MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON: Agent Reconnaissance in Front Offensive Operations

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation, classified TOP SECRET, prepared in 1985 for use in the Voroshilov General Staff Academy.

2. This document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

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Deputy Director for Operations

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Summary:

The attached intelligence report is a translation from Russian of the text of a lecture at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy on the subject of agent reconnaissance in support of military operations. The organization of the paper is rather loose and the treatment is somewhat anecdotal. Points are sometimes introduced without being developed. The lecture first mentions briefly some new developments in the field, including an "improvement of TO&E" and an increase in size of reconnaissance units. This is followed by a list of the tasks for which agent reconnaissance is useful, and finally a discussion of planning and organization. Touches on various problems this type of reconnaissance faces and provides a very sober estimate of how effective it can be expected to operate.

End of Summary
AGENT RECONNAISSANCE IN FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

... organization and conduct of agent reconnaissance [agenturnaya razvedka, or human-source intelligence] in a front offensive operation.

Order No. 00200 of the Minister of Defense on combat and operational training, and the recent Order No. 0060 of 1985, on the results of the exercises in the Baltic and Belorussian military districts note that work is currently being done in an adverse and dangerous international situation. The actions of the United States and its allies are becoming more aggressive. The United States is escalating military preparations and attempting to change the correlation of forces to its advantage. They are deploying intermediate-range missiles and cruise missiles in Europe which are substantially altering the correlation of forces and, in fact, these missiles are becoming [two words illegible]. Under these conditions, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are taking certain extra measures in order to improve the defense capability of the country and to increase the combat readiness of our Armed Forces.

Order No. 00200 states that the adversary and his possible scenarios of action at the beginning of a war must be analyzed in depth. [For instance,] in preparing an attack and endeavoring to disrupt the organized deployment and commitment to war of our Armed Forces, the enemy will attempt first of all to destroy the control system, missile troops, air defense means, aircraft at airfields, and naval forces in their bases. For all practical purposes, he will attempt to take us by surprise. In other words, the attack must be sudden, so that we do not succeed in taking any [counter]measures.

In analyzing these orders, we can also note that in all the orders, at all our exercises, one and the same issue is brought up: the need to improve the effectiveness of reconnaissance all types, including special reconnaissance.

Special reconnaissance is conducted by agent reconnaissance organs as well as by special-purpose [SPETSNAZ] large units and units. The following measures are currently in progress.

1. New, effective means of reconnaissance are undergoing accelerated development and entering service, such as the SU-24[MR], which has a tactical radius of 1200 km and is an excellent aircraft. Our aircraft currently perform reconnaissance with a tactical radius of 600 km. The MIG-25 should also be included. In addition, the new RAMONA-PLANSHEET system has come out. This
automated system enables us to detect enemy aircraft at a range of 400 km, when radar reconnaissance is [virtually unable] to detect aircraft.

2. The second direction is improvement of training of personnel.

3. The third direction is improvement of the TO&E of reconnaissance large units and units. We now have the radiotechnical brigade instead of radiotechnical regiments. The capabilities have [grown] substantially. An army has a regiment instead of a battalion. If we examine special reconnaissance, a front used to have a regiment; now it has a brigade, and this brigade has a new composition. It now has 240 SPETSNAZ reconnaissance groups. An army now has, instead of a company of eight SPETSNAZ reconnaissance groups, a battalion of 30 SPETSNAZ reconnaissance groups.

4. The fourth direction involves the methodology of conducting reconnaissance. We have the forces and means, but we lack the requisite methodology -- how to organize, conduct, and implement these tasks. The exercises we conduct indicate that we are on the right track, but that this work must be continued.

To cite one example in illustration, a combined-arms army or tank army can with its forces strike 80 percent of the enemy targets in its zone, whereas reconnaissance can detect approximately 30 percent of these targets; the official exercise figures are 40-45 percent. The exercises indicate that there is a positive result, but that this is still insufficient. The recent order of the Minister of Defense therefore states, "In 1986 special reconnaissance exercises are to be conducted at which we will re-examine our weak spots and determaine what equipment should enter service." These exercises are being prepared, and will be held sometime in May. The last exercises on this subject were held in 1980, the KARPATY-80 exercises.

