipment, while the ROKs, despite our extended military assistance grants, can only equip 85% of their force and could need \$1 billion in aid to modernize (see Section 5 and 9, Chapter II). We have projected a substantial North Korean Navy mining capability and have considered a mine counter-measures improvement program for the ROK Navy which could cost up to \$50 million (see Section 4, Chapter IV). We have also planned on the basis that a massive North Korean air attack could be launched with a minimum preparatory or stand-down period and consequently almost no warning, a capability even the US cannot maintain with extensive maintenance facilities (see Section 4, Chapter III).

Intelligence community support in developing further evidence on these issues has been requested. Nevertheless, since the collection and analysis programs involved would take considerable time, at least 12-18 months, we have had to base defense requirements on the best data available now. In many cases, such as land forces, this could mean that requirements are overstated.

5.2 Implementation Problems

There are many problems which could block implementation of a move away from our present policy toward an alternative such as "accelerated self-reliance." Some of these problems are subject to unilateral US action -- for

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example, obtaining adequate financing for an expanded MAP. Preliminary observations on this issue are discussed in Section 7 below. Other problems -- the cooperation of the ROK government and the performance of its economy -- are not so easily transcended, and bear further consideration.

Economic Performance

In both program packages, a rapid economic assistance termination schedule is assumed. Our confidence in this proposal stems from optimistic economic forecasts of Korean economic development in the next decade, during which Korea should reach self-sustaining growth. Under an optimistic set of assumptions, Korea could generate enough savings by 1973 to support a 7% growth rate. Of course, she will need foreign exchange to import the required raw materials and capital goods. As Korea loses the artificial foreign exchange source created by the war in Vietnam (\$100 million annually) and foreign exchange earnings from US troops in Korea (\$100 million annually) her continued ability to expand commercial export will become increasingly important. If exports continue to grow, on the basis of a model developed for this study it can be shown that aid termination and introduction of a military sales program would not reduce the growth rate below 7%. This finding assumes that other aspects of US policy do not change.

With respect to military assistance, where the US now bears the entire foreign exchange cost (currently \$160 million per year) of the support of Korea's armed forces, some of the burden can be shifted gradually to the Koreans. Korea could assume an increasing amount of the military force foreign exchange costs burden with a reinstatement of the MAP transfer program and by commencing purchases of military imports. The latter program could reduce the MAP costs of a modernization program by up to \$240 million. The FY 70-74 total for both programs could range as high as \$355 million.

Cooperation

Another major obstacle to implementation could be political or diplomatic -- a breakdown in ROK-US cooperation. The Koreans may be unwilling to see any major changes in the ROK-US relations until the SVN war is over and their two divisions return. They may be unwilling to focus their modernization programs in ways that serve US interests. For example, where we want to reduce the probability of hostilities, the ROK leaders may seek to concentrate on offensive forces. They may want to maintain a large combat emphasis in their force structures despite lack of support to sustain these units in combat, with the net result being a degradation in combat capability (similar to the situation in the Republic of China's and Turkey's army).

Skillful diplomacy can guide US-ROK relationships past some of these difficulties. If "accelerated self-reliance" were to be pursued, for example, general agreements would have to be reached on the relationship between increased MAP levels and changes in US troop levels and on the specific nature of the force modernization contemplated.

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5.3 Communist Responses

Three somewhat conflicting goals were listed above (Section 3). Attempting to increase the ROK ability to defend itself (goal 4) while seeking to prevent large-scale North-South hostilities (goal 1) and attempting to maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea (goal 2) presents a dilemma. If Korean military capabilities are increased, they may appear so potent that the leadership in North Korea would begin to fear defeat from a ROK surprise attack. These fears might cause the North Koreans to initiate a counter-buildup or to attempt a spoiling attack. The Soviets and Chinese might also respond to an improvement in ROK capabilities by escalating their own involvement and presence in North Korea and by increasing military assistance.

There is a reasonable basis for this judgment. Military analysts in these Communist countries might perform an historical study, a force comparison, and a wargame simulation that would yield results similar to our own. These analyses would suggest that the ROKs alone could defend Korea north of Seoul against an NKA attack with far fewer divisions than they now maintain. A corollary to this assessment would be that ROK land forces, even without modernization, represent a considerable threat to North Korea. Our analyses are summarized below:

TABLE 5-1

ROK VERSUS NORTH KOREA: LAND FORCE COMPARISONS

	<u>Enemy Strength</u>		<u>ROK Defense Requirements</u>	
	<u>(divs)</u>	<u>(Strength) 2/ (000's)</u>	<u>(Divs)</u>	<u>(Strength) 2/ (000's)</u>
Historical Basis	25	281	10	288
Wargame Analysis	25	281	9-12	259(+)
Force Effectiveness Comparisons	25	281	10	288

1/ See Sections 3, 4, and 5, Chapter II, for discussion.

