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TABLE 6-7

OVERALL COUNTER-INFILTRATION PROGRAM  
(Cost in \$ US ~~Millions~~)  
*Thousands*

	Arms for Homeland Reserve <sup>1/</sup>	Communi- cations <sup>2/</sup>	Mobility <sup>3/</sup>	Arms for Rangers, etc.	Protection of Key Internal Points <sup>3/</sup>	DMZ <sup>6/</sup> Barrier	Coastal <sup>5/</sup> Barrier	Total Cost
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2	3,068	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,068
3	3,068	9,010	-	-	-	-	-	12,078
4	3,068	9,010	7,650	-	-	-	-	19,728
5	3,068	9,010	7,650	-	-	-	13,448	33,176
6	3,068	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	-	13,448	36,441
7	26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	-	13,448	60,251
8	26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	-	8,466	32,219	86,750
9	26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	8,466	32,219	114,719
10	26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	16,076	32,219	131,329
11	26,140	9,010	7,650	3,265	27,969	26,076	84,227	184,337.

- 1/ The US has 400,000 M-1 carbines which would cost \$3,068,000 and enable the ROKG to arm up to 1,071,000 militia. If another 929,000 weapons are furnished, thus arming 2,000,000 militia, rough estimate of the total cost for all 1,329,000 weapons is \$26.14 million.
- 2/ See Table 4-2 and discussion in Section 4 of Chapter V.
- 3/ Trucks amount to \$2,477,000 and helicopters \$5,203,000.
- 4/ About 60% of the total \$26.1 million would strengthen ROK conventional defenses. The small program is experimental and includes Phase I limited expenditures for 24 kilometers of the DMZ. The \$8,466,000 is for lighting of the entire DMZ force, but no searchlights.
- 5/ Phase I, partial, and complete programs are shown.

6.7 FRD  
FRD

FRD [Redacted] North Korea has attempted a number of raids into the South for other purposes; FRD  
FRD

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Energy Act 1954.

In this context, four possible postures bear consideration:  
(1) The current "policy continuity" posture. FRD

FRD  
FRD

[Redacted]

FRD

[Redacted]

FRD strength, and costs for the forward deployment  
postures are shown in Table 6-8 below:

TABLE 6-8

OVERALL ANNUAL COSTS OF THREE TYPICAL POSTURES<sup>1/</sup>  
(Millions of US \$)

	<u>I</u> <u>Present</u> <u>Deployment</u>		<u>II</u> <u>Battlefield</u> <u>Nuclear Force</u>		<u>III</u> <u>Symbolic</u> <u>Nuclear Force</u>	
	<u>STR/No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>STR/No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>STR/No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>
FRD	FRD	(7.6)	FRD	(3.5)	FRD	(3.8)
Security for Storage Sites (Present con- ditions--strength & number of sites)		57.0		34.7		8.4
Delivery Systems Engineers, Target Acquisition, Infantry Support		66.6		33.9		7.5
		<u>65.6</u>		<u>55.9</u>		<u>35.9</u>
GRAND TOTAL		193.0(196.8)		126.2(128.0) 136.9 3/		52.1(55.6)

1/ See Section 10 of Chapter II for a detailed treatment of costs, strengths  
and capabilities.

2/ Consolidating storage FRD would eliminate this category.

3/ With Nike Hercules.

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### 6.8 Program Package Variations

As mentioned above, the two program packages already outlined (Tables 4-2 and 4-4) are illustrative (or boundary cases). On the basis of the considerations mentioned in Sections 5 and 6, it is possible to develop a number of alternative program packages. For example, if we were to continue the present policy there are certain improvements or changes that could be made to the Korea oriented program in order: (1) to improve the readiness of the forces; (2) to prepare for a "Self-reliance" posture after the Vietnam war subsides; and (or) (3) to permit US forces in Korea to be reduced in number or re-configured for a regional role.

We have developed two variations on program plan I (Table 4-2). The first, which is displayed in Table 4-2A (page 40), includes: (1) additional MAP funds for helicopters and for maneuver unit modernization (as described in Section 6, Chapter II for eighteen divisions); (2) funds for the counter-infiltration coastal barrier and Homeland Reserve Force; (3) an increase in US land forces of 8,500; (4) a minimal USAF air posture as was included in the "Accelerated Self-reliance" Package (Alt II); and (5) the JSOP airbase construction program (Alt A, Section 5 of Chapter III). The second variant, displayed in Table 4-2B (page 41) includes: (1) mobility, artillery, and maneuver unit combat modernization for eighteen ROK divisions (Section 6 of Chapter II); (2) some increase over the present program for ROKAF modernization (Alt A); (3) funds for the counter-infiltration coastal barrier and for arming the Homeland Reserve Force; (4) a decrease in US land forces to one division at 80% TQE; (5) a small USAF presence (Alt II); and (6) construction of several dispersal bases and other airbase improvement (Alt C<sub>1</sub>).

Several variations on the "Accelerated Self-reliance" program have been developed as well. The first, displayed in Table 4-4A (page 42) would: (1) modernize only 14 ROK divisions -- the greater NKA/CFR threat is considered unrealistic; (2) provide funds for a lesser improvement to the ROKAF (Alt A-JSOP) in view of arms-race reservations in Section 5 above; (3) furnish funds to not only arm the Homeland Reserve Force, but also for Phase I of the counter-infiltration program; (4) retain one US division in Korea for use as a regional reserve and catalyst for similar local forces; (5) phase out USAF temporary deployments to Korea (Alt III) because the US Land presence suffices to convey our commitment; and (6) construct a new camp for the remaining US division, South of Seoul, improve two existing airbases to MOBs standard, and construct three dispersal bases (Alt C<sub>1</sub>).

The second "Accelerated Self-reliance" variation, displayed in Table 4-4B (page 43), is an economic comparative advantage case: The US furnishes the complicated technical capabilities and the ROK the more labor intensive resources. Accordingly, the program includes: (1) combat modernization for eighteen ROK divisions but not including air defense (see Section 6 of Chapter II); (2) the present MAP ROKAF program (Alt E); (3) the same counter-infiltration program as in 4-4A; (4) the present USAF deployments (Alt I); and (5) considerable airbase construction in order to accommodate USAF augmentation (as well as to permit operations without immediate use of Japanese bases).

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The third variation on "Accelerated Self-reliance" would include only those programs which appear feasible on grounds of "political reality" or "expediency" (see table 4-4C on page 44): (1) ROK land force modernization would be limited to helicopters, artillery, and maneuver unit equipment; (2) ROKAF improvement would be increased only somewhat -- Alt A (or the same program as in Table 4-4A); (3) the ROKG would be given funds for a "partial" barrier system and for arming the HRF (see Chapter V and Section 6.6 above); (4) US land forces would be reduced to one division at 90% TOE; (5) USAF temporary deployments would be phased out (Alt IV); and (6) the variant construction program indicated in Table 4-4A would be followed.

