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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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24 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON: Strategic Operations in an Ocean Theater of Military Operations

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation, classified ~~TOP SECRET~~, prepared in 1985 for use in the Voroshilov General Staff Academy.

2. [redacted] this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

25X1, E.O.13526




for

Richard F. Stolz
Deputy Director for Operations



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Page 1 of 18 Pages

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ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-026, document no. 13
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 14, 2015

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 18 Pages

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COUNTRY USSR

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO. 1985

DATE 24 June 1988

SUBJECT

USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON: Strategic Operations
in an Ocean Theater of Military Operations

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of strategic operations in an ocean theater of military operations. The lecture opens with an assessment of US and NATO naval capabilities, with particular attention to ASW forces and means. This is followed by a general definition of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations, its objectives, content, scale, and duration and a broad outline of the principles of preparing and conducting the operation. The paper concludes with a brief enumeration of the future directions of development of strategic operations in ocean theaters of military operations.

End of Summary

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Page 4 of 18 Pages

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS IN AN OCEAN THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

We shall consider two topics: the content of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations, its objectives and the tasks [of the forces]; and the principles of the preparation and conduct of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations.

[Several lines illegible.] ... question of military science naturally [word illegible] [the study] of the ocean as an arena of armed conflict [three words illegible].

In a future war the conflict in ocean theaters of military operations will be global in scope and will be an essential part of armed conflict as a whole. At the present time the United States and its allies are building up an unprecedented naval power in the sphere of the world's oceans. Their sea-based strategic nuclear forces now include 736 ballistic missile launchers. SSBNs are the main component of their strategic offensive forces. Fifty-five percent of the nuclear warheads in their strategic arsenal are concentrated on these submarines. In the Americans' view this grouping is capable of hitting 2500, or more precisely, 2262 major installations on the territory of our country and that of the socialist commonwealth countries.

The probable enemy's naval power in the oceans and seas also consists of carrier groupings, which are the basis of the general-purpose naval forces and the reserve of the strategic offensive forces.

The naval forces of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Spain currently have 20 attack and ASW aircraft carriers on which approximately 1200 aircraft are based. Almost one half of these aircraft carry nuclear weapons. They have 1800 nuclear bombs with a total yield of 700 megatons and are capable of hitting up to 900 different targets in ocean and sea theaters of military operations to a depth of [1500 km].

Antisubmarine forces and means included in the global ASW system are located in strategically advantageous areas and are supported by the enemy's expedient basing system. In the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea alone, these forces and means include more than 350 ASW ships, approximately 150 submarines, including 60 SSNs, and more than 400 ASW fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

The enemy's antisubmarine surveillance system in the seas and oceans is based on the stationary underwater sonar reconnaissance and surveillance system SOSUS, which is an extensive network of coastal sonars with acoustic antennas situated far out at sea [several words illegible]. SOSUS is a passive

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Page 5 of 18 Pages

directional hydrophone system which operates using subsonic frequencies, that is, from [a few] up to 400 Hz. This enables the system to detect submarines and surface ships and vessels at quite long ranges. With a probability of 0.5, SOSUS detects submarines in the Atlantic at a range of about 350 miles on the average and in the Pacific Ocean at a range of approximately 650 miles. ✓

SOSUS covers a very large water area and is capable of detecting more than 60 percent of the submarines located at sea; for all practical purposes, it can detect almost all of our submarines. The American command is thus [virtually able to see] every one of our submarines with a very high accuracy; the accuracy in determining location varies from 15 to 50 miles. Although this accuracy does not permit immediate employment of weapons against submarines, it does make it possible to successfully direct maneuverable ASW forces to the areas where our submarines are located. These forces will then carry out [presearch] and set up prolonged tracking of a submarine. SOSUS is a terrible enemy of the Navy, because if it is functioning in the threat period and at the onset of war, our submarines will [several words illegible] of the Americans. And strategic missile submarines are a key element [several words illegible]. All information concerning SOSUS is considered to be extremely valuable: information on the location of the shore posts, on the point where the cable from the shore post goes out [word illegible] to sea, on the location of the acoustic antennas, on the composition of the shore post (whether there is an autonomous or [two words illegible], etc.), the survivability of the shore post, etc.