Tasks, forces and means of agent reconnaissance. The tasks are defined by the front commander and elaborated by the front chief of staff in advance during peacetime in support of the operation to be conducted, and are based on the reconnaissance orders of the GRUGSh [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff], or now, of the intelligence directorate [RU] of the staff of the high command on the axis. It should be said, however, that this question has not been worked out; rights and obligations in this area have not yet been precisely defined. For the time being things are done as previously: the special combat order on reconnaissance of the GRUGSh. In defining tasks the following must be taken into consideration: the available data on the enemy; the actual capabilities of the forces and means of agent reconnaissance, and the agent-operational environment. Agent reconnaissance is [frequently] assigned more tasks than it can carry out, but it is not enough simply to put an agent in place and then expect him to provide you with information. This is why chiefs of staff, especially of the military districts, groups of forces, and
Agent recon will not do everything for you; its forces and means are limited.

The objective of agent recon is to reveals the initiation of immediate preparations by the enemy for an attack, the strength of enemy troop groupings, the enemy's possible intention, the times of attack, and the location of key enemy targets. This general goal is achieved by carrying out reconnaissance tasks. Which reconnaissance tasks must be carried out by agent reconnaissance in support of the preparation and conduct of the first front offensive operation?

1. Ascertain changes in the military-political situation in the theater of military operations and in the daily activity of the armed forces. For strategic reconnaissance, in a strategic operation, this is the most important task, but for agent operational [operativno-agenturnaya] reconnaissance this is not the most important, although it is quite important.

2. Detect the plans of the potential adversary for mobilization deployment and operational deployment of his armed forces. NATO is attempting to shorten the times for strategic deployment. Previously they deployed 85 divisions in Europe by M-30, whereas now this is done by M-10, in one-third the amount of time. Operational deployment used to require 15 days, whereas now they do it in seven days -- half the time. Let us examine a strategic operation in the Western TMO as shown on map No. [blank; not received] to illustrate what happens: our nearest army, the 11th Tank Army, is in Kaliningrad. The distance it must travel is 1200 km. To calculate the amount of time it must travel by [word illegible] means, we take 250 km as the average distance travelled in a day. This is just for traveling, but it must still spread out. While the first units are moving forward, the others are still in place. When the first large units and units arrive, they still have to wait for the others. The enemy attempts to preempt us by taking advantage of such factors. They believe that reconnaissance will be able to detect their immediate preparations for an attack in any case, and once these are detected, they must preempt us. Let us assume they begin combat actions with the use of nuclear weapons and that they carry out sabotage on the dam at Kaunas, for example. The water will overflow, with a wave height of about 20 meters, flooding out over three to five km at first, and then to 30 km, for an extent of 150-200 km. Along this zone all the bridges, railroad [crossings], etc. will be flooded. The troops of the second operational echelon of the strategic grouping, the Fourth or Fifth Front, will [not] be able to approach [word illegible] or will be held up altogether. We therefore need to know [the enemy's] plan and intentions, and this can only be done by agent reconnaissance.

3. Detect [the enemy's] intentions to use nuclear attack means. If the strike is reciprocal, that is, both sides deliver strikes simultaneously, our

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first echelon troops will suffer casualties of 40 to 50 percent. However, if our strike is retaliatory, our troops will suffer casualties of 60 percent. To see the effect of 60 percent casualties, according to our assumptions and calculations, if a division loses 60 percent of its personnel and equipment, it is, in fact, not battleworthy. Our strike must therefore be delivered in good time, and to do this we need reliable data: "The enemy will begin combat actions on day X, at X hours, using nuclear weapons." This kind of information can be obtained only by agent reconnaissance.

4. Ascertain changes in the combat strength and numerical strength of the ground forces, air forces, and air defense forces. We know quite well what exists in peacetime, but we need to know what changes. Reconnaissance of air defense means is now equal in importance to reconnaissance of nuclear attack means. Previously two launchers in each Nike Hercules battery employed nuclear weapons; now all Nike Hercules launchers employ nuclear weapons to a distance of 155 km against land (?) targets. Patriot will also employ nuclear weapons [two words illegible]. If combat actions begin without the use of nuclear weapons, the main means of hitting the enemy in the operational depth will be our aviation. Calculations indicate that if the enemy's air defense system is not suppressed, the probability that our aircraft will get through 100 km from the border into the interior will be one to two percent at medium and high altitudes, or 25 to 30 percent at low and super-low altitudes (from 50 to 300 m). For this reason we need to know where the air defense system is, so that we can take it out in good time — whether by nuclear weapons, precision weapons, or through the use of special means.