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TABLE 4-2A

**US KOREA PROGRAM PACKAGE ONE "A" POLICY CONTINUITY - INCREASED READINESS <sup>1/</sup>**  
 (Major Program Costs in \$ US Millions at 1968 Prices)

	Personnel (FY 73)	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	One-Time Costs	FY70-74 Total	Major Budget Category	
									AIO/HAP	DDO
<b>Defense Support</b>										
<b>ROK Support <sup>2/</sup></b>										
Land		107.6	159.5	155.6	93.4	87.9		604.0	604.0	
Air		28.8	26.4	29.8	26.2	34.6		145.8	145.8	
Naval		10.7	13.1	14.2	12.2	14.0		64.2	64.2	
Logistic Supplies							787.0	787.0		787.0
Counterinsurgency							110.1	110.1	110.1	
Other MAP/CIG Prog.		19.2	26.1	23.0	16.5	12.2		97.0	97.0	
Subtotal		166.3	225.1	222.6	148.3	148.7	897.1	1,806.1	1,021.1	787.0
<b>US Forces</b>										
Land <sup>3/</sup>	61,245	875.6	1,015.2	1,015.2	1,015.2	1,015.2		4,936.4		4,936.4
Air <sup>4/</sup>	5,700	20.4	20.4	18.8	18.8	18.8		97.2		97.2
Naval <sup>4/</sup>	215	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		18.0		18.0
MAAC	1,275	21.4	21.4	21.4	21.4	21.4		107.0		107.0
Logistic Supplies										
Construction							227.9	227.9		227.9
Subtotal		921.0	1,060.6	1,059.0	1,059.0	1,059.0	227.9	3,386.5		3,386.5
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE SUPPORT</b>	<b>68,435</b>	<b>1,087.3</b>	<b>1,285.7</b>	<b>1,281.6</b>	<b>1,207.3</b>	<b>1,207.3</b>	<b>1,125.0</b>	<b>7,194.6</b>	<b>1,021.1</b>	<b>6,173.5</b>
<b>Economic/Political Support</b>										
<b>Budget/ROP Support</b>										
Supporting Assistance		15.0	-	-	-	-		15.0	15.0	
Development Loans		30.0	25.0	20.0	-	-		75.0	75.0	
PL 480, Title I & II		65.5	38.0	33.0	-	-		136.5	136.5	
Other (TC, etc.)		4.8	3.7	2.7	1.5	1.0		13.7	13.7	
Subtotal	90	115.3	66.7	55.7	1.5	1.0		240.2	240.2	
<b>Political Development</b>										
USIA	20	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2		5.3	5.3	
Peace Corps	320	.8	.9	.9	.9	.9		4.4	4.4	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )				
Subtotal	340	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1		9.7	9.7	
<b>TOTAL E/P SUPPORT</b>		<b>117.0</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.1</b>		<b>249.9</b>	<b>249.9</b>	
<b>US Operations Support</b>										
Department of State		2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1		14.2	14.2	
CIA		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
<b>TOTAL US OPS Support</b>		<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.1</b>		<b>14.2</b>	<b>14.2</b>	
<b>TOTAL US PROGRAMS</b>		<b>1,206.8</b>	<b>1,357.0</b>	<b>1,342.2</b>	<b>1,213.8</b>	<b>1,213.9</b>	<b>1,125.0</b>	<b>7,458.7</b>	<b>1,285.2</b>	<b>6,173.5</b>

<sup>1/</sup> Cost estimates are treated in much greater detail in Chapters II - VI below. Many variations are possible -- see Section 6, this chapter.  
<sup>2/</sup> These MAP estimates assume no increase in ROK military purchases. As a minimum, the MAP transfer program set aside when ROK troops deployed to SVN could be reinstated.  
<sup>3/</sup> Includes direct and indirect costs associated with US troops. Phase-out begins in FY 72 and is concluded in FY 73. All cost reductions have been set forward into FY 73. Units could be maintained as reserves for \$ million p.a. more.  
<sup>4/</sup> Includes only direct costs, above those needed to maintain the same forces in CONUS.

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TABLE 4-2B

US KOREA PROGRAM PACKAGE ONE "A" POLICY CONTINUITY - REDUCED US PRESENCE <sup>1/</sup>  
(Major Program Costs in \$ US Millions at 1968 Prices)

	Personnel (FY 73)	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	One-Time Costs	FY70-74 Total	Major Budget Category	
									AID/MAP	DDO
<b>Defense Support</b>										
<u>ROK Support</u> <sup>2/</sup>										
Land		107.6	139.3	133.8	93.4	87.9		602.2	602.2	
Air		30.7	40.9	63.6	53.2	33.9		242.3	242.3	
Naval		10.7	13.1	14.2	12.2	14.0		64.2	64.2	
Logistic Supplies							277.0	277.0		277.0
Counterinsurgency							66.8	66.8		66.8
Other MAP/CIO Prog.		19.2	26.1	22.6	16.5	12.2		96.6	96.6	
Subtotal		168.2	239.6	254.2	175.3	168.0	343.8	1,389.1	1,072.1	377.0
<u>US Forces</u>										
Land	25,043	875.6	875.6	875.6	419.8	419.8		3,466.4		3,466.4
Air	5,700	20.4	20.4	18.8	18.8	18.8		97.2		97.2
Naval	225	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		18.0		18.0
MAAG	1,375	21.4	21.4	21.4	21.4	21.4		107.0		107.0
Logistic Supplies							(-295.0) <sup>4/</sup>	(-295.0)		(-295.0)
Construction		921.0	921.0	919.4	463.6	463.6	116.3	116.3		116.3
Subtotal		921.0	921.0	919.4	463.6	463.6	(-178.1)	3,510.5		3,510.5
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE SUPPORT</b>	<b>32,233</b>	<b>1,089.2</b>	<b>1,160.6</b>	<b>1,173.6</b>	<b>638.9</b>	<b>631.6</b>	<b>165.7</b>	<b>6,899.6</b>	<b>1,072.1</b>	<b>3,787.5</b>
<b>Economic/Political Support</b>										
<u>Budget/DOE Support</u>										
Supporting Assistance		15.0	-	-	-	-		15.0	15.0	
Detachment Leases		30.0	25.0	20.0	-	-		75.0	75.0	
FL 480, Title I & II		65.5	38.0	33.0	-	-		136.5	136.5	
Other (TC, etc.)		4.8	3.2	2.2	1.5	1.0		13.7	13.7	
Subtotal	30	115.3	66.2	55.2	1.5	1.0		240.2	240.2	
<u>Political Development</u>										
USIA	30	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2		3.3	3.3	
Peace Corps	320	.8	.9	.9	.9	.9		4.4	4.4	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )				
Subtotal	340	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1		9.7	9.7	
<b>TOTAL E/P SUPPORT</b>		<b>117.0</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.1</b>		<b>249.9</b>	<b>249.9</b>	
<b>US Operations Support</b>										
Department of State		2.5	2.7	1.9	3.0	3.1		14.2	14.2	
CIA		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
<b>TOTAL US OPS Support</b>		<b>2.3</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.1</b>		<b>14.2</b>	<b>14.2</b>	
<b>TOTAL US PROGRAMS</b>		<b>1,208.2</b>	<b>1,231.9</b>	<b>1,234.2</b>	<b>645.4</b>	<b>637.8</b>	<b>165.7</b>	<b>5,123.7</b>	<b>1,336.2</b>	<b>3,787.5</b>

<sup>1/</sup> Cost estimates are treated in much greater detail in Chapters II - VI below. Many variations are possible -- see Section 6, this chapter.

<sup>2/</sup> These MAP estimates assume no increase in ROK military purchases. At a minimum, the MAP transfer program set aside when ROK troops deployed to SVN could be reinstated.

<sup>3/</sup> Includes direct and indirect costs associated with US troops. Phase-out begins in FY 72 and is concluded in FY 73: All cost reductions have been set forward into FY 73. Units could be maintained as reserves for \$ million p.a. more.

