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19 November 2001

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DR. GROSS: I'm Dr. Charles J. Gross, the Air National Guard Historian in the National Guard Bureau. Today's date is 19 November 2001. I'm at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, at 1st Air Force headquarters to interview Major General Larry K. Arnold, the Commander of 1st Air Force concerning the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the response of 1st Air Force and other Air Defense assets to those events.

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DR. GROSS: Sir, for the sake of the historical record, could you identify yourself?

MG ARNOLD: Larry Arnold, Commander, 1st Air Force, Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR).

DR. GROSS: Okay, very good.

MG ARNOLD: Major General, Air National Guard, United States Air Force.

DR. GROSS: Part of that is sometimes overlooked by the public.

Could you lay out the force structure rules of engagements, major organizational elements and responsibilities of your command prior to 11 September 2001?

MG ARNOLD: Okay. Prior to 11 September 2001, we were the -- we had really three responsibilities. By the way, to some degree those have not significantly changed. NORAD is divided up

into three regions: the Alaskan region, the Canadian region, and the United States or the continental United States NORAD region.

I was the Commander of the continental United States NORAD region responsible for air sovereignty or I should say Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control of the Continental United States NORAD region.

Additionally, as Commander of 1st Air Force, I was responsible for organizing, training and equipping our forces that were supporting CINCs worldwide. For example, Northern Watch, Southern Watch, that sort of thing.

A tertiary role that I had was working for Joint Forces Command as the Commander of Air Force Forces for Joint Task Force Civil Support which had to do with consequence management after a CBRNE event, as we call after weapon of mass destruction, Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear or High Explosive, CBRNE, C-B-R-N-E, sort of event.

The command-and-control force in the NORAD business had to do with peacetime ROE [i.e., rules of engagement]. Those ROE are pretty standard throughout the Air Force. Do you want this classified or unclassified?

DR. GROSS: Classified if you think that's where the information is and we'll handle it that way.

MG ARNOLD: All right. ROE matters are normally sensitive if not classified; but, basically, under peacetime ROE,

CINC NORAD normally has the responsibility for declaring a target hostile

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. Can you talk a little bit about your force structure?

MG ARNOLD: Force structure. Our region was divided into three command-and-control sectors. The Southeast Air Defense Sector, at Tyndall Air Force Base [Florida]; Northeast Air Defense Sector at Rome, New York; and the Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force Base in the state of Washington, responsible for providing command-and-control to those geographical areas.

And what I'm talking about is they run the radars and scramble aircraft. They have scramble authority over aircraft assigned to their sector area. And, of course, we had 10 Air National Guard [fighter] units that were assigned to 1st Air Force, seven of which were pulling air sovereignty alert prior to 11 September 2001, seven locations around the country where they were pulling alert, starting up in the northeast would be Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts, pulled by the 102nd Fighter Wing. At Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, pulled by the 119th Fighter Wing. At Homestead Air Force or Air Force Reserve Base I guess now, in Florida, pulled by the 125th Fighter Wing. At Ellington Air National Guard Base in Texas pulled by our



Ellington unit which is 147<sup>th</sup>. Out at Old March Air Force Base now called Riverside, Riverside, California, pulled by the Fresno Air National Guard unit 144th Fighter Wing. And, pulled alert at Portland by the 142nd Fighter Wing.

Now, I left off Tyndall. Tyndall Air Force Base, we had the 148th out of Duluth, the 148th Fighter Wing out of Duluth pulling alert here.

DR. GROSS: What was the requirement for the alert in terms of how soon they had to scramble and who could do it and that sort of thing?

MG ARNOLD: Over the years, that's changed to some degree, but the alert aircraft obviously the response posture immediate has come to be defined as soon as possible, but not later than [REDACTED]

Now, years ago, we used to call it [REDACTED] With the advent of the inertial navigation systems, it took a little longer than [REDACTED] to get airborne just for the inertial NAVs to come up, even though that's not a problem today because of our updated INS systems that we have.

It has sometimes taken up to [REDACTED] because people wear exposure suits and we did not ever want that to be an issue during peacetime. So we were allowed up to [REDACTED] to be able to respond to a scramble prior to the 11th.

DR. GROSS: And in your opinion, how good of a coverage

from an air sovereignty standpoint --

MG ARNOLD: We didn't have air sovereignty, we had token air sovereignty. Seven sites around the country was inadequate to be able to respond. We had numerous events where no fighters in a suitable location would be the end result. And that basically meant there was no way to get there, from here to there.

