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c. ROK Self-Defense: NKA/CPR Attack

(1) Initial ROK Defense: (Minimal Program). In this posture the ROK forces would be expected to hold alone against an NKA attack, even if the latter were reinforced by a CPR force subsequent to the attack and on confirmation of CPR involvement. US land forces could move from reserve positions or be rapidly deployed to Korea using programmed strategic mobility resources to reinforce ROK defenses. FRD FRD The land force modernization and improvement programs for the ROK would include: (a) firepower modernization for 16 elite divisions; (b) increasing the support structure to support 10 divisions; (c) TOE fill at CINCPAC levels for 16 divisions. These programs would entail a MAP program ranging from \$900 to \$1251 million.

(2) Initial ROK Defense: (Average Risk). The major difficulty with c(1) above is that ROK commanders (and US commanders as well) may be unwilling to reduce the size of ROK forces at the same time the US conventional role is reduced, despite the cost and extent of modernization. Accordingly, 18 rather than 16 divisions might have to be maintained. The support capability would be improved by filling equipment shortages and possibly increasing the support structure to accommodate 10 simultaneously engaged divisions. MAP for FY 70-74 would range from \$961 to \$1451 million. ROK budget costs would range from \$1540 to \$1662 million for FY 70-74.

(3) Sustained Defense. As indicated in other sections (3, 4, 5) 16 ROK divisions could probably hold a NKA/CPR invasion, if they were equipped and fought at US standards. US forces could be deployed to augment the ROK, if necessary; however, in this posture extra funds would be spent to reduce the risk of an early ROK defeat. The modernization and improvement program would extend to 20 ROK divisions. TOE shortages in support units would be filled, and the support structure would be increased (mostly reserve units) so that 16 fully engaged divisions could be supported simultaneously. At the twenty division level, MAP costs for FY 70-74 would range from \$1451 to \$1602 million; ROK budget costs would range from \$1662 to \$1740 million. Costs for these program alternatives are shown in Table 1-5 on p. 61.

1.6 Alternative US Deployments

The US has actively participated in the domestic affairs of Korea since 1945. During this period of involvement, the ROK has greatly increased its capabilities to sustain itself economically and to provide for its own security. With improvements in its land forces through modernization and the establishment of an adequate support infrastructure outlined earlier, increased ROKA capabilities for self-support ROK confidence would be bolstered and there would be no need for any continuing US land force deployment.

The problem is how to initiate disengagement of US land forces yet meet the requirements of the political constraints. One approach to the problem is to initiate a phased reduction in US land forces as the modernization and improvement programs reach a certain level of development. This is probably best

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TABLE 1-5

ILLUSTRATIVE ALTERNATIVE ROK LAND FORCE ROK BUDGET/MAF COSTS^{1/}
(1968 prices in \$ US Millions)

	<u>CY70</u>	<u>CY 71</u>	<u>CY72</u>	<u>CY73</u>	<u>CY74</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Present Program</u>						
ROK Costs	236	273	305	344	382	1540
US Costs (MAF)	<u>102</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>467</u>
Total	<u>338</u>	<u>373</u>	<u>404</u>	<u>430</u>	<u>462</u>	<u>2007</u>
<u>Alternatives</u>						
<u>Present Program with CIGFIR</u>						
ROK Costs	236	273	306	345	384	1544
US Costs (MAF)	<u>102</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>537</u>
Total	<u>338</u>	<u>422</u>	<u>412</u>	<u>438</u>	<u>471</u>	<u>2081</u>
<u>ROK Self Defense Force-NKA Threat</u>						
<u>Combat Modernization</u>						
ROK Costs	236	273	300	334	356	1499
US Costs (MAF)	<u>102</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>139</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>71</u>	<u>629</u>
Total	<u>338</u>	<u>489</u>	<u>439</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>427</u>	<u>2128</u>
<u>Balanced Force (A)</u> ^{2/}						
ROK Costs	236	273	302	337	372	1520
US Costs (MAF)	<u>124</u>	<u>311</u>	<u>196</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>900</u>
Total	<u>360</u>	<u>584</u>	<u>498</u>	<u>482</u>	<u>496</u>	<u>2620</u>
<u>Balanced Force (B)</u> ^{3/}						
ROK Costs	236	273	304	343	380	1535
US Costs (MAF)	<u>124</u>	<u>311</u>	<u>282</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>254</u>	<u>1251</u>
Total	<u>360</u>	<u>584</u>	<u>586</u>	<u>623</u>	<u>634</u>	<u>2786</u>
<u>ROK Self Defense-NKA/CFR Threat</u>						
<u>Initial Defense (A)</u>						
ROK Costs	236	273	305	344	382	1539
US Costs (MAF)	<u>126</u>	<u>326</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>961</u>
Total	<u>362</u>	<u>599</u>	<u>545</u>	<u>484</u>	<u>511</u>	<u>2500</u>
<u>Initial Defense (B)</u> ^{4/}						
ROK Costs	236	273	320	387	446	1662
US Costs (MAF)	<u>126</u>	<u>326</u>	<u>327</u>	<u>302</u>	<u>270</u>	<u>1451</u>
Total	<u>362</u>	<u>699</u>	<u>647</u>	<u>689</u>	<u>716</u>	<u>3113</u>
<u>Sustained Defense</u> ^{5/}						
ROK Costs	236	273	330	419	482	1740
US Costs (MAF)	<u>132</u>	<u>330</u>	<u>381</u>	<u>398</u>	<u>361</u>	<u>1602</u>
Total	<u>368</u>	<u>603</u>	<u>711</u>	<u>817</u>	<u>843</u>	<u>3342</u>

1/ See Tables 9-2, 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, Section 9.

2/ Includes Combat Force Modernization and equipment fill for support units.

3/ Includes Balanced Force A plus additional support units for 10 divisions.

4/ Includes Combat force modernization, equipment fill for support units and new support units for 10 divisions.

5/ Includes Initial Defense A plus additional support units for 16 divisions.

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in view of the many political constraints involved. Another approach would be to initiate an early US force reduction as a cost trade-off to obtain the desired ROK force improvement programs. The political and military risks involved in this approach may be too great, notwithstanding the potential cost savings of the trade-off. To provide a range of options with which to consider the problem, we have considered three basic alternative land force deployments, each with a number of variations which are representative of the broad range of sub-options available. These alternatives are summarized below and discussed in Section II.