In the opinion of NATO's leaders, the course and outcome of military actions in the European and Far Eastern theaters of military operations will depend to a significant degree on the stability and continuity of ocean lines of communication; they do not contemplate military operations in the European and Far Eastern continental theaters of war without support from [word illegible] of the United States in the form of movements of strategic supplies, goods, strategic reserves of the armed forces, etc. Therefore, when hostilities begin the enemy will make great efforts to prevent the interdiction of ocean transport movements and to organize defense of his lines of communication. This task is considered by the enemy to be one of the most important in armed conflict at sea. Thus, the threat from the direction of the ocean to our state and to our allies in the socialist commonwealth has become [two words illegible] very great. In connection with this, by a decision of the CPSU Central Committee there has been created within a short period of time a qualitatively new ocean-going nuclear missile fleet capable of delivering a powerful retaliatory-reciprocal strike against any target and prepared to oppose aggression on maritime axes and to perform major operational and strategic tasks. Taking advantage of the capabilities of present-day weapons and using large combat-ready force groupings deployed in advance in the theaters of military operations, the aggressor will naturally attempt to begin a war with a surprise attack, because this will give him many advantages. Under these conditions the requirement for the combat readiness of our Armed Forces, including the Navy, is

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Page 6 of 18 Pages

greatly increased. This requirement is met most successfully through continuous performance of combat service by the allocated complement of fleet forces and through the continuous presence of naval forces in the assigned areas of the seas and oceans and their readiness for combat actions.

At the present time the enemy's strategic groupings deployed in ocean theaters of military operations are countered by the corresponding groupings of our Navy (submarines, missile-carrying surface ships, and naval aviation) which engage in surveillance and tracking of enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines and are located in advantageous positions for employing weapons, ready to immediately deliver strikes for the purpose of weakening the enemy's nuclear might.

In the recent past, when nuclear missile weapons did not exist, combat against the enemy's navy was usually conducted by [two words illegible] destruction of groupings of his forces in the course of naval engagements and also by conducting systematic combat actions in limited areas of the ocean over a relatively prolonged period.

The current situation in the ocean theaters, however, requires the simultaneous defeat of a large number of strike groupings of the enemy's naval forces in short periods of time over enormous distances, which makes it necessary to concentrate large forces of our fleets in the oceans and to enlist not only the Navy's forces, but also formations and large units of other branches of the Armed Forces to perform the tasks. [This, of course,] goes beyond the scope of naval operations and makes it necessary to utilize quite complex forms of strategic operations by the armed forces. [Several words illegible] of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations.

A strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is an aggregate of coordinated and interconnected (in objective, place and time) operations, strikes, and combat actions of formations and large units of various branches of the Armed Forces (with formations and large units of the Navy predominant), conducted according to a unified concept and plan and under the unified direction of the Supreme High Command and the immediate command of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the ocean theater of military operations. Strategic operations can be conducted in the Atlantic or Pacific theaters of military operations. They are divided by time into initial and subsequent operations. At the beginning of a war a strategic operation can be conducted with or without the employment of nuclear weapons.

The objectives of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations result from the overall objectives of the war and the tasks of the armed forces which are determined by the state's political leaders. The content of the objectives of the operation are affected by the condition of the armed forces of the sides, the correlation of forces, the strength and capabilities of

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Page 7 of 18 Pages

the strike groupings of the enemy and of friendly forces, and the military and geographic conditions of the theater. In the initial strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations the objectives can be to thwart or blunt enemy strikes from ocean axes, defeat the main groupings of naval forces, weaken the military and economic capabilities of the enemy coalition, and cause coastal and island states to withdraw from the war. In subsequent operations the objectives can be different: completing the defeat of groupings of enemy naval forces in the ocean theater of military operations, interdicting the enemy's transport movements over oceans between theaters, seizing distant islands, strait zones, and the coastal territory [word illegible].