You know, the northeast, from Otis all the way down to Langley, it seems like a long distance. If you were going after -- if you were in the latter days of the Cold War when the Russians had been flying their Bears down to Cuba and you were responding just to those kinds of events, the east coast was okay. It wasn't great, but it was okay. You probably could have responded to those events. If you had some tankers, it would have helped.

But to say that we had air sovereignty where we could get airborne and go out and touch an unknown aircraft within a reasonable period of time -- I would define reasonable period of time, within a half hour, although that's not satisfactory. There was no way that we could do that in very many places in the country unless the unknown happened to be cropped up.

The most difficult places were in the southeastern part of the United States where you have 70 percent of the unknown aircraft appearing.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)(g)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)(g)

So to say that we had air sovereignty was a myth. We had token air sovereignty at best and I'm not the only person to say that. GEN. [Richard B.] Myers when he was Commander of NORAD [14 August 1998 to 22 February 2000] said that as well.

DR. GROSS: I assume this was pointed out to people in the Pentagon. What was the response to all that?

MG ARNOLD: Well, I think the thought pattern was that we were in deep peace and the only country that had the capability of attacking the United States country, nation, state, with aircraft was Russia and that the Cold War was supposed to be over and so, therefore, we didn't have to worry about it; plus their military was -- had been driven down.

Our concern, of course, had been for some time about a terrorist attack on the United States using asymmetrical methodologies such as a cruise missile or an unmanned aircraft of some type which can fly slowly but long distances and carry small payloads that might be able to do significant damage, or the scenario I painted to you from an airplane crossing over from



Mexico or from some other island.

So I think it was a matter of priorities and the Pentagon and in some cases, the amount of money saved was small. My opinion is that having worked on the Air Force Board that often at that level where -- these kinds of decisions are principally supported and sold. Most of the time at that level, the ability to affect the budget is nibbling on the fringes. And I would consider the reduction of the total number of assets to have proper air sovereignty was classified as nibbling on the fringes.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. But, that left you basically without the capability to accomplish the mission?

MG ARNOLD: If your mission was to provide air sovereignty for the continental United States, it left us without the capability to do that.

Now, on the good side, the good side is that the command-and-control structure, the infrastructure, the radars, the COM to be able to protect against a target coming from outside the United States remained in place. Not that they were robust. The radar is inadequate, designed for FAA, not designed to look down, designed to look up. They're great at 30,000 feet. They were nonexistent below [ ] along the east coast/west coast. It doesn't matter where. They just weren't designed to do that particular job.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(g)

So we had serious concerns about cruise missiles and had initiated an advanced concept technology demonstration, which had been approved for cruise missile defense. And basically developed a portable Joint Expeditionary Base Command-and-Control Center that we could place into a situation, into an area, a geographical area based on an event that we wanted to protect.

And then our concept of operations would be to link available military assets that might be called upon to defend that area.

We've never been asked to do that, but we had a plan to be able to do that.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Okay. Well, I want to clarify one point. You're talking about being able to provide air sovereignty. In that, as we talked earlier today, that was in the context of stuff coming into the United States from outside the continental United States. I don't believe that anybody ever really was looking at what happened on the 11th of September from something.

MG ARNOLD: No, I don't think so. I don't think people -- you know, we thought there was a possibility of people perhaps hijacking airplanes and holding people hostage or putting a bomb on them or blowing them up. I don't think we thought of using a fuel air bomb, being an American airliner, of taking off in the United States and then going in and crashing into the World Trade

Center.

I think we'd become -- I hate to use the word, "complacent," but certain it's applicable in retrospect. I think we believed that the point of departure security that we had in our airline terminals was sufficient to stop that. So we never imagined something like that anyway. But we did worry about airplanes that might take off inside the United States that would perform some hostile act within the United States. Our thought to that was that was a law enforcement issue.

You know, when you think of the United States military, our objective is to protect the United States against, normally, against foreign enemies. But, you know, when you take the Pledge of Allegiance or your Oath of Office, it's foreign and domestic, you know.

DR. GROSS: All.

MG ARNOLD: All. All enemies of the United States.

DR. GROSS: Yes.