Alternative 1 - Present Deployment of Two Divisions

Under the present deployment, the two US divisions are manned at under 80% TOE and have attached approximately 11,000 KATUSAs.* Total strength numbers around 52,700. The present force could be maintained, or, on grounds of temporary improvement, it could be increased: Two variations were considered (See Table 1-6 on the next page). Under the first variation, an increase in troop strength (8,500 spaces) was added to bring the over-all division strength to around 90% with a little more than half of the increase going to support level forces.** A second variation was an increase of 13,101 spaces over present strength.*** This increase would raise division manning to approximately 90% and would also provide some modernization in aviation, intelligence, air defense and support capabilities. Annual costs for the present deployment is about \$897 million with costs for the two variations ranging from over \$1 billion for the 8,500 space increase to \$1.1 billion for the 13,000 increase. Troop lists for these force increases are included in Annex II, Vol. II.

Alternative 2 - Withdraw One Division

Under Alternative 2, two variations were considered. In the first case, the division was restructured at 90% to a full G-series TOE plus a separate infantry brigade, plus support with a strength of around 54,600. This roughly equates with the strength of the present two division force (52,700). An Aviation Group was included which would permit simultaneous lift of about two infantry battalions. Under this concept, a brigade force could be positioned on the DMZ, with the brigade rotating periodically with the brigades of the division. Cost for this alternative was around \$921 million vs. \$897 million for the present two division force. It would be possible to reposition the division south of Seoul where with some tailoring (i. e., 90% but without KATUSAs), it could be considered as a regional reserve force. Replacing the 11,000 KATUSAs would cost approximately \$187 million annually. Relocation costs range from \$81 to \$148 million (one-time) depending on location. Troop lists are found in Annex II, Vol. II.

In the second variation, a division level force with a Corps Headquarters and a minimum support force was structured at 100, 90 and 80% strength with only US personnel to permit more rapid deployment as a regional reserve as well as in the Korea security role. Strength of the force ranged from over

* KATUSAs are paid by the ROKA but US incurs some O&M costs.

** Nov '68 JCS recommendation.

*** Mar '69 CG, 8th Army recommendation.

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TABLE 1-6

US ARMY STRENGTH IN ROK (000) END FY 70^{1/}

	<u>US TO/TD</u>	<u>US Mpr</u>	<u>% US</u>	<u>KATUSA</u>	<u>Tot Mpr</u>	<u>%</u>
Division Forces ^{2/}	65.0	46.3	71.2	11.0	57.3	88
Special Mission Forces ^{3/}	6.2	6.4	99	--	6.1	99
Total	71.2	52.7 ^{4/}	74	11.0	63.4	89

1/ Source: OASD/SA

2/ Includes 2nd and 7th Infantry divisions and their ISIs. Their SSIs are structured in the reserve components.

3/ Includes 4th Missile Command, KMAG, other service support (USAF), Stratcom and Strategic Intelligence, plus some air defense units.

4/ Includes PROV-MAACK (Army, Navy, Air Force)

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TABLE 1-7

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL COSTS
ALTERNATIVE US KOREA LAND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS^{1/}

<u>Alternatives</u>	<u>Personnel</u> <u>(000's)</u>	<u>FY 70</u> <u>Cost</u>	<u>FY 70-74</u> <u>Cost</u>
<u>I. Present Two Division Force</u> <u>Deployment^{2/}</u>			
at 80% strength	52.7	.9B	4.5B
at 90% strength	61.2	.9B	5.0B
at 90% + modernization	65.8	.9B	5.4B
<u>II. Reduction to One Division Force</u> <u>(Begin FY 73)^{2/}</u>			
1 Div + 1 Bde.	54.6	.9B	4.6B
1 Div (all US) @ 100%	31.0	.9B	3.7B
1 Div (all US) @ 90%	28.0	.9B	3.7B
1 Div (all US) @ 80%	25.0	.9B	3.6B
<u>III. Only Small Residual US Force</u> <u>(Begin FY 73)</u>			
FRD		--	.18B
MAAG	2.0	--	.07B
<u>IV. Relocation of One All-US</u> <u>Division Force^{3/}</u>			
to vic Suwan-Pyongtaek	--	.15B	--
to vic Taegu-Pusan	--	.14B	--
to vic Seoul	--	.08B	--
<u>V. Relocation of Two All-US</u> <u>Division Forces^{3/}</u>			
to vic Suwan-Pyongaek	--	.30B	--
to vic Taegu-Pusan	--	.28B	--
to vic Seoul	--	.16B	--
Improve present location	--	.13B	--
<u>VI. Reforger Concept (Begin FY 73)</u>			
Preposition equip. for 1 Div. Force	.5	.2B ^{4/}	16.4B ^{5/}

^{1/} Does not include KATUSAs; assumed US force deployments change as ROKA modernization progresses.

^{2/} Includes MAAG.

^{3/} One-time costs in FY in which relocation is implemented.

^{4/} Initial costs to include cost of additional equipment set required during FY that Reforger would be implemented.

^{5/} Cost of cadre in Korea to maintain pre-positioned Reforger equipment.

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Over-all annual costs for the three forces which would be in Korea range from \$193.0 million for the current posture to \$52.1 million for the symbolic force (see Section 10).

Our discussion of FRD led to the following:

a. There are advantages to changing the current posture, e. g., security problems would be reduced; there is overlap in FRD indicating that a different FRD should be able to accomplish the mission.

b. There are reasons for having FRD even if US troops withdraw: The uncertainties of relying on sufficient airlift to be available in an emergency to rapidly deploy a force together with the possibility that ROK airfields may have been severely damaged and therefore denied to the force.

c. In the costing of land force alternative postures, we used the FRD which seemed most appropriate.