<sup>4/</sup> Includes only direct costs, above those needed to maintain the same forces in COMUS.

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TABLE 4-4A

**US KOREA PROGRAM PACKAGE TWO "A" ACCELERATED SELF RELIANCE - US REGIONAL FORCE IN KOREA 1/**  
(Major Program Costs in \$ US Millions at 1968 Prices)

	Personnel (FY 73)	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	One-Time Costs	FY70-74 Total	Major Budget Category	
									AID/MAP	DDP
<b>Defense Support</b>										
<b>ROK Support 2/</b>										
Land		127.9	220.4	203.3	158.5	143.6		853.7	853.7	
Air		30.7	40.9	63.6	38.2	53.9		242.3	242.3	
Naval		10.7	13.1	14.2	12.2	14.0		64.2	64.2	
Logistic Supplies							205.0	205.0		205.0
Counterinsurgency							50.3	50.3		50.3
Other MAZ/CIG Prog.		18.8	14.2	11.4	9.7	11.4		65.5	65.5	
Subtotal		188.1	288.6	292.3	233.6	222.9	235.3	1,481.0	1,481.0	205.0
<b>UN Forces</b>										
Land 3/	30,985	875.6	875.6	873.6	343.0	345.0		3,716.8		3,716.8
Air 4/	5,700	26.7	20.4	16.1	5.4	2.7		71.3		71.3
Naval 4/	213	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		18.0		18.0
MAAG	2,000	21.4	21.4	21.4	32.8	32.8		129.8		129.8
Logistic Supplies							(-441.0) 5/	(-441.0)		(-441.0)
Construction							198.1	198.1		198.1
Subtotal		927.3	921.0	916.7	386.8	384.1	(-242.9)	3,693.0		3,693.0
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE SUPPORT</b>	38,901	1,115.4	1,209.6	1,209.2	620.4	607.0	12.4	5,174.0	1,276.0	3,898.0
<b>Economic/Political Support</b>										
<b>Budget/ROP Support</b>										
Supporting Assistance		15.0	-	-	-	-		15.0		15.0
Development Loans		30.8	25.0	20.0	-	-		75.0		75.0
PL 480, Title I & II		63.3	38.0	33.0	-	-		136.5		136.5
Other (TC, etc.)		4.8	3.7	2.7	1.5	1.0		13.7		13.7
Subtotal	30	113.3	66.7	55.7	1.5	1.0		240.2		240.2
<b>Political Development</b>										
USIA	20	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2		5.3		5.3
Peace Corps	320	.8	.9	.9	.9	.9		4.4		4.4
Other		(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)		(.1)		(.1)
Subtotal	340	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1		9.7		9.7
<b>TOTAL E/P SUPPORT</b>		117.0	68.6	57.7	3.5	3.1		249.9		249.9
<b>US Operations Support</b>										
Department of State		2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1		14.2		14.2
CIA		(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)		(.1)		(.1)
Other		(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)	(.1)		(.1)		(.1)
<b>TOTAL US OPS Support</b>		2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1		14.2		14.2
<b>TOTAL US PROGRAMS</b>		1,234.9	1,280.9	1,269.8	626.9	613.2	12.4	5,438.1	1,540.1	3,898.0

1/ Cost estimates are treated in much greater detail in Chapters II - VI below. Many variations are possible -- see Section 6, this chapter.  
 2/ These MAP estimates assume no increase in ROK military purchases. As a minimum, the MAP transfer program set aside when ROK troops deployed to SVN could be reinstated.  
 3/ Includes direct and indirect costs associated with US troops. Phase-out begins in FY 72 and is concluded in FY 73: All cost reductions have been set forward into FY 73. Units could be maintained as Reserves for \$ million p.a. more.  
 4/ Includes only direct costs, above those needed to maintain the same forces in CONUS.  
 5/ Already funded.

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TABLE 4-4B

**US KOREA PROGRAM PACKAGE TWO "B" ACCELERATED SELF RELIANCE - US-RISK COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM <sup>1/</sup>**  
(Major Program Costs in \$ US Millions at 1968 Prices)

	Personnel (FY 73)	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	One-Time Costs	FY70-74 Total	Major Budget Category	
									AID/WP2	DDP
<b>Defense Support</b>										
<b>ROK Support <sup>2/</sup></b>										
Land		126.7	233.1	315.5	306.4	286.0		1,267.7	1,267.7	
Air		28.8	26.4	29.8	26.2	26.6		145.8	145.8	
Naval		10.7	13.1	14.2	12.2	14.0		64.2	64.2	
Logistic Supplies							787.0	787.0		787.0
Counterinsurgency							66.8	66.8		66.8
Other MAP/CIG Prog.		16.5	21.5	28.7	30.7	25.7		123.1	123.1	
Subtotal		184.7	294.1	388.2	375.5	360.3	853.8	2,456.6	1,669.6	787.0
<b>US Forces</b>										
Land <sup>3/</sup>	5,300	875.6	875.6	875.6	89.8	89.8		2,806.4		2,806.4
Air <sup>4/</sup>	5,700	33.1	33.1	18.8	18.8	18.8		122.6		122.6
Naval <sup>5/</sup>	215	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		18.0		18.0
MAAC	2,000	21.4	21.4	21.4	32.8	32.8		129.8		129.8
Logistic Supplies							(-589.0) <sup>2/</sup>	(-589.0)		(-589.0)
Construction							169.9	169.9		169.9
Subtotal		933.7	933.7	919.4	145.0	145.0	(-419.1)	2,637.7		2,637.7
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE SUPPORT</b>	13,215	<u>1,118.4</u>	<u>1,227.8</u>	<u>1,307.6</u>	<u>520.5</u>	<u>505.3</u>	<u>434.7</u>	<u>5,116.3</u>	<u>1,669.6</u>	<u>3,444.7</u>
<b>Economic/Political Support</b>										
<b>Budget/WOP Support</b>										
Supporting Assistance		15.0	-	-	-	-		15.0		15.0
Development Loans		30.0	25.0	20.0	-	-		75.0		75.0
PL 480, Title I & II		65.3	38.0	33.0	-	-		136.3		136.3
Other (TC, etc.)		4.8	3.7	2.7	1.5	1.0		13.7		13.7
Subtotal	30	115.3	66.7	55.7	1.5	1.0		240.2		240.2
<b>Political Development</b>										
USIA	10	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2		5.3		5.3
Peace Corps	320	.8	.9	.9	.9	.9		4.4		4.4
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )				
Subtotal	340	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1		9.7		9.7
<b>TOTAL E/P SUPPORT</b>		<u>117.0</u>	<u>68.6</u>	<u>57.7</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.1</u>		<u>249.9</u>		<u>249.9</u>
<b>US Operations Support</b>										
Department of State		2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1		16.2		14.2
CIA		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )		( )
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )		( )
<b>TOTAL US OPS Support</b>		<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.1</u>		<u>16.2</u>		<u>14.2</u>
<b>TOTAL US PROGRAMS</b>		<u>1,236.2</u>	<u>1,299.2</u>	<u>1,368.2</u>	<u>527.0</u>	<u>511.5</u>	<u>434.7</u>	<u>5,378.4</u>	<u>1,933.7</u>	<u>3,444.7</u>

<sup>1/</sup> Cost estimates are treated in much greater detail in Chapters II - VI below. Many variations are possible -- see Section 6, this chapter.