MG ARNOLD: However, we organize -- we organize our law enforcement issues and our intelligence collection, it's against the law for the United States military to collect intelligence internally within the United States, except under emergency conditions.

That's why we have the FBI. They are allowed for law enforcement purposes with very strict controls to guarantee your



constitutional rights and mine; but they are allowed to collect information when they have probable cause and with adequate court orders, they're allowed to collect information.

The CIA, which is really part of the Department of Defense in my mind, certainly part of the defense infrastructure, collects information outside of the United States. And then, of course, we in the military unless there has been a state of emergency declared are only allowed to fight outside of our borders, not inside.

DR. GROSS: Okay. We've pretty much covered most of the stuff in item 2. I'd like you to skip ahead to question number 3 if that's all right.

MG ARNOLD: In the 1996 -- okay. Had there been a serious effort to reduce or even eliminate altogether 1st Air Force as a dedicated Air Defense organization prior to 11 September 01, of course.

DR. GROSS: That would be the one, yeah.

MG ARNOLD: And there had been. It had gone back, as we had drawn down the military -- let me go back a little bit in history even further back. I'll go back to 1978.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: When they shut down Air Defense Command -- I may be wrong a year on that. It might have been '77. But really we shut down Air Defense Command and when Air Defense



Command was shut down, we didn't now how to do the air sovereignty mission even then. So some people had made decisions about what to get rid of, but a lot of people did not think about the follow-on structure that was required.

So we created this thing called ADTAC and really the commander of ADTAC was called the Deputy Commander of Tactical Air Command for Air Defense. That's what ADTAC really stood for.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: Deputy Commander of Tactical Air Command for Air Defense. Well, a deputy commander doesn't do anything and I remember talking to the commander at the time had been the -- been out there and I'm trying to think of his name-- it will come to me here in a minute -- of what was the issue.

And he told me in a conversation I had with him a few years ago that he told the Commander of Tactical Air Command this did not make any sense and that the staff at Tactical Air Command in those days wanted nothing to do with any command organization being responsible for the air defense of the United States.

Well, eventually, the powers that be rose higher in the power in the Air Force and decided that if you're going to have to do this mission, then you have to create a command organization. They created 1st Air Force. So, 1st Air Force was created, ultimately moved to Tyndall, not necessarily for all the right reasons, but moved to Tyndall anyway.

And as we ended the Cold War, but still doing the air sovereignty mission, still responsible for whatever came from without, there began to be pressure to cut the budget even further.

And I talked about it before: nibbling down.

So during the QDR [i.e., Quadrennial Defense Review] that was essentially the 1996 QDR, but it really wasn't released until about, you know, late in '96, [that the] QDR got released.

The QDR reduced the air defense portion of this mission even further and suggested that there only be four dedicated air defense flying units and that any other requirements would be supplied by Joint Forces Command.

The good news is that the commander of NORAD at the time, GEN. Howell Estes [27 August 1996 to 13 August 1998], would not buy that and he fought to maintain seven alert sites at least.

Also what was not visible in the QDR, but was behind the scenes was that in the budget arena the United States Air Force had taken every effort to shut down 1st Air Force along with, I might add, 8th Air Force, and 13th Air Force because they thought that their jobs had gone away. I can go into a great deal of discussion about each of these, but I'll stay with 1st Air Force.

So from 1997 essentially until the end of '97 and

perhaps even until close to the end of '98 there still had been a lot of discussion about shutting down these numbered Air Forces.

The bottom line was in the Air Force they decided that they couldn't do away with their numbered Air Forces. They still had a job to do for them; but, even at the last minute, what used to be Tactical Air Command is now, of course, Air Combat Command, the staff went to GEN. [Richard E.] Hawley, by this time, Commander of ACC [i.e., Air Combat Command] and said, "What is your position on shutting down 1st Air Force?"

He said, "I don't have a position. Is there a better way to do the mission?"

And, of course, that was news to these folks because their belief was that the reason you were shutting down 1st Air Force was because there was no mission.

They went back, they looked and they studied. They came back and finally, the final answer to GEN Hawley was, "No, we haven't found a better way to do the mission."

The question that they should have been asked before they ever asked the question: Is there a better way to do the mission?

Or they should have asked themselves and should have gotten a satisfactory answer: Is the mission no longer a mission of the United States Air Force?