1.8 Program Packages

On the basis of the various alternatives for ROK and US land forces considered in this chapter, it is possible to develop a number of program packages which will permit improvement in ROKA self-defense capability and which may permit a reduction of US forces. The basic goal in these program packages is to utilize the cost savings from a US land force reduction to offset the costs required to improve the ROK land forces. The programs which follow assume that various combinations of the improvement alternatives are initiated in FY 71 with the current US force structure continuing through FY 72. Starting in FY 73, US redeployments and force structure changes would be initiated resulting in costs reductions which would be applied to the continuing ROKA modernization program. Relocation of the US force south of Seoul into a regional reserve location would be accomplished at this time, assuming that the ROK division(s) had returned from SVN. Other combinations of alternatives are possible, but the following are representative of a number of different variations (see Table 1-8 on p. 67).

* FRD

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TABLE 1-8

PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES
(FY 70-74)
(millions of \$)

<u>PROGRAM DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>TOTAL COSTS</u>
<u>Present Program 1/</u>						
US (2 Divisions)	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	4,485.0
ROKA (18 Divisions) 2/						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	304.9	344.1	382.4	1,540.5
US MAP 3/	102.0	100.3	98.8	85.9	80.0	467.0
Total	1,235.1	1,270.3	1,300.7	1,327.0	1,359.4	6,492.5
<u>Program I</u>						
US FRD	897.0	897.0	897.0	122.6	122.6	2,936.2
ROKA (14 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt. force modernization, fill spt equip. shortages, add spt units ammunition for 75 days, counter-infiltration and present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	300.1	330.5	356.2	1,498.9
US MAP 4/	121.9	261.2	248.5	268.6	237.0	1,157.0
Total	1,255.0	1,431.8	1,445.6	724.7	715.8	5,592.9
<u>Program II</u>						
US (1 Div Regional Force @ 90% TOB) (Troop List V) 1/	897.0	897.0	897.0	482.4	482.4	3,655.8
ROKA (14 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force modernization, counter-infiltration, ammo for 75 days plus present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	299.1	327.5	350.2	1,485.9
US MAP 5/	121.9	261.2	186.5	139.6	116.1	815.9
Total	1,255.0	1,431.8	1,382.6	949.5	948.7	5,957.2
<u>Program III</u>						
US FRD	897.0	897.0	897.0	122.6	122.6	2,936.2
ROKA (16 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force modernization, fill spt equip shortages, add spt units, ammo for 75 days, counter-infiltration & present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	303.9	343.1	379.6	1,535.7
US MAP 6/	123.9	310.8	281.9	279.1	254.2	1,249.9
Total	1,257.0	1,480.8	1,482.8	744.8	756.4	5,721.8
<u>Program IV</u>						
US (1 Div Regional Reserve @ 90% TOB) 1/ (Troop List V)	897.0	897.0	897.0	482.4	482.4	3,655.8
ROKA (16 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force mod., ammo for 75 days, counter-infil., present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	302.1	337.2	371.8	1,520.2
US MAP 7/	123.9	310.8	197.5	144.5	123.7	900.4
Total	1,257.0	1,480.8	1,398.6	984.1	977.9	5,076.4
<u>Program V</u>						
US (1 Div Regional Res. @ 90% TOB) (Troop List V) 1/	897.0	897.0	897.0	482.4	482.4	3,655.8
ROKA (16 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force mod., fill spt equip shortages, add spt units, ammo for 75 days, counter-infil plus present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	320.4	386.6	446.6	1,662.7
US MAP 8/	123.7	325.6	326.5	302.4	220.2	1,310.4
Total	1,258.8	1,495.6	1,543.9	1,171.4	1,199.2	6,868.8
<u>Program VI</u>						
US FRD	897.0	897.0	897.0	122.6	122.6	2,936.2
ROKA (18 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force mod., ammo for 75 days counter-infil., plus present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	304.9	344.1	382.4	1,540.5
US MAP 9/	106.6	265.5	179.6	90.9	72.1	714.7
Total	1,234.7	1,435.5	1,381.5	557.6	577.1	5,191.6
<u>Program VII</u>						
US (Residual Force) 1/	897.0	897.0	897.0	122.6	122.6	2,936.2
ROKA (20 Divisions) 2/						
(Cbt force mod., fill spt equip. shortages, add spt. units, ammo for 90 days, counter-infil. plus present program)						
ROK Budget	236.1	273.0	329.0	419.1	482.3	1,739.5
US MAP 10/	132.3	330.1	181.0	197.8	161.4	1,602.6
Total	1,265.4	1,500.1	1,607.0	939.5	960.3	6,278.3

1/ See Tables 11-1 and 11-2.
2/ See Table 9-2.
3/ See Section 7.2, Table 9-3 and Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9.
4/ See Table 9-4.
5/ See Table 9-5.
6/ Program levels.

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SECTION 2: DIFFERENTIATING ROK AND US LAND FORCE ROLES IN KOREA

2.1 General

US and ROK roles in Korea could be differentiated. Certain threats the ROKs can meet more effectively - for example, North Korean infiltration. In other cases, US forces play a larger role, e. g., deterring an all-out Chinese attack. There are some ambiguous threat scenarios in which the US would probably prefer not involving its prestige. Of course, where the challenge to our commitment is clear, we might wish to act for political reasons even if our support is not necessary on military grounds.

The current positioning of forces and operational procedures provides for almost no differentiation between US and Korean roles. This arrangement made good sense when the ROK land force capability was limited and the principal threat large -- a NKA/CPR reopening of the Korean War. With ROK capabilities significantly improved and the North Koreans employing a strategy involving attacks below the threshold of open aggression, another look at these roles is overdue.

The following seems an appropriate and realistic differentiation of ROK and US defense roles for this analysis: (1) The ROKs conduct an effective defense north of Seoul for all the North Korean land threats for a period long enough so the US can initiate diplomatic actions before intervening in force; (2) the US furnishes logistic support, and combat units, if necessary, for a sustained conventional defense against a combined North Korean and Chinese attack; (3) against an all-out attack the ^{FRD} FRD (4) both the ROKs and the US could maintain forces in Korea which are able to reinforce other Asian countries.

2.2 Current US Roles

The present US combat unit deployment to Korea is among other things symbolic: It is a "warning" to the North Koreans and Chinese that we will use force to preserve South Korea. The fact that one division is on the front-line, where any decision to respond to a provocation rests with the local commander, on grounds of self-defense, rather than with US Government policy makers, eliminates doubts about our sincerity. Since US involvement would result more from a reflex than a decision, this forward deployment conveys a powerful warning to the Communists.