<sup>2/</sup> These MAP estimates assume no increase in ROK military purchases. As a minimum, the MAP transfer program set aside when ROK troops deployed to SVN could be reinstated.

<sup>3/</sup> Includes direct and indirect costs associated with US troops. Phase-out begins in FY 72 and is concluded in FY 73: All cost reductions have been set forward into FY 73. Units could be maintained as reserves for \$ million p.a. more.

<sup>4/</sup> Includes only direct costs, above those needed to maintain the same forces in COMUS.

<sup>5/</sup> Already funded.



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TABLE 4-4C  
US KOREA PROGRAM PACKAGE TWO "C" ACCELERATED SELF RELIANCE - POLITICAL VARIATION <sup>1/</sup>  
(Major Program Costs in \$ US Millions at 1968 Prices)

	Personnel (FY 73)	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	One-Time Costs	FY70-74 Total	Major Budget Category	
									AID/MAP	ROD
<b>Defense Support</b>										
<b>ROK Support <sup>2/</sup></b>										
Land		107.6	138.0	144.1	93.4	87.9		571.0	571.0	
Air		30.7	40.9	63.6	53.2	53.9		242.3	242.3	
Naval		10.7	13.1	14.2	12.2	14.0		64.2	64.2	
Logistic Supplies							787.0	787.0		787.0
Counterinsurgency							66.8	66.8	66.8	
Other MAP/CIG Prog.		16.8	6.1	3.2	3.2	5.8		32.8	32.8	
Subtotal		165.8	198.1	225.8	162.0	161.6	853.8	1,747.1	980.1	787.0
<b>US Forces</b>										
Land <sup>3/</sup>	30,986	875.6	875.6	875.6	502.2	502.2		3,631.2		3,631.2
Air <sup>4/</sup>	800	17.7	5.4	2.7	2.7	2.7		31.2		31.2
Naval <sup>5/</sup>	213	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6		18.0		18.0
MAAG	2,000	21.4	21.4	21.4	32.8	32.8		139.8		139.8
Logistic Supplies							(-295.0) <sup>3/</sup>	(-295.0)		(-295.0)
Construction								198.1		198.1
Subtotal		918.3	906.0	903.3	541.3	541.3	(-96.9)	3,713.3		3,713.3
<b>TOTAL DEFENSE SUPPORT</b>	34,001	<u>1,084.1</u>	<u>1,104.1</u>	<u>1,129.1</u>	<u>703.3</u>	<u>702.9</u>	<u>756.9</u>	<u>5,456.4</u>	<u>980.1</u>	<u>4,500.3</u>
<b>Economic/Political Support</b>										
<b>Budget/ECF Support</b>										
Supporting Assistance		15.0	-	-	-	-		15.0	15.0	
Development Loans		30.0	25.0	20.0	-	-		75.0	75.0	
FY 480, Title I & II		63.5	38.0	31.0	-	-		136.5	136.5	
Other (TC, etc.)		4.8	3.7	2.7	1.3	1.0		13.7	13.7	
Subtotal	50	113.3	66.7	53.7	1.3	1.0		240.2	240.2	
<b>Political Development</b>										
USIA	20	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2		5.3	5.3	
Peace Corps	320	.8	.9	.9	.9	.9		4.4	4.4	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )				
Subtotal	340	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1		9.7	9.7	
<b>TOTAL E/P SUPPORT</b>		<u>117.0</u>	<u>69.6</u>	<u>57.7</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.1</u>		<u>249.9</u>	<u>249.9</u>	
<b>US Operations Support</b>										
Department of State		2.5	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1		14.2	14.2	
GIA		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
Other		( )	( )	( )	( )	( )		( )	( )	
<b>TOTAL US OPS Support</b>		<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.1</u>		<u>14.2</u>	<u>14.2</u>	
<b>TOTAL US PROGRAMS</b>		<u>1,203.6</u>	<u>1,175.4</u>	<u>1,189.7</u>	<u>709.6</u>	<u>709.1</u>	<u>756.9</u>	<u>5,744.3</u>	<u>1,244.2</u>	<u>4,500.3</u>

<sup>1/</sup> Cost estimates are treated in much greater detail in Chapters II - VI below. Many variations are possible -- see Section 6, this chapter.  
<sup>2/</sup> These MAP estimates assume no increase in ROK military purchases. As a minimum, the MAP transfer program set aside when ROK troops deployed to SVN could be reinstated.  
<sup>3/</sup> Includes direct and indirect costs associated with US troops. Phase-out begins in FY 72 and is concluded in FY 73; All cost reductions have been set forward into FY 73. Units could be maintained as reserves for \$ million p.a. more.  
<sup>4/</sup> Includes only direct costs, above those needed to maintain the same forces in CONUS.  
<sup>5/</sup> Already funded.

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SECTION 7: OBSERVATIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION

A major constraint on the choice of Korea policy packages is the predicted availability of funding. Doubts about the adequacy of future funding can inhibit planning and policy choices even before a program is designed. Perennial denial or shortage of funds at the time of appropriation reinforces this bias. Accordingly, one may feel that the U.S. should not attempt to expand certain categories of resource transfer to the ROK, since we might thereby construct a carefully balanced schedule of such inputs, including items from different programs, sponsored by different agencies and screened by different congressional committees, and with different degrees of "constituency", only to find that it is irregularly or deficiently funded. The result might be troops lacking in effectiveness in future years when they might be put to the test.

Thus, there is an inevitable tendency to opt for safer, "minimal" policy packages or strategies -- those that tend to center on the status quo, avoiding the need to develop support or pressure for any obvious change within one of the traditional accepted program categories -- or without even apprehending the possibility of "trading-off" an input such as U.S. troops stationed in Korea against another input such as MAP-funded modernization of the ROK Army. This caution itself might create distortions in the program mix and lead to the selection of a much higher cost strategy, which is not nearly as effective, or which is below the threshold of security, or which does not optimally serve U.S. interests.

At this point it may be useful to range over possible funding sources. In order to assess the likelihood that funding, either in dollars or in equipment, will be available for alternative elements of the program, we will (1) state the whole 5-year costs of a few "benchmark" policy packages, (2) match presently programmed resources against these package costs, (3) derive the "shortfall" in each case, and (4) try to identify possible sources of the necessary additional funding, whether ordinary or extraordinary, dollars or equipment (original or surplus), MAP budget or Service-funded, grant or concessionary Foreign Military Sales. These considerations are reflected in Table 7-1 on the next page.

The table states program costs excluding, for the moment, the item of direct U.S. troop deployments. This serves to highlight the fact that any program to strengthen ROK forces -- either a rounding out of present programs to constitute "Policy Continuity" or a move to "Accelerated Self Reliance" -- will entail additional funding, since no feasible trade-offs are available within the set of items that excludes U.S. troops. The full cost of U.S. troops is then stated among possible additional sources of funding for the alternative program packages.