DR. GROSS: Well, before we go on to the events of the



11 September, I think it might be a good time to talk about the RAM Team that you commissioned several years ago to examine this question of the mission and where it fit in the future of the Air Force and the Air Guard.

MG ARNOLD: Yeah. Well, I'd had a long conversation with [Colonel] Dan Navin (Ret.) [Special Assistant to MG Arnold], really, for a couple of years about we needed a team to go out and do some analysis. I thought that team should have been sponsored by Air Combat Command. Air Combat Command. Or by the National Guard Bureau. Someone. Because we had so little support at the National Guard Bureau alone, we were -- we were just something that was eventually going to go away and nobody gave us much support.

So I knew that the new QDR was coming up. It was supposed to be released and has been released, obviously, in the Year 2001. And so my goal was to do a study to look at the mission as we talked about before. Is there a mission?

And number 1, if there is no mission, then we ought to divest ourselves of the resources and figure out a better way to use these resources doing another mission that we have.

If there was a mission, which I suspected there still was -- I mean there was a mission -- then we needed to have -- I asked the question: Is there a better more efficient -- not necessarily more efficient, but efficient is one part of it, but



is there a more effective way to do this mission and save resources and still be able to do the mission?

So a study composed of mostly Guard people, unfortunately, but we included active duty people from Tactical Air Command or ACC, Air Combat Command, and from NORAD in that study and there were actually people from the Rand Corporation in there as well as National Guard Bureau and 1st Air Force headquarters.

I chose Major General Paul Pockmara to run that study because Paul, even though he was a Guard general officer, had never been part of Air Defense Command and I wanted someone to head up this study that was not labeled as a 1st Air Force type officer.

And, of course, the results of that were, there is -- there is still a mission. All the four stars said so. And no one thought that we were going to stop doing aerospace warning and aerospace control against air breathing threats to North America.

And they also did an exhaustive study of another way, doctrinally sound way, of bedding this mission down from a headquarters perspective in another numbered air force.

And the answer simply was the other numbered air forces were fully engaged and had plenty to do.

DR. GROSS: How did people in the Pentagon and

throughout the Air Force respond to your final conclusions of those studies?

MG ARNOLD: I thought it was useful. You know, I'm not sure how much visibility it had, but it had enough visibility that it turned the tide, first of all, in the Guard Bureau.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: I found that from a personality point of view that [MAJ.] GEN. Weaver, Paul Weave [ANG Director], who had never been a foe, certainly, but he began to realize because of the study and because of the debriefing that we were going to be around for a while.

I think [LT.] GEN. [Russ] Davis [Chief, National Guard Bureau] had decided at one time that we would not be around for a long time and had expressed to me concern over the potential -- we were talking at that time about converting the Alaskan 611th Air Defense Air Defense Squadron into the Air National Guard and he was opposed to that because he thought that the air defense mission was a sunset mission. But as a result of the Roles and Mission Study, he concluded that it was not a sunset mission. It may not be a big mission, but it was still going to be there; and, therefore, then actively supported the conversion of the 611th to the Air National Guard which is in progress as you know.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Well, so much for the preliminaries. Could you talk about the events of 11 September and how you

reacted and what actions were taken here? And whom to do what.

I know it's a long story.

MG ARNOLD: It is a long story. On the 11th, we had been engaged in a NORAD Vigilant Guardian Exercise. It was basically a SEMEX, a command post type exercise. Then we'd been operating -- had been in for about, again, for four days.

I was on the morning of 11 of September I was up in our video teleconferencing facility, just had a VTC with the NORAD staff. The CINC, I don't believe was actually present during that briefing, but his senior staff was.

And, as we walked out the door, I got a -- somebody had come upstairs and they grabbed me and said, "We got a real world hijacking going on."

And so I ran downstairs to our battle cab and up to the upper dais there, got on the phone with Colonel [Bob] Marr, who's the Northeastern Defense Sector [Commander] and he told me, "Boston is -- we don't know where the airplane is, but Boston is, has a flight, United Airline flight that they believe has been hijacked."

And he said, "I've got the fighters on cockpit alert."

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: Now, let me explain this. The procedure for us responding to a hijack is for the FAA [i.e., Federal Aviation Administration] to go to the Department of Defense and



request assistance. It's considered a law enforcement issue.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: They then, the Department of Defense, if they agree to take this on are then supposed to go to CINC NORAD.

