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Another major problem is health and welfare. Sanitation and sewers are still primitive - only 13 percent of Seoul toilets have a flush system. There is a shortage of doctors and health services. While government and some private businesses have initiated medical insurance and social security programs, these are not widespread; yet at the same time only a small minority of the respondents in the survey either wanted or expected to be supported in their old age by their children. Workers' compensation for government workers and those in larger enterprises has been in effect since 1964. These facts show, both that a beginning has been made toward the solution of some social welfare problems, and that it is only a beginning. Unless progress keeps pace with rising needs and even faster-rising demands, the lack of essential services and of political participation could add intensity to any national issue.

A.3 The Business Community

Under government leadership and established political-economic priorities, the Korean business community has been at the forefront of the ROK's rapid economic development and industrialization. Nearly every major government economic policy through the 1960's touches on the development and welfare of the private industrial sector.

Initial and economically hazardous partnerships between government and inexperienced entrepreneurs in the early post-Korean War era, and extending through much of the Rhee regime in the 1950's has gradually evolved into a professional community of private industrial-commercial interests. These newly emerging interests have struck patterns of new relationships with government and political leaders. From a core of small favored business groups in the mid-1950's, the Korean business community has expanded into a proliferation of private firms engaged in all aspects of manufacture, domestically, and in the international market. By the end of 1968, government and private industry absorbed approximately 3 million workers, an increase of nearly 90% since 1962. The overall structure of the community remains essentially overshadowed by major industrial combines or conglomerates that have enjoyed exclusive privileges from government executive leadership. These conglomerates, approximately 10-15 in present numbers, have not advanced entirely on merit alone. They have obtained advantages and position in the larger framework of short-term political expediency. Yet, conversely, it has been the larger business combines that have been among the first to infuse modern management techniques into the production processes. Sound industrial management in the private sector has also had the effect of educating government leadership on the fundamentals of business and economic priorities, which frequently conflict with unrealistic political objectives of the government.

Business, on its own part, has been responsive to the challenge and the lure of favored incentives. Increased availability and access to domestic and foreign capital, advanced management and planning expertise, along with government protectionism and favoritism, have all contributed to the expanded wealth and influence of the ranking business community. Since early 1967, the executive branch of government has undertaken a directed effort to diffuse

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the expanded increments of national wealth to a wider number of business interests. The motivation for such actions has been largely political in order to lessen the political-social impact of creating industrial giants that eventually become unresponsive to government controls. Some enterprises are only fronts for the political leadership, while others are allowed to arise as a result of making substantial pay-offs. Since the mid-1960's, increasing numbers of manufacturing and trading enterprises have entered into competition in the export market that has expanded at more than a 40 percent annual rate since 1965. The government is also moving to divest itself of basically profitable, but poorly managed monopoly industries to relatively new business organizations that are reliable and responsive politically.

Government planning and regulatory actions, both official and unofficial, have by no means been entirely responsive to soundly conceived economic priorities. Extensive covert involvement by ROK CIA in major commercial endeavors has placed substantial segments of Korean industry and commerce under political management for the purpose of generating funds for government political activities. Covert manipulation of other private and government-owned business also creates a disruptive effect upon important sectors of industry. Controls and methods of manipulation have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, but not necessarily less lenient. Where means of more direct control are absent, business executives must still adhere to fairly refined "statutes" of tribute to government solicitors appointed by the Executive.

The overall climate of the Korean business community may be generally described as optimistically buoyant in reaching for new domestic and international markets, and rapidly expanding under strains of inexperience and self-application - all under close and sometimes disruptive government administration and manipulation.

The business community has the capability and has organized itself as an interest group (Federation of Korean Industries, National Chamber of Commerce, etc.), but has not sought to challenge the government on any significant political-economic issues. Because of diverse and competing member interests it functions largely as a forum for publicity and "acceptable" debate.

A.4 Youth and Students

Korea is a young country. Approximately 4 out of 10 persons are under 15 years of age; roughly 5 percent are 15 to 19 years old (1964 figures). Except for about 6 percent of those 18 to 23 who are enrolled in universities, the population over 19 is already engaged in the adult society, as are many who leave school after the sixth year. These facts, coupled with the difficulties of making a living, argue against any early general revolt of youth as such, so long as unemployment and under-employment can be kept within politically manageable proportions - as they apparently have been for the last few years.

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The main areas where youth has expressed itself have been on the campus, in politically-affiliated youth groups, and in hoodlum gangs and juvenile delinquency. Traditionally, Korean villages have had social groups organized by age. The Government encourages various youth groups, including Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 4-H Clubs, but there has been no one national youth movement since Yi Pom-Sok's National Youth Corps was dissolved in 1949 as a threat to President Rhee's control. The bulk of the enlisted men in the armed forces are young draftees. Discharged veterans have been a problem in the past, but are now kept under control through the ROK Veterans' Administration. None of these groups, except for the students, has recently displayed any distinct political motivation except when led by adult politicians or government leaders for specific political ends. Respect for age and authority is still strong. Thus the "youth problem" in Korea, from the political viewpoint, is chiefly a student problem at present. However, with a declining birth rate, growing urbanization, and improved welfare, an aging and more well-to-do population may later face a confrontation between generations.

Students were mobilized by contending political forces prior to 1948, but after that they were of little political importance until they emerged in 1960. They remained a force to be reckoned with - less because of their own organization than because of the sympathy they attracted among the population generally - until about 1965, when improved government techniques for controlling them, and the upturn in the nation's economy, combined to turn attention away from political issues. Unlike 1960, when both high-school and college students had had the experience of frequent mobilization by the government to demonstrate for political issues and had a nationwide Students National Defense Corps as a vehicle, there is not now any significant general organization of students. Thus, although the total numbers of students are formidable - over 400,000 in high schools and over 85,000 in colleges and universities, with more than half the latter in Seoul - they have no ready institutional means of united action.

Nevertheless, a 1966 USIA survey indicated that 15 percent of university students - chiefly social-science majors - are "potential activists." A qualified academic observer has spoken of underground political movements centering around support of Kim Chong-p'il, of Fabian democracy, and of Marxist ideas. About half the students indicated they are active in some school organization; student government organizations were rated most important in school life.