The content of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is determined by the operation's characteristic features, objective, tasks, the composition of [word illegible], as well as by [line illegible]. The characteristic features of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations are:

1. The need [to conduct it] at the very beginning of a war, among the first operations of the armed forces, in order to defeat the enemy's main nuclear groupings which present a threat to the country and to groupings of our armed forces from ocean and sea axes before, or in the worst case when these groupings begin to employ nuclear weapons.
2. The massed utilization of forces over enormous expanses of water, which determines the intercontinental spatial scope of the operation.
3. The scale and complexity of command and control of a large number of groupings located at substantial distances from their basing areas, and the complexity of command and control under conditions of intensive employment by the enemy of weapons and electronic warfare means.
4. The large volume of operational, rear, and special support with the enlistment of large forces, including space reconnaissance systems, global [two words illegible], etc.

The scale of a strategic operation will be determined by its objectives, the area of operations of the strike groupings of the enemy and of our forces, the location of installations on enemy territory, the capabilities of our forces, and the conditions of the theater of military operations. On the basis of all these factors, it can be estimated that the scale of an initial strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will reach 3000 km in depth and 2000-3000 km or more in breadth, with some of the tasks of an initial operation carried out to the entire depth of the ocean theater.

The duration of a strategic operation will depend on the objective, the content of the tasks being carried out, the periods of time during which the

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Page 8 of 18 Pages

tasks are carried out, and the weapons employed. In a war in which nuclear weapons are employed the defeat of the enemy's main strike groupings can be achieved within three to five days, which would make the duration of the strategic operation three to five days.

The destruction of surviving enemy [naval forces] will be determined by the specific circumstances of the situation and by the condition of the forces of our fleet after an exchange of initial nuclear strikes. In military operations in which conventional weapons [alone] are employed, the duration of a subsequent strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations can be 35 to 45 days or more -- 12 to 15 days for defeating the first echelon of the enemy's strike groupings, and 20 to 30 days for defeating the second echelon.

A strategic formation called a "grouping of armed forces in an ocean theater of military operations" is created to conduct a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations. This grouping of armed forces includes the forces of one or several fleets, large units of an operational air army of the Supreme High Command, coastal formations (large units) of air defense forces, and large units of airborne troops. In addition, [part of line illegible] can be operationally [operativno] [word illegible] to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the ocean theater of military operations, [and] a front or army or, in an extreme case, army corps operating on a coastal axis as well as large units of military transport aviation and large units of a strategic air army of the Supreme High Command can be operationally included.

At the beginning of a nuclear war and in the course of the war large units of Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) can deliver strikes against enemy targets in an ocean theater of military operations according to the plan of a strategic operation of nuclear forces. Such strikes can be carried out in support of [word illegible] the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in an ocean theater of military operations.

In general a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will include initial and subsequent operations of a fleet or fleets, initial and subsequent operations of a coastal front (coastal army), an air operation, an air defense operation, amphibious landing, airborne landing, or amphibious and air assault landing operations in which operational-strategic assault forces are landed, antilanding operations, and, in addition, strikes by the nuclear forces of the country within the context of an operation of strategic nuclear forces against enemy naval targets in an ocean theater of military operations.

A strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will not be the simple sum of all these operations. These operations will be united by a single concept, which will be manifested in the interrelation and interconditionality of the results of certain operations with the results of other operations, in the unity of objective of the operations -- the destruction

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Page 9 of 18 Pages

of the main groupings of enemy naval forces, SSBNs and carrier groupings -- and in the need for all these operations to be conducted simultaneously at the beginning of a war.

The tasks of the forces in the operation are divided into the immediate task and the subsequent task. The immediate task of the forces in an operation will be performed by conducting the initial fleet operation, initial front operation, an air operation, air defense operation, amphibious or amphibious and air landing operations, and antilanding operations and will include: defeat of the first echelon of strike groupings of enemy naval forces, missile submarines and carrier groupings; defeat of groupings of enemy ASW aircraft in the air and at their bases; seizure of strait zones, individual islands, and coastal sectors; defeat of enemy troop groupings on coastal axes; combat with enemy assault landing forces; repulsion of an enemy air attack; and gaining supremacy in seas which are adjacent to our coast and in individual areas of the oceans which are of operational importance to a depth of 1500 km. The immediate task of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will be performed to a total depth of [word illegible] 1500 km and over a breadth which, depending on the theater, can vary from 2000 to 3000-3500 km, broader in the Pacific Ocean and narrower in the Atlantic Ocean. The amount of time it takes to carry out the immediate task is 12 to 15 days or more.