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TABLE 7-1

**FY 70-74 COSTS FOR ALTERNATIVE US MILITARY PROGRAMS**  
(In US \$ millions or 1968 dollars)

PROGRAM PACKAGE	Operations <sup>1/</sup>	MAE	RFM Modernization Growth	RFM Growth	Construction	Infil/ Counter Insurgency	Logistic Support	All Other Activities <sup>2/</sup>	Total	Change From Program I
<b>I Policy Continuity</b>										
MAP	512.6		161.7	62.7		56.9		83.0	816.9	
DDO	290.6	107.0			40.5		787.0 <sup>3/</sup>	--	1,095.1	
AID/Other	23.9							336.0	359.2	
Subtotal:	627.1	107.0	161.7	62.7	40.5	56.9	787.0	419.0	2,377.9	
<b>I-A Increased Readiness</b>										
MAP	512.6		236.7	62.7		110.1		97.0	1,021.1	+304.2
DDO	135.2	107.0			227.9		787.0 <sup>3/</sup>	--	1,237.1	+112.0
AID/Other	23.9							259.2	356.1	-65.8
Subtotal:	671.7	207.0	236.7	62.7	227.9	110.1	787.0	356.2	2,522.3	+230.6
Change from Program I	(-25.4)	--	+137.0	--	+187.4	+53.2	--	(-61.8)		
<b>I-B Reduced US Presence</b>										
MAP	512.6		333.4	62.7		66.8		96.6	1,072.1	+235.2
DDO	135.2	107.0			116.9		(-18.0)	--	221.1	(-774.0)
AID/Other	23.9							259.2	264.1	(-25.8)
Subtotal:	671.7	107.0	333.4	62.7	116.9	66.8	(-18.0)	356.8	1,657.3	(-616.6)
Change from Program I	(-25.4)	--	+231.7	--	+66.4	-9.9	(-80.0)	(-61.2)		
<b>II Accelerated Self-Reliance</b>										
MAP	512.6		331.0	366.4		46.0		179.4	1,465.4	+668.5
DDO	135.2	129.8			136.9		779.0	--	640.9	(-434.2)
AID/Other	23.9							259.2	284.1	(-23.8)
Subtotal:	671.7	129.8	331.0	366.4	136.9	46.0	779.0	369.6	2,370.4	+68.5
Change from Program I	(-25.4)	+22.8	+439.3	+193.7	+66.4	(-10.9)	(-588.0)	(-69.4)		
<b>II-A US Regional Force in Korea</b>										
MAP	512.6		391.5	236.1		50.3		63.5	1,276.0	+459.1
DDO	89.3	129.8			198.1		(-236.0)	--	181.2	(-913.0)
AID/Other	23.9							289.2	264.1	(-92.8)
Subtotal:	625.8	129.8	391.5	236.1	198.1	50.3	(-236.0)	292.7	1,712.3	(-356.6)
Change from Program I	(-51.3)	+22.8	+299.8	+103.4	+157.6	(-4.6)	(-1,023.0)	(-113.3)		
<b>II-B SE-RFK Cooperative Advantages</b>										
MAP	512.6		289.3	673.8		46.8		175.1	1,699.6	+952.7
DDO	140.6	129.8			140.9		198.0	--	636.3	(-436.8)
AID/Other	23.9							259.2	264.1	(-23.8)
Subtotal:	677.1	129.8	289.3	673.8	140.9	46.8	198.0	365.3	2,572.0	+800.1
Change from Program I	--	+22.8	+207.6	+613.1	+140.9	+9.9	(-589.0)	(-51.7)		
<b>II-C Political Variation</b>										
MAP	512.6		302.1	62.7		66.8		35.8	980.1	+163.3
DDO	44.2	129.8			198.1		492.0	--	859.1	(-235.0)
AID/Other	23.9							260.2	264.1	(-23.8)
Subtotal:	580.7	129.8	302.1	62.7	198.1	66.8	492.0	276.0	2,119.3	(-136.0)
Change from Program I	(-91.6)	+22.8	+200.5	--	+177.6	+9.9	(-293.0)	(-103.0)		

1/ US Land Forces not included. MAP costs support ROK operations; DDO costs USAP and USF deployments. AID/Other includes USA, State, etc.  
 2/ MAP costs include TCMR; AID/Other costs are for political and economic assistance.  
 3/ Includes \$277.8 million already funded.

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Excluding the savings that might occur through removing part or all of the U.S. troops in Korea from the force structure during the period FY70-74, the main cases of policy packages I ("Policy Continuity") and II ("Accelerated Self Reliance") show a need, over five years, for \$57 million and \$683 million respectively, over the currently projected program inputs.

Possible sources for the additional resources needed include:

Supplemental MAP budget appropriation. Supplementals of \$100 million in FY68 and the possibility, now under discussion, of \$100 million for FY70 are evidence that substantial amounts can be obtained through this means. However, these appropriations have been, in all cases, timed and psychologically related to crises provoked by the North Koreans, and would be difficult to introduce otherwise.

Equipment of ROK units now in Vietnam. Land force equipment items also in the proposed modernization packages, consisting of \$16.9 million of combat and \$102.4 million of support, have been given by the U.S. to two and one-third ROK divisions now fighting in Vietnam. We could make the decision to let the ROKs return to Korea with this equipment.

Equipment of U.S. divisions now in Korea, if withdrawn. If the decision is made, under one of the policy option packages, to reduce or withdraw entirely U.S. combat troops, and further, to drop them from the active force structure, then varying amounts of division equipment might be made available to the ROK Army. The dollar amounts would range from roughly \$77.1 million if one U.S. division were removed (Policy Package One B, and Two A and C) to \$151.9 million if two divisions were removed (Policy Package Two and Two B). The split between combat and support equipment would be about 40%:60%.

Additional Service funding. This could be either through regular or supplemental defense budgets. Certain classes of items, such as airbase perimeter defense, airbase construction, strengthening of the DMZ defenses, can plausibly be placed in U.S. defense budget categories. At times, even explicit ROK armed forces modernization items have been included in proposals for U.S. defense appropriations; an example is the CIGFIR proposal, which included \$15 to \$40 million for ROK force improvement (see discussion in Chapter 5).

Additional ROK budget expenditures. The burden of additional defense costs could be shifted to the ROK budget, through substitution of concessionary Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases, or even direct purchases of arms. An examination of the ROK economy tends to show that Korea could absorb as much as \$240 million over the next five years in additional defense expenditures. (MAP transfer, on the other hand, has already been assumed to be in effect in our calculations embodied in Table 7-1.)

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Funds now allocated to maintain U.S. troops in Korea: Present expenditures to maintain U.S. troops in Korea and in the active force structure, including their support and manpower "overhead", constitutes the largest potential "source" of funds for other programs aimed at promoting Korea's security. Funds that might be made available by removing and/or inactivating one or both of the two U.S. divisions now in Korea are illustrated in the table on the next page.

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TABLE 7-2

FUND SAVINGS FROM U.S. LAND FORCES

(Savings in \$ million)  
(FY 73 & 74 only)

<u>Withdrawal Option</u> (No. of Divisions Withdrawn)	<u>Policy</u> <u>Package</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Savings if</u> <u>only removed</u> <u>from Theater</u>	<u>Savings if</u> <u>Inactivated</u>
1	I-B II-C	143.0	911.6
1 and the remaining division strengthened and in regional reserve posture	II-A	109.2	661.2
2 but leaving certain support forces	II II-B	369.8	1,591.6

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CHAPTER TWO

ROK AND US LAND FORCES FOR DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA

Contents: Introduction and Summary, p. 50; ROK and US Roles, p. 68; ROKA-NKA Historical Analysis, p. 71; ROKA-NKA Wargame Analysis, p. 77; ROKA-NKA Force Comparison Analysis, p. 84; Land Force Modernization, p. 96; Logistic Requirements, p. 116; Land Force Support Requirements, p. 126; ROKA Force Structure Alternatives, p.140; FRD [redacted] p.150; Alternative US Deployments, p.167.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1 General

The ROK faces a spectrum of threats. They range from low-scale North Korean infiltration with the design of establishing a base for insurgency to the possibility of large-scale North Korean/Chinese Communist attack. To deter, and, if necessary meet these threats, the ROK has maintained land forces of 19 1/3 divisions with the support of substantial US military assistance as well as a more visual evidence of our assistance through the stationing of US forces in Korea.

