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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

8 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : DIRECTIVE of the Minister of Defense of the
USSR, No. D-0030, Results of the Winter
Training Period and Tasks for the Summer
Training Period of the 1977 Training Year

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET document issued by the Minister of Defense of the USSR. This is a general directive of broad dissemination on the results of a spring inspection of winter training and on the tasks of the 1977 summer training. It finds training good on the whole but then cites the main deficiencies found in various military districts, forces, and fleets. The main problems are ineffective organization, inability to use new equipment, and poor discipline. The last point is stressed. The summer training goals are to remedy the defects cited and improve training in general.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

W. W. Wells
William W. Wells

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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB- 312/02533-77

DATE OF
INFO. 1977

DATE 8 August 1977

SUBJECT

DIRECTIVE of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, No. D-0030 of
 15 May 1977, Results of the Winter Training Period and Tasks for
 the Summer Training Period of the 1977 Training Year

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a TOP SECRET document issued by the Minister of Defense of the USSR. This is a general directive of broad dissemination on the results of a spring inspection of winter training and on the tasks of the 1977 summer training. It finds training good on the whole but then cites the main deficiencies found in various military districts, forces, and fleets. The main problems are ineffective organization, inability to use new equipment, and poor discipline. The last point is stressed. The summer training goals are to remedy the defects cited and improve training in general.

End of Summary

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DIRECTIVE

of the Minister of Defense of the USSR

No. D-0030

15 May 1977

Moscow

Results of the winter training period and tasks for the
summer training period of the 1977 training year

The Soviet Armed Forces, in fulfilment of the decision of the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the October (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of Order No. 00130 for 1976 of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, have, during the winter training period of the 1977 training year, improved combat readiness and operational, combat, and political training. The high political enthusiasm in the Army and Navy caused by the preparation for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution and the socialist competition that has been developing in large units and units and on ships has contributed to the mobilization of the efforts of personnel towards higher quality fulfilment of the assigned tasks.

The plans of operational, combat, and political training for the winter training period have been fulfilled in all the branches of the Armed Forces and in the Civil Defense system. In military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and armies, solid results have been achieved on the whole in combat readiness and in field, air, and naval levels of training. Work to master and effectively use new weapons systems and combat equipment has been

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carried out more energetically.

Tasks in the training and combat teamwork of operational level control organs have been accomplished more correctly, and the methods of organizing and conducting operational exercises have been improved. The problems of deploying troops and naval forces, removing them from under strikes, conducting operations under the various conditions of the initiation of a war, defeating the enemy in short time periods, and gaining superiority in the air and at sea have been purposefully worked out.

The requirement of preparing troops, aviation, and naval forces for actions under the most difficult conditions which may arise in a modern war has been incorporated more fully in the combat training. A closer interrelation between different types of training has been achieved. The effectiveness of missile launchings and firing from most types of weapons has increased.

The level of party-political and ideological indoctrination work has risen, and its effect on the accomplishment of assigned tasks has been strengthened.

At the same time, the spring inspection of troops and an analysis of the results of the winter training period have shown that in a number of military districts, groups of forces, armies, and fleets, especially at the army and division levels, there are still instances where exactingness is low and where the assessment of one's own work and of the training level of subordinate large units, units, and ships achieved is not rigorous enough. New requirements arising in connection with the development of military affairs and the growing capabilities of troops and naval forces have not been taken into account fully. Training standards and requirements in a number of cases have been set too low. Some branch arms chiefs, formation commanders, commanders, and staffs base themselves not on the maximum but on the average, or even minimum, combat capabilities of units (ships), weapons, and equipment. All opportunities to drastically improve the quality and effectiveness of the training of the Armed Forces are not fully exploited, and some of the tasks assigned in Order No. 00130 of the Minister of Defense of the USSR have been fulfilled with delay and serious defects.

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Combat readiness. The procedure and deadlines for bringing large units and units being rearmed with new combat equipment to high levels of combat readiness are not being spelled out with timeliness. The sequence of warning units and of their actions upon a combat alert have not everywhere been worked out precisely (Group of Soviet Forces Germany, Leningrad Military District). In some air armies they have permitted a lowering of the combat readiness of air units, and the number of crews is being built up slowly (16th Air Army). The tasks of shortening the times required to supply mobilization resources, to take equipment and weapons out of storage and bring them into readiness are not being accomplished with enough determination (6th Army). Plans for the engineer preparation of concentration areas and equipment shelters, and the stockpiling and dispersal of materiel reserves are being fulfilled with delay (Far Eastern Military District, Central Asian Military District).