He then comes down us and directs us to launch airplanes in support of the hijacked airplane.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: You can imagine how long that might take.

DR. GROSS: Quite a bit, yeah.

MG ARNOLD: But in reality, as soon as I got in there, Bob Marr, he says, "I think," he says, "I think we need to scramble the airplanes."

I said, "Go ahead and scramble them and we'll hold them out in 105 until we get the necessary clearance."

I'm on the phone in the meantime, simultaneously talking to the NJ3, General Rick Finley, who is brand spanking new, up at NORAD. He's a Canadian officer and he said, "Absolutely, we'll go ahead and support it."

By then I'm looking -- as I -- as we're talking about scrambling the airplanes which was at 8:46, the news flash suddenly came up on television and we saw this smoking hole in the side of the North Tower of the World Trade Center and the thought that went through my mind was, "I wonder if this could be a hijacked airplane." I almost dismissed it because I knew that



the hijack was out of Boston.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: And we didn't know where the airplane was.

We just knew that we were being requested for assistance. But in the meantime, this occurred.

Shortly after that, that particular collision with that United Airline flight that collided into the World Trade Center was confirmed as a hijacked airplane. But I don't believe at that time that that word had gotten to me. It had just been confirmed; but we did not receive that information. And in the fog and friction of war as you know there, the next thing that I saw was this other airplane flying into the South Tower as many of us saw.

And by then, you know, this was -- you begin to realize that one could be an accident: some airplane has flown into the Tower. Two? This looks like some sort of concerted effort.

Are you getting ready to turn that thing over? What are you thinking about doing?

DR. GROSS: I can take a look.

(Off the record.)

DR. GROSS: We're fine.

MG ARNOLD: All right. By now we begin to get other calls. By the way, the second airplane, the American Airlines 70 -- no, 11, yeah. American Airline 11 I believe it was.

DR. GROSS: Okay.

MG ARNOLD: Had crashed into the South Tower. By now, we are getting calls about a United Airline that had taken off out of Newark and was now wondering around up in Ohio area there and we had a call that that was a possible hijacking.

And so we watched -- we were trying to figure out where he's going. At one time, we thought that airplane was going to Cleveland. He went by Cleveland. We thought maybe he was going to Chicago. We tried to get airplanes airborne out of Toledo.

We thought -- at one time we got a call for a Delta flight. And that Delta flight was thought to be a possible hijacking.

We looked at the airborne airplanes we had up in Michigan to see if they could be any help to us. Nobody was in position. The Delta Airlines [flight] eventually landed. The United 93 started heading south. We scrambled -- we, talking the northeast [air defense sector], talking to Bob Marr, we scrambled three airplanes out of the Langley detachment of the 119th and headed them to Washington, D.C. to put them overhead in case that United 93 was coming.

In the meantime, as we were going through this process of getting these guys airborne, we get a call of a possible hijacking of American Airliner 77, the one that hit the Pentagon. Had no clue where it was. Didn't see it. No point out on this

thing.

And then we get a phone call that it's headed towards Washington, D.C. We didn't know whether it was headed towards Washington, D.C., from the north, the south, didn't know.

And, in fact, I wasn't so sure that one of those earlier called hijackings might have been headed down towards Washington, D.C., and some other airplanes had run into the, into the World Trade Center.

But we then watched the smoke go up in Washington, D.C., we didn't know where it was at the time. As our airplanes are getting airborne, they come up Washington, D.C. We're watching this United -- by now we know it is the Pentagon. We're watching this airplane and we're thinking, "We're going to have to out and shoot this airplane down."

In my mind, it wasn't even a question of ROE. It was a question of we had had hostile acts and, therefore, we had a clearance to fire.

Now, theoretically, I think that is true under our existing ROE. It wouldn't be true today, but I don't believe that I needed the President to tell me to do that. As it turns out, that airplane, you know the passengers we believe rushed forward on that airplane. That airplane crashed up in Pennsylvania and we did not have to order that airplane to be shot down.

As it turns out, the Vice President had declared, given CINC NORAD the authority to shoot down airliners that had shown hostile intent in the United States about three minutes after the United 93 crashed. So the last airplane crashed before we got clearance.