2/ Strength in division forces.

There are several ways of dealing with this dilemma. First, the total ROK force structure can be reduced at the same time as the remainder is modernized: The present eighteen division force level could be reduced to 14 or 16 divisions (see Section 9, Chapter II). This was done in the "accelerated self-reliance" package. Second, we could restrict ROK on-hand ammunition and logistic supplies (discussed in Section 7, Chapter II) and not improve their sustaining support units (see Section 8, Chapter III). Third, we might continue ROK reliance on the US for air defense and tactical air support. Currently, it is generally accepted that the NKA is a far stronger air force, particularly for defense missions. Both these possibilities are discussed in Section 6 below. Finally, we could continue to retain control over the ROK forces through the UN Command arrangements. The credibility of the latter approach becomes more questionable, however, as ROK self-confidence and capabilities develop.

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These moves might also reassure the USSR and CPR. The vital interests of the Chinese, at least in the short-term, may be compatible with the continued existence of an independent non-Communist South Korea so long as the ROK does not attack North Korea or otherwise threaten to take over North Korea. Moreover, the evidence on which any CPR intervention is based would have to be firm, otherwise the CPR action would be challenged by the Soviets who are also competing for influence in North Korea and are the main source of North Korea's modern military equipment.

5.4 Other Risks

Our expectations of a particular program package may be unfulfilled for reasons somewhat beyond our control. The political environment in Asia may become hostile to a continuation of present policies. This tendency might evolve out of growing Asia nationalism and lesser power disaffection with intimate great power involvement (as a legacy of the SVN conflict). It could be reinforced by a complementary US unwillingness to become involved with lesser country defense problems lest they lead to a major confrontation of the great powers. Of more immediate relevance, the political environment in Korea could either facilitate or hinder successful implementation of a policy program package. Three elements are likely to be critical in determining Korea's political environment in the next few years: The performance of the political system; the intensity of the NK confrontation; and the US role in the region as viewed by the Koreans.

The performance of the Korean political system, which will be significantly tested in the 1971 presidential election, could result in an orderly re-election of Park Chung Hee through a electoral process accepted as legitimate by Korean standards; a visibly "irregular" continuation of Park's tenure, with substantial loss of legitimacy and effectiveness; the emergence of a weak new government through an election or a coup; or the rise of a new strong nationalist leader, appealing to xenophobia and latent anti-Americanism.

The character and level of North Korean confrontation could take several forms. First, there might be a continuation of the present level and direction of infiltration and hostile probes. Second, if NK prospects changed, there could be a sharp increase in penetrations, terrorism, and assaults aimed at destroying public confidence in the ROK government and in the US. Third, North Korea may move toward a moderated level of aggression, accompanied by appeals to reunification, designed to split the ROK leaders from their US supporters and from the Korean people.

In ROK eyes the US security role and performance in Asia will be tested by the degree of firmness with which the US responds to future Korean affronts, by the evolving US military (particularly base) posture in the region, and by the manner in which the US disengages from the Vietnam conflict. Two sharply opposed South Korean reactions bear consideration. On the one hand, they might feel satisfaction and reassurance if the US responses to North Korean provocations were strong and if the US base posture in Japan and Okinawa remained essentially unimpaired. If the Vietnam conflict were concluded on satisfactory terms, the Koreans would also feel that their

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close regional association with the US was vindicated. Alternatively, if the US appeared to perform badly in these security tests, the Korean confidence in US support would be undermined and the ROKs could move toward other defense arrangements of their own.

These major factors, as well as others -- the state of the ROK economy, ROK military effectiveness, and Korean attitudes toward their foreign relations -- have been considered in determining the risks associated with the two major program packages. Four cases reflect the more interesting and plausible environments for evaluating risks. Each also poses quite different problems for US policy. They are:

(1) A quite optimistic case, based on a legitimate re-election of President Park, with promise of stability on the domestic scene. This government would be fully capable of coping with North Korean subversion that continues at roughly present levels. These developments would be accompanied by a firm US security performance, reassuring to the Koreans. In this situation, the ROKG would be more self-assured and assertive in its relations with the US and a policy of "accelerated self-reliance" would be most appropriate.

(2) The second case is less favorable. The Park regime would continue in power but with a severe loss of legitimacy and effectiveness. North Korea would exploit ROKG vulnerability by stepped-up aggression, precipitating suppressive counter-measures. A US tendency toward disengagement in SEA or Japan, even in a limited way, would be considered by the ROKG as totally inappropriate, and would make acceptance of US support politically awkward for Park. A critical and apprehensive US view of the deteriorating Korean situation might lead to an undermining of US public support for ROK.

