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Secretary Rumsfeld  
"Day of" 9/11 Questions:

I. POSTURE & READINESS PRIOR TO 9/11

A. Rumsfeld on Homeland Defense:

In your interview with the DoD historian, you were asked to what extent you had begun to think about homeland security prior to September 11. You provided the following answer:

"We had been engaged in what was called the Quadrennial Defense Review. So, well prior to September 11 we had been talking about the defense of the homeland and discussing how we were going to be able to deal with that problem. *We had elevated it to the top of our priority list.*" (emphasis added)

(1) Please describe these discussions. Who was involved? What actions were contemplated? What threats were envisioned? Specifically, prior to 9/11, what were the priorities?

(2) To your knowledge -- in the context of these discussions or any other -- prior to 9-11 did DoD ever consider the threat to the homeland posed by a suicide hijacking? Prior to 9/11, was there any planning or training within DoD for such an attack?

B. NORAD Mission:

Last May, in testimony before our Commission, General McKinley of NORAD stated that:

"On the day of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, [NORAD's] mission was to defend North America, to surveil, to intercept, to identify, and if necessary to destroy, those targets which we were posturing were going to come from outside our country. . . . It was [our responsibility] to look outward, as a Cold War vestige, primarily developed during the Cold War, to protect against Soviet long-range bomber penetration of our intercept zone."

(1) If homeland security was at the top of DoD's priority list -- and if NORAD was the primary (or perhaps sole) Command with responsibility for safeguarding the nation prior to 9/11 -- why was NORAD only equipped to protect against Soviet long-range bomber penetration of our intercept zone? Do you agree that NORAD's mission was this limited?

(2) Prior to 9/11, was there any discussion of changing NORAD's mission to take account of new, emerging threats? If not, why not?

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## II. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ON 9/11

### (1) Immediate Response to WTC 2

I understand from documents we have received (Rumsfeld Interview with DoD historians, Bates #Bates 51148-60) that on the morning of 9/11 you were meeting with a group of congressman and then returned to your office for your daily intelligence briefing.

Please walk me through how you learned of the second hit on the World Trade Center, and what you did immediately thereafter. I want to focus your attention on the period of time between the second hit on the WTC, but before the hit on the Pentagon – roughly 0905 to 0940.

- During this time, did you realize the country was under attack? If so, what steps did you take?

### (2) Command and Control Operations Post-Pentagon Crash

As I understand it, after the plane hit the Pentagon you went down to the parking lot and assisted with some of the rescue efforts. After that, you went to the National Military Command Center and Executive Support Center. Is that correct?

- Who was running the air defense operations when you arrived at the NMCC? Approximately what time did you arrive?
- After you arrived, what did you do?
- In terms of obtaining situational awareness and coordinating the air defense operation, what interagency conferences were you involved in? (NB: We know of the Air Threat Conference Call and Dick Clarke SVTS – what else?)

(S) (NB: Entry From NMCC After Action Report: “Senior leaders (CINCs/Service Chiefs/SECDEF/NSC) were not in conference, but appeared to be coordinating with each other outside the conference...**Lost VCJCS & SECDEF to multiple SVTS convened by NSC for long periods of time. No NCA direction in conference during this time.**”

- At the senior level, who was coordinating with the FAA? Did you speak with anyone from the FAA on 9/11? From DOT?
- What was your awareness of the hijacked aircraft over Pennsylvania – Flight UA 93?

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- What was your awareness of the fighter aircraft that were being launched from Andrews? Who was coordinating with Andrews, given that they were operating outside of the NORAD chain of command?

(3) **Shoot Down Order**

[NB: The key to this line of inquiry is the follow up questioning, in light of Secretary Rumsfeld's previous statements and the Air Threat Conference Call (excerpts below). See also NMCC 11 September 2001 Integrated Chronology (appended to NMCC AAR) and Shoot Down Chronology for more detail.]

A good deal has been written and said about the decision that day to order the shoot down of civilian aircraft.

Please describe your recollection of the following:

- From whom you received the order?
- When did you receive it? (in terms of sequence of events, if not the actual time)
- What was the substance of the order that was conveyed to you? Did it include specific details regarding rules of engagement and if not, how were those details crafted?
- How was the order passed down the chain of command at DoD?
- Is it your understanding that the order was passed to the pilots of the fighter aircraft that were capping DC?
- Was it your understanding that the order applied throughout the day (and perhaps beyond), or did you have to go back to the President for each individual target?