US logistic unit deployments to Korea also have this symbolic role. However, because automatic US involvement is not guaranteed in lesser threat scenarios, the range of threats deterred, because of a desire to avoid US involvement, is smaller. Hostile actions which could be initiated by North Korea with little contact with US logistic units include: (1) Infiltrating of raiding parties south to sabotage and ambushes within the DMZ and in areas below the south tape; (2) attacking an air force AC&W installation on P-Y-Do; (3) initiating a limited objective attack which might seek to destroy the hydroelectric plant at the Hwachon Reservoir or perhaps capture the ROK territory

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2.3 Current ROK Roles

ROK land force roles have not been different from those of US troops, except in one instance: US forces have not normally been engaged in rear area searches for NKA infiltrators. Both the UN command arrangements, which place ROK forces under the operational command of a UN headquarters for all defensive operations along the DMZ, and the decision to retain US forces on a sector of the frontline have militated against making the ROK role more distinct. Partly because US land forces are so expensive, however, the US has encouraged the ROKs to maintain the bulk of the divisions needed against even a Chinese-North Korean combined attack. ROK forces are also serving a regional defense role, with approximately 50,000 forces in South Vietnam.

2.4 Alternative US-ROK Roles

As will be indicated in the sections to follow, the ROKs have enough forces to defeat most of the likely threats without US land force support on the frontline. As indicated in Section 11, the US combat and logistic unit deployments to Korea, in their present form (50,000 troops), add only incrementally to the overall land force capability (600,000) of allied forces. On the basis of an historical analysis, force comparisons, and wargame simulations, one can conclude that the ROKs alone could probably manage adequately for a considerable period against even the most taxing condition, a North Korean attack along the historic avenue of approach to Seoul, reinforced by the CCA.

The doubts one might have on this judgment of ROK capabilities stem from imponderables, e. g., NK and ROK comparative military leadership, age and availability of equipment, training, possible CPR threats to use nuclear weapons, unexpected failures in executing sound plans. Because of these uncertainties, the NKA might be willing to take some risks for measurable gains. So long as US involvement is guaranteed, the North Koreans would have a further factor -- our reaction -- to consider.

The current US posture has not deterred North Korean low intensity aggression along the DMZ in the past few years. US involvement in these incidents has resulted in our prestige being challenged and sometimes compromised in lesser situations where we need not have been. Though the current US deployments along the DMZ or nearby may assist in warning the NKA/CPR that the US will assist the ROKs in meeting all-out aggression this result is gained at a considerable impairment of our flexibility. US land forces to the rear or US Air Force units could always be joined with the ROKs when necessary. This reduction in flexibility occurs regardless of the size of US units on the line.

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As long as the ROKs can be kept clearly superior to the North Koreans, on the ground at least, ROK forces could be used to meet lower intensity NKA provocations. Of course, this is only an added option; it would not have to be exercised always. Its use would make clear to the North Koreans that their actions might be met, perhaps with more force than expected, and after only a ROKG decision.

Against the larger threats, US logistic support would be necessary after the first 60 days, even if substantial improvements are made to ROK capabilities. Moreover, as indicated in the chapter on air requirements, it will not be possible to make the ROKAF self-sufficient during the FY 70-74 period. Therefore, US tactical air support could also be necessary. Whether or not US land combat forces would be needed, even against the combined NKA/CPR attack threat, would depend on the size CPR force committed, the length of the battle, and ROK losses. As an indication that the US would furnish divisions, if necessary, two demonstrations might be appropriate: (1) rapid deployment exercises to Korea; or (2) continued stationing of US units in Korea. Both courses would appear prudent initially; later, based on the NKA/CPR actions, further adjustments could be made with more confidence. US deployments and troop locations are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.

As insurance against the greater than expected attack, it makes sense to FRD [redacted] The FRD [redacted] is a more difficult question to be discussed in Section 10. For example, from a strictly capabilities viewpoint, FRD [redacted] FRD

2.5 Regional Security Role

US/ROK forces in Korea could be used in regional roles. The probability of two or more major simultaneous conventional conflicts is small: the Chinese are logistically constrained to fighting an all-out conflict in either Southeast Asia, Korea, or in the north, though smaller actions could, of course, be initiated simultaneously. The possibility of deploying elsewhere some ROK forces maintained for use in Korea against the all-out CPR/NKA threat is examined in Sections 9 and 11, where it is indicated that ROK regional forces could be drawn from the existing force structure if a reserve replacement force were mobilized.

US baseline force structure units maintained for the defense of Asia consist of 7 divisions in FY 73. Conceivably, one of these divisions could be stationed in Korea if it was in a posture permitting rapid deployment elsewhere. US units now in Korea might be repositioned and reorganized, and consequently employed to meet these needs thus reducing the total US Asia oriented baseline force structure. A more detailed consideration of such alternatives is contained in Section 11.

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SECTION 3: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

3.1 General

The balance of ground forces in Korea has changed so radically since 1950 that there is almost no chance the North Koreans could gain by a repeat of the 1950 surprise attack. Then the ROK Army was not organized for a conventional defense against any sizable invader. The small ROK combat forces were poorly trained and equipped; the war supplies the US had provided had been nearly exhausted in training activities; its forces were outnumbered over 2 to 1 on the front and 1.5 to 1 overall.

In fact, as will be seen, such a review of later phases of the review of the Korean War could also suggest that a ground attack north by aggressive ROK commanders might easily have succeeded against North Korea and might have had some success even though the CPR had entered the war.

3.2 Policy and Force Objectives - 1950

Before the June 1950 North Korean attack, US military aid to Korea had been directed primarily toward ROK internal security. Essentially, we had furnished the ROKs with light infantry equipment. To the extent North Korea action across the DMZ was a threat, it was felt that several such lightly armed units could be an effective deterrent. This basic policy and force objective was established by the National Security Council in the spring of 1949 and was not to change until after the invasion. One result of the policy was that the United States was not particularly aggressive in furnishing additional military aid to the ROK. In the period 1946 to July 1950 equipment for a ROK Army of 65,000 valued at approximately \$56 million was delivered to the Koreans. The FY 50 military assistance program for Korea, set at about \$10.2 million, consisted primarily of maintenance materials and spare parts.