Student attitudes have apparently changed in significant respects since 1960, while remaining the same in others. There seems to be less simplistic faith in either Western democracy or Marxism as a panacea for Korea's problems, and more inclination to look for distinctively Korean solutions. This shift involves both increasing nationalism - the result of almost a generation of schooling under an independent government - and increasing pragmatism, as evidence of continuing economic progress makes preparation for specific

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future goals more meaningful. Youthful black-and-white attitudes on the nation's shortcomings continue, focused particularly on social injustice and corruption. At present, however, there seems to be little disposition in the schools to organize or fight for any political issue, leader, or party.

Several surveys of student attitudes have been made since 1960 by USIA, private researchers and the Korean Government. Salient points from the standpoint of political analysis, drawn from these surveys and from comments of qualified observers, include the following:

(1) Students apparently have a positive attitude on change and new ways. A survey by Lewis and Chang suggests that Korean students (a sample of 866) are almost as receptive to "acceptance of the general desirability of change;" "acceptance of the desirability of that which is new," and "acceptance of a break with tradition," as are urban Japanese students, and considerably more so than rural Japanese. Moreover, there is relatively little difference in the attitudes of urban and rural Korean students - possibly because country boys who go to Seoul high school (where the survey was made) are change-oriented, or because the urban environment has influenced them. Perhaps the most revealing responses were to two of the eight propositions used in the survey: "On the whole, the old ways of doing things are the best" - with which 83 percent of the urban students and 77 percent of the rural students agree and, "New things are usually better than old things," with which 66 percent of the urban students and 55 percent of the rural students agreed. The most equivocal response was to the proposition, "I like people who are willing to change," with which 55 percent of the urban students and 59 percent of the rural students agreed. (Lewis-Chang, n.d.)

(2) Former ideas of political "student power" have been largely dissipated, both among the students and in the adult community, and most students are apolitical. Reasons include government infiltration of the student body, the lack of an outstanding issue spurring the students to action, and improved job opportunities, with the accompanying reluctance to jeopardize career prospects by political activity. Personal goals dominate university students' thinking; they are not generally interested in public service as such or in political participation. Moreover, they echo the government's policy in giving priority to economic development over political issues, including democratic freedoms. (It would appear that social-science students tend to have the strongest and most deviant political and social ideas.)

(3) Students also believe that democracy must be tailored to the Korean scene, and apparently prefer a strong, authoritarian government capable of "getting things done" even at the cost of restricting political freedoms. However, there is little support for Communism. Over 90 percent of students in a 1966 ROK Government survey indicated anti-Communist attitudes (although the sponsorship of the survey raises some question as to the accuracy of the responses).

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(4) As a means of influencing government decisions, students nevertheless favor getting people organized and interested in an issue, rather than working through an existing political party. Only a handful believe that organizing a protest demonstration, or even using personal influence channels, is the most effective approach - a possible sign of growing modernity in outlook.

(5) "Nearly all students believe that Koreans generally and their government in particular lack a strong sense of national identity. This belief is the foundation of their dissatisfaction with their government, their society, and the United States and its relations with Korea." (USIS Msg 48) This nationalistic outlook was expressed in a different way by an opposition Assemblyman's son, who said to an Embassy officer that "men of his father's generation instinctively look to outside powers for guidance on matters affecting Korea's interest. However, men of the son's generation do not think the same way and look forward to the day when the outlook represented by his father will be changed." (Memcon October 23, 1968)

(6) Students distrust and apparently misunderstand their government, believing that a "basic disagreement" exists between Korean youth and government leaders. (On the other hand, observers have pointed to closer links between government and youth now than ever before. This attitude is probably part of the traditional dislike of power and authority, which will persist to some extent regardless of government policy, but which may be less aggravated now than in the past.)

(7) A majority of the students surveyed by USIA contract in 1966 were either "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied" with their standard of living; nearly half said they would be satisfied with their living standards after 10 years, although an equal number said they couldn't tell. At the same time students indicated acute awareness of general economic problems, 98 percent holding that the disparity in living standards between rich and poor was greater than it should be, and 51 percent believing that the gap would increase in the future. "Economic instability and poverty" was cited by a majority as Korea's most important domestic problem.

(8) "Reunification is a latent issue in student thinking. A majority believe Korea cannot achieve satisfactory economic development without it, but only one student in ten considers reunification likely in the 'foreseeable future.'" (USIA R-6-68)

(9) Students like the United States. They are impressed with American military and economic strength, and believe it will be used for peaceful ends. Over two-thirds wanted Korea on the side of the U.S. in the world situation. At the same time, they resent U.S. influence over the Korean government and criticize the U.S. aid program both for failing to make Korea economically independent and for serving primarily selfish U.S. objectives (e. g., a market for U.S. surpluses). Seventy-two percent of the students thought U.S. officials exercise too much influence on the way the government is run.

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(10) The students distrust and dislike Japan, but also favor increased trade and student exchange agreements, believing that Korea stands to profit from increased intercourse.

(11) In contrast to even the educated among the general population, a large majority of students think the United Nations is decreasing in effectiveness; the reason most often given was the unwillingness of member nations to compromise their national interests for the general good.

(12) Aside from aspects of the international situation directly affecting Korea, students seem at most mildly interested, and even unaware, of events on the international scene. The recent student demonstrations in Japan and the Czech civil protests have not evoked much interest or response. Student unrest and hippie movements in Japan, other parts of East Asia, and the West, that stem from a revolt against the establishment, have not become fashionable in Korea.

(13) So far as their own life as students is concerned, the responses to a 1966 ROK Government survey indicated satisfaction among 32, and neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction among 45 percent. Dissatisfaction had declined since a previous Government survey in 1962. Principal reasons for dissatisfaction were tuition and economic problems, social disorder and dissatisfaction, school environment, poorly qualified professors, and (chiefly in the provinces) poor facilities.

(14) Students' career preferences and occupation ratings reflect a marked shift away from traditional emphasis on government and politics. A questionnaire administered to 864 students in four Korean high schools in 1964 by a private scholar (Chang) indicated highest rankings for business, academic, scientific, and social welfare positions. Cabinet ministers ranked ninth, while first place went to "member of the board of directors of a large corporation." "Diplomatic", however, placed third. The 1966 ROK Government survey found that students consider the most desirable jobs to be college teaching, business, farm management, journalism and social work. Least desirable were military service, religion, and government service.