The subsequent task of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will be carried out by conducting subsequent operations of a fleet or fleets, subsequent operations of coastal fronts (armies), and subsequent air, air defense, and antilanding operations, and will consist of completing the defeat of strike groupings of enemy naval forces, defeating the second echelon of the enemy's strike groupings, SSBNs and carrier groupings, defeating advancing reserves of enemy naval forces, defeating troop groupings on coastal axes, and carrying out the task of disrupting the enemy's ocean and sea transport movements. The subsequent task is performed to a depth of 1500 km from the line to which the immediate task is performed. The total depth of an initial strategic operation is thus on the order of 3000 km. The amount of time it takes to perform the subsequent task is approximately 20 to 30 days, so that the total amount of time required to perform the tasks of a strategic operation is 35 to 45 days.

* The main aim of the actions of the forces in an initial strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is to destroy the enemy's missile submarines and strike carriers in order to diminish the nuclear capabilities of enemy naval forces to the maximum extent and to prevent or blunt enemy strikes on ocean axes, to defeat troops on the enemy's coast; and to seize island and coastal states of the enemy coalition and force them to withdraw from the war.

The main aim of the actions of the forces in a subsequent strategic operation can be to destroy convoys and cargo ships in the ocean and in ports,

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Page 10 of 18 Pages

destroy ports, and defeat antilanding groupings of enemy forces at sea and on coasts in order to provide support for landings of our operational-strategic assault landing forces. ut

Support actions or aims in an initial strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will consist of destroying or neutralizing ASW forces and means and air defense forces and means, that is, those forces and means which [oppose our main groupings] in the performance of tasks on the main axes; hitting key installations in the system of command and control; basing, and material-technical support for enemy forces and troops; and gaining supremacy in enclosed seas and seas adjacent to our coasts. In subsequent strategic operations in an ocean theater of military operations support actions and aims will consist of destroying the forces and means which provide cover for enemy convoys and which oppose our assault landing forces.

In general the operational disposition of forces in a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations will include three echelons: the first echelon of forces and troops, which consists of the combat service forces of the fleets which are already deployed at sea, with allowance for their augmentation in the threat period, units and large units of naval, long-range and front aviation, and units and large units of Air Defense Forces aviation; the second echelon, which consists of the remaining combat-ready forces of the fleets and the remaining combat-ready forces and troops of formations and large units of other branches of the Armed Forces participating in this operation; and the reserve.

To perform the assigned tasks provisions are made for the creation of the following force groupings in the echelons of the operational disposition. The first grouping ([which is in each] echelon) is the grouping of forces and troops for action on the main axis to destroy the enemy's SSBNs and carrier groupings. This grouping will include diversified ASW forces, including ASW aviation, ASW submarines, and large units of ASW ships, and diversified striking forces, including naval missile-carrying, long-range, and ASW aviation, missile submarines, and missile ships. The second grouping is for support actions to destroy (neutralize) the enemy's ASW forces in the interests of friendly submarines performing key tasks; to destroy (neutralize) [continental] air defense forces and means in sectors where fleet aviation and long-range aviation fly over enemy territory; to destroy (neutralize) installations in the enemy's system of command and control, surveillance, navigation, and other types of support; and to destroy (neutralize) enemy forces and means in gaining supremacy in seas which are adjacent to our coast and in operationally important areas of the ocean.