This situation could favor either policy. If accelerated self-reliance had been pursued, the US and ROK would not face the awkwardness of close quarters. Some and possibly all the forward deployed US forces would be in the process of redeployment. If North Korea attacked through miscalculation, the partially modernized and "somewhat" self-reliant ROK forces might well hold the line, thus providing time for US diplomatic moves before a decision were made to commit our combat forces. On the other hand, a continuation of the present policy would have US forces forward deployed at a crucial time, when they might be most needed to deter North Korean provocations.

(3) A third case -- less optimistic than (1) but better than (2) -- would see a weak new regime coming to power by election or coup and ushering in a period of domestic political uncertainty. North Korea would attempt to exploit any weakness by stepped-up aggression. The confidence of the new regime, however, could be bolstered by association with the US which would be successful in its overall security performance in the region. In addition, the US domestic mood could permit continuing strong bilateral ties, lending much-needed prestige and reassurance to the new regime. In differentiating the policies, the considerations mentioned with respect to (1) and (2) would apply here as well. A salient point, however, is that a weak

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regime would have difficulty adjusting to a new policy, and regardless of other considerations, there might be a tendency to set aside major readjustments in Korea. If "accelerated self-reliance" were well underway, however, it might be continued without major repercussions.

(4) The fourth case is based on the emergence of a popularly elected strong nationalist leader, not tied to past policies, who would steer Korea toward a more independent course. North Korea would drift toward xenophobia and refocus its confrontation policy on reunification to lure the ROK from its pro-West orientation. An unsatisfactory US security performance would assist that process. The US would find the ROKG more independent-acting, though not inherently more secure, with enhanced bargaining power derived from a vacillating US policy.

In this case (and another discussed in Chapter VII -- the same except that there a weak ruler emerges), the possibility that Korea might fall into hostile hands becomes a reality. If a strong ruler were elected and the US were forward deployed as at present, readjustments would be in order, no doubt, and the US might have little freedom for diplomatic maneuver. An extension of the US presence might, in fact, be interpreted as hostile by the new ROK leadership, the US appearing to be waiting for a coup.

At this point, it would be useful to underscore the observation made above in Section 5.1, that we have little evidence on which to have predictions of what Korean leaders will do in the future and how we might respond. Too much depends on the perceptions, powers and skill of the personalities involved, both US and Korea. Accordingly, these four situations are speculations, at best, and the apparent tendency of our conclusions toward "accelerated self-reliance" might be favored by the present optimism about Korea.

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SECTION 6: VARIANTS ON THE PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

The two program packages indicated above are largely illustrative. Modifications to the policy and strategy rationale for the "policy continuity" and "accelerated self reliance" programs could lead to other program choices. Moreover, there are so many variations and combinations of programs that no single program package could be justified as a unique optimal combination. In this section variant programs are discussed for: US land force deployments, ROK land force modernization, US tactical air deployments; improvements to the ROKAF air base construction. Some alternative "policy continuity; and "accelerated self reliance" program packages are indicated at the end of the section. The variants are developed in more detail in chapters 2-6.

6.1 US Land Force Deployments

The analysis in Chapter 2 indicates the ROKs could defend alone North of Seoul against a NKA attack with 10-12 divisions. Accordingly, the present ROK 18-division force, which in aggregate is substantially superior numerically and at least equal qualitatively to the North Korean Army, may be more than enough to successfully counter a NK attack. The ROKs would have the further advantage of fighting from prepared defensive positions. Consequently, it is probable that US land forces now in South Korea are not needed to defend South Korea against a NK attack. The withdrawal of the two US divisions now in South Korea may be a political rather than a military question and is closely linked with the presence of two ROK divisions in Vietnam.

In program package two--"accelerated self reliance"--changes in US land force deployments are contingent on ROK modernization. In that option, withdrawal of US land forces would follow modernization of ROK forces. The timetable for withdrawal is also keyed to these improvements. Alternatively, withdrawal could be related primarily to the return of ROK forces from Vietnam: It may not be politically feasible to change US land force strength in Korea while major ROK forces are still in Vietnam. Some ROK modernization would be needed to meet special problems--see sections 5 and 6, Chapter II--but it would be left to the ROK or financed by the US for political reasons.

If US forces were to remain in Korea, as contemplated in program package one, we might want to improve their readiness or reconfigure the force for reserve missions in Asia. A range of alternative US deployments has been examined and is discussed briefly below. Costs are in Table 6-1.

Alternative 1 - Present Deployment of Two Divisions: The variations have been developed to this alternative: (1) Increase overall strength to 90% TOE by adding 8,500 spaces--slightly over half going to support forces. This force would raise total annual costs (\$897 million) to just

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over \$1 billion; (2) Raise manning to 90% TOE emphasizing improved aviation, intelligence, air defense and support capabilities. This would involve an increase of 13,100 spaces and would cost about \$1.1 billion per year.