Despite the general shift toward pragmatic concern with economics and personal considerations, students unquestionably retain a latent capacity to rally around a national issue which arouses a strong emotional response. The government itself recognizes that the students are still the focus of interest in the entire community. Thus they might again be a center of dissent and demonstration in a time of political troubles, given an issue on which they held strong views which were supported by the general population, as in 1960.

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APPENDIX B

POLITICAL LEADERS AND POLITICAL PROCESS

1. The Presidency and the Executive
2. Democratic Republican Party
3. Conservative Opposition
4. Other opposition groupings
5. Communications media
6. Intellectuals

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APPENDIX B

POLITICAL LEADERS AND POLITICAL PROCESS

B.1 The Presidency and the Executive

The evolution of the executive establishment - its charter and its role - during the 1960s is inseparably linked to the style and technique of leadership of President Chung Hee PARK - his allegiances, his alliances, his moods, and his sense of historic destiny, along with his impressive record of political self-education beginning in the hectic days of the military junta regime. By the end of his first elective term in office, President Park had firmly established a personal style of leadership permitting relatively prolonged political stability and the accompanying rate of impressive national economic development.

Lacking the ingredients of charisma from the outset, the President has exercised his talents most effectively in structuring an internal executive balance of power and influence. His strength of leadership remains founded on his firmness of will, his increasing administrative dexterity and his personal relationship with key political figures, which enable him on numerous occasions to take decisive and sometimes harsh action against individual supporters in the political elite without destroying or significantly eroding the fabric of his political backing. Park has never been significantly challenged by any internal leadership group (civilian or military), but has been the focal point of influence sought by all contending second echelon power groups.

The President has been the driving force behind the use of growth and development as the major justification and rationale for his Government. In pursuing this policy he has, by the weight of his own power, gradually increased the influence of persons whose value lies in their administrative and technical achievements rather than their political popularity, even against the demands of strong elements within his own party.

More recently, and often in connection with the highly controversial third term issue, the President has been criticized for his domineering and arrogant manner. However, taken within the Korean perspective, his style of leadership has produced ultimately desired effects of internal stability and viability. Today, his growing sensitivity to the development of popular consensus behind the regime's programs may have become a more central factor in his outlook and his choice of administrative techniques. Yet, it is probable that he is still drawn to the technique of dictating government action and then setting out to mobilize acceptance and response.

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A preference for authoritarian techniques is a logical result of the President's background. His social origin is roughly lower-middle-class. He was educated in the authoritarian, Confucian-oriented Japanese school system, became a Japanese army officer, was briefly a member of the Communist Party, and served another 14 years in the Korean Army. Thus there is little in his conditioning which would make him sympathetic to the democratic approach, and the perpetual crisis under which Korea has lived argues against the luxury of democracy. While he has developed and demonstrated his adeptness for political manipulation, he has not appeared comfortable in the role of a democratic leader. Many of his closest advisers share this background and attitude. Moreover, the President is not an easy man to advise; despite his seeming remoteness and taciturnity, he is capable of violent outbursts of emotion, which tend to inhibit frank expressions of views.

Executive power is applied and maintained through a variety of agencies. At the core is the Presidential Secretariat, a key power center. Around it are the State Council and the government bureaucracy, Democratic Republican Party, ROK Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the armed forces - including the ROK Army Security Command (formerly ROKA CIC), and the Korean National Police (KNP). These are the six elements that constitute the executive balance of power. Relations between these elements are at times, and depending upon the issues of organizational and personal interest, both complementary and conflicting. The President has intended that they be both, to provide the basis for balance and checks. The principal basis for cooperation among them is shared loyalty to the President; they compete for his favor and for power and influence.

The State Council, though it is controlled by the inner executive "establishment" (Secretariat and informal personal advisors) is not merely an arm and political scapegoat of the Chief Executive. It is expected to carry on the business of government and has some latitude for criticism and policy debate. To provide for continuation and longevity, required to implement new policies, the President has resisted ministerial changes in the face of political crisis, and probably will continue to do so. Since the aftermath of student revolts over the ROK-Japan issue in 1964, the installed cabinet has remained substantially in place, with the Prime Minister and several other original members still in office. President Park has not seen fit to enforce government political party identity upon the cabinet, though such a request was finally made and accepted in late 1964. One of the key members of the inner executive and the cabinet, former Deputy Prime Minister Chang Ki-yong, refused to join the DRP throughout his tenure in office - with obvious approval of the President, who continually used him for executive actions in the political arena.

It is not surprising that with the assumption of both the presidency and the DRP leadership (as party president), Park has continued to turn his energies and political expertise to developing and strengthening the executive vis-a-vis the national party organization. He is undoubtedly motivated by the desire to hedge his personal power position. In no small measure, he is

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certainly prompted in his actions by "exterior influences" within the contending leadership elements in the DRP - the party is still not wholly owned by himself. Yet the controls over the DRP leadership have clearly made the party structure dependent upon presidential direction. This was the foundation of frustration and internal crisis that prompted KIM Chong-p'il's temporary political exile in 1964 and again the following year, and finally his eventual disaffection and resignation from the party chairmanship in May, 1968.

Kim's demise from leadership circles has, for the first time in recent years, created the first significant imbalance of power at the apex. The President shows no immediate interest in restoring the balance. Probably he feels that his supremacy no longer requires that he need do so. In the short term, his attentions have turned to maintaining the internal balance among his closest and still contending political aides and advisers, and utilizing their respective talents (YI Hu-rak, Chief Presidential Secretary; KIM Song-kon, businessman and raiser of DRP funds; KIM Hyong-uk, Director of the CIA; KIM Chae-ho, Secretary General of the DRP; KIM Song-un, former Defense Minister; OM Min-yong, Ambassador to Japan; and others.)

By virtue of his chosen tactics in creating and maintaining an internal balance of governmental and political powers among his chosen lieutenants, President Park has also created the "politics of exclusion" - limiting or barring possible contenders for power from any position of challenge to his leadership. Thus he has produced a virtual vacuum of concentrated authority at the secondary echelon of power. The senior advisory group surrounding the President, by virtue of its make-up, is nothing akin to a politically homogeneous whole. Personnel suspicions and animosities are not far from the surface. The underpinning system exercised by the President of playing one advisor off on another to the dictates of any given situation further exacerbates latent rivalries. Thus, in reality, the outward appearance of cohesiveness within the inner executive establishment (secretariat and personal advisors) is not matched by the tensions of personal rivalry within. The President's option to proceed with his third term plans serves in part, however, to reduce the heightening of these diverse and multiple rivalries since the prospect that the President will remain in office for another four-year term also presumably extends their own tenure. This consideration may well have motivated his entourage to encourage the President in his intention. (Similar considerations impelled President Rhee's advisers to rig the election in 1960 to keep him in office.)

