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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Resignation of Mr. C. D. Jackson from the
Board of the Free Europe Committee

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the DCI. The suggested action is outlined in the Recommendations Section of Attachment A.

2. As the Director will recall, John Hughes urged that the DCI talk to C. D. Jackson at some length in order to persuade him to withdraw his resignation from the Board of FEC. John Hughes suggested January 8th, before DCI's meeting with the Council of Foreign Relations, as a possible date.

3. Attached is our analysis of the situation which lead C. D. Jackson to resign, and our suggestions as to how the Director might approach C. D. with respect to it.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment A: Analysis - C. D. Jackson resignation
" B: RFE Broadcasting Policy Toward Poland

cc: DDCI

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C. D. Jackson resigned from the Board of the Free Europe Committee a day or two after the UN debate on Hungary in which the U.S. decided to press only for a "condemnatory" resolution rather than seeking to revoke the credentials of the Hungarian U.N. delegation. He also wrote letters to President Eisenhower and DCI indicating that he believed this was an indication of a breach of faith with the Hungarian people, and that in effect we were no longer serious about working for the eventual freedom of the peoples of captured Europe. He also declined to accept the President's invitation to the Crusade for Freedom luncheon at the White House on December 15th.

In subsequent talks with John Hughes on this general subject, he indicated that the U.S. position in the UN debate on Hungary was merely the "last straw which broke the camel's back." The basic problem, in his mind, was the intrusion of the State Department into FEC affairs, as typified by Ambassador Beam's vetoing of Archie Alexander's proposed orientation trip to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Jackson believes that this matter should have been carried to the top of the Department and Beam over-ruled. C.D. has in the past been critical of what he considers State's "formally correct" positions concerning the Satellites which has resulted in many criticisms by State of RFE's Polish broadcasts.

C.D. has suggested that DCI should discuss these matters with the Secretary of State and that C.D. would be glad to participate in such discussions.

Discussion

Although we believe that C.D.'s action may have its roots in many areas, such as his acute embarrassment at having been General Crittenberger's principal sponsor as President of FEC, we believe that C.D. has some points which ought to be taken seriously.

Some representatives of State have over the past several months undertaken what we believe to be a campaign of destructive criticism of RFE, with special reference to its Polish broadcasts. Although we do not understand all of the background factors in this problem, this campaign seems to stem, in part at least, from criticism made by Polish Communist regime officials to Embassy Warsaw and elsewhere. RFE is made to appear as negatively attacking Gomulka, unduly interfering in Polish internal affairs, and complicating a very delicate and difficult situation in that country.

This matter is influenced by at least these factors: (a) State thinking that RFE is so closely identified with the United States that it should take about the same line as broadcast by VOA (b) a more optimistic assessment of Gomulka and the situation in Poland by Polish-desk representatives in State than we believe is realistic (c) an attitude on the part of these representatives that it is not appropriate for RFE to call attention to retrogressive steps in Poland except in the most innocuous terms.

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It should be pointed out that the Policy papers worked out by CIA-USIA and State representatives in August of 1957 authorize RFE to carry on the kind of broadcasts now being criticized by State. Copy of the Polish paper is attached as Attachment B, with pertinent passages indicated in red pencil.

It is also pointed out that the National Intelligence Estimate on Poland, dated September 1958, indicates a much more pessimistic situation in Poland currently than State desk-level people seem to be willing to admit.

One indication that the Polish regime intends to keep up its pressure for total "Socialist" conformity may be found in the following quotation from a speech by Aleksander Zawadzki, member of the Politburo and CC, at the recent XIII Plenum:

"...the more correctly and consistently the Socialist offensive develops...the more talk there will be about a retreat from October. We should disregard it. We are acting and we will act in accordance with the interest of the working class...in accordance with the ideology and vocation of our party. And this must put a final and complete end to this "October" which was propagated by the Polish reaction and strongly supported by international reaction." (A. Zawadzki. Proceedings of the XII Plenum. p. 161. - Polish text.)

Another area in which not only RFE but also more recently State Department officials have expressed concern over Gomulka's policies is in foreign affairs...where Gomulka has sharply attacked the U.S. and more militantly aligned himself with Moscow.

Our assessment of RFE's current broadcasts are that they are based on excellent information, that they are geared to straightening out the distortions in regime propaganda and preventing further slippage from the "October freedoms," that their policy is realistic, that it conforms with currently agreed-on policy papers, that while there is an occasional mistake, on the whole they are remarkably good and effective.

Recent audience reaction to RFE (by the Polish people, not the regime) indicates that RFE broadcasts are well received and appreciated. This includes such important figures as persons close to Cardinal Wyszynski and reflect his reactions.

We therefore agree to a considerable extent with CD's views on this subject, as concerning Poland at least, and believe that his suggestion for a high level discussion in State is desirable.

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Recommendations

That DCI:

1. Tell C. D. Jackson that he has a valid criticism of at least desk-level State attitudes about RFE Polish broadcasts.

2. Tell C. D. Jackson that our estimates of RFE Polish broadcasts are that while there may be an occasional mistake, the sum total of their output is excellent and should be continued.

3. Arrange a meeting at the necessary level in State to reach an understanding on this matter and to correct lower-level impressions which we believe are not correct.

4. Advise C. D. Jackson that he and Archie Alexander are welcome to participate in such discussions.

5. Encourage C. D. Jackson to withdraw his resignation and remain on the team to assist the new president who needs all the help he can get to lead the organization.

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