Alternative 2: Withdraw One Division: Two variations have also been developed within this alternative. In the first, the present 2-division force would be re-structured to one division with an extra infantry brigade and additional support elements attached. Manned at 90% TOE and augmented by KATUSAs, this force would have slightly greater strength than the two existing divisions taken together (54,600 versus 52,700 men). An aviation group would also be included to provide airlift for two infantry battalions. Under this concept, one brigade might be deployed along the DMZ on a rotational basis. The remainder of the division could be positioned south of Seoul where it could serve as a regional reserve force (for other parts of Asia as well as Korea). Total annual costs for this posture would be about \$920 million.

In the second variation, a division force with a corps headquarters and a minimum support force is structured with only US personnel, to permit more rapid deployment as a regional reserve as well as in the Korea security role. Strength of the force ranges from over 30,000 at 100% to 25,000 at 80%. Costs for this option range from \$441 million for the 80% force to \$523 million for the 100% force.

Alternative 3: FRD [redacted] The "Accelerated Self-reliance" alternative (Program Package Two) would FRD [redacted] leaving a FRD [redacted] (including security forces) and FRD [redacted] Annual costs would be \$123 million. A variation, the Reforger concept, FRD [redacted] from CONUS made available for rapid deployment to Korea. Essential equipment for this force could be pre-positioned in the ROK (with maintenance Cadre) at an annual cost of \$8.2 million. (In addition, maintenance of the ready division in CONUS would cost another \$141 million (\$79 million for a brigade) per year.)

Costs and strengths (in FY 73) for each of the alternatives are summarized in Table 6-1 on the next page.

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TABLE 6-1

ALTERNATIVE US KOREA LAND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS 1/
(Millions of \$US at 1968 Prices)

	<u>Strength 2/</u>	<u>FY70</u>	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>FY70-74</u>
<u>Alternative I: (Present 2 Div Deployment) 2/</u>							
Troop List I	52,745	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	4,485.0
Troop List II (a + 13,101)	61,245	897.0	1,036.6	1,036.6	1,036.6	1,036.6	5,043.4
<u>Alternative II: (One Div Force) 2/</u>							
Troop List IV (1 Div + 1 Bde)	54,602	897.0	897.0	897.0	921.8	921.8	4,554.6
Troop List V (1 Div, All US)							
100%	30,986	897.0	897.0	897.0	523.6	523.6	3,738.2
90%	27,985	897.0	897.0	897.0	482.4	482.4	3,655.8
80%	25,043	897.0	897.0	897.0	441.2	441.2	3,573.4
<u>Alternative III: FRD 3/</u>							
FRD					89.8	89.8	
"Reforger"					32.8	32.8	
Prepo Cadre	500				8.2	8.2	
Total	3,808	897.0	897.0	897.0	130.8	130.8	

1/ Troop lists are contained in Annex II, Vol II.

2/ Strength at end of FY 72.

3/ These costs are for the minimum program: Additional expenditures could be required in CONUS--\$141 million per year--increasing total Korea oriented force costs from \$130.6 million to \$271.6 million.

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6.2 ROK Land Force Modernization

Our force analyses indicated that 10-12 ROK divisions were needed to meet an NKA threat and 16-23 ROK divisions could be required against a combined NK/CPR attack. The approach used in the aggregate analyses did NOT include an evaluation of ROK capabilities to support the divisions in sustained combat. A separate study was made of this problem; it was concluded that: (1) some existing support units are missing essential equipment; and (2) in some areas additional support units are needed. These problems could be solved by improvement programs discussed below.

Alternatively, improvement and modernization programs might be focused only on combat forces on the basis of a judgment that the NKA could not engage in sustained combat because they also lack adequate support, and therefore, that any ROK-NKA war would be resolved in the initial 30-60 days. Our more detailed comparative analyses underscored a number of specific improvements that were needed in ROK combat units and suggested combat capabilities that might be augmented--for example, corps artillery--when equivalent US capabilities are no longer available in the theater.

In designing modernization programs for the ROK land forces, the range of forces addressed was narrowed to 14 to 20 divisions. The lower limit was set for political reasons. Since an NKA/CPR sustained conventional attack is quite unlikely, modernization of more than 20 divisions was also believed inappropriate.

ROK Combat Force Modernization: Improvements were considered for maneuver units (M16 rifles, new machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, improved tanks, and anti-tank missiles), in ground and air mobility (armored personnel carriers and helicopters), in additional artillery and air defense, and finally in communications and command and control capabilities. Balanced programs were designed for modernization budget levels ranging from \$157 to \$284 million (see Section 6 of Chapter II).