Analysis of existing information indicates that President Park may feel drawn or compelled to amend the constitution permitting him to seek a consecutive term. In the Korean context, his decision to take this precarious political step is not an unnatural one in light of preceding domestic political events, and the direction of his leadership since the 1967 national elections. Should he make this decision, it is probable that he would be motivated by the conviction that his major economic and political programs are "correct," and that his continued personal leadership is a pre-

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requisite to the successful implementation of these programs. It is also probable that he would envisage the program and period of the forthcoming Third Five-Year Plan (1972-76) to be the zenith of his career. To exclude himself from the seat of power when the determined pinnacle is attained would not only be an unnecessary act of self-denial, but would threaten the stable foundation of executive authority - the political underpinning of the nation's modernization process. Another rationale that would be part of his decision is the theory or idea that the ROK must be endowed with the image of a strong, invincible polarization of power in the south to counter the growing cult image of KIM Il-sung that he is indeed a contender and a foe to be reckoned with in any crisis perpetrated by the North Korean regime. Following this trend of thought, self-imposed retirement would only serve to induce the obvious aggressive response from North Korea.

There are some signs of greater authoritarianism on the part of the leadership group around the President. This is a natural Korean response to political stress - the opposition and public reaction to 1967 election irregularities, the increasing threat from North Korea, and the third-term issue. The North Korean threat in particular, as manifested in the attempted assassination of the President in 1968 and the Pueblo affair, have helped to convince this group of what many of them are disposed to believe anyway - that this is not the time to be concerned about the development of democratic freedoms, especially if the result is to depose them from comfortable positions of power, prestige, and wealth.

Thus far, indications are that President Park and other principal ROK leaders are well informed on the situations and problems of the Korean polity. In addition to the formal information channels - the bureaucracy, the police, the Army Security Command, The Central Intelligence Agency, and the Board of Audit (the effectiveness of which last is unknown, but is probably not great) - the President also utilizes his own staff as information gatherers, and reportedly reads the newspapers attentively. He travels extensively. He presumably receives some information from the Democratic Republican Party and from the National Assembly debates. He also receives information through his own informal circle of cronies (who, however, tend to be from the President's own region of origin and are not broadly representative of the nation). There is clear evidence of positive reaction to major problems - for example, relief and development measures in the Cholla provinces following the drought there; an anti-corruption campaign responding to growing complaints; current planning to concentrate more development resources on the agricultural sector during the Third Five-Year Plan.

If the President holds office for a third term, the principal sources of instability will be (1) failure of communication between leadership and people, (2) an internal struggle for power, (3) Park's death or incapacitation.

(1) If trends toward more authoritarian rule and greater dependence on a small group of associates continue, then the President may grow less aware of problems needing solution - especially the less visible ones, or those with longer-range implications - because (a) he may grow more confident of his

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ability to crush, co-opt, or buy off any opposition, (b) his associates may shield him from unpleasant information in order to protect themselves, or even try to manipulate him to perpetuate their own power, as happened at the end of the Rhee regime. (Even at present, the main formal information gathering agencies are better at enforcing the will of the center of power than at conveying the situation of the periphery, as has always been the case in Korea.) Although forces supporting Park probably can succeed in getting him a third term without great difficulty, they would probably produce an explosion in seeking a fourth if such trends developed in the meantime. Any major scandal or economic recession might also trigger an explosion.

(2) Authoritarian rule - or even long continuation of firm rule - focuses power on one man or a small group of men, thus exacerbating rivalries and divisions among the supporters. This is particularly true in Korea with its tradition of individual ambition, factionalism, character assassination, and physical assassination extending well back into the Yi Dynasty. President Park himself recognized this point in 1961, when he said to Ambassador Berger: "I know Korean history and my people. The longer we the military junta remain in power the greater the danger that we will be corrupted by power or money or divide among ourselves."

(3) The President's death or incapacitation would trigger a scramble for power, the outcome of which is not now foreseeable, although Kim Chong-p'il is probably still the most likely to win. Whether the still fragile Korean political order would survive the struggle is problematic. Possibilities include another Army takeover or larger-scale subversion and possible takeover by North Korea. Fear of the latter contingency, plus the remaining constraint of American influence, are the principal factors which would support some degree of order in the succession struggle.

In the event President Park decides not to seek a third term there can be expected dissension and at least temporary chaos within the secondary echelons of authority. Coupled with such a decision, it is probable that the President would be inclined to designate his choice as successor. In the latter action, President Park would certainly be motivated by the desire to ensure continuity of his major political and economic programs. A potential successor having won such distinction, and presumably general acceptance within DRP circles would immediately become the center of political faction contention. A designated successor such as Kim Chong-p'il would almost certainly arouse renewed animosities with vested powers in such close Presidential lieutenants as Yi Hu-rak and Kim Hyong-uk. A presidential mandate to all vying parties dictating terms of cooperation could not be expected to continue in force for any considerable period beyond President Park's retirement as Chief Executive.

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B.2 Democratic Republican Party

Changing Character

Although the Democratic Republican Party retains much of the same leadership with which it was formed, it would be a mistake to assume it is therefore the same party which came into being in early 1963. At that time, it had a revolutionary model (the Kuomintang) and a clearly defined goal--to provide the mechanism by which the young officers of the SCNR could maintain the power they held since 1961. The party's tasks were few and related. The central task was to provide a vehicle for Park Chung Hee's candidacy. Secondary requirements were to enable the broadest possible participation in carrying out the programs of the SCNR and to assure that these programs did not become stymied by political self-interest or bureaucratic indifference.

Today it can be said that the DRP is a victim of its own success. With the exception of national reunification, which was probably never seen as an immediately attainable goal, almost all targets have been achieved. President Park is safely into his second term. Though there is grumbling over the dominance of retired military in the party and government, it is no longer a closed corporation. Through development of a dual party government system and the interchange of personnel, it is difficult to conceive of a deep division between party and bureaucracy.

