

11/3/03
10 AM
K Street

Jack Salata

1989 FAA fledgling Intel office
post par an
office of spec Invest @ AF

Belting up intel op.
reached out to AF agents - he was
a civilian

'92 worked counter terrorism aspect
w/ CIA & State and a little w/
FBI

~~for~~ Pandam Commission found to increase
intel sharing w/ FAA

CTC @ CIA
State Dept Bureau of Dip Sec

he was 2nd person to go to State
for FAA from '72 - early 1998.

Middle of the tour the Manila plot bring
down 12 airliners 1995 so his tour
was extended.

SIOF where Liaison sat at FBI
for while he

out of 1998 became Liaison full time @ FBI

August '98 attacks on African embassies
USBL unit. African faith force
1999 was a member of USBL that
became Real Field unit

99 2000 job - doing threat analysis for
the FAA + Bureau

very issue that a threat to aircraft
he was directly responsible -
for FAA + FBI

working FAA staff + as threat analysis
for VCL unit. About 4 staff.

State Dept: he was a "liaison" officer
acc to MOU.

The Bureau: "detail" to the Bureau
they were just that to bring to
the table his expertise as FAA
representative

1990 law gave liaison role:
was FBI's understanding

For FBI: Oklahoma City lead to creation
expansion of CTC. Cultural differences
people came to them w/ expertise
he had strong back in international
terrorism.

Bureau never prohibited him from doing
his FAA responsibility.

"Serve two masters," although he
reco in FAA was a primary
responsibility

Detail or liaison - a morph unit or

raised concern w/ FAA there was a great deal of pressure on Luke he pulled back from FBI tasking when there were problems he needed to work from FAA

a mutually supportive relationship.

went to the pt. of asking FAA to look @ the way the way the FBI interpreted it.

as long as he was satisfying both masters, he was doing ok

1995-1996 Greg Aheron was liaison to Bureau before assigned to command unit.

there was a need some came from State the Bureau thought Sal should go to intel cell. Sinton cleared that w/ the FAA -

VBL was a direct operational unit "they rule the roost" rather than a support unit he leaped at chance to join that unit.

Division to Time in VBL unit:

Every day connected to FAA. 10 calls a day from the catch. court.

They were top priority every day.

60% - 40%

FAA

FBI

Intel information about an airport
nat'l level intel threatened aviation
put full focus on the problem
spec, worked w/ FBI agents assigned
to airports.

worked w/ legal attaches "Legat"
abroad.

Talked + emailed.

worked w/ overseas contacts abroad

Beverly Right - ret. Agent -

focused on CAS program. Airport
operations

Pol / Intel / OPS.

he worked w/ Beverly

Joint Vul. Assess Program

she was prim liaison to agents in the
Field on threats to CAS.

FBI efforts on CAS were real ^{very} strongly
"they had gotten the message"
were involved in it.

Mike Routhas - "never a time he did not
have direct access to him"
he would ask Sal for his
advice.

~~Billy Cox~~ he had a great relationship w/

Alexis Mike Rawlins. Great communication
Smalltalk (sr?)

replaced ~~dot~~ described himself as an
Bev. (aggressive person. Rawlins wanted info
passed to CIA immediately)

Fledgling → real program

she was there on 9/11. "CAS program manager"

Instances where Policy worried w/ Intel to
create elements of info. collection effort
by groups to develop "friendly informants"

State Dept ~~could not~~ ^{cable} went out every
year to Embassies + Legats +
CIA operatives - ESST, elements of info
international scope

DOMESTIC COLLECTION

Pepe falcon was Bev's contact
it was an ops focus. She handled
it.

she saw that his job was international
but though out of ITC he was a FBI

Intel officer used ACS (an automated system)
he was given limited access to ACS

International see threat - so for ex.
threat to a domestic airport

worked w/ closest ~~airport~~ IT supers
Field offices near airports

times when he moved info by "EC"

The Bureau's effort to move into intel out
of the Bureau used a:
~~the~~ Teletype he authored many
of these -

Knowledge of ACS - he had limited access.
domestic info came to Bev from Field.
Bev. Right & Linn had a wonderful
relationship met sev. times a week

She moved info to ops people as a
~~constant~~ courtesy. She would also let
him know.

He was a high energy person moving around the
building.

People were insular about how they
channeled the information Stovepiping @ FBI
Heybolah unit tracking act. in Detroit
- Salata could not get that done
at any time

he disagrees that information wasn't relayed
to ~~FBI~~ on domestic issues.

After PM An 103

FBI got letter w/ comm to FIAA
1995 Okla City - Bureau people that
were in cities covet their information
operational security Insularity.

Throughout career @ FAA there was culture of dislike distrust for FBI he has no idea why.

FBI has rep of being moular People from mil, intel,

Agents take information try to build a case - Protect the information

OSI agent, he disliked how FBI did business.

when he was there, he changed his tune. "WALK A MILE IN THE FBI ~~MOCCASINS~~ MOCCASINS."

Cultural sea change w/ Mike Rowlin - his sect. manager never denied FAA A meeting @ the Bureau

Canadian met Dale Watson his first week on the job @ # ACS I Irish never met w/ FBI Hi officials to his knowledge; often met w/ FCT + STATE DEPT)

Relationships strong in NY. Airways + FBI agents there ~~LAX~~ LAX good relationships

JTTF : Ockneck Resam case; worked until to put FAA agent on the case out in Seattle - Claudio's program and FAA said no. JTTF

Dec. 1999

Salata never denied access.

75-80% of time he rec. a full recap of case. allowed to move a good deal of it to FAA

worked hard to make relationships work

Greg assigned to analytical unit had to go to ops to get what he needed

for Salata in ops he was the filter.

Counterterrorism Division (100+ people)

1. UDL Unit: Any info on Islamic extremists he got directly - SUNNI extremism

2. Hezbollah unit - SHAI extremism

he had few interpersonal skills to get to know everyone they knew he was there

Diff not in that unit; presumption -

Blr in Policy & Ops role - she wouldn't get everything related to CAS. she would not know if Detroit had