Operational training. The capabilities of the armed forces groupings of the probable enemy and the variants of deploying them are not being analyzed thoroughly enough. Attention is not being devoted to a detailed study of his new weapons systems and combat equipment (latest aircraft, combat helicopters, artillery, air defense means, as well as modern antitank means, large burst ammunition, and missiles with television and laser guidance systems, etc.) and to the working out and mastery of effective methods of combating them and dependably protecting against them.

The work methods of commanders and staffs to control troops (forces), especially during combat actions, are improving slowly in a number of military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and armies. The best methods of accomplishing assigned tasks are not always sought out when decisions are made (Leningrad Military District, Kiev Military District, Baltic Military District, Pacific Fleet). Some commanders organize their troop control activity without taking into consideration generalized experience and modern demands, basing themselves only on personal practice, and do not impose the required demands on subordinate staffs.

The level of staff work in the headquarters of many formations and large units remains low. The planning of operations and combat actions is often not carried through to the end, combat documents are worked out carelessly, operational

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calculations are performed with errors, and work maps are maintained ineptly. Staff officers are not being instilled with a sense of high responsibility for every combat document that is filled out. Effective monitoring of the fulfilment of assigned tasks is not organized in many cases (1st Guards Army of the Kiev Military District, Odessa Military District, Central Asian Military District, 5th Air Army, 17th Air Army, 8th Separate Air Defense Army, Northern Fleet).

Mobilization training. The quality of mobilization resources in a number of military districts is being improved slowly. The organizational structure and combat effectiveness of the units and large units being refitted with new equipment is rarely checked. Mobilization exercises in many military districts are stereotyped in organization and conduct and in this connection they do not promote the development of the practical skills of commanders and staffs in the organized and precise fulfilment of mobilization measures under varied situational conditions (Belorussian Military District, Volga Military District, Siberian Military District).

Troop control. Control posts in the formations of the Ground Forces and Air Forces continue to remain unwieldy. Work to reduce their personnel and raise their mobility is being done slowly. The improved system of front and army control posts is not everywhere understood and employed properly. The equipping of mobile control posts does not fully meet modern requirements. Their security, defense, and camouflage is generally underestimated. Due to deficient skill in organizing the relocation of control posts during combat actions, there are cases where communications with subordinate staffs are lost for an extended time.

Command personnel of staffs are weak in their knowledge of the capabilities of available means of automation. Electronic computer equipment is not used efficiently enough, as a rule, to perform even the simplest calculations. Its use for the modeling of combat actions and to do the array of calculations necessary to make optimum decisions has not been mastered.

Combat training. Still unfulfilled is the task of improving the training of commanders of subunits and units (ships). Many commanders of companies (batteries), battalions, and regiments

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cannot organize combat in short periods of time. Improvement of the methodological skills of command personnel lags behind the development of military art. Division and regiment commanders in many cases cannot organize and conduct two-sided tactical exercises in a methodologically correct and instructive way.

Due attention is not being devoted to the struggle for fire superiority over the enemy in combined-arms, air, or naval combat. Demands have been dropped somewhat on the firing skill of units (ships), especially on hitting the target with the first round (missile launching) at maximum ranges. Tactical reconnaissance is underrated.

Tactical actions of large units and units (ships) are developing and improving slowly. In the training of branch arms and special troops, the new conditions in the conduct of combat actions associated with the use of modern means of combat and the experience of local wars are not being taken fully into account. In all branches of the Armed Forces, especially in the Air Defense Forces of the Country, cooperation between the branch arms has not been adequately worked out (Moscow and Baku Air Defense Districts, Transcaucasian Military District, Black Sea Fleet).

In organizing and carrying out party political work, some political organs are not looking deeply enough into the actual state of affairs in troops and fleets and have had little effect on eliminating the defects uncovered.

Fundamental improvement of troop discipline has not been achieved, especially among the troops of the Far Eastern Military District, the Transbaykal Military District, the North Caucasus Military District, the Baku Air Defense District and 11th Separate Air Defense Army, the 73rd Air Army, and the 1st and 35th Railroad Corps (zhdk) of the Railroad Troops, and in most fleets, where the number of serious incidents has not diminished. The continuing instances of misappropriation and loss of weapons and ammunition, incidents on guard duty, gross irregularities in disciplinary practice, and humiliation of young soldiers cause particular alarm. There continue to be a large number of air breakdowns and fatal air accidents, especially in the Air Defense Forces of the Country, where the number of flight accidents in the winter period of the current year increased by half.

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The main reasons for the indicated shortcomings are the serious oversights in organizational activity of individual commanders, political organs, and staffs, and the slow restructuring of their work in keeping with the requirements of the Twentieth-Fifth Congress of the CPSU.