The ROKs themselves were also primarily concerned with internal defense. Though they were harassed by frequent incidents along the DMZ, anti-guerrilla operations in the southern sector of the peninsula engaged a considerable percentage of the ROK forces (44%), and especially those ROK army units that were better equipped and trained.

It was also not clear that the US would re-enforce the ROK Army in event of an attack from the north. The often cited announcement of President Truman in January 1950 that the United States would not intervene militarily to help the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek hold Formosa against a Chinese Communist amphibious attack cast doubts about our intentions. These doubts were strengthened when Secretary of State Dean Acheson followed one week later with a statement that the United States would fight to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but that the new nations of Asia were on their own. Establishment of this defense line, to the rear of Korea, may have encouraged the North Koreans.

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3.3 ROK Equipment Levels - 1950

US discussion of policy and force objectives for Korea during the spring of 1950 delayed the provision of much needed additional equipment and support. Congress took considerable time reviewing military assistance plans for Korea, in hopes of bringing them into line with a somewhat ambiguous US policy. There was a desire to avoid wasting resources on programs which did not reflect the real needs of the Koreans. To help refine proposals, survey teams were dispatched for more detailed reviews of needs. As a result, of the \$10.97 million aid allocated for Korea by Congress in 1950, none arrived in Korea before the attack - about \$350,000 worth of spare parts was enroute on 25 June 1950.

This delay in supporting the ROKs had two serious effects: (1) the equipment furnished prior to June 1950, sufficient for only 6 light infantry divisions (65,000), was distributed unevenly over eight divisions (85,000); and (2) all ROK forces were badly in need of spare parts, replacements, and ammunition to make up inventories which had been diminished at much greater rates than forecast. This clearly demonstrates the undesirability of maintaining forces in excess of what can be supported.

The decision to arm and equip only 65,000 troops had been made in March 1949, and despite KMAC requests was not changed even though the ROKs themselves continued to recruit and organize a larger force of eight rather than six divisions. In a move to alleviate equipment shortages, the Koreans brought out 20,000 Japanese rifles they had hidden in 1945 and 1946 when US forces were destroying Japanese arms. However, most of these weapons were unserviceable or of marginal use due to a shortage of ammunition supplies.

The ROK attempt to maintain a larger army also caused the rapid exhaustion of spare parts and inventories. In June 1950 spare parts in all categories were exhausted and, based on KMAC estimates, 15% of the Korean Army's weapons and 35% of its vehicles were unserviceable. In a report dispatched ten days before the NK attack, KMAC stated that defensive operations could be supported with these stocks for no more than fifteen days.

3.4 State of ROK Training - 1950

The state of training was also poor. Disruptions to the training schedule were caused by border incidents, guerrilla activity and by the turbulence caused by the ROK Government's removal of some key personnel because of their pro-Communist leanings. In addition, the training schedule had been designed for 65,000 troops, when, in fact, nearly 100,000 needed to be trained. This requirement presented serious scheduling and facility problems which were not solved. As a result, only 30% of the 67 infantry battalions in the ROK army had completed even company training by the beginning of 1950, let alone battalions and regimental level training and combined arms exercises. The situation was similar in artillery units: Training had

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only been conducted through battery level. To bring training of these units to adequate standards would have taken another twelve months, if all went well. Unfortunately, the North Korean attack came too soon.

3.5 The North Korean-South Korean Strength in Balance - 1950

In view of these factors it is not surprising that at the start of the war the ROKs were at a decided strength disadvantage. North Korean Army forces were much more extensively armed and trained, and approximately one-third of the combat personnel consisted of experienced hardened troops from the Chinese Civil War and World War II. Supplies of arms, including modern weapons, had been furnished North Korea during the period 1946-1950 at a rate much greater than that of the ROKs. As a result, the North Koreans were numerically stronger than the ROKs in nearly all categories of strength: Combat troops - 1.5 to 1; tanks and armored cars - 3.5 to 1; artillery pieces - 3 to 1; overall military strength - 1.5 to 1; combat strength on the line dividing North and South Korea - 2 to 1.

3.6 Comparison: 1950 with Present

The substantial changes in Korea that have occurred since 1950 make any NK attack very unlikely. Now the ROK Army is fully attentive to the mission of defeating an invasion, and the deployments and fortifications along the DMZ leave little doubt as to the magnitude of opposition which the North Koreans or Chinese could expect. Behind this combat strength is a political-economic structure much changed from the instability of 1950. The ROK ground forces are numerically superior to the North Koreans in strength, in most categories of weapons, in support forces, and in training. Comparative strengths are discussed extensively below.

Ostensively, as a consequence of this changed military balance, the North Koreans appear to have focused primarily on a defensive military land force which would see offensive action only after some type of insurgency had been successfully initiated in the south. This judgment is based on the primarily defense nature of their deployments and their public statements. One by-product of the improved ROK posture is growing concern that the ROKs might attack northward on a large scale in response to some provocative NK action.

3.7 Force Balance - 1951 to 1953

The force balance changed measurably during the remainder of the war. In fact, if aggressive ROK Army commanders review closely the 1951-53 actions, they might well be motivated to plan an attack north. The only limiting factors would be the paucity of ROK air power and ROK dependence on US logistic support. These limitations would probably not be offset by the element of surprise in an attack north by a vastly superior striking force, even if the NKA forces were to break initially, as did the ROKs in June 1950. It is useful to look more closely at the forces involved during this period for the perspective furnished on what ROK requirements might be in another Korean War.