1.2 Roles

The ROK can meet certain threats more effectively and has done so -- for example, North Korean infiltration. The ROK can also perform effectively in meeting a North Korean attack and perhaps could block for 30-60 days a combined NK/ChiCom attack provided US assistance is furnished.

The current positioning of US forces and operational procedures provide for almost no differentiation in US and Korean roles. As a result, the US would automatically be involved in open hostilities and is constantly involved in the infiltration problem along the US portion of the DMZ.

In analyzing ROK/US defense requirements, we have differentiated US and ROK defense roles as follows: (1) The ROKs would conduct an effective defense north of Seoul for all the North Korean land threats for a period long enough so the US can initiate diplomatic actions before intervening in force; (2) the US would furnish logistic support, and combat units, if necessary, for a sustained conventional defense against a combined North Korean and Chinese attack; (3) against an all-out attack the US would maintain FRD [redacted] FRD [redacted] in Korea; (4) both the ROK and the US might maintain forces in Korea which are able to reinforce other Asian countries (see Section 2).

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1.3 ROKA-NKA Force Comparisons

Taking these roles as a point of departure, we estimated the structure of the ROK land forces and its support structure plus the logistics required to enable the ROK to meet effectively the NK and NK/ChiCom threats in the various roles assigned. We also examined the case of ROK defense against a smaller combined NK/ChiCom, to determine if the ROK could hold a combined attack for a limited period (30-60 days). The focus of the analysis, however, was the determination of the required force levels for the lowest risk (NK alone) and the most demanding case (sustained NK/ChiCom). We assumed that the insurgency threat could be handled by the ROK alone with certain modernization improvements (see Chapter Five, The Infiltration and Insurgency Problem).

In order to determine specific force structures required to meet the North Korean and sustained NK/ChiCom conventional threat, three comparisons were made:

(1) An historical perspective in which the ROKA was compared with the NKA using Korean War experience factors. This analysis generally concluded that a ROK force of 10 divisions would be required to meet a NKA attack, while for a NK/ChiCom attack, 24 divisions would be required (see Section 3).

(2) A wargame analysis using the Army Wargame SPECTRUM, with certain modifications, played ROK forces against a NK attack and against a sustained NK/ChiCom attack. This assessment reached the conclusion that ROK active forces should include at least 12 ROK active divisions for use against North Korea and 22 divisions would be required against NK forces reinforced by the Chinese (see Section 4).

(3) In the force effectiveness comparison, 10 ROK divisions were required to offset current NKA capabilities, while at least 23 divisions could be needed to defend adequately against an all-out NKA/Chinese invasion (see Section 5). Force requirements are summarized below in Table 1-1.

TABLE 1-1

ROK DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS<sup>1/</sup>  
(ROK - NKA/ChiCom Force Comparisons)  
(000's)

<u>Historical Basis</u>	<u>Enemy Strength</u>		<u>ROK Defense Requirements<sup>2/</sup></u>	
	(Divs)	(Strength)	(Divs)	(Strength)
NKA Attack	25	281	10	288
NKA/ChiCom Attack	59	931	16-24	692
<u>Wargame Analysis</u>				
NKA Attack	25	281	9-12	259+
NKA/ChiCom Attack <sup>3/</sup>	59	931	22-29 1/3	635+
<u>Force Effectiveness<sup>3/</sup></u>				
NKA Attack	20	281	10 <sup>3/</sup>	288
NKA/ChiCom Attack	45	661	23	652

1/ See Sections 3, 4 and 5 for discussion.

2/ Based on NKA Div strength of 9,200 with equipment based on current intelligence plus assumption of full TOE; ROK div strength of 13,200 with current equipment levels. ROK strength includes a 50% increase of combat forces to meet reserve requirements.

3/ Provided current artillery strength maintained, additional 4.2" mortars are provided, tank strength remains constant and the force is adequately supported.



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### ROK Force Requirements

Using the three force comparisons as the basis and giving careful consideration to the evidence available, we arrived at the following force levels which we thought necessary to meet the three threat scenarios.

a. Defense Against the NK Threat. Our analysis indicated a spread of 9-12 fully ready ROK divisions would be required to enable the ROK to meet the NK threat alone. Even though the three force comparisons indicated so few divisions would be required, 14 modernized divisions were considered a minimal number in view of the political factors and the uncertainty of USSR or Chinese restraints on NK belligerency. Reductions below 16 divisions may not be acceptable to the ROK because they may wish enough forces to defend against a larger threat, as a safety factor for the situation where an initial NK attack may, in fact, be an unconfirmed combined NK/ChiCom attack, a 16 division force appropriately improved was considered to be adequate to enable the ROK to initially meet this contingency. The 16 division force level could also give the ROK the increased capability to play an important regional role.

b. Defense Against an Initial Combined NKA/CPR Attack. In this case, the force requirement ranges from 16-18 divisions. As indicated above, a 16 division force should permit the ROK to initially defend against a combined attack, at least until Chinese involvement is confirmed or US regional or rapid deployment forces could be employed to assist the ROK if required. The 16 division force is considered minimal to enable the ROK to hold alone initially. The 18 divisions level may be politically more attractive, both to ROK and US commanders, because of the uncertainty of the threat. An 18 division force should enable the ROK to hold for up to 60 days and to play a regional role as well.

c. Defense Against a Sustained NK/CPR Attack. On the basis of our analysis, ROK force levels should be increased to 20 divisions to sustain a NK/CPR attack. While 16-18 ROK divisions\*, equipped and fought at US standards, could probably hold a NK/CPR invasion, the higher level of 20 divisions would reduce the risk of ROK defeat without US force deployment (except probably a nuclear force). These 20 divisions would need some combat modernization and the additional support capabilities.

These force level requirements are discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 9. They serve as the basis upon which the major force improvements which follow were developed. Before proceeding to a discussion of force levels, it would be useful to review briefly the major areas where ROK forces could be improved.

#### 1.4 ROK Land Force Improvement Issues

There are various problems impairing the effectiveness of ROK land forces, preventing them from operating as effectively as their US compatriots. Most of these problems can be solved. The major issues are:

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\* 17 US/ROK divisions were able to successfully engage almost a million NK/Chinese forces during the Korean War.

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- Modernization of ROK ground combat forces
- Improvement of ROK war reserve supply levels
- Improvement of the ROK support infrastructure

ROK Ground Combat Force Modernization

The present MAP plan includes little modernization for the ROK combat forces. The limited availability of MAP funds acted as a constraint on MAAG planners, and accordingly, improvements in the land combat forces had to take their place in the long list of uses for these funds. The counter-infiltration program (CIGFIR) furnishes a sizable supplement to the MAP modernization, amounting to at least \$15.0 million in needed new items. The alternative selective modernization programs, designed on the basis of the ROK land force planning objectives -- defense against a NK attack, initial defense against the NKA/CPR attack until US reinforcements arrive, or for a sustained defense against a NKA/CPR attack -- include additional costs as indicated in Table 1-2. The modernization programs include improvements: in maneuver units (M16 rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, improved tanks, and anti-tank missiles), in artillery, in mobility (ground and air), in air defense and in communications and command and control capabilities. Program details are discussed in Section 6. It should be emphasized that these modernization packages are for combat units only.