The reserve, as a force grouping, is the reserve of forces and means intended for reinforcing the grouping on the main axis and for replacing its losses, as well as for performing unforeseen tasks which arise suddenly in the

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Page 11 of 18 Pages

* course of an operation. During the period of conventional operations the reserve will of necessity contain nuclear groupings, which above all will include units of naval missile-carrying, ASW and long-range aviation. The objectives, tasks, and time periods of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations are coordinated with those of other strategic operations: a strategic operation in an adjacent continental theater of military operations, an operation of strategic nuclear forces, and a strategic operation to repel an aerospace attack by the enemy. In turn, it has an effect on the attainment of the objectives in these operations and utilizes the results of these operations. Therefore, precise coordination of the efforts of [word illegible] groupings of armed forces in the various theaters of military operations will be one of the main factors for achieving success in the course of military operations.

Principles of the Preparation and Conduct of a Strategic Operation in an Ocean Theater of Military Operations

The preparation of a strategic operation is generally carried out in advance in peacetime, and usually includes the same measures as other operations, such as a front operation. The immediate preparation for an operation is carried out when the threat of war arises and specific combat tasks are received. It consists of clarifying the operation plan and tasks for the forces as applied to the developing situation. Of particular importance are preparation of the forces and making them combat ready, [final preparation] of the ocean theater of military operations, and deployment of the groupings in the area where the tasks are to be performed.

A central role in the preparation of the operation is played by decision-making and planning of the operation. The decision for an initial strategic operation is made by the Supreme High Command, and for subsequent operations by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the ocean theater of military operations. In contrast to other operations, the decision for a strategic operation is made up in the form of a textual document with a map attached, [line illegible].

Planning of the operation is based on the decision which is made [with consideration for] preparation of the overall plan for the strategic operation as well as the plans for the fleet and front operations, air operation, amphibious landing operation, antilanding operation, etc., that is, the plans of the operations which are components of the strategic operation. Planning for an initial operation is done in peacetime under the direction of the General Staff by the commander-in-chief and Main Staff of the Navy, which [functions] as the staff of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the Atlantic Ocean Theater of Military Operations. In addition to the Commander-in-Chief and the Main Staff of the Navy, the commanders-in-chief and main staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces which allocate formations and large units to

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Page 12 of 18 Pages

participate in the operation also take part in planning, as do the Deputy Minister of Defense for the Rear Services and his staff, the branch arm commanders and chiefs of special troops, and the commanders and staffs of the fleet, front, and formations of long-range and military transport aviation.

Planning of an initial strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is carried out long before war begins. Planning of a subsequent operation will be carried in the course of concluding the initial operation, when the results of that operation are clear.

In preparing the plan for a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations, particular attention is given to special preparation of the initial strike, which can be delivered using nuclear weapons or conventional weapons alone. In either case the purpose of the initial strike is to blunt to the maximum degree a nuclear strike by the enemy from the direction of the ocean. In connection with this [two words illegible] of the initial strike [two words illegible] is for missile submarines to be destroyed before they launch their missiles and carriers to be destroyed before attack aircraft take off from them.

Tasks are assigned to the fleet, front, and other formations by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the theater of military operations in his operational directive. The fleet and front commanders and staffs generally draw up the general operational directives for an initial fleet or front operation as well as the operational directives of each flotilla and army, the operational directives of fleet and front air forces, the directive for rear services, the directive for technical support, and the combat orders and combat instructions for the types of support (combat instructions are issued for reconnaissance).

Cooperation among the groupings of Armed Forces branches in a strategic operation is organized by the General Staff and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the ocean theater of military operations. This cooperation requires precise coordination of the efforts of the fleets, fronts, and formations and large units of other branches of the Armed Forces that are carrying out tasks both on the main axis and on auxiliary axes.

A very important place in the preparation of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations belongs to the organization of comprehensive support for the operation -- operational, special, technical, and rear services support. The main categories of support for the forces of the Navy which are carrying out tasks in the ocean include reconnaissance, maskirovka [camouflage, concealment, and deception], electronic warfare, all types of defense, and protection from weapons of mass destruction.