The result has been a predictable hardening of the ideological arteries. The party which once appeared as a development without precedent in Korean history is rapidly assuming the characteristics of more typical political groupings. That is to say that for the first time since its inception factionalism is accepted as commonplace and rumors of overt splits are not discounted. Staff positions are less of an opening to the top and more of a shaky sinecure. It is increasingly difficult to picture the present secretariat promoting a "New Life Movement," substantive disaster relief campaigns, or even revivifying the more recent abortive Youth Service Corps.

All of these were earlier efforts to project an image of youthful revolutionary vigor. Most were in the style of the early driving force of the DRP, Kim Chong-p'il. The decline of his power has coincided with the stagnation of the party as a fresh and vital force on the Korean political scene.

The present public figures of the party are increasingly of a grey quality which makes their distinction from their NDP counterparts difficult. The comparison of Yun Chi-yong and Kim Chin-man with their predecessors is sufficient to illustrate the point.

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Declining Influence

The apparent decline in vigor of the DRP stems in part from factors outside the party. When the decision was made to move to a civilian government the party served Park Chung Hee as a means of controlling a hostile bureaucracy from outside the government. As Park has become increasingly confident in his control over the bureaucracy he has exerted his influence more directly and has consequently felt less need for a party originally conceived to be almost a second or parallel government.

More and more the loci of power have moved outside the party. Many of the staff secretariat have acknowledged this phenomenon by leaving the party. Military officers and civilians who were recruited at an early stage with promises of Assemblyman status have found their reward somewhat hollow as the Assembly has had its authority and prestige eroded away by the same concentration of power in the executive branch. The opposition to a third term amendment recently expressed within the party stems in part from this feeling of frustration.

This shift away from the DRP, moreover, is consistent with President Park's concept of "administrative democracy," which he enunciated in 1961. Oh Kie-chang describes the concept as follows: "Since little popular foundation of democracy exists in Korea, the revolutionary regime must uphold democratic principles at least at the administrative level. Administrative democracy practiced during the revolutionary or transitional period (underline added) must allow and welcome criticisms and recommendations by the people. All the achievements and failures of the administration should be judged by the public...The revolutionary forces must democratize the administrative structure in the direction of decentralization to encourage individual initiative and administrative efficiency...by rational management as well as effective democratic control." Oh comments that Park's ideas of education and reform of the people "are akin to the familiar notions of the tutelage period and of guided democracy." It is also apparent that Park's emphasis on administration and receptiveness to criticism are wholly consistent with the ideal Confucian structure, in which both enlightened administration and criticism were provided within the hierarchy, and petitions could be received from the people, but in which political parties as a means of articulating public interest had no place. It is relevant to recall that President Rhee, also, had no use for political parties until he was obliged to create one as a means of winning the elections which international pressures forced him to hold.

Basic Divisions

Already within the first term of President Park a basic division within the DRP became apparent. On the one side was the group headed by Kim Chong-p'il who represented a clear threat to their continuance in positions close to the President. Though this group has no clearly defined head, its leadership is generally considered to consist of Yi Hu-rak, Secretary to the President; Kim Hyong-uk, ROK CIA Director; Kil Chae-ho, Secretary

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General of the DRP; Kim Song-kon, DRP Finance Chairman and Om Min-yong, Ambassador to Japan. Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon, while distrustful of KCP and generally cooperative with the above group is not regarded as playing a leading role.

The terms "mainstreamer" and "non-mainstreamer" have today lost their meaning. This is partially because of the reversal of roles with the downfall of Kim Chong-p'il and partially because his opponents in victory have not formed a cohesive group.

One more potential source of disunity within the party is a characteristic shared with other political parties in Korea. The DRP has an elaborate organization with good channels of communication and some trained workers down to the eup or myon level. While the loyalties of these staffers extend directly back to the party's hierarchy, it is also true that within each constituency the Assemblyman or candidate has his own little fiefdom of part and full-time DRP staff members who owe their primary loyalties to him. Loyalties of Central Secretariat members also appear to be divided.

Third Term Amendment

The tone of the recent speeches in opposition to the third term amendment and private remarks by opponents within the DRP have two features in common. One is respect for President Park. The other is that an amendment would negate the goals of the May 16 Revolution. How much of this is more rhetoric and how much true idealism is debatable, but it cannot be ignored that, at this stage, much of the hard core of opposition to the amendment centers around Kim Chong-p'il followers. Proponents of the amendment tend to be those who see their careers closely linked to that of the President while opponents are those who see equal or better possibilities with the President removed from the scene.

At this early stage of the controversy over the third term amendment it is difficult to predict the outcome of this division within the party. Three alternatives are possible, however. The first would be a surrender on the part of the third term proponents if they are unable to muster sufficient support within the party. This would allow the dissidents to return to the fold and the party would continue on much as it is with decision-making authority centered elsewhere, but with the party's prestige enhanced and the role of the dissidents enlarged. A second possibility is that of the party division continuing to deepen. In that case, the proponents of the third term would probably make even greater efforts to by-pass the party and assign it a figurehead role. A third alternative is the possibility of a real split with the hard core dissidents coalescing and leaving the party. This may come to be the only course left open to the dissidents and may become the preferred course if they become convinced the President's cause cannot succeed.

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Outside Reaction

Public reaction to these alternatives will be dependent upon the situation at the time. Despite its best promotional efforts, the DRP has never quite shed its public image of a military-dominated organization bankrolled and guided by the ROK CIA which has managed to enlist the support of business tycoons by a series of preferential loans for the benefit of a few big business combines. Pre-revolutionary politicians who have joined cannot escape the suspicion of opportunism. Political cartoons generally represent the DRP as a well-fed individual wearing a Mao-style "New Life" jacket and hiding his intentions behind the dark glasses popularized by the junta in the early days.

The dramatic break from the organization of some leaders who actively participated in the revolution could result in formation of an organization which might become a Liberal Party. This party could conceivably obtain widespread support, particularly if the seemingly incompatible political bedfellows, the intellectuals and the military, were recruited to the cause. On the other hand, if the present division is somehow papered over, the DRP will probably continue to receive increasing indifference from the general public.