Improvement in the Support Infrastructure: Two issues were addressed. First, filling equipment shortages in current support units and second, adding additional support units so that 10 or 16 fully engaged divisions can be supported. Balanced program costs range from \$62.7 million for support unit equipment shortages in the present program to \$328.9 million to fill all the shortages in all ROK support units. Adding support units to sustain from 10 to 16 fully engaged divisions would cost \$330.9 million and \$502.1 million respectively for designed programs (see Section 8, Chapter II.)

A number of illustrative modernization program levels are indicated in Table 6-2 on the next page. The programs are designed to meet US goals. Accordingly, in joint discussions with the Koreans concerning modernization

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they should be used as limits or ceilings on the extent of force modernization which the US would support (either by making credit available or by outright grant). No doubt, the Koreans will have their own preference: In the past they have tended to stress size rather than readiness, combat forces rather than essential support, and modern "status weapons" rather than simpler more maintainable models. There has also been an tendency toward offensive capabilities.

TABLE 6-2
ROK LAND FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
(Investment and Operating Cost Totals
for FY 70-74 in foreign exchange only
(MAP or FMS))

Force Level (Divisions)	Cbt Units	Support Unit Equip Shtge	Add'l Spt Unit	Total	Operating Costs (FY 70-74)	Total FY 70 74	Operating Costs FY 75 1/
14	193.3			193.3	374.3	567.3	18.4
14	193.3	193.3		386.4	374.3	760.7	39.0
16	210.9			210.9	374.3	585.2	19.0
16	210.9	219.5		430.4	374.3	804.7	43.7
16	210.9	219.5	349.5	779.9	374.3	1154.2	76.8
18	287.1			287.1	274.3	661.4	23.1
18	287.1	245.6		532.7	374.3	907.0	49.6
18	287.1	245.6	367.5	900.2	374.3	1274.5	99.6
20	354.1			345.1	374.3	728.4	30.4
20	354.1	266.2	502.1	1122.4	374.3	1496.7	109.2
MAP (present)	30.0	62.7			374.3	467.0	84.0

1/ Cost in foreign exchanges for spare parts.

6.3 US Air Deployments

As suggested in the description of both program packages (section 9 above), it may be appropriate to continue maintaining US aircraft in Korea. This could warn North Korea of our commitment in hostilities. Four alternative USAF postures have been developed:

Alternative I (Current Presence): This option was included in "policy continuity"--Table 4-2. The 151 aircraft now based in Korea (5960 personnel costing \$19.6 million per year more in Korea than in CONUS)

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would be maintained through FY 71 and reduced to 36 aircraft in FY 72 (about 1600 personnel at \$5.3 million per year over CONUS). General support forces remain constant at the pre-1968 level of about 4100 (\$13.5 million per year). Total FY 70-74 cost over CONUS for Alternative I is \$122.6 million.

Alternative II (Minimal Presence): This is the "accelerated self-reliance" alternative--Table 4-4. US aircraft are maintained in Korea throughout the FY 70-74 period--the same 36 aircraft force as Alternative I during FY 72-74. However, the current deployment would be reduced to 48 aircraft immediately (rather than continued at 151) at a savings of \$25.4 million. General support personnel are again maintained at the pre-1968 level. Total period cost would be \$97.2 million.

Alternative III (Gradual Phase-out): The US presence would be reduced to 101 aircraft in FY 70, 48 in FY 71, 36 in FY 72, and withdrawn entirely in FY 73. If support forces remain constant, this alternative would cost \$92.9 million: Reduction in support forces by 20% in FY 72, 40% in FY 73, and 20% in FY 74 would save \$21.6 million in general support costs.

Alternative IV (Rapid Phase-out): The present USAF deployment would be reduced to 48 aircraft immediately and phased out altogether in FY 71. 20% of general support personnel would be withdrawn in FY 70, 40% in FY 71, and 20% in FY 72. Overall costs of Alternative IV would be \$31.2 million.

Annual costs and strengths for each deployment schedule are shown in Table 6-3 on the next page and discussed more extensively in Section 7 of Chapter III.

