



78/50E

RAS - landmark trial,

as USG went to trial in blind shell,  
even UBL's name - there was Afghan connection,  
+ UBL came up, Ayman came up, MK came up  
Defense was brought this & up as a defense,  
i.e. training for Afghani, not for US)

"conspirator list" - defense asked for that  
list, judge gave govt. every little time - goal was to  
be overseen, because it had evidentiary significance as  
conspirator exception to so list is a list of possible conspirators.  
(Karsar rule) + it was filed under seal to protect the  
conspirators - but it was leaked immediately  
Sudanese mission to US was on list.

167 names, incl. UBL.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

told

prosecutor that UBL was ~~involved in~~ connected to jihad in  
Afghanistan.

but UBL was very much in background.

Khalid Ibrahim, defense witness, may have  
mentioned UBL in trial - that was only mention of UBL in  
trial, if it occurred.

late 95/early 96, prosecutor learned of TFL/Alec  
station, focused on UBL.

mainly Av also came up then, although Fitz...

did he  
ask us  
to be  
discreet  
here?

FS/SCI

another peripheral <sup>mention:</sup> ~~mention~~

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

worked for UBL in Abu Saudi office before

UBL left Saudi

CTA shared their info. w/ the prosecutors for lead value - though prosecutors said, mil./intel. action had precedence, they're just backup.

~~and~~ upon reading the CTA materials in 96, prosecutors struck by how ~~much~~ after he was connected to various jihads - but unclear what UBL was doing, or whether he was knowingly funding terror.

Fadh is the light bulb. Prosecutors debriefed him in 95. (great that CTA gave access to all pertinent docs - great cooperation of CTA). (made him available to prosecutors after CTA squeezed him dry).

(~~debriefed~~)

Fadh enabled ~~great~~ prosecution to get a handle

Fadh was crucial to Emb. bombing trial - crucial to being able to interrogate & / or arrest others.

"Islamic Army" v. "Qaeda" - confusing.

~~Fadh~~

Blind shell <sup>93</sup> call to <sup>Reshawar</sup> ~~Shawar~~ - "How are the cameras?"

Persons answers, they're almost all closed because of FBI pressure - & blind shell soup, "even the base [Qaeda] in Arabic".

(FISA take on this call - this ~~was~~ call introduced in court in landmark trial).

FS/SCI

mid-97 - Fadh talks @ "Qaeda," + Fitz. remembers earlier mention in Smith phone call.

Fadh reveals ~~that~~ <sup>UBL is</sup> that ~~is~~ running an org.

~~the~~ <sup>in Kenya</sup> o'whali's ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~understanding~~ "Qaeda" the org., versus "Qaida" the network, versus the large jihadi network. Aug. 12, 98 302 (around there).

"Qaeda" the org. could assign people to different tasks, e.g., Fauwaz is emir of a camp, then sets up kanyan cell, then sent to London.

Similarly, Odeh had different jobs. Some people would not join AQ but would work w/ them, ~~they~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~wanted~~ <sup>only</sup> ~~served~~ <sup>worked</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup>.

O'whali did not even buy it, et. of latter.

Then AQ has broader relationships w/ wider jihadi networks, i.e., funding ~~the~~ other groups.

Qaddafi's ~~brother~~ <sup>brother</sup> was very impressed w/ UBL's ~~eff~~ <sup>eff</sup> ~~going~~ <sup>going</sup> to reform + ~~ending~~ <sup>ending</sup> his life, + ~~ending~~ <sup>ending</sup> his mission. Core AQ belief: no countries, 1 caliphate. UBL was the glue that tied ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~net~~ <sup>net</sup> groups together & redirected them to goal of unified caliphate & to fight west.

what led up to <sup>vs</sup> actions in Nairobi?

"Wakil" comes up in reviewing Agency files in 96, ~~see~~

i.e., did not give UBL full control over them, but worked with them on specific projects, i.e. contractors

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Abuhalima had mentioned ~~to~~ trying to get guns from "Wakil" in Texas.

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seemed like a transit ~~point~~ point, a "flophouse."

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

LI sent the final report.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted]

raid on Nairobi house - Fitz

pushed for FBI agent to join, & Coleman did.

found Herun computer that talks about ~~the~~ shell cell going to Somalia (again, corroborating Fadd).

Herun was principal organizer of East Africa bombings

Harun came back to US, & is <sup>debriefed</sup> ~~debriefed~~ + brought before 95.

~~we~~ we didn't have a full picture of Nairobi call, thought it was purely logistical call.