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3.8 Ground Force Strength: 1951-1953

During the period 1951-1953 nine US and eight ROK divisions performed well against an enemy force which, at its peak, numbered over a million troops. As mentioned above, in the early periods of the war the US/ROK forces were heavily outnumbered. By the spring of 1951 this strength gap was being closed. The comparative strengths in the enemy offensive of April 1951, the UN offensive of May 1951, give some insight into the relative capabilities of opposing forces:

TABLE 3-1

KOREAN WAR GROUND FORCE STRENGTH COMPARISONS (1951-1953)
(Thousands of troops in Korea)

	<u>Total Forces</u>	<u>Combat Forces</u>	<u>Percentage Engaged (%)</u>
<u>Communist Forces (Total)</u>			
Communist Offensive (1951)	828	377	46
UN Offensive (1951)	678	331	49
Overall Average (Total)	893	273	31
Overall Average (NKA)	249	67	27
<u>UN Forces (Total)</u>			
Communist Offensive (1951)	535	360	67
UN Offensive (1951)	552	357	65
Overall Average (Total)	627	263	42
Overall Average (ROKA)	411	199	48

1/ Primary source: H.Q. 8th Army Command Report, May, 1953. ROK data from OCA study "ROK and UN Ground Strength in Korea", 1954.

As can be seen above, the UN command consistently had 50% more of its combat forces engaged. There appear to be varying reasons for this: First, the Communist forces were weak on technical and logistic support; they could not maintain large forces engaged for any length of time. Normally, a CCA/NKA division attacked for five days, with a "basic load" and then rotated back from the front. Second, the North Koreans remained concerned about the threat of amphibious raids; consequently, a large portion of the NKA forces were engaged in coastal defense. Finally, throughout the campaign, the enemy apparently was unwilling to risk too much of his force on any

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single operation, a tactic of caution, perhaps because of US air superiority or because his objectives were limited.

3.9 Logistical Support Comparison (1951-1953)

During the later stages of the Korean War, due to effective logistics, the UN forces also enjoyed a considerable firepower advantage over the enemy. For example, if total enemy mortar and artillery expenditures are compared with UN 81 mm mortar and the 105 mm howitzer expenditures, UN forces fired seven times the total Communist expenditures during the period April 1952 to March 1953, with one monthly advantage of 38-1. These comparisons are exemplative of the considerable logistical edge the 17 US/ROK divisions had over the NKA/GPR forces, thus enabling them to effectively engage in defensive and offensive warfare against a numerically much larger force. Relevant data is summarized below:

TABLE 3-2

COMPARATIVE AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

	<u>NKA-CCA</u>	<u>UN</u>
Tubes (Mortar & Howitzer)	2270	2340 ^{1/}
Total Rds ('000) ^{2/}	1780	12,360
Rds/Tube per day	2.2	14.6

^{1/} Only 81 mm and 105 mm Howitzers.

^{2/} Last year of war.

3.10 Defense Requirements Based on the Korean War

The Korean War experience is only a fair basis for estimating ROK defense needs. Since 1954 ROK land force effectiveness has increased: Firepower has been improved through provision of additional artillery, tanks, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, air defense missiles, etc., and by extended training and exercises that have improved the overall leadership level throughout the force. During the same period US and CCA units have been withdrawn, for the most part. However, North Korean Army capabilities have also increased, though as will be indicated in Section 4, our knowledge of changes in North Korean forces, equipment levels and readiness is quite limited.

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It is possible to project ROK requirements to defend against a North Korean or combined North Korean/Chinese attack, based on Korean war performance, by making certain tentative assumptions. For example, offensive and defensive operations in the less spectacular latter two-years of the war may not be representative of future combat, though there would be many similarities: The terrain and objectives would be the same and general troop dispositions have not changed appreciably. The ROKs defending alone may not be as tenacious or aggressive as when fighting along-side US forces - however, the solid performance of ROK units in SVN would tend to discount this concern. Also, the present man-for-man ability of ROK soldiers fighting against NKA-CCA troops may not be fairly represented by the Korean War data -- though again, there is good reason to believe that ROK Army improvements, based on fifteen years of US military assistance and training, have exceeded changes in North Korean capabilities, where the emphasis has been on developing a strong air force. Assuming all such considerations balance, ROK defense needs would be as indicated below. Of course, if counter-attack forces were needed or a severe rear area security problem developed, more forces would be necessary.

TABLE 3-3

ROK DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS: HISTORICAL BASIS

	<u>Enemy Strength^{1/}</u> ('000)		<u>ROK Defense Requirements^{2/}</u>		
	<u>Combat^{3/}</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Combat^{3/}</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Divisions</u>
NKA Attack (25 Divisions)	281	345	216	283	10
NKA/CPR Attacks (59 Divisions)	693	995	533	788	24

1/ Based on current intelligence. (See Section 5.)

2/ Based on Table 3-1, page 74, and current ROKA support needs, Section 8.

3/ Combat Zone.

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SECTION 4: ROK SELF-DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS: WARGAME ANALYSIS

4.1 Summary

The adequacy of ROK defenses against a North Korean attack was evaluated by simulating a Korean war using wargaming techniques. SPECTRUM, a recent Department of Army study, was used with revisions being made to the basic wargame input data based on variations in logistics (para. 4.3), close-air support (para. 4.4) and a defensive posture advantage for the ROKA (4.5). Additionally, the following changes were made in the SPECTRUM scenarios in our analysis. First, we assumed that the initial attack was met by an all ROK force, with the implication that the 1 1/3 US division had been redeployed or relocated elsewhere in-country. Second, we considered both the circumstance where the initial attack was by NK only and the case where the CCA reenforced NK (the SPECTRUM scenario). Because the latest SNIE indicates the greatest threat still to be a conventional attack, we relied on conventional strategies of confrontation like SPECTRUM, rather than make modifications for other strategies such as insurgency. We do not believe that these modifications would reduce the validity of our results over those of the original wargame.

Using these revisions, six and one-third committed ROK reinforced divisions could hold a North Korean attack along the DMZ, or at least north of Seoul. If US close air support is available, at 20-30 sorties per division engaged, six divisions may suffice. Should the North Koreans be reinforced by Chinese Communist combat units (up to 35 divisions in the theater) ROK needs would increase to 14 2/3 reinforced divisions committed, assuming US close air support is available.

Additional ROK forces would be needed as reserves to meet geographically localized demands for increased forces or to respond against the unexpected. These requirements were not simulated in the wargame. Based on experience in the Korean War discussed previously, an increase in forces of about 50%-100% would be needed. Therefore, ROK active forces for use against North Korea should include at least 12 divisions, and ROK total forces, active and reserves, for use against a NKA force reinforced by the CPR, should include at least 22 divisions.