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Page 13 of 18 Pages

Reconnaissance in a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is organized by the General Staff in support of all the branches of the Armed Forces in the theater. Strategic reconnaissance, having as its main objective timely warning of preparations by the enemy to attack our country, is called on to support the immediate preparation of the branches of the Armed Forces to conduct strategic operations in ocean and continental theaters of military operations. In order to achieve this objective, the entire set of reconnaissance measures must support:

1. identification of possible times that enemy actions will begin and the possible time that nuclear weapons will begin to be employed;
2. identification and clarification of the composition, disposition, and activities of the main nuclear groupings of naval forces and their combat readiness;
3. identification of the overall strategic concepts of the enemy's naval command;
4. identification of the enemy's capabilities for opposing groupings of our forces in the performance of tasks in the operation;
5. identification of the organization of all the categories of support for the enemy's naval forces;
6. detection of changes in the basing system and in the system of preparation of the ocean theater of military operations.

The system of reconnaissance which supports the preparation and conduct of a strategic operation is based on a general disposition of forces which features extensive use of ships and aircraft deployed in the theater for combatting enemy [word illegible] and of special groupings of reconnaissance forces and means to track the enemy at sea and in his bases. The first echelon of reconnaissance in a strategic operation will be the forces and means which are deployed in the constantly operating reconnaissance system in the theater.

In combat actions in which conventional weapons alone are employed, the main task of reconnaissance will be to ascertain the duration of the period of conventional warfare and to ascertain and clarify the signs of preparations for and times of transition to nuclear actions, as well as support in directing our striking forces to the enemy's main nuclear groupings and target designation support, that is, support in delivering the initial strike.

The efforts of reconnaissance will subsequently be focused on ascertaining the results of nuclear strikes and on support in directing striking forces to surviving or recently detected enemy groupings.

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Page 14 of 18 Pages

The main component, the core of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations are the initial and subsequent fleet operations, each of which is an aggregate of interconnected flotilla and squadron operations and separate naval operations, engagements, and combat actions. Naval operations, which in their content and objectives most fully reflect the specific nature of armed conflict at sea, occupy a special place. They include naval operations to destroy enemy missile submarines, naval operations to destroy enemy carrier groupings and ASW forces, naval operations to destroy ground targets, minelaying naval operations, naval operations to disrupt the enemy's strategic ocean transport movements, etc.

A naval operation to destroy enemy missile submarines will encompass several areas simultaneously. It will be carried out using the maximum quantity of ASW forces. Missile submarines will be destroyed in [word illegible] areas, combat patrol areas, on the routes of passage of the missile submarines from bases to these patrol areas, and at the bases of the missile submarines. The entire complex of weapons [several words illegible] will be used to do this. The search for missile submarines will be carried out over enormous expanses of the ocean theater of military operations, more than 20 million square kilometers. The search will begin three days before the outbreak of war, and when the war begins all the missile submarines [being tracked], both those in place and those under way, will be destroyed by combat service forces. The main objective of a naval operation to destroy missile submarines is to destroy the maximum number of missile submarines before they launch their missiles, because each missile submarine is a strategic installation and its destruction is equivalent to eliminating 130 to 200 nuclear warheads from the enemy's strategic nuclear arsenal.

*Combat
Service
during war*

Destruction of enemy carrier groupings, which are the strategic nuclear forces reserve, will also be carried out at the beginning of a war at the same time as the task of destroying missile submarines is being carried out, and will be carried out in the course of conducting an independent naval operation to destroy carrier groupings. The grouping of forces for seeking out and destroying enemy carrier groupings in an ocean theater of military operations includes nuclear submarines with cruise missiles and torpedoes, air-capable missile and artillery ships, naval missile-carrying aviation, and long-range aviation. A special grouping of forces consists of combat service forces which in peacetime track aircraft carriers in combat patrol areas, combat assignment areas, and at the approaches to these areas.

The initial strike against aircraft carriers, both those in place and those under way, will be delivered by the combat service forces, and subsequent strikes will be delivered approximately two to three hours later, depending on the distance of the carriers from the basing areas of our aviation, by naval missile-carrying aviation, long-range aviation, and missile and torpedo

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Page 15 of 18 Pages

submarines which [two words illegible] are directed to enemy carrier large units [for the purpose of] exploiting success. Combat with enemy carrier groupings employing conventional weapons requires an increased detail of forces and means and maximum latitude in action, since carrier groupings possess tremendous defensive capabilities and the carriers themselves have considerable combat durability. For example, in an initial mass bombing attack an American carrier group is capable of hitting up to 25 airborne targets, that is, cruise missiles or aircraft. Sinking an aircraft carrier, however, requires at least 15 hits by cruise missiles or at least 25 hits by torpedoes. Therefore, in [word illegible] in which conventional weapons are employed, [word illegible] with carrier groupings is possible only by enlisting substantial forces and means.