In the meantime -- I didn't know it at the time, but the White House Secret Service had called up Andrews [Air Force Base, Maryland to the 113<sup>th</sup> Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard] and Andrews had gotten [F-16] airplanes airborne out of Andrews and they to fly underneath our CAP which was over Washington, D.C. We were up around 20,000 feet; they were flying down really low and talking directly to Washington Approach Control which might have been a better thing to do because the radars that were being used by the FAA were much better than the radars we were using. Our radars are long-range radars as I said before. They were talking to Approach Control and probably had a better picture of what is going on.

DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.

MG ARNOLD: In the meantime, the Vice President had declared Washington [DC] a free fire zone, any airplane that was entering the Washington, D.C. area was told to turn around or be shot down or land immediately.

And, by the way, in the middle of all this fog of war, we ended up with 21 unknown or 21 potential hijacked airplanes.



There were no more, but we were working all of them at that time.

We knew that the President was down in Florida. We asked if we -- we didn't know what he was going to do. Eventually, we asked the question if he takes off do we need to escort?

We were told no. But then the airplane took off and we got immediate word that the Secret Service had asked us to escort.

DR. GROSS: Gees.

MG ARNOLD: And we were in position anyway. At that time, we had fighters airborne all over -- we were starting to get multiple fighters all over the country to become airborne.

We diverted an AWACS aircraft that was on a training flight. We had diverted them earlier over to where the President was, down there in the Sarasota area of Florida. And so the AWACS was coming across Florida from the east coast. He thought he was on some kind of an exercise, not a real world thing. And we eventually escorted the President all the way over to Barksdale Air Force Base.

We didn't know where he was going, they wouldn't say. We landed the fighters at Barksdale Air Force Base. We had other fighters prepared to cover. AWACS remained on orbit. We had tankers. We were diverting tankers, scrambling tankers in order to cover this.

The President subsequently took off again, you know, about an hour later I believe and proceeded to Offutt Air Force Base and we, again, we did not know where he was going, but our fighters took off with him, escorted him up to Offutt, had AWACS overhead as well. And then after -- when he was at Offutt, he was talking to the Secretary of Defense. I related that to you this morning.

I think the last unknown we had was a US Airways flight that had taken off out of Madrid, Spain, and was headed to New York and had been reported as a possible hijacking.

And the Northeast Air Defense Sector, working through the FAA had called US Air's headquarters and they said, "No. We just talked to the pilots and they're back on the ground at Madrid. They turned around. Not hijacked."

And that was the end of the big run/flurry of possible hijackings that we were supposed to have at that time. The President then got back in his airplane and proceeded back to D.C. But even doing that, we were escorting from the rear. We had been told to stay back. We were back 5 to 10 miles just watching. And I think the Secret Service still not knowing that we were there, fog and friction of war, told the District of Columbia [ANG] to intercept the President coming back into Washington.

And they did. They came up and joined right up on the

wings of the airplane. There was a lot of pictures taken at that particular time.

DR. GROSS: Yes.

MG ARNOLD: But we didn't order them from NORAD to do that. That was just Secret Service trying to do their own thing out there and the President came back and landed in Washington, D.C.

In the meantime, we were -- we sat down with a map. I just drew circles around about 15 major metropolitan areas.

DR. GROSS: Nobody was telling you to do this at this time?

MG ARNOLD: No.

DR. GROSS: You just said, "Hey, do this."

MG ARNOLD: "Let's do this."

And we started flowing aircraft. We started getting communications with all these fighter units. Some were 1st Air Force units. Many -- most were not. And we started putting people on alert status and as they would load their airplanes and started launching them into these orbits up into to cover the population centers.

We discovered that the Navy had pushed ships out to sea on the east coast eventually, within the next 12-13 hours, unbelievable response time. [U.S.S.] George Washington was off the coast up by New York. [U.S.S.] JFK [John F. Kennedy] was

also on the east coast. We worked with ADM Dawson out of 2nd Fleet and he readily understood doctrine. It's a good thing we'd been studying doctrine. CINC NORAD had already been declared the supported CINC. He rolled those forces right underneath us.

We rolled the George Washington under the Northeast Air Defense Sector. We rolled the JFK under the Southeast Air Defense Sector and their Aegis Cruisers also were along with them and we rolled them right under the same thing. And that really was working out from our perspective pretty well at that time.

Joe, I'm going to have to stop and get with you again.

DR. GROSS: Okay. Great, thank you very much.

(The interview was adjourned.)