Relations of the party with various power groups such as the military are difficult to determine. There are indications, however, that attitudes within the military are split much along the lines of the division within the party: the older, senior officers being generally satisfied with a continuation of the status quo and the younger field-grade officers dissatisfied at the directions the party is taking.

Korean intellectuals have an instinctive distaste for the DRP which stems from its military cast and the means by which it came to power. Subsequent achievements have earned little more than a grudging acknowledgment that things have not gone as badly as they might have. At the same time, the opposition parties have failed to present an inspiring alternative. Without the third term issue this state of affairs might be expected to continue. However, as the issue moves into the open the intellectuals can be expected to make known their opposition. If the DRP is able to unite on the issue, alienation from the intellectual community can be expected to increase. On the other hand, the intellectuals might quickly rally to a group within the DRP which managed to present the image of an opposition to constitutional amendment based on principle. This dissident group would presumably be centered around Kim Chong-p'il who has traditionally been anathema to the intellectual community. However, there are provocative inklings that his youthful appearance, his colorful personality, and not least, his readiness to criticize the United States may make him acceptable for leadership in the next decade. If the above factors are combined with an apparent principled stand on the third term issue his past sins as Director of a heavy-handed CIA, manipulator of dubious financial ventures, and promoter of relations with Japan may well be overlooked.

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Prospects

In sum, the past half decade has seen the DRP lose much of its raison d'etre and become increasingly less the central organ of political action. Coincidentally, it has lost the presence of the man who dominated and guided its founding. The President, whose cause it serves, is not a strong supporter. Frustration and dispute over the proper role of the party have arisen. All of these developments needed only a crucial issue to bring them into focus. The question of the third term is providing that issue. The development of the third term question will determine the future of the DRP and, in fact, if it has a future. Until the direction of this issue becomes clearer than it now is, speculation on the future of the DRP is premature.

B.3 Conservative Opposition

The principal political opposition is the New Democratic Party, which was reassembled from rival conservative factions to offer a united opposition to President Park in the 1967 election, but lost to him by an indisputable margin. It has a delegation of 46 members in the National Assembly (about a quarter of the total seats), who represent chiefly urban constituencies. The Party has an elaborate formal organization, and branches in all provinces and Assembly election districts, but is a weak political force in most areas between elections. It is hard-pressed for political funds, weakly led by men who tend to regret the past rather than anticipate the future, divided by factions and personal rivalries (which are covertly encouraged by the government), and generally lacks a meaningful program. Within the past eight years, the elements now comprising the NDP have four times united and four times split up. The present head, Yu Chin-o, is a respected lawyer and academic leader, with little political experience. The NDP's predecessor, the Democratic Party, held political power for ten months in 1960, but demonstrated incapacity to govern. Many of the leading opposition figures are still the same as in 1960. The NDP, therefore, is not seriously regarded as a current contender for political power.

Nevertheless, there are sources of strength which will probably keep the NDP or some equivalent organization alive. One source is Korean political tradition. The NDP is a lineal descendant of the conservative anti-Japanese forces within Korea which formed the Hanguk Democratic Party, originally supported Rhee, later became his principal opposition, and have therefore been spokesmen for conservative aspirations and discontents for over twenty years. Their slogan, "We can't live, let's try a change!" elected an opposition Vice President under Rhee in 1956. This "opposition mentality" strikes a responsive chord in the Korean soul, especially while the NDP is led by men respected both for their age and their fighting record.

Another factor favoring the opposition is government policy. While the government wants to capitalize on the weaknesses of the opposition, it also seeks to keep them as an active political force. Some members of the government and ruling party probably regard them as an encumbrance to the

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decision-making process, and some also just tolerate it to maintain the appearance before the world of a pluralistic system of government. Many, however, are committed ideologically to the growth of democratic institutions in Korea and believe the opposition has a role to play. The government thus tends to avoid situations where the opposition forces are completely frustrated and occasionally make minor concessions to them. The leader of the opposition is given by law a salary equal to that of the Speaker of the Assembly. The government in mid-1968, in cooperation with business leaders, even formed a Politicians-Businessmen Council to guarantee that the opposition would receive financial support during election campaigns--although this move has also been interpreted as a control device.

In view of these factors, the most likely situation for Korea is continuation of a one-party dominant system, in which the opposition is strong enough to provide a political sounding-board and safety-valve but not strong enough seriously to challenge the government. So long as government leadership and performance are effective, this arrangement can be held in equilibrium--as it has been during most of the history of the Republic--through a combination of government pressure and toleration. Atrophy of the opposition is possible. The public may grow accustomed to one-party rule, and deprive the opposition of electoral and financial support. The government may grow more authoritarian, and less tolerant of opposition. With the passing of the present generation of leaders, younger men may not devote themselves to a cause that seems to promise little in terms of power and influence. However, there is a group of younger men with ties to the opposition, including at least a few of real ability. In view of the Korean predilection for opposition, complete disappearance of an opposition party seems unlikely.

It is also possible that the opposition might be revitalized. A charismatic leader could arouse emotions and build a broad base of support, particularly if the government in power were losing power or direction and social or economic problems offered popular issues. There are some indications that the NDP is endeavoring to make itself a stronger political force. At the beginning of 1966, for instance, and again in the 1967 election, NDP leaders focused more on issues of substance and on specific programs than on the emotional appeals of the past. The government and ruling party leaders could be expected to undermine by every means possible the emergence of a dynamic opposition leader or a strong opposition movement. Yet a transfer of power at some time in the future, peaceful or otherwise, to an opposition party is not to be entirely ruled out.

There are no important opposition organizations apart from the New Democratic Party. The Masses Party, led by a former Democrat, professes a moderately socialistic doctrine, has two representatives in the Assembly and marginal political organization. Its two Assemblymen are part of a 14-member Assembly group called the "Political Friends Society," composed chiefly of former members of the ruling party, which is not really an opposition at all. A United Socialist Party, which also claims to represent the

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moderate socialist forces, maintains a precarious existence without Assembly representation; it is endeavoring to build a political base among laborers, farmers, and youth and "instill the ideals of democratic socialism." At election time, several other splinter parties spring up--nurtured by covert government money--to divide the opposition vote, but they have no other purpose or program. There were seven such groups in the 1967 election.