5. Ascertain the coordinates of the enemy's operational-tactical and strategic nuclear attack means. This previously referred only to operational-tactical means but now includes strategic means as well: cruise missiles, Pershing II, Pershing I, and Lance. What accuracy is required in determining coordinates? In support of employment of R-900 and R-300 missiles, the accuracy should be to within 150-250 m, and for tactical missiles it should be 80-150 m. At the SPETSNAZ exercises our [trained intelligence personnel] determine the coordinates on the average to within 150-250 m; at the exercises agents [agentura] determine them using a three-point fix to 600-700 m and more. We have an instrument which automatically determines coordinates; it weighs approximately 12 kg. There is another new instrument which weighs approximately 5 kg. The problem is approaching with one of these instruments to take a fix. Let's say a security platoon surrounds Pershing I missiles at a radius of 1.5 km from the missiles. We can't get any closer than 1.5 km to determine the coordinates. We need a small, automatic instrument which enables us to take a fix. At present there is no such small instrument.

6. Detect the location of troop and weapons control posts, particularly ground control posts of RUK [reconnaissance-strike systems] such as PLSS, Assault Breaker, and others, as well as the [Lance] system [word illegible].
This also refers to control posts for nuclear attack means. An analysis of exercises conducted by our potential adversary reveals that if there is an army group in the [word illegible] zone, let's say the Northern Army Group, and the attacks are coordinated, they are capable of attacking an opposing grouping of front troops in the first hours with one or two launches of operational-tactical missiles and cruise missiles and one sortie of weapon-platform aircraft and rendering this grouping nonbattleworthy. According to other calculations, if nuclear weapons are not employed, in the course of the first two to four days a front is capable with its reconnaissance forces and means of detecting approximately 20 percent of the enemy's nuclear attack means; however, we need to destroy 90 to 95 percent of these means. This means that the front reconnaissance complement [komplekt razvedki fronta] requires further improvement.

7. Ascertain measures for airlifting troop groupings from the United States, Great Britain, and other axes. Five divisions can be airlifted from the United States in 10 days, and we must detect this promptly.

8. Ascertain the time and direction of advance of reserves.

9. Detect measures taken by the enemy for operational preparation of the TMO. For example, we are interested in flooding areas and in where defense lines will be established. In the area near Hanover in the FRG there is a highway, and above this highway there are two canals, one above the other. If [word illegible] break into this [illegible], our main grouping which could deliver a strike on the Hanover-Brussels axes will, in fact, be stopped. The water will be 50 to 70 cm high, 80 km across and 100 km long. No tracked vehicle can pass through this mess nor can it be forded. We need to know about this in advance.

10. Ascertain the political attitudes and morale of the enemy troops and the attitude of the local population toward the Soviet Army. We do not attach much importance to this question in our exercises, and did not attach much importance to it during the Great Patriotic War. In the East Prussian Operation, when our troops were approaching, [word illegible] the war, we conducted agent reconnaissance in Belorusian territory; our personnel were welcomed, fed, and assisted by the local population, and we believed that everything was fine. When combat actions were moved to the territory of East Prussia, -- this was late 1944 -- we believed that we would be greeted as liberators. We completely failed to take into account the attitude of the local population toward us. We sent our reconnaissance personnel there in soldiers' uniforms and overcoats, with Soviet-made automatic rifles; we even gave automatic rifles and boots to the Germans. All their provisions and maps were Soviet, of course. And what did the local population do? Everyone was armed, beginning with the 16-year-olds, and as soon as they caught sight of anything that looked like a Soviet soldier, they shot, without asking for documents.
completely failed to take this into consideration and relied on the local population assisting us, which did not happen. As another example, one of our tasks is to provide assistance to partisan and resistance movements. We need to know in advance: will there be such a movement in the FRG -- we believe not; in the Netherlands -- perhaps; and so on. Such questions are of concern and are reflected in specific plans, even those for the preparation and conduct of front operations.