In a strategic operation in which conventional weapons are employed, an air operation to weaken or defeat enemy nuclear-missile aviation groupings will be important. Participating in this operation will be aviation of the fleet (fleets), aviation of coastal formations of air defense forces, long-range and front aviation, large units and units of strategic and operational air armies of the Supreme High Command, rocket troops and artillery, airborne troops, Spetsnaz units, and electronic warfare units. The air operation will be conducted at the beginning of the war, and it will be of short duration, three to five days. Another characteristic feature of the air operation is that it will be conducted without nuclear weapons; its results will have a strong effect on the success of a strategic operation under conventional warfare conditions. The main content of the actions of the forces in an air operation will be the destruction of enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air, as well as neutralization and destruction of reserves and conduct of operational aerial reconnaissance.

Destruction of aircraft at airfields using conventional weapons can be a difficult task due to the fact that the enemy has [built] many sturdy shelters, including shelters for [word illegible] aircraft. For example, at airfields in the Federal Republic of Germany alone more than [2000] shelters have been built, including more than 500 reinforced shelters with a cover thickness of 600-800 mm, almost a meter of concrete. The ineffectiveness of actions against airfields which have sturdy shelters was demonstrated in particular by the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when in the course of the three days from 10 October to 13 October, as a result of massed strikes by Israeli aircraft against Syrian airfields [several words illegible] aircraft were destroyed, because [several words illegible], but the attacking side, the Israelis, lost more than [number illegible] aircraft of their [word illegible] to hits by surface-to-air missiles. This resulted in the subsequent transition of the Israeli air forces to different tactics, the tactics of [word illegible] aircraft, drawing Syrian aircraft into aerial combat. Thus, when it is necessary to neutralize enemy aviation at airfields which are equipped with shelters, actions which are aimed at putting the airfields themselves out of action, such as mining the airfields or making the runways unusable, are more effective.

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Page 16 of 18 Pages

The objectives of a fleet operation which is conducted simultaneously with a [word illegible] front operation are to defeat coastal groupings of enemy troops, capture important coastal sectors, islands, and ports, and, in certain cases, to improve basing conditions for fleet forces.

An air defense operation is conducted with the joint efforts of formations of air defense forces, air defense troops of a coastal front, and fleet air defense groups to repel enemy airstrikes against important coastal installations, troop groupings, and naval force groupings and to interdict overflights by strategic aircraft into the interior of our territory. *SR 7/3*

Amphibious landing operations and amphibious and air landing operations in which landing forces on an operational-strategic or operational scale are landed are carried out to capture strait zones and improve fleet basing conditions, to capture important coastal areas and islands, to assist ground forces on coastal axes in defeating enemy coastal groupings, and to cause individual countries in the enemy coalition to withdraw from the war. A strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations can include an antilanding operation as well as combat actions to thwart debarkation by enemy assault landing forces on our coast or in the flank [or rear] of attacking troops.

In a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations which begins with employment of conventional weapons alone, powerful, coordinated strikes must be delivered immediately against the enemy both at sea and on land, and the delivery of the initial strike against the enemy is particularly important. The initial strike must be delivered suddenly, in the shortest possible time, and it must receive comprehensive support. The main targets of the initial strike are enemy missile submarine groupings and carrier groupings which are the basis of the enemy's nuclear might, ASW groupings, and important ground targets.

The main role in the initial strike is played by combat service forces and by long-range and naval missile-carrying aviation.

The most important role in supporting the initial strike is played by reconnaissance. It is reconnaissance which provides descriptions of enemy targets, and it is reconnaissance which shows where the most important targets, or as they now say, "top-priority" targets (those which are to be hit in the initial strike) are located at the present moment. [Word illegible] Order No. 00200 early this year, in which the attention of all command personnel, all the Armed Forces was [focused] on reconnaissance of top-priority targets.