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TABLE 6-3

ALTERNATIVE USAF KOREA DEPLOYMENTS^{1/}
(\$ million US Net Costs over CONUS)^{2/}

	<u>FY70</u>	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>FY70-74</u>
<u>Alternative I (Current Presence)</u> ^{3/}						
Aircraft Deployment	19.6	19.6	5.3	5.3	5.3	55.1
General Support	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	67.5
Subtotal	33.1	33.1	18.8	18.8	18.8	122.6
<u>Alternative II (Minimal Presence)</u> ^{4/}						
Aircraft Deployment	6.9	6.9	5.3	5.3	5.3	29.7
General Support	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	67.5
Subtotal	20.4	20.4	18.8	18.8	18.8	97.2
<u>Alternative III (Gradual Phase-Out)</u>						
Variation A: ^{5/}						
Aircraft Deployment	13.2	6.9	5.3	--	--	25.4
General Support	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	67.5
Subtotal	26.7	20.4	18.8	13.5	13.5	92.9
Variation B: ^{6/}						
Aircraft Deployment	13.2	6.9	5.3	--	--	25.4
General Support	13.5	13.5	10.8	5.4	2.7	45.9
Subtotal	26.7	20.4	16.1	5.4	2.7	71.3
<u>Alternative IV (Rapid Phase-Out)</u> ^{7/}						
Aircraft Deployment	6.9	--	--	--	--	6.9
General Support	10.8	5.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	24.3
Subtotal	17.7	5.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	31.2

^{1/} Not including 174-man USAF MAAG costing \$3.0 million/year. See Chapter II for discussion of MAAG forces.

^{2/} USAF world-wide average of \$3,300 per man-year.

^{3/} 151 aircraft (5960 personnel) through FY71; 36 aircraft (1600 personnel) FY72-74. General support forces constant at pre-1968 level (4100 personnel).

^{4/} Present deployment reduced to 48 aircraft (2100 pers) in FY70; 36 aircraft (1600 pers) FY72-74. General support constant at 4100 personnel.

^{5/} Present deployment reduced to 101 aircraft (4000 pers) in FY70; 48 aircraft (2000 pers) in FY71; 36 aircraft (1600 pers) in FY72; withdrawn in FY73. General support constant at 4100 personnel.

^{6/} Aircraft phase-out follows same schedule as in footnote 5 above. General support personnel reduced 20% in FY72; 40% in FY73; 20% in FY74.

^{7/} Present deployment reduced to 48 aircraft in FY70; withdrawn in FY71. General Support personnel reduced 20% in FY70; 40% in FY71; 20% in FY72.

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6.4 ROKAF Modernization

In order to avoid NKAF arms escalation responses, it may make sense to continue the present ROKAF modernization program (Alternative E) regardless of which overall Korean policy is adopted. ROKAF improvements with the increased capability "Accelerated Self-reliance" program (Alternative B) would greatly reduce the current disparity between NKAF and ROKAF aircraft inventories; lesser forces are represented in Alternatives A (current JSOP) and C (emphasis on insurgency) while parity with the NKAF is implied in Alternative D. A previously programmed F-4D squadron, costing \$51.1 million and scheduled for August 1969 delivery, adds significantly to the aircraft strengths outlined below. The problems encountered in enhancing the ROKAF become clearer as the different alternatives are examined.

Alternative E: Policy Continuity

The present MAP 74 program provides \$145.9 million to the ROKAF during FY 70-74. New aircraft and related equipment (36 F-5s, 8 RF-5s, 27 C-119s) would cost \$71.8 million for acquisition and \$74.1 million for operations; no additional aircraft would be provided for support missions, e.g., training, anti-submarine, rescue, utility. Under this program, the ROKAF would remain considerably inferior to present and projected NKAF. ROK costs are estimated at \$112 million.

Alternative A: Current JSOP

Under this plan, all F-86 aircraft would be phased out: The two F-86D squadrons retained with MAP 74 would be replaced by F-102s, and the 50 remaining tactical F-86Fs with F-5s making a total of seven F-5A squadrons. Also included are one squadron each for Special Operations (25 A-37s), training, anti-submarine warfare, and reconnaissance, as well as 32 C-123s for improved airlift. MAP costs would be \$110.7 million for investment and \$130.3 million for operations; ROK costs \$186 million. Only nominal increase in technical support would be demanded.

Alternative C: Accelerated Self-reliance

This alternative would provide the ROKAF with seven squadrons of F-5s (enlarged from 18 to 24 aircraft), three squadrons of A-37s (25 aircraft each) and one squadron of sixteen AC-119K gunships all for tactical missions. Twenty-four F-102s would be provided for air defense -- the F-5s and F-4s are also effective in this role, perhaps more so in Korea. Airlift capability would be increased by providing forty-eight C-119s rather than C-123s (as with JSOP), since the latter type is in short supply and needed for USAF attrition in Vietnam. Mission diversification is reflected in the 187 aircraft provided for support activities. MAP investment costs would be about \$199.3 million, MAP operating costs \$142.8 million, and ROK costs \$242 million. Technical support requirements would increase moderately with this force.