I hereby order:

1. Eliminate in the summer training period the deficiencies discovered in combat readiness and the training of troops and fleets and ensure quality fulfilment of the tasks assigned in Order No. 00130 for 1977 of the Minister of Defense of the USSR. Make use of the favorable combat training opportunities in the summer period to raise the level of field, air, and naval training of large units, units, and ships and their all-round preparation for successful actions under the complex conditions of a combat situation.

Continue to mobilize the efforts of all personnel of the armed forces to fittingly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. Celebrate these anniversaries with new successes in increasing the combat power of the troops and naval forces and in strengthening organization and discipline.

2. Improve the training of commanders and staffs of all levels in the organization and conduct of modern operations and combat actions. Achieve mobility and cohesion in the actions of troops (forces) day or night in the attack and defense, and achieve surprise and rapidity of delivering attacks on the enemy with full exploitation of the combat capabilities of weapons and combat equipment.

Constantly improve methods of work on the practical mastery of the weapons and combat equipment with which troops and naval forces are equipped. On the basis of thorough study and skilful use of weapons and equipment, and of investigation in the best methods of employing them in combat, learn to get out of the equipment and weapons everything they are capable of. Conduct research more extensively in exercises into the combat capabilities of weapons and equipment, especially of new systems. When fulfilling operational and combat training tasks, study the new weapons systems and combat equipment of the probable enemy

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more thoroughly.

3. In all Armed Forces branches formations, large units, and units, continue to improve control of troops and naval forces. Improve the organization and structure of control posts, their preparation, and equipment. Pay special attention to increasing the mobility and ensuring the survivability of mobile control posts.

Diligently master the troop control means of communications, automation, and mechanization. Master modern methods of controlling troops (forces), ensuring high quality, efficiency, and dependability of control under any conditions of a situation.

4. In the operational and tactical exercises that are conducted, improve the working out of cooperation between branches of the Armed Forces, branch arms, and special troops at the operational-tactical level.

Develop cooperation and liaison with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Mongolian People's Republic to strengthen the combat collaboration of the fraternal armies.

5. Ensure more skilful fulfilment of combat tasks by large units and units (ships) during the conduct of combat actions with a strong and aggressive enemy. Work out how to hit his installations and targets with high accuracy at long ranges and, as a rule, with the first round (missile launching). Make the training situation in exercises and the conduct of firing approach to the maximum the conditions of combat reality.

Devote more attention to studying the methods of breaking through an enemy's defense saturated with modern antitank means, to effectively overcoming his air defense as well as to having naval forces negotiate his antisubmarine lines. Work out operational (combat), special, rear services, and technical support measures in all types of combat activity more fully.

Introduce elements of combat competition more actively into the system of combat training of troops and naval forces. Organize and widely extend aviation and water sports in the armed forces. Strengthen popular sports work among the troops and in fleets. Raise the level of quality of the competitions in combat

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training with different types of weapons and in combat vehicle driving.

Practice holding competitions more often in drill training. Direct physical training towards ensuring the physical and psychological readiness of personnel to successfully perform training and combat tasks; increase the stress in physical training exercises.

6. The commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services, on the basis of the growing capabilities of large units, units, subunits, weapons, and combat equipment, are to study in the summer training period the possibilities of updating the current training norms and requirements of the programs and courses in firing and driving and check them in the troops. Proposals on these matters are to be submitted to the General Staff by 1 October 1977.

7. Military councils, formation commanders, and political organs, in keeping with the requirements of the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU and the October (1976) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, are to increase the efficiency and quality of their work, strengthen party influence on all aspects of troop life, and instil in all personnel superior vigilance, responsibility for combat training, skills, and discipline. They are to react more strongly and scrupulously to shortcomings in training and foster in command personnel a self-critical attitude towards the results of their work and an intolerance of shortcomings. They are to increase the effectiveness of political indoctrination work and take fuller account of the requirements for an integrated approach in the political and military indoctrination of personnel. They are to ensure total fulfilment of the socialist responsibilities undertaken in honor of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution.

They are to persistently strengthen military discipline and order and achieve precise fulfilment of the requirements of the general military regulations in the life of the troops. They are to make it the practice to regularly sum up the results of work to strengthen military discipline in formations, large units, and units.

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This directive is to be distributed down to commanders of divisions and separate brigades. It is to be studied in full with regiment commanders and first and second rank ship commanders, and with the remaining officers in the part that concerns them.

Minister of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union D. USTINOV

Chief of General Staff,
Marshal of the Soviet Union N. OGARKOV

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