Oubali broke after the bombings & gave up Herun.

Ali Mohamed - before his arrest in 98, he was

FS/SCI

6

conceding  
~~likely~~ a lot.

he was interviewed by FBI in late 94 for  
blind Sheikh's trial. got call in Nairobi from US  
that USG wants to talk to him, comes back, told by  
Atif not to come back.

moamed gave the <sup>Hage</sup> ~~list~~ list to ~~him~~ in  
Kenya.

after bombings, moamed is arrested -  
b.s. for also b.s. on only partial info. for a  
year, but eventually he mostly broke (but  
still, trust but verify).

Atif: 100% confident in Saad's honesty ~~(but)~~

(bad of phytomorph? remembers everything to participate in  
may not accurately remember what people told him)  
always

Atif: M's statement to it. in charge of plan -  
100% accurate

AQ - Sudan - Iran: tripartite relationship.  
Sudan + AQ joined at the hip (even though they  
spied at each other).

relationship of Iran was much looser, because  
of Shia-Sunni split.

Judith Miller, "bad press 99 names" -  
Iran - EJT relationship.

EJT learned car bombing <sup>from Nes.</sup> ~~strategies~~ + justification  
for suicidal operations, which Sunnis had traditionally forbidden.

FS/SCI

3 E15 eventually merges w/ AQ.

CB did not widely advertise w/in AQ of connections to Shia, because ~~that would have~~ it's hard for some in AQ to accept.

Fall on Cambodia. cooperation of Iran, Iraq, & Sudan -  
Cwe should look at 30287 - Fall is reporting what others are telling him, i.e., it's secondhand.

Khobar plant is site of meeting for WMD work -  
we should look at the 302.

also, 302 on conventional weapons collaboration.  
Down in Arizona, Hage has, Jalal Khan there.

ambitious training from Hage. - Mohamed's claim seems credible  
~~the~~ history of jihadist scrub training, people  
like wali Khan -

training in Afghanistan on this (Mohamed 302)  
(see also Mohamed tr.)

\*

Khobar: ~~is~~  
conceivably, not necessarily an "either-or."

no idea if AQ participated or not -  
but JIB was split investigator in a way  
that split along "1" that would have impeded the larger  
process.

(Fall says it was said by  
Fall thought CB involved but  
Fitri doubts it.)

(?) (dishes say that?)  
(FBI)

FS/SCI

OPM Sang - <sup>who knows</sup> inspired by ~~AFI~~ ~~but~~

doesn't know ~~if~~ if this was CBI  
or not.

recalls that ~~she~~ <sup>she</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> funded  
by CBI.

\$20,000 to <sup>no one</sup> ~~the~~ defense fund - we could never  
prove this occurred, or that it went to WTC I bombing.

(Montasser in Egypt alleged jihad to Zawahiri).

we will never trace the funding of WTC I

AQ & WTC I - never been reviewed that ~~WTC I~~ AQ  
was behind it.

Blind Sheikh travels abroad a lot after he  
arrives in US in 1990

Pak photo # Rahman calls - Pakistan info.

we just don't know how Yusef & Asaj  
hooked up ~~to~~ <sup>with</sup> the conspirators.

perhaps Yusef did not coordinate in advance  
of his WTC I conspiracy - not entirely implausible.  
we just don't know.



TS/SCT

Fadh in Yusuf meeting UBL - secondhand, Fadh has no direct knowledge

- poison gas bombs - it occurred, but Yusuf may have sold  
① AQ after WTC etc

Khalifa's first sergeants on manual ~~of~~, + "Qaeda" on manuals - does not necessarily mean (?) an AQ operation.

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also, has to include

Bojwka

part of AQ network - (Barcia & Dieter have been handled)

Shah is very close to AQ, so that's a strong indicator of ILC involvement contact of Khalifa.

Yusuf part - WTC etc is in AQ camps

Landmarks & Sudan

- no doubt the Sudanese mission was involved (we introduced <sup>incriminating</sup> tapes or transcripts of Siddiq A.I. talking to Sudanese diplomats)  
- Sudanese diplomats <sup>was</sup> expelled by US - doesn't know if US did

but schedules (connected to Hamas) - they had Yusuf's phone # in NY, of his 2nd house - sketch of Israeli emb., nitroglycerine - ~~part~~ this suggests Yusuf was part of a large network - "we" never know if UBL/AQ had a role

anything else.

How did it did it go?

- ~~UN unit~~ FBI intel. UN unit in NY might know more.

status of Emb. bombings

no crap yet

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(Doug G.)