In order to perform these tasks it is necessary to reconnoiter the targets, and there are many targets. As we stated previously, the total number of targets in the front zone is 1000 to 1200. Of these, key [vazhnyshiy] targets -- PERSHING missiles, cruise missiles, nuclear munitions depots, [two words illegible] posts, command posts -- number approximately 400 to 450. However, calculations indicate that reconnaissance cannot detect 1000, and 450 is difficult. It is necessary to support the effective employment of the weapons in a front, and in a strategic operation, the intermediate-range missile forces of the Strategic Rocket Forces -- the SS-20s -- must also be supported. That involves 300 launchers, with three warheads per launcher -- 900.

For this reason, a new term has appeared -- top-priority [ pervoocherednyj] targets. If the total number of targets is 1000 to 1200, and the number of key targets is approximately 400 to 500, we designate 120 to 150 as top-priority targets. For instance, on the Hannover-Brussels axis, on the North German strategic axis, this new term is evident with regard to the planning of the first nuclear strike. As you know, we have nuclear planning groups which include intelligence personnel. We are developing the plan for reconnaissance of these targets, and we have now come down from 400 targets to 150 -- the targets which we must hit and destroy in the first strike. Approximately 100 of these targets are the responsibility of agent reconnaissance. The document states which targets these are: first of all Pershing I platoons, Lance batteries, ground forces divisions, SAM batteries, etc.

[Unknown amount of text missing.]

... in the General Staff many of the old tenets are being abolished and a new classification into strategic and operational targets is taking effect. There are instructions on the classification of these new targets. The classification is new and [word illegible]; therefore the literature does not [correspond] absolutely. The classification of targets into strategic and operational is now incorporated into the "Principles": first, the average human source, strategic [or operational] -- his capabilities, what he can do in one day; second, what type of target this is, how it is used, can it be hit with a single nuclear munition [or warhead, boyepripas], if a strategic target -- by strategic means, if an operational target -- by operational means. Under the new classification, [in the missile forces] operational reconnaissance [is now responsible for] [words illegible] launchers and self-propelled launchers, which
were previously strategic targets, and a number of others, such as nuclear
minefield complexes. In the ground forces, previously only a division was an
operational target; now separate brigades are also included. In the air
forces, most has remained the same, except that sections of highways adapted for
aircraft landing and take-off have been added. In the navy, everything has
remained approximately the same. As for staffs and control posts, previously
agent operational reconnaissance [word illegible] reconnaissance of a command
post from an army corps up, but now [remainder of sentence illegible]. Rear
installations, however, have remained. The military post is now included,
whereas previously it was not. Administrative-industrial installations of an
area up to 50 square km are operational targets; those with an area greater than
50 square km are strategic targets. Training centers are operational targets.

Electric power stations from 100,000 to 500,000 kW are operational targets;
those over 500,000 kW are strategic targets. Railroads and [contamination]
areas up to 50 square km in area are operational targets and those with an area
greater than 50 square km are strategic targets.

Every target throughout the world has been assigned a number. The numbers
are assigned not by the General Staff, but by the high command on the axis and
by the fleet in its zone. Only where there are no axes, etc., are numbers
assigned by the General Staff. Each target is assigned a number, and only
numbers are used in all correspondence. The first digit stands for Europe (1),
Asia (2), etc. The second digit stands for the axis. For example, in Europe
there are officially two axes; a commander-in-chief has not been appointed yet
for the third because they cannot decide whether to appoint someone from the
Ground Forces or from the Navy. The third digit stands for the theater of
military operations. The next three digits stand for the country. For
instance, Oman is 477, Iran is 326, Finland is 239, Sweden is 573, and so on.
[Two lines illegible.] The third number is the branch of the armed forces. The
numbers after that stand for the unit.

The 1942 system of coordinates provides the main data for a target, but
there can be additional data following the coordinates of the target. For
instance, if it is a combined target, such as [illegible] Air Base in the FRG,
because the airfield is itself a target, and this can be part of yet another
target. For instance, if the 135th Air Wing of the British Air Force is located
there, then this target is also included as part of the 135th Air Wing. The old
system is being replaced by a new one, and there are many new abbreviations and
symbols. For example, an army corps is written as a field army, and missiles,
cruise missiles, etc. have new symbols.