4.2 The Basic Wargame Simulation

In the recent Department of Army study SPECTRUM, ROK/US defensive capabilities in preplanned battle positions south of the DMZ were examined assuming a D-day attack of 21 NKA divisions. The NKA would reinforce its attack with an additional four follow-on divisions deployed before D+15. The total defense force consisted of 20 2/3 ROK divisions and 1 1/3 US divisions on the line and two more ROK reserve divisions which could be deployed by D+15. Stalemate was accomplished by D+30. This initial analysis showed that the ROK/UN force had a considerable force margin to spare (at least 20%).

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Based on this wargame, the ROKs could accomplish the defense alone if: (1) the firepower contributed by the US forces were furnished by the ROKs, in which case the ROK combat forces are increased or the ROKs are furnished improved weapons; (2) the time to stalemate were longer, since the time required to gain the offensive is considered a function of friendly/enemy force ratios; a decrease in this ratio would increase the time necessary to reduce the enemy force to the point that he no longer can effectively attack, let alone break through the primary defense lines; or (3) the number of NK units available for the offensive were reduced; for example, the ROK or US amphibious counter-attack capabilities may require North Korea to retain a reserve; or (4) the ROK safety margin were reduced.

4.3 Variations in Requirements Based on Logistics

In the basic wargame NKA capabilities were projected on the assumption that the enemy forces were supplied ammunition at the same rate as ROK troops (which is based on the US expenditure rates). If we assume that the NKA is supplied ammunition at the rate computed from current DIA data which is lower than the US consumption rate used originally and similar to Korea war reference-- see Table 4-4 at the end of this section. The lack of intelligence concerning the NKA may make this assumption overly optimistic, though generally, the DIA data represents the best estimate. This change in firepower for the mortars and artillery of the NKA division is shown in the table below. The decrease amounts to a 38.0% reduction in the NKA force capability. To match this NKA force in firepower, the ROKs alone would need only 14 2/3 divisions.

TABLE 4-1
REDUCTION IN NKA FIREPOWER POTENTIAL

<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Weapons per Reinforced Division^{1/}</u>	<u>US Ammo Rates (Rds/Day)^{2/}</u>	<u>Forecasted NKA/CPR Rates (Rds/Day)^{3/}</u>	<u>Percentage Reduction in NKA Firepower (%)</u>
<u>Mortars</u>				
82 mm	87	46.4	10.9	77
120 mm	57	30.0	6.6	78
160 mm	5	26.1	6.6	75
<u>Artillery</u>				
76 mm	34	26.8	17.3	35
122 mm	23	55.3	14.9	73
152 mm	3	48.6	10.7	78

^{1/} Computed from DIA data.

^{2/} From SB 38-26.

^{3/} DIA, AP1-220-5-2-64 INT: DIA standard rates; computed.

4.4 Variations in Requirements Based on Close Air Support

If ROK forces obtain close air support from US tactical forces (up to 20 sorties per division) their firepower is increased by 8.75% of their total firepower on D-Day. This firepower increase is enough so that only 13 1/3 ROK divisions are adequate to stalemate the NKA attack. Because the firepower

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added by NKA close air support is so limited, its presence would increase ROK requirements by only 1/3 division (see Chapter Three for a discussion of NKAF ground attack limitations).

4.5 Variations in Requirements if ROKs are in Defense Posture

The preceding discussion assumed no posture advantage for the ROK defenders. There are two ways to adjust for postures: (1) reduce the firepower of the attacker -- a lower effectiveness would be obtained for fires engaging a dug-in force rather than troops in the open; or (2) assume that stalemate is reached at a lower defense to offense force ratio.

If the firepower of attacking and defending forces are to be adjusted, both ROK and NKA postures should be re-examined. Using NK tactical doctrine for an attack force, it would seem logical to expect enemy infantry to advance with about half of the men standing (moving) and half prone, seeking temporary cover. This situation would exist back 1,000 meters from the line of contact. Artillery and command observation posts would probably vary from 75% prone - 25% foxhole to 100% foxhole. In rear areas, 25-60% of the men would probably be standing; the remainder prone or in foxholes.*

Since most of the ROKA mortars and organic division artillery would be engaging the advancing enemy units, the 50% prone - 50% standing criterion used initially seems reasonable. Larger caliber corps artillery firing at NKA observation posts, command posts, artillery positions, and assembly areas would be hitting harder targets - 25% foxhole, 35% prone, and 40% standing, on the average. Therefore, the firepower scores computed for the ROKA, which are based on indirect fire against targets 50% prone - 50% standing, should be varied only for corps artillery. Doing this reduces the ROKA Corps artillery firepower by 22%, and thus reduces the total firepower of the ROK reinforced division force by 2%.

The ROKA target postures the North Koreans could expect to encounter would be considerably different from the average (50% prone - 50% standing) used in the initial wargame. ROKA front-line units would probably be in a 75% foxhole - 25% prone posture at worst; more likely, they would be 90% + foxhole - and the remainder prone. Command posts, observation posts, assembly areas, etc., would probably be 80% foxhole - 20% prone at worst again, it is more probable that most of the ROK forces would be in foxholes or bunkers. Consequently, the effectiveness of NK fires would be considerably less than that of ROK fires because the ROK troops would not be in the open. As shown in the next Table, the effect of these harder ROKA postures is to reduce the NKA artillery and mortar firepower by 71%.

* pp. G-III-A-A-10 to 12, USACBC, Optimum Mix of Artillery Units

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TABLE 4-2

VARIATION IN NKA FIREPOWER DURING
ATTACKS ON ROKA DEFENSE POSITIONS

<u>Weapons</u> ^{1/}		<u>Lethality of Rds: Prone and Standing Targets</u> ^{2/}	<u>Lethality of Rds: Targets in Bunkers and Foxholes</u> ^{3/}	<u>Reduction in Lethality Per Round (%)</u>
<u>Type</u>	<u>Nbr</u>			
<u>Mortars</u>				
82 mm	87	--	--	69 ^{3/}
120 mm	57	6,620	2,079	69
160 mm	5	--	--	69 ^{3/}
<u>Artillery</u>				
76 mm	34	--	--	72 ^{4/}
122 mm	23	7,998	2,255	72
152 mm	3	4,475	1,489	71

1/ Computed from DIA OB data.