B.4 Other Political Opposition

Despite years of North Korean attempts, by propaganda and infiltration, to encourage "progressive" and "revolutionary" political forces in South Korea, and despite the Marxist and Communist thinking in Japanese intellectual circles which influenced Koreans before liberation and could do so now, there appear to be virtually no organized centers of far-left or Communist political activity in the Republic. In large part, of course, this is due to the surveillance of the Korean CIA and other security agencies. Another factor is the genuine anti-Communism of the bulk of the population, based on years of indoctrination, the experiences of the Korean war, and the memories of refugees from the North. Moreover, the recent economic successes of the South deprive the left of most of its appeal.

During the period of total political freedom in 1960 and early 1961, significant currents of neutralist and left-Socialist thought appeared, primarily among students and intellectuals, focused on unification and on opposition to American influence in Korea. These two foci still possess their appeal. In a time of political confusion or uncertainty, similar movements might emerge again. They would have, as they did in 1960, the overt and covert backing of the North Koreans. For the present, however, there is little likelihood of any significant organized political activity of this sort. One such attempt--the United Revolutionary Party--was uncovered by the Korean CIA in 1968, but its actual proportions were far smaller than the arrests and publicity suggested. Small and unsophisticated pockets of ardent opposition, and even of Communist sympathy, exist in scattered mountain villages, but under present conditions they offer no perceptible threat to the political order.

B.5 Communications Media

The principal mass media, and the principal vehicles of political communication and opinion formation, are newspapers and radio. Motion pictures are produced and widely seen. Other media of importance to selected audiences are magazines, books, and television. Word-of-mouth communication is also important. Posters and handbills are frequently used by government and by private groups. At election time, political oratory--typically amplified by loudspeaker--is an important communication form.

There are 35 "major" daily newspapers in Korea, with a total circulation of about two million. A public opinion survey under USIA contract in 1965 found that 60 percent of a cross-section of the Seoul population read a newspaper every day, and another 10 percent several times a week. Problems of

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distribution still prevent newspapers from regularly reaching many rural localities, but press influence in rural communities is increasing.

Radio is the principal source of news for the rural areas, but is also influential in Seoul. Exposure everywhere is high. The government-controlled system operates 45 radio stations blanketing the country, and there are 14 privately-operated stations (not counting U.S. armed forces facilities). There is a total of around 1,323,000 wireless receivers and 1,185,000 rural wired receivers. In 1965, 1 out of 3 rural families owned a receiver. (Korean Government statistics in 1968 showed, however, that in one south-western province there was only one receiver per 33 people, compared to 1 per 9.4 people in Seoul. Total radio audience is estimated at over 10,000,000 daily. The 1965 USIA survey in Seoul found that nearly 70 percent of the people listened to the radio daily; another 12 percent, several times a week. About a third listened to foreign broadcasts.

Among other media, there are eight monthly magazines which appeal to various elite groups, ranging in circulation from 15,000 for Pijines (a business publication), and 25,000 for the intellectual-oriented Sasangye, to 80,000 for the women's magazine Yowon. There were over 9,000 books published in 1965, normally printed in 2,000 copies each, but 90 percent of these were reference and textbooks. The annual motion picture audience is estimated at 170,000,000 (about six times the population); there are 600 commercial theaters, eight producers, and 120 films produced annually. Fifty percent of the USIA sample in Seoul saw a newsreel more than once a month. Television is not a major medium in Korea, but there are 80,000 receivers in Seoul and other large cities, chiefly in wealthy homes.

Korean civil communications systems are reasonably well developed and utilized in the principal urban areas. In 1966, Seoul had a capacity of 110,000 telephone lines, but the total of telephones in use in the country was 233,000 (less than 1 per 100 people), and connections with smaller population centers are poor. Postal and telegraph service covers the entire country and is reasonably effective. In addition, the Koreans are great travellers by foot, bicycle, bus, and train. Daily air services link the principal cities, but are utilized only by the elite few.

There are several professional organizations in the communications field, among which the Korean Newspaper Editors' Association is perhaps most important; it has a membership of about 200. There are also a Korean Newspaper Publishers' Association, a Korean News Service Association, a Korean Reporters' Association (with 1500 members), a Kwanshoon Club (an older and more selective journalists' organization, affiliated with the International Federation of Journalists), a chapter of the U.S. fraternity Sigma Delta Chi, a Korean Press institute (affiliated with the International Press Institute), and several associations in the motion picture and radio fields. There is a Korean branch of the International Poets, Essayists, and Novelists Club (PEN). Despite all these organizations, and despite efforts at codes of press and

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radio ethics, the Korean media are not yet models of responsibility. Considerable progress has nevertheless been made.

The Korean Government has long devoted considerable effort to controlling and utilizing the mass media for molding public opinion. Although the population has traditionally been suspicious of government output (sales of independent newspapers, for example, are better than of those with official connections), treatment has become increasingly sophisticated and effective. The Ministry of Public Information is the principal formal agency for this purpose, but the President's office, the Ministry of Education, the armed forces, various individual ministries, and the CIA and police, also play important roles in initiating, managing, and controlling news and opinion. The United States, through USIS and the AID program, has also contributed materially to the development and utilization of mass media, and continues to play a considerable role in this field. The intellectuals and leaders in the communications field, although tending toward opposition to government and divided among themselves, nonetheless contribute to the development of enlightened public opinion and serve as a fairly effective check on government excesses.

The Government operates most major radio stations, and therefore controls their output. It also closely monitors the output of newspapers and other communications media, some of which it owns or controls. Most newspapers have a resident representative of the CIA. However, there is currently no formal censorship. The media understand the rather limited bounds of their freedom of expression, and generally stay within them. When the bounds are overstepped, arrests or forced resignations of media personnel, or suspension of publication, are the consequence. Through a multiplicity of control devices, the government is in a position to apply various lesser pressures to keep the media in line.

In general, communications media are free to report news which is not of high political sensitivity, and to criticize social ills and petty government misdoings, so long as the principal leaders and the character of the regime are not impugned, and so long as no support is given to Communism, "progressive" Socialist positions, or accommodation with North Korea. Since the number and size of newspapers is limited, there are physical limits to the volume of news which can be reported.