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Alternative B: Air Superiority Oriented

Here, expanded emphasis is placed on air superiority with a force of 240 high-performance jets provided (compared to 210 with "Accelerated Self-reliance" and 127 with "Policy Continuity"). Sixty-four C-119s would improve airlift, and mission diversification would follow Alternative C. Estimated costs are: \$289.8 million MAP investment, \$153.4 million MAP operations, and \$255 million ROK budget. The ROKAF would have to almost double its previous rate of personnel growth to achieve this force, and technical demands would be high.

Alternative D: Parity

This alternative postulates a force numerically and qualitatively equal to the maximum 1974 NKAF now projected. Included are twelve enlarged squadrons of F-5s and three additional squadrons of F-4Ds for a total of 394 high-performance jets. One squadron of A-37s, one of AC-119s, four of C-119s, and almost 200 support aircraft round out this parity force. Costs would be \$544.0 million MAP investment, \$176.4 million MAP operating, and \$270.2 million ROK budget. Technical demands would be nearly twice the present level (almost 500,000 maintenance man hours per month vs. less than 300,000 for the FY 69 force). Attempting to develop a force of this size and complexity within five years would tax ROKAF growth capacity and could involve some reduction in force readiness during the build-up period, even with extensive use of CONUS training.

The feasibility of incorporating a new aircraft type, the F-5-21, as a follow-on replacement for ROKAF F-5s or F-86s was also considered. A decision to produce the F-5-21 in the US has not been reached at this time and is contingent upon the F-5-21s application in areas other than Korea alone. The F-5-21 seems a promising follow-on candidate for Korea because of its performance, simplicity and compatibility with current ROKAF F-5s. Costs of the ROKAF alternatives, with and without F-5-21 aircraft, are summarized in Table 6-4 on the following page.

The present program also includes \$41.6 million for construction -- basic improvements to present bases and facilities proposed by COMUSKOREA. Additional airbase construction and hardening bear consideration for several reasons: (1) to accommodate an increase in the ROKAF; (2) to reduce reliance on Japanese bases in event of a large USAF deployment to reinforce Korea; and (3) to facilitate a possible continued air presence in Korea.

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TABLE 6-4

FY 70-74 COSTS FOR AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION, OPERATION, AND SUPPORT
(Million of \$US at 1968 Prices)

<u>Policy Continuity</u>	<u>Without F-5-21</u>		<u>With F-5-21</u>	
	<u>Follow-on Option</u>	<u>Follow-on Option</u>	<u>Follow-on Option</u>	<u>Follow-on Option</u>
	<u>MAP</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>ROK</u>
Present Program (Alt E-MAP)	145.9	141.6	194.8	109.3
Improved Force (Alt A-JSOP)	141.0	185.7	232.2	178.9
<u>Accelerated Self-reliance</u>				
Basic Program (Alt C)	342.1	204.3	446.3	203.9
Increased Capability (Alt B)	443.2	213.7	487.1	215.9
Parity Force (Alt D)	720.4	243.8	769.3	241.5

With respect to the construction programs indicated below, the first -- JSOP -- includes three new MOBs (at \$53 million each) and improvements to existing ALOC airfields (\$8.2 million).* The second program includes improvement of two existing bases to MOB standards, and construction of two dispersal bases (for use by USAF augmentation aircraft). ALOC improvements, 150% sheltering for all in-country tactical jets, full reveting for other aircraft, and adequate hardening POL storage to support a large US air augmentation would cost another \$23.7 million. Thus, Alternative B costs about \$5.6 million less than JSOP even though it provides three more fully jet-capable airfields by emphasizing improvements to existing bases and construction of dispersal bases rather than focusing on new MOBs. Alternative C and its subcase are essentially the same except that only one or no MOB would be constructed in each, respectively.

* Main operating bases (MOBs) are complete, manned facilities fully capable of accommodating all types of aircraft. Dispersal bases (DOBs) are "bare" in that they include only essential physical features - runways, aprons, structures, etc. - all necessary support is deployed along with operating units when the base is activated.

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TABLE 6-5

FY 70-74 AIRBASE CONSTRUCTION FOR ALTERNATIVE ROKAF FORCES
(Million \$ US)

	<u>ALT A</u> <u>(JSOP)</u>	<u>ALT</u> <u>B</u>	<u>ALT</u> <u>C</u>	<u>ALT C</u> <u>(Subcase)</u>	<u>ALT</u> <u>D</u>	<u>ALT E</u> <u>(MAP 74)</u>
New Bases <u>1/</u>	159.0	131.6	78.6	25.6	247.6	--
Improvements to Existing Bases <u>2/</u>	49.8	65.1	65.1	65.1	65.1	41.6
Acft and POL Hardening <u>19.1</u> <u>3/</u>	<u>19.1</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>24.7</u>	<u>24.7</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>18.3</u> <u>3/</u>
TOTAL US MIL DEPT COST	227.9	220.4	168.4	115.9	346.6	59.9
MAP Costs	--	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>0.6</u>
TOTAL US COSTS	227.9	222.3	170.1	116.9	351.9	60.5

- 1/ Three MOBs for Alt A; two MOBs and two DOBs for Alt B; one MOB and two DOBs for Alt C (MOB deleted from Alt C subcase); four MOBs and two DOBs for Alt D.
- 2/ COMUSKOREA basic improvements package (\$41.6 million) included with all alternatives.
- 3/ Additional hardening not included in present plan.