2/ Measured in square meters: 50% prone, 50% standing.

3/ Measured in square meters: 75% foxhole, 25% prone.

4/ Not available. Variation is estimated.

When these changes to NKA and ROKA firepower potential are considered, fewer ROK Army forces are needed to block the North Korean invaders. Assuming a stalemate along the DMZ can be achieved if the ROKs match North Korean firepower, then the ROKs need 6 1/3 reinforced divisions. If the North Koreans have air support, the number of ROK divisions required for defense remains about the same (since air support increases NK force by only 1.1%). However, if the ROKs are supported by US air at 8.75% of the D-day firepower, initially estimated in the wargame, then six reinforced ROK divisions are required. This assumes, of course, that limited ROKAF forces are not used for close support missions.

4.6 ROK Requirements Against a Combined CPR/NKA force

If the North Korean attack did not accomplish its objective, it is conceivable that the CPR would reinforce the NKA. Should this occur, ROK

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needs on the front line would increase substantially. Assuming that the ROKs have retained their defensive postures and that the CCA/NKA units have ammunition available at the DIA forecasted rates, based on the wargame simulation ROK committed forces would have to be increased to approximately 14 2/3 divisions. Limitations in space would militate against deploying additional units on the line - their effectiveness would be decreased. This force would not be capable of holding along the DMZ, but would have to give way gradually to prepared "switch back" lines north of Seoul. If there are no surprises, the NKA/CCA attack could be held north of Seoul at least another 30 days, allowing ample time for US reinforcement, if necessary, or escalation.

4.7 Reserve Requirements

Additional units would be needed as reserves. In the simulation of the war, it was assumed that forces would be effectively positioned, thus enabling the ROKs to stop the attack with a minimum of units. In actuality one would expect the enemy to achieve some surprise, both as to the time of the attack and as to the precise location of his main thrust. Consequently, a fairly mobile ROK defense in depth, with forces in reserve, would be preferable to a concentration of all defense forces along the DMZ.

Our experience in both the Korean War and the current SVN conflict provides some basis for estimating the percentage of forces that should be maintained, over and above the raw defense requirements, for such a defense in depth. During the Korean War, as indicated in Section 3 above, the ROK Army was able to keep engaged an average of 48% of its forces, with about two-thirds committed during major defensive or offensive actions. Efficiency has improved somewhat since the Korean War. In the current SVN conflict, US units have averaged about 20 combat days per month, or 65% of total forces engaged continuously. This is a 50% improvement in efficiency over Korean War experience.

In any future conflicts in Korea it would be reasonable to expect the ROK Army to keep committed on a sustained basis at least 50% of its force. Against major enemy offensives, such as a NKA attack reinforced by the CCA, the ROKs should be able to commit up to 65% of total divisions. These estimates assume availability of adequate ammunition and logistic support. On this basis, ROK total needs range from 9 to 29 1/3 divisions, as indicated in the next table. Of this total, it makes sense to keep in active forces at least enough divisions to stop a NKA attack. Additional needs could be met by activating cadre or reserve divisions, thereby saving considerably on manpower and defense costs. ROK Defense requirements are summarized on the next page.

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TABLE 4-4

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES: SELECTIVE MONTHS

<u>COMMUNIST: ARTILLERY & MORTARS</u>				<u>UN FORCES: 81 mm MORTAR and 105 mm HOWITZER</u>			<u>COMPARATIVE RATIOS</u>		
<u>Selective Months</u>	<u>Tubes/Period (Total)</u>	<u>Tubes/Period (At Front)</u>	<u>Total Rounds Expended</u>	<u>Rnds/Tube/Day (Total)</u>	<u>Rnds/Tube/Day (At Front)</u>	<u>Total Tubes</u>	<u>Total Rnds Expended</u>	<u>Rnds/Tube/Day</u>	<u>Enemy (total rnds) to Friendly (81 & 105 rounds)</u>
Apr 52	E 1886	E 1001	71,640	1.3	2.4	2037	727,890	11.9	1 - 10
May "	E 2075	E 1101	110,535	1.7	3.2	2097	599,736	9.2	1 - 5
June "	2349	1246	205,000	2.9	5.5	2162	1,045,786	16.1	1 - 5
July "	2349	E 1257	151,373	2.1	3.9	2162	820,559	12.3	1 - 5
Aug. "	2522	1307	185,443	2.4	4.6	2211	786,483	11.5	1 - 4
Sept. "	E 1822	959	307,937	5.6	10.7	2211	909,380	13.7	1 - 3
Oct. "	E 2086	1098	286,247	4.4	8.4	2223	1,837,831	26.7	1 - 6
Nov. "	E 2157	1135	148,206	2.3	4.4	2354	1,265,217	17.9	1 - 9
Dec. "	E 2176	1145	36,760	.5	1.0	2485	953,221	12.4	1 - 26
Jan. 53	E 2124	1118	37,400	.6	1.1	2616	1,408,429	17.4	1 - 38
Feb. "	E 2806	1477	69,375	.9	1.7	2747	978,575	12.7	1 - 14
Mar. "	2879	1014	169,240	1.9	3.4	2878	1,029,395	11.5	1 - 6
TOTAL			1,779,156				12,362,502		1 - 7

Note: E = Estimated

1/ This period was selected because by this time the CCF had built up its logistic system and supplies were more plentiful.

2/ Hq. 8th Army Command Reports.

3/ Logistics In the Korean Operations, Vol. II, Hq. AFPE/8A (Rear).

4/ Data was available for tubes on the front which were firing April-August 1952 (710; 781; 884; 892; 892). An average of 37% of the total tubes were firing on the front.

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TABLE 4-3

ROK DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

ROK DEFENSE FORCES

<u>Enemy Force</u>	<u>Divisions Committed</u>	<u>Reserves (Temporary)</u>	<u>Reserves (Sustained)</u>	<u>Total Requirements</u>
NKA Attack (21-25 Divisions)	6	3	6	9-12
NKA/CCA Attack (25-60 Divisions)	14 2/3	7 1/3	14 2/3	22-29 1/3

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