The main continuing objective of our forces for the entire period of conventional operations is to undermine the nuclear capabilities of the enemy's ocean grouping and maximum [word illegible] of nuclear might [against it].

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Page 17 of 18 Pages

Oceanic Theater Nuclear ops.
They will preempt!

When the transition is being made to employment of nuclear weapons, delivery of the initial nuclear strike on the orders of the Supreme High Command must thwart the enemy's attempts to pre-empt us in delivering the initial nuclear strike and must make it possible to seize and maintain the strategic initiative. According to our strategic military leaders, the most important thing is to prevent the enemy from pre-empting us in delivering the initial nuclear strike; it is in this sense that the term "retaliatory-reciprocal" strike should be understood. In this case everything depends on reconnaissance. If reconnaissance indicates that the enemy is actually preparing for actions [word illegible] using nuclear weapons, and that in fact he could, according to all our signs, deliver a strike at a particular time, at this point we will deliver the initial nuclear strike. This is the way it is [worked out] at all the exercises, [several words illegible].

** ~ ~ ~*

The initial nuclear strike is delivered immediately following or simultaneously with the initial strike of the strategic nuclear forces, it is delivered simultaneously against all the targets and to the entire depth of the disposition and basing of the enemy's naval forces. This is why the objectives of the operation are literally achieved within the three to five days during which combat actions are conducted in which nuclear weapons are employed, because the enemy is hit to the entire depth [several words illegible]. The principle targets of the initial strike are missile submarines and the aircraft carriers which form the basis of [the enemy's] nuclear might, and the initial nuclear strike by our forces will therefore be crucial to the subsequent course of the strategic operation and to the achievement of the main objectives, that is, thwarting or substantially blunting nuclear-missile strikes by the enemy from the direction of the ocean.

Depending on the situation, subsequent nuclear strikes can be massed, multiple, or delivered by a single nuclear munition, and can be delivered [only on particular] axes for the purpose of hitting nuclear weapons platforms which have survived or which have just been detected by reconnaissance. After an exchange of nuclear strikes, the nature and effectiveness of subsequent actions by forces and troops will be dependent on a different pace and on the extent to which the battleworthiness of the forces and troops is restored. Regrouping and [word illegible] of the forces and redeployment of large units and units of naval missile-carrying and ASW aviation from other theaters of military operations for the purpose of creating [word illegible] groupings and forestalling the enemy in recovering battleworthiness are considered to be the main condition for success in subsequent actions to complete the defeat of the enemy's naval forces.

Thus, in a modern war, conflict in ocean theaters of military operations will be global in scale and will be an essential part of armed conflict [as a whole]. Thwarting or blunting enemy nuclear-missile strikes on an ocean axis, diminishing the military-economic capabilities of the states of the enemy

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Page 18 of 18 Pages

coalition, causing coastal and island states to withdraw from the war, and other tasks can be carried out only through the united and precisely coordinated efforts of formations and large units of various branches of the Armed Forces. These tasks are carried out by conducting strategic operations in ocean theaters of military operations.

The strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is one of the most important forms of strategic actions of the Armed Forces, one in which, by virtue of the specific nature of combat actions at sea, the leading role is played by the Navy.

Initial and subsequent fleet operations form the basis of a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations. The strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations is closely tied to other strategic operations. It affects the achievement of the objectives of these other operations and in turn utilizes the results of these operations.

The following are directions of development of the strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations as a form of strategic actions of the armed forces:

1. further expansion of the scale of the strategic operation;
2. an increase in the [two words illegible] of tasks carried out in remote areas of the ocean by force groupings which possess a high degree of combat durability;
3. more active utilization of air armies of the Supreme High Command and of formations of the Strategic Rocket Forces in a strategic operation in an ocean theater of military operations;
4. an increase in the scale of assault landing actions, including actions for landing operational-strategic landing forces on island territories and in support of the actions of [word illegible] groupings of our troops and forces in remote areas.

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