TABLE 1-2

COMBAT FORCE MODERNIZATION ALTERNATE PROGRAMS  
(investment costs \$US millions)

	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 74</u> <u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Current Program</u>						
MAP (current)	5.0	7.0	7.8	4.9	5.3	30.0
CIGFIR <sup>1/</sup>	15.0	--	--	--	--	15.0
Total	20.0	7.0	7.8	4.9	5.3	45.0
<u>Alternate Programs</u> <sup>2/</sup>						
NKA Defense	10.6	116.1	61.5	35.0	17.7	240.9
Initial Defense						
NKA/CPR	10.6	123.8	97.6	66.5	18.6	317.1
Sustained Defense						
NKA/CPR	10.6	121.7	115.8	91.3	64.7	394.2

<sup>1/</sup> Includes only counter/infiltration/guerrillas portion of the CIGFIR program.

<sup>2/</sup> Includes the present MAP program and proposed modernization. CIGFIR includes about \$15.0 million of modernization items; their inclusion in FY 70 would reduce FY 71-74 requirements; includes air defense alternatives, (see Table 6-14 and Section 4, Chapter III).

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### Improvements in War Reserve Supplies

Because only a minimal quantity of war reserve supplies -- ammunition, spare parts and attrition replacement items, and petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) -- has been available for the ROK forces, their ability to fight effectively has been questioned. Furnishing these items involves a complex logistic system, additional units and capabilities. This subject is discussed in Section 8. Advance procurement and stockpiling of the supplies is also required. Of course, to the extent that ammunition and POL are stockpiled in Korea, there is a potential danger that the ROKs might pre-emptively attack North Korea. Therefore, a careful balance is needed so that in Korea supplies are adequate for initial defense but not large enough to permit a ROK attack north.\*

In the broader context, there are basically three logistic supply alternatives. First, in order to avoid disturbing the status quo, present deployments and support concepts could be continued until the end of the Vietnam conflict. Accordingly, supplies costing an estimated \$589 million would continue to be set aside for the two US divisions, the ROK would be furnished \$277 million for ammunition giving it 75 days for 18 divisions at ARPAC rates, and eventually, perhaps \$510 million of parts and attrition items (18 divisions for 90 days) would be stockpiled: a total of \$866 to \$1376 million.

Second, as part of a program to pass responsibility for ground defense against NKA attacks to the ROK, their ammunition and supplies could be increased, while concurrently the US forces would be withdrawn from the front-line, one division remaining in a reserve role (perhaps regional), and the other inactivated. In this case, supplies costing \$148-295 million would be stockpiled for the US divisions, the variation depending on whether the costs are allocated to Korea or divided between SEA and Korea, and \$18 million of ammunition, \$450-850 million for spare parts (8 to 12 divisions for 180 days) would be set aside for the ROK: a total of \$616-1163 million.

Third, consistent with a policy that assigns to the ROK complete responsibility for conventional defense on the ground against both NKA and NKA/CCA attacks, ROK ammunition and Class II and IV stocks would be increased still further. Ammunition stocks costing from \$154 to \$207 million would be appropriate, the higher amount if NKA-CCA combined operations were a realistic threat. Another \$640 million would be needed for spare parts and attrition replacements -- 23 divisions for 90 days.

It is assumed that against the Chinese a 90-day conventional war policy would be adopted similar to the NATO strategy. Small additional costs would be required for the FRD [redacted] this is discussed in Section 10. The total costs of this alternative would range from \$872 to \$925 million with FRD [redacted] \*\* If 180 days of spares for

\* A rather complicated way of accomplishing this balance -- by using special ROK supply rates rather than ARPAC rates -- is discussed in Section 7. Adoption of this proposal would reduce funding requirements approximately \$259 million.

\*\* Includes annual operating costs FRD [redacted]

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23 ROK divisions were to be furnished, the costs would range from \$1704 to \$1757 million. The principal costs are summarized below:

TABLE 1-3

ALTERNATIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

(Costs in \$US Millions)

<u>Status Quo</u>	<u>Ammunition</u> <sup>1/</sup>	<u>Spare Parts</u> <sup>2/</sup>	<u>Total New Funding</u>
ROKA	277 <sup>3/</sup>	510 <sup>4/</sup>	787
US	239	350	-- 5/ 787
<u>ROK Defense Against NKA</u>			
ROKA	18 <sup>6/</sup>	450-850 <sup>7/</sup>	468-868
US	60-120 <sup>8/</sup>	88-175 <sup>8/</sup>	(-34) to (-) 294 <sup>9/</sup> 127-574
<u>ROK Defense Against NKA/CPR</u>			
ROKA	154-207 <sup>10/</sup>	650-1757 <sup>11/</sup>	804-1964
US	24	44	(-) 521 <sup>12/</sup> 283-1743

1/ See Table 7-4. For US costs, current SVN data is used; one division force/day costs \$672,000.

2/ See Table 7-7.

3/ 75 days/18 Div @ ARPAC rates

4/ 90 days/18 Div.

5/ Already funded and in place or in pipeline for 2 US Divs.

6/ 75 days/16 Div.

7/ 180 days/8-12 Divs.

8/ Range depends on whether costs allocated to Korea or divided between SEA/Korea.

9/ Assumes 1 US div inactivated; savings result from US stocks on hand.

10/ 75 days/18-23 Divs.

11/ 90-180 days/23 Div.

12/ Assumes 2 US divs inactivated; savings result from US stocks on hand; FRD

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### Improvement in the Land Force Support Infrastructure

The present ROK land force support structure does not appear adequate for a sustained defense without US logistic support.\* Additional support units are necessary, as well as continued effort on building the required infrastructure. While many improvements have been made since the Korean War, including new and improved roadways, additional railroad capacity, permanent depots, etc., the actual land force support units are considerably reduced in strength. They actually appear less capable of supporting the ROK combat units now than during the war. However, if the support infrastructure is improved, the ROKs will have the increased capability to initiate sustained offensive action north without the restraints of the present low support posture. Also, costs of these improvements are very high. On the other hand, improving ROK support capability, at least to meet a NK attack, reduces the need for US involvement, thereby increasing our flexibility. Also, costs of providing US support units is much higher than if ROK units are used.

At the current level of 18 ROK divisions (17 Army-1 Marine), for instance, additional support units totaling approximately 113,000 men would be required to sustain these divisions in combat continuously. At the 16, 20, and 23 division force levels, the support augmentation required is about 90,000, 125,000 and 150,000 men respectively.

In considering a broad range of alternatives to improve ROK support capabilities, four specific support concepts were selected for study (see Section 8). First, the current ROK support structure could be left unchanged and be improved in a minor way with US grants or military sales. Assuming continuation of the currently proposed MAP program, the five year cost of this alternative would range from about \$88 million for 14 divisions to \$125 million for 20 divisions.

A second alternative would be to make no major changes to the force structure, but to fill equipment shortages in the existing support structure. This would assure adequate ROK ability to oppose the NKA, even if the North Koreans make qualitative improvements in their force. Estimated MAP (or FMS) costs would range from \$245 to \$275 million for 16-18 divisions, including \$90 to \$150 for the current MAP program.