The press has a long and not unsuccessful history of struggle for freedom of expression. A recent example was the struggle over the Press Ethics Law of 1964, which represented an important victory for moderation in government power. Attempts to control irresponsibility and blackmail began during the Rhee regime, quietly assisted by the United States, and have had some effect. It was this campaign which gave birth to the Korean Newspaper Editors' Association, one of the more effective of Korea's organized interest groups.

With a highly literate population (about 90 percent can read the native phonetic script), a highly organized system of communications, unusually

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complete ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, and high media exposure, Korea has few barriers to modernization and social mobilization. In fact, the problem may be the reverse one: that popular expectations may rise faster than resources and capabilities to meet them or the development of political and social institutions to absorb them. This may be one of the principal challenges to the Korean political system in the 'seventies, as the rural sector--thus far conservative and tranquil--enters the mainstream of national life.

B.6 Intellectuals

Scholarship has traditionally had far higher prestige in the Chinese cultural orbit than in the West, because of the Confucian tradition of the scholar-gentleman and the selection of government officials by examination on the classics. Distinction between intellectuals and the ruling class was hazy, until industrialization and the Western impact forced specialization. This traditional prestige is reinforced in Korea by the continuing efficacy of education as a channel of upward social mobility, and recently by the prominence of Western scholars and their Korean disciples in coping with the problems of national development. The views of intellectuals--expressed to students, through mass media, and informally to political leaders--carry proportionally more weight in Korea than in many other countries.

Intellectuals are chronically disunited among themselves, however, and have no one clearly defined interest group. Their weight is felt in politics primarily on a few principal issues on which they have positions in common. Notable among these are freedom of intellectual action and expression, official corruption, and usually negative attitudes on the political regime currently in power. They are divided on such issues as socialism, nationalism, anti-foreign views, planned vs. free economy, or political democracy.

Korean intellectuals--in the sense of individuals whose careers and reputations have something to do with the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself--are no more precisely identifiable than elsewhere, but those with potential or actual influence on the national scene probably are holders of advanced degrees from Korean, Japanese, or Western universities, and those whose professions are intimately involved with the humanities--principally college and high school teaching, editing of newspapers and journals, and writing. The two categories obviously overlap to a very large extent, particularly among college teachers. Only a few religious leaders can be considered intellectuals. The total number of individuals in the intellectual category is probably on the order of 25,000 (or less than 0.1 percent of the population); of these, probably three-quarters or more are in Seoul, where they would constitute perhaps 0.5 percent of the population. Their power base is their influence with roughly 500,000 high school and 100,000 college students; their influence on the public through the mass media; and their

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informal channels of communication with college and high school classmates and former students or associates throughout the society.

Influential individuals among intellectuals--in the sense of potential political importance--are chiefly those who occupy leading institutional positions--e. g., college presidents and deans, newspaper editors, pastors of large Christian churches. A few men, like Yu Chin-o, have moved into politics. Occasional individuals develop influence on the basis of their own charisma or the power of their message. The opposition philosopher Ham Sok-hun is a leading, if somewhat shopworn, example. Such cases in Korea are rather few.

The present administration from the beginning days of the junta has endeavored to harness intellectual brainpower and coopt its support, with variable success. Probably there is closer cooperation between the academic community and government as a result both of government efforts and of the increased need for specialized education and training. Two graduate schools of public administration, for example, funnel most of their graduates into the middle levels of government via higher civil service examinations. Numbers of qualified educators have served on special government boards and commissions. The Government is playing a more positive role in encouraging (and paying for) graduate research. Latent opposition to government authority among intellectuals undoubtedly persists, but it is muted, and what the net impact is on students is uncertain. So far as the press is concerned, mild opposition views still are expressed, but the ideological fervor of opposition is largely dissipated--for the present at least--by a combination of government largesse with government controls and by the current economic successes of the administration.

For the time being, intellectuals do not appear to be a focus of social instability. However, if the administration should present them with a challenge which threatened their position or evoked a common emotional reaction from a considerable number of them (such as the third-term issue), the intellectuals could be a potential force for change--as they were in 1960. They could assume the role of leaders, spokesmen, or propagandists for any current of popular disaffection.

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APPENDIX C

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

1. Bureaucracy
2. Legislature
3. Courts and Justice
4. Internal Security: Police and Militia
5. The Military Establishment
6. Korean Central Intelligence Agency

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APPENDIX C

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS

C.1 Bureaucracy

The 15 ministries and certain other agencies of the ROK Government, as well as the provincial and local governments, are staffed by a single national civil service with essentially uniform entrance and serve requirements. The Minister of Government Administration, Yi Sok-che is the head of the service and is responsible for personnel administration. There are a total of 200,000 civil servants, divided into higher and lower categories, each comprising a graded series of classes. Admission to the higher category is by rigorous examination, which has always been impartially administered although its content has not always been relevant to modern tasks. Structure and personnel of the ministries have been reorganized and purged from time to time--particularly in the period between the end of the Rhee regime in 1960 and the end of the military government in 1963. Nevertheless, the civil service is among the most continuous of Korean political institutions.

Until 1960, the bureaucracy was heavily conditioned by its Japanese origins and its Japanese-trained personnel, some of whom were suddenly promoted from clerical to senior positions by the American occupation. This orientation, on the one hand, provided a viable operational framework, for getting routine business done. On the other hand, it reinforced the status quo, stifled initiative and made the civil service a pliant tool in the hands of the oligarchy under Rhee.

The Student Revolution, according to an experienced former bureaucrat, "put a stop to the dominance of the Japanese-educated elite in the political-administrative structure of Korea." Even before the military coup of 1961, the top level of the old bureaucracy had been removed, and some younger and more vigorous men promoted into their places. A 1962 study showed a lowering in average age levels in classes near the top of the service, so that the average in Classes I (Vice Ministers) and II-A (Bureau Directors) was lower than in Class III-A (Section Chiefs). "The thrust at the top was made both by bringing in new blood (including selected military officers) and by promoting relatively merit-oriented civil servants from the middle ranks... The thrust at the bottom reflected to a large extent the influx of new university graduates, which was begun under the Democratic Administration." The United States, through its technical assistance and participant training has "provided new pride and professional stature to the bureaucracy and developed at steadily higher levels a large group of people familiar with Western outlook...with an increasingly strong interest and pride in effective government management." Of 289 U.S. public administration trainees from 1955 to 1966, 144 were in government as of April, 1967; of these, 11

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