Terra Financing

~~to funds~~

- jihadis are raising a lot of money in US.

Hamas is raising a lot here

(suspects that Hamas + AQ cooperating -

2 of the greatest anti-semitic orgs in the world)

they go thru NGOs of innocuous names.

+ these orgs don't cost that much.

Key: raising money thru cigarette smuggling, counterfeit goods

FS/SCF

doesn't know how much AQ is raising here.

~~FS/SCF~~ also, it's easy to divert charitable funds, or parts of funds, ~~to terrorist groups~~ that to terror groups.

(They genuinely believe in charity, as well as jihad).

seems to be reluctance to invoke correspondent bank provision of Patriot Act.

money laundering cases are very difficult in general, & especially here.

even giving mujaahidin money abroad is not necessarily a crime, i.e., defense that you are giving to lawful combatants in a civil war.

Just to  
Dony  
late @  
956

~~FS/SCF~~  
956 is difficult - not clear if it applies to funding lawful combatants - plus, you have to show a conspiracy of a US member to kill or cause damage overseas.

These front org keep records showing charitable disbursements - very hard to show these are false.

if you can build a case if you get lucky on wiretaps, e.g., person down says he knows it's designated.

IS/SCF

even though these are ~~hard~~ hard, you have to keep trying to make these cases.

Argument - fraud charge - not easily replicable.  
~~Argument~~ Have to prove false statements.

donors - 1) some know exactly what's going on  
 2) some are totally unwitting donors  
 3) people in middle - suspect something but don't have actual knowledge.

only category #1 helps w/ a fraud case.

doesn't have a sense of how well USF is doing overall in stopping fundraisers.

Recommendation: DHS needs to look closer at certifying charities. DHS certification is ~~the~~ ~~best~~ ~~of~~ seen by donors as an imprimatur. ~~penalty~~

need stronger penalties for a charity misrepresenting itself to DHS.

not giving Bureau lead on Terror Financing - should Bureau take lead?

Answer: you don't want competing bureaucracies + turf. But DHS may run cases w/ a possible terror angle & not look ~~too~~ too hard at the possible terrorist angle. So it's not totally clear

How to create a really good system.

Is FBI good ~~at~~ at doing ~~the~~ terrorism fund-raising cases?

FBI has some really good financial investigators. But these cases are just hard.

FBI is as good at it as anyone else. You should have criminal investigators on a case, not just intel. people. Criminal agents are used to tough cases even.

Fitz. kept up w/ AQ until start of Embé bombing trial.

major AQ cells around the world

- Africa
- Pak.
- Kashmir
- Philippines - Abu Sayyaf, Mindanao
- Xinjiang, Le Thinh
- Uzbekistan, Taj. (?)
- knew that Pakistan was an important waypoint to Chechnya
- Bosnia (not sure AQ presence)
- Italy - a lot of AQ people there in 98
- France
- Egypt (i.e. EZT, #6)
- Lebanon (Asbat-al-Ansar)
- Kenya thru to Combi
- Somalia - best camps there at least there 98 (AZAZ)

75/SCI

~~the topic~~ - Old Horn of Africa countries

- Saudi, Yemen (by time)
- Fin. rates
- Algerians, Tunisians, moroccans & connects
- South Africa (Capetown)
- Germany (Berlin & Dusseldorf)
- Belgium - AQ presence.
- London ~~etc~~
- Denmark - ~~didn't expect to~~ glass to get ~~etc~~ <sup>asylum</sup>
- Canada - very liberal asylum laws
- tri-border area

Pat. #320 + AQ - ~~show nothing of English way~~ <sup>doesn't know much either</sup>

Ali Mohamed talked of #320 surveillance against us in early 90s. assumes a relationship between them based on, e.g., Taliban by Kashid

major AQ operations disrupted

- ~~can't recall~~
- cells were broken up - Baku in 98 - Agency would know much better.

not involved w/ Qata & KSM.

- is law enforcement info. being disseminated well ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> intelligence comm.?

A: doesn't know, does think there was a mindset that <sup>open</sup> it does want intel. - but they

FB/SCI

can be of tremendous intel. value.

~~do not know~~

Bureau is sharing info much more w/ prosecutors because the wall is down.

also, Bureau ~~is~~ agents <sup>the</sup> did not do analysis of docs handed them to lower status analysts - this especially occurred ~~at~~ w/ intel. agents, who thought their job was debrief people.

NSA person in velle brought in - positive change.

let Felt know @ how much <sup>more</sup> ~~time~~ time, who, & ~~how~~ when, for addl interviews