6.5 Naval Forces Improvement Program Variations

Little modernization for the Navy was included in either program above (Tables 4-2 and 4-4). Since NK naval threats are remote, aside from infiltration, this proposal seemed reasonable. Nevertheless, the ROKG may not share this view and may seek more concentrated in the following areas: (1) high speed coastal patrol craft for counter-infiltration operations; (2) replacement of some obsolete minesweepers; (3) perhaps some additional small combatants and support craft to enable ROKN forces to contribute to a multilateral naval force. The proposed CIGFIR naval program goes considerably beyond this (see Sections 1, 7, and 8, Chapter IV and Sections 1 and 9, Chapter V). Costs and ships strengths for several other programs to increase ROKN capabilities are summarized in the next table. The ROKN counter-infiltration programs are discussed in more detail below.

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TABLE 6-6

NAVAL PROGRAM VARIATIONS

	FY 70-74			Gen Cbt	Patrol Craft	Amphi Ships	Mine- swee- pers	Auxi- liary craft	Total
	US AND ROK COSTS								
	(\$US Millions-1968 prices)								
	ROK Budget	NAP Inv. Oper.							
<u>Policy Continuity</u> (Present Program -- Alt A)	121.6		66.0	5	58	20	11	12	105
<u>Accelerated Self- reliance</u> (Improved Force -- Alt B)	121.6		20.9	5	57	20	11	12	105
<u>Improved Anti- Infiltration</u> (Alt C)	133.0	19.1	71.0	5	71	26	11	12	125
CIGFIR (Subcase)	137.0	62.9	79.8	5	102	26	40	14	187
<u>Independent/ Multilateral</u> (Alt D)	121.6	32.3	65.1	5	82	21	20	16	144

6.6 Infiltration Programs

The issue of what level of aid should be given to counter-infiltration is complicated by the fact that the US Government could become intimately involved in internal Korean politics by assisting ROKG counter-infiltration activities. This has not occurred yet. Up to now, we have: (1) taken responsibility for stopping infiltration along that section of the DMZ guarded by the Second Division; (2) operated six patrols (looking for agent boats); and (3) furnished advice and material aid. The primary effort, especially in the interior, has been planned and directed by the ROKG. This approach encourages Korean independence and responsibility, and avoids somewhat the image of freedom fighter vs. imperialists with which the North Koreans would like to cloak their infiltration efforts.

In considering alternative counter-infiltration programs, we examined three basic approaches: (1) intercept the infiltrators before they enter Korea (i.e., maintain a barrier); (2) capture them in the interior; (3) dissuade them by taking suitable retaliatory actions. The barrier approach and the build-up of interior capabilities have been used so far. Apart from some minor reconnaissance missions by ROK forces, there has not been an attempt to deter infiltration efforts by means of retaliatory strikes.

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Three levels of aid have been examined to improve the "barrier": (1) a "total" program which would buy lighting for the whole DMZ fence, APCs and M-16s for selected forces along the DMZ (which overlaps proposals for general force improvements), a complete coastal radar system for the East and West coasts, a mobile patrol operation, improved air patrol against agent boats, harbor patrol with minesweepers, etc., costing \$110 million; (2) a "partial" program which would buy lighting for just the DMZ and a slightly reduced coastal radar system, costing \$40.7 million; and (3) a "Phase I" program costing \$14.2 million which would furnish enough lighting for the DMZ and enough of the coastal radar systems, so that the effectiveness of these systems could be determined before they are further underwritten. The latter program in itself would not substantially improve the quality of either the DMZ or the coastal barrier system.

In addition to the barrier, build-ups in the ROKG capability in the interior could require the following assistance (roughly in order of priority): (1) arms for the homeland reserve; (2) improved communications equipment; (3) improved mobility (trucks and helicopters); (4) improved arms for counter-infiltration and Ranger battalions; (5) improved protection of key internal points. The last area overlaps strongly the improvement of conventional defenses, since hardening against guerrilla mortar attacks would also protect against conventional attacks, and vice versa.

By combining these program components a number of counter-infiltration packages ranging in cost from zero to \$184 million were developed. At each cost level an effort has been made to include what appears to be the most cost-effective program (see Table 6-7).

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