A front must have certain agent reconnaissance forces and means in order to
perform reconnaissance tasks. The agent organization includes a chief of
reconnaissance, an agent section, which is referred to as the second section, a
special reconnaissance section, and the communications section. There is one
intelligence center (RTs), which is usually not located far from the front.
headquarters or [two words illegible], two or three reconnaissance posts (RP), a separate Osnaz radio center [radiouzel], which maintains contact with agents and with the [reconnaissance] organs, and there can also be an agent reconnaissance operational group. In Afghanistan it is called an agent group; in general it is called an operational agent group. These are the command and control organs.

The corresponding active agent networks (DAS) are also set up by the intelligence center and reconnaissance posts. An active agent network is [several words illegible] collects. It can generally have 70 to 90 agent sources. It may have more than this or less than this; there are no concrete figures. Our experience and analysis of work during the Great Patriotic War indicate that one operations officer can conduct all the different processes -- spot, assess, recruit or co-opt, train, dispatch, handle, and, when necessary, take over -- for approximately 1.6 to 1.8 agent sources, or in other words two agent sources. An agent source refers to a residency, an agent group, or an individual agent. It is the general practice in the armed forces to refer to an agent source without revealing what it is. These figures refer to an agent source, whether it is a residency, an agent group, or even an individual agent.

We believe that with automation and so forth, this figure can be two agent sources, perhaps 2.2 to 2.5. Then we must count how many officers are in the intelligence center, how many are in the reconnaissance posts [several words illegible], and we obtain a list of our capabilities. An officer cannot handle five agent sources. The experience of the war indicates that during the last 10 months of the war, one operations officer spotted, recruited or co-opted, trained, dispatched, handled, and took over approximately 85 people. If we examine the active agent network, we take 0.4 to 0.6 to be the probability that an agent source will perform a reconnaissance task. An agent source can conduct reconnaissance of one or two targets at one time. Analysis indicates that the probability that an agent in strategic reconnaissance will perform a task, depending on the situation, is also approximately 0.5. We do not only task [an agent] with identification, but the information must be [two words illegible] 0.5. Apparently, one agent source is not enough to successfully carry out reconnaissance of a Pershing missile with a 0.95 probability; the probability that this source will perform this task is 0.5 at best. It is therefore necessary to have another agent source or to send a SPETSNAZ group, reconnaissance aircraft or other means to the area and coordinate action.

We have other calculations which indicate that the probability that a group of ground forces will make it across the border is approximately equal to 0.75. The probability that an aircraft will make it through the air defense system is approximately 0.8. The probability that a group will be detected while operating in the rear of the enemy is approximately 0.6, and the probability that the group, if detected, will be destroyed, is 0.85. Taking all this into consideration, the probability that an agent group will carry out its task is at most 0.35. Thus, the time has passed when we could say that once we had
inserted an agent source, a task would be carried out. [Line illegible.] ... that the probability that [word illegible] would reach him [it] was equal to 0.5.

We now believe that when the enemy is activating his groupings, it is possible that he will invade our territory to some depth. Once we withdraw, this area must be reconnoitered, and we set up a reserve agent network. A reserve agent network is generally only set up on an axis along which the enemy is attacking. Calculations indicate that we can set up this reserve network to a depth of 100 to 120 km. It is dangerous to extend it any farther, because this is the depth of defense of the first echelon armies and it would be difficult to maintain it at any greater distance. During the Great Patriotic War the depth of the reserve agent network was up to 600 km, but at this distance it became impossible for us to control.

As a rule, a reserve network is made up from the local population, for the most part people who are not of draft age, the disabled, and [word illegible] women, because the enemy will promptly [take people away] who are not in these categories. Members of the reserve network are used in various ways, but they must be skilled.

The auxiliary agent network consists of various safehouses, etc.; it will not be discussed here.

The agent reconnaissance reserve is set up and utilized for the purpose of reinforcing the active agent network. In peacetime it may be small, but when the threat period or period of immediate preparations for operations arrives we begin to dispatch agents from this reserve. Before combat actions begin this is done by land, and after combat actions begin it is done by air. There are no figures on how many of these agents there may be; this is determined independently in each military district. For example, in some districts they number in the hundreds, and in other districts, in the tens. However, a reserve which becomes too large is generally of poor quality. The events in Afghanistan showed that the reserve which was in the Central Asia Military District and was designated for action in Afghanistan turned out to be incapable of performing tasks, or that it was very difficult for it to operate there. They did not know the language, religion, or way of life.