Thirdly, the force structure could be increased to assure that the ROKs could engage the NKA on a sustained basis. This would entail full support for ten divisions. At a 14-16 division level (active), estimated additional MAP (or FMS) costs range from \$330 to \$350 million. These costs include equipment for new support units plus \$170 to \$200 million for present equipment shortages. By using active strength spaces from divisions put in the reserve, the total ROK strength could be held below 600,000.

Finally, the force structure could be increased so the ROK could engage a NKA/CPR attack, at least until FRD [redacted] are brought to bear. This entails support units for 18-20 divisions fully engaged. Additional MAP (or FMS) costs range from \$367 to \$500 million, including \$200 to \$230 million for present equipment shortages. This force would be extremely

\* Approximately 217,000 support troops support 226,000 combat troops; US ratio is about 2 support to 1 combat (based on 32,000 ISI/SSI for 16,000 division).

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strong, furnishing the ROKs with a capability to lead in regional defense arrangements. The program and costs of these alternatives are shown in Table 1-4 on the next page.

The cost of relying on the US to supply the support units in sustained conflicts against either the NKA or NKA/CPR forces is quite high. The five-year cost for the additional units needed to support 10 divisions in sustained combat is over \$1.6 billion if the units are US as compared to \$837 million (\$230 million MAP or FMS, \$90-\$607 million ROK defense budget costs for O&M) depending on whether the ROK forces are active or reserve. To support more ROK divisions is correspondingly more expensive: costs (which include both the ROK budget and MAP assistance to Korea) for the added forces to support 16 and 18 ROK divisions are \$1.4 and \$1.7 billion respectively. This conclusion holds even though the study assumes that support for seven US divisions is available in the US baseline force structure which could be used in emergency in Korea. A further action, which is appropriate for contingency planning, is: US land forces units which may be necessary to support the ROK Army should be identified as a special mission package in the US force structure, tailored, and oriented to performing their support mission in Korea.

#### 1.5 ROK Force Structure Program Alternatives

On the basis of our force comparisons referred to above, 9 to 12 divisions\* should be adequate for the ROK to defend against NK with 16-23 needed to meet the greater threat of a combined NKA/Chinese attack, depending on whether an initial or sustaining defense force was required. Not all of these divisions need be active.

In the discussion of these force analyses (see Section 1.3), we refined this range of forces based on a consideration of the political constraints, the continuing uncertainty of North Korean actions and the possible desirability of giving the ROK a capability for a regional role. Thus for the ROK defense against the NK threat we arrived at a force level of 14-16 divisions while for the larger combined threats, a range of 16-20. In this latter range, a 16 division force was considered more than adequate for the NK threat, but minimal to meet an initial combined NK/CPR attack. The higher level of 18 divisions should permit the ROK to hold against an initial combined attack until US reinforcements arrived (if required). This level would also permit the ROK to have the capability of playing an important regional role. For the sustained combined NK/CPR attack, 18 divisions were considered a minimal force against this threat whereas a 20 division force would permit the ROK to hold against this threat. We considered this an average risk force (see Sections 1.3, 3, 4 and 5).

The modernization programs for combat units (Section 6) and support units (Section 8) focus on this narrower range of divisions -- fourteen to twenty. In the program years being discussed, full modernization of twenty divisions would be a major undertaking and could well overtax the leadership and management resources of the ROK military. Conversely, a reduction of present forces

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\* Appropriately modernized: See Sections 5 and 6.

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TABLE 1-4

FOREIGN EXCHANGE COST OF PRIMARY ROK SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES  
(Assumes no inflation in MAP or FNS items)

	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Present MAP Program (18 Div)</u> <sup>1/</sup>	24.1	22.5	21.6	23.1	22.3	113.6
<u>Alternatives</u>						
<u>Force Level Variations Present MAP Program</u>						
14 Divisions	18.8	17.5	16.7	18.0	17.4	88.4
16 Divisions	21.4	20.1	19.2	20.5	19.8	101.0
20 Divisions	26.6	24.9	24.0	25.6	24.7	125.8
<u>Fill Equip. Shortages</u>						
16 Divisions	44.4	53.0	54.0	43.5	51.7	246.6
18 Divisions	49.8	60.1	60.3	49.0	57.1	276.3
<u>Increase Support Structure</u> <sup>2/</sup>						
<u>Sustained Spt Against NKA Attack</u>						
16 Divs/10 Divs Spt	44.4	78.7	84.4	134.6	130.5	472.6
18 Divs/10 Divs Spt	44.4	89.2	86.6	139.9	141.0	501.1
<u>Increase Support Structure</u> <sup>3/</sup>						
<u>Sustained Spt Against NKA/CFR Attack</u>						
20 Divs/16 Divs Spt	55.2	91.5	115.5	190.5	195.1	648.8

<sup>1/</sup> Support units only. See Section 6 for combat unit improvement.

<sup>2/</sup> For costs see Section 8.44. Reserve division cases, with costs of about 15% of the active rate, are detailed in Section 9. Includes equipment shortage fill and modernization (and operation) in the current program.

<sup>3/</sup> Assumes support forces in SVN return with their US equipment.

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from the presently constituted nineteen divisions to a modernized force of fourteen divisions was also considered the largest feasible reduction, in the next five years, without overburdening the military leadership or generating political problems. These judgments, though consistent with the political analysis in Chapter Seven, are subject to change as programs are implemented.

The alternative ROK land force structures indicated below are illustrative. Additional variations are certainly possible, and granted limitations in funds, would probably be more realistic. However, the purpose here has been to furnish the total military requirement at minimum risk. The rationale for the alternatives is provided in Section 9. The main alternatives and costs are indicated below:

a. Continuation of Present Program

(1) Minimal Land Force Program. Gradual reductions in MAP grants for land forces would be initiated when politically feasible (FY 71-72), transferring such expenditures to FMS. FY 70-74 costs would entail \$467 million MAP for the land forces, exclusive of the CIGFIR program. ROK costs for the same period would be approximately \$1540 million.

(2) Modest Modernization. This is essentially the present MAP program downgraded to a 14-16 division program. It includes some ROK modernization, but still leaves a large range of needs unaddressed. FY 70-74 MAP costs range from \$410 to \$537 million, depending on whether or not the JCS CIGFIR program is included:

b. ROK Land Force Self-Defense: NEA Threat

(1) Minimal Program. Under this alternative, modernization improvements would be related to eventual changes in US land force dispositions. One US division, or elements of it, might be retained in Korea for its value as a symbol of US commitment. The minimal program is tied to improving a smaller number of elite divisions (14), and improvements would be concentrated in maneuver unit and artillery firepower. MAP FY 70-74 costs would be about \$629 million and ROK FY 70-74 costs would be about \$1500 million.

(2) Balanced Program. In addition to the modernization included in the minimal program above, the ROK Army support capabilities and war reserve ammunition stocks would also be improved. Two options bear consideration with regard to the support structure: (a) fill TOE shortages through MAP (or FMS) and by encouraging local production of essential items: estimated additional MAP costs range from \$40 to \$237 million; (b) increase the ROK Army force structure so that support units would be available for ten ROK divisions simultaneously engaged: estimated additional MAP cost of about \$330 to \$350 million. Total MAP costs for this alternative could range from \$900 to \$1251 million.