(U) **Rumsfeld to DoD Historian:**

**Historian:** What about authorization to shoot down United #93? Did that come from the Vice President?

**Rumsfeld:** Technically, it couldn't, because the Vice President is not in the chain of command. The President and he were talking and the President and I were talking, and the Vice President and I were talking. Clearly he was involved in the process.

**Historian:** It was reported that the decision came from the Vice President

**Rumsfeld:** He might have recommended that.

**Historian:** But the rules of engagement came out of your office.

**Rumsfeld:** Sure.

(On establishing ROE)

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**Historian:** How long did it take you to establish the rules of engagement to possibly shoot down any other planes that might come in?

**Rumsfeld:** They were probably established pretty fast in my mind, and then we refined them. Dick Myers and I talked about them.

**DiRita:** I would say it was within the first hours, because I left after about two hours and you had worked a lot out in conversations with the Vice President.

**(TS) Rumsfeld on ATCC, approximately 10:37-39:**

[NB: Prior to this exchange, Mr. Hadley and other duty officers from the PEOC were passing shoot down orders from the Vice President to the ATCC; see Shoot Down Chronology for more details.]

**VP:** I've talked to the Vice President, I know he's trying to reach you. Have you spoken to him?

**SecDef:** Yes but early on, right after the Pentagon was hit.

**VP:** OK, he's going to relocate to another site. We received an anonymous call over here that Angel was the next target and I assume he thought steps had been taken to provide protection for Air Force One.

**SecDef:** Correct, that's been ordered.

**VP:** Are our forces on heightened alert?

**SecDef:** Yes, I've ordered Threat Con Delta.

**VP:** "There's been at least three instances here where we've had reports of aircraft approaching Washington – a couple were confirmed hijack. And, pursuant to the President's instructions, I gave authorization for them to be taken out. Hello?"

**SecDef:** "Yes, I understand. Who did you give that direction to?"

**VP:** "It was passed from here through the operations center at the White House, from the PEOC."

**SecDef:** "Okay, let me ask the question here, has that directive been transmitted to the aircraft?"

**VP:** (Immediately responds to question) "Yes, it has."

**SecDef:** "So, we've got a couple of aircraft up there that have those instructions at the present time?"

**VP:** "That is correct. And it's my understanding they've already taken a couple of aircraft out."

**(4) DEFCON 3**

Who made the decision to go to DEFCON 3 and how was it executed?  
Was the President consulted before the decision was made?

**ATCC Transcript on DEFCON DECISION:**

**(TS) 10:43 DDO to Conference:** The Secretary of Defense had directed that we go to DEFCON 3 and be prepared to go to Level 2.

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10:44 SecDef to VP: We're recommending going to DEFCON 3.

VP: Run that by him (the President) and let him make the call. I think it's a good idea.

SecDef: I'll pull some notes together and call him shortly...

10:45 DDO: Hold off on DEFCON 3 - we need to go to POTUS before we can execute.

10:46 DDO: Override last instruction. The Vice Chairman is directing we go to DEFCON 3 - Time 1046. All stations acknowledge...

**NMCC AAR on DEFCON Decision:**

~~(S)~~ "DEFCON change decision made without reviewing/implementing any of the prearranged coordination actions contained in CJCSM 3402.01"

**III. Post 9-11 Review & Assessment**

(1) After the attacks of 9-11, did you order any type of review of the air defense operation that day? If so, what were the results of that review? If not, why not?

(2) How would you assess NORAD's performance on 9-11?

[NB: You may want to refer to the following entries from the NMCC AAR:

~~(S)~~ "NORAD fails to notify NMCC of hijack and does not request any conference at NCA level until NMCC initiated a Significant Event Conference (SEC) 30 minutes later."

~~(S)~~ "NORAD unable to provide accurate updates on CAP status in Air Threat Conference. It took 50 minutes from the time the CAP was established overhead DC for NORAD to report it in the conference."

(3) How would you assess the performance of the NMCC?

(4) Do you believe that DoD would have been able to shoot down Flight 93, had the passengers not brought the plane down in Pennsylvania? If so, please describe your understanding of NORAD's readiness to carry out such an order at approximately 10:25.