In some districts this reserve is intended for yet another purpose. We have a number of border military districts and groups of forces which do not carry out agent reconnaissance in peacetime. But what if war begins tomorrow? We need to set up an active network in the rear of the enemy. This is when this reserve is intended to set up active networks in the rear of the enemy, in the threat period or even when combat actions begin. However, in order to begin to set up a [network] from members of the reserve, we must know precisely what will
happen, whether the enemy will initiate military operations. We may dispatch agents who begin to operate but who are not legalized, and then there is no war. The events of 1963 in Cuba were such an instance: things were well under way, certain measures had begun to be carried out, but there was no war.

Planning and organization of agent reconnaissance. The 26th Party Congress defined.... [Unknown amount of text missing.] ... [planning], organization, and implementation of reconnaissance [word illegible], as it is written in the "Principles". Planning [word illegible], and this is beginning to be included in all the documents. The "Principles" are now being revised in connection with the departure of the Chief of the General Staff. We ask that planning once again be made an element of the organization of reconnaissance, and that the branches [vidy] of reconnaissance be changed. As it now stands, reconnaissance is divided into ground, sea, air, space, and special reconnaissance, and special reconnaissance is further divided into agent reconnaissance and special reconnaissance. We ask that agent reconnaissance and special reconnaissance be made separate branches of reconnaissance.

A plan of front agent reconnaissance for an offensive operation is prepared in the form of a text and a map. The first section of the plan covers the objective and the main tasks. This now also includes special tasks. Agent operational reconnaissance now includes regular agents and SPETSNAZ agents. In peacetime these SPETSNAZ agents are designated to lay the groundwork at targets which are to be taken out of action by us at the beginning of a war. The reserve includes agents who are designated to perform special measures at the beginning of the war: putting electric power stations and other targets out of action, annihilating or capturing government leaders and military [word illegible], and a number of others. Therefore we now also train SPETSNAZ agents. Then there are organizational tasks -- who is to be [exfiltrated], who is to be dispatched, who is to do what, etc.

In the second section of the plan available forces and means are allocated among targets: special attention to such-and-such, availability of such-and-such, which group and source are to perform which tasks, what [time period is given] for this, and which organizational measures are to be carried out during this time. We divide the targets into groups, identify nuclear attack means, what is to be allocated to this, how much is to be allocated for the operation in all. This is followed by measures involving the reserve network (where to set it up and how many [agents]), then recruitment measures.

Agents must be not only recruited or co-opted, but trained as well. The plan must indicate how much time is to be spent on this, and this must then be coordinated with the timing of the operation. An offensive operation lasts 12-15 days, or so it is written in the "Principles", but what actually happens? Let us examine a situation on map No. [blank; not included]. Let us assume that on the Berlin axis the enemy activates a grouping of 1700 tanks -- Leopard IIs,
etc. Ideally, at least three days are needed to stop and repulse this grouping. It is then necessary to get to and cross the forward line of NATO. We may say 15 days, but calculations and exercises show that this figure is evidently 20 or even 30 days. The reconnaissance plan indicates that cruise missiles in the FRG are to be reconnoitered, but while we are recruiting an agent and so forth, by the end of these 15 days, there are no more cruise missiles left in the FRG. This means that we must indicate not what we will recruit and use in the first operation, but what we will use in the second operation. The first operation is planned up to the borders of France; we will not succeed in recruiting and training an agent for this operation, however, but rather for the second operation. The subsequent task of the strategic operation is in Spain, so that at this point it is already necessary to recruit people who can perform assignments on the territory of Spain.

The next section in the plan covers the organization of command, control, and communications: [word illegible] to carry out communications with the chief of intelligence, what measures [are to be taken], and how everything will be organized. Examined realistically, however, command and control is a complex matter. The diagram of command and control [not included] shows the communications center of the chief of intelligence, the reconnaissance post, the [word or acronym illegible], and the intelligence center. However, there are many more questions to be dealt with. What are the capabilities of the Osnaz radio center? How many contacts can it maintain? Our regulations state that each agent source must make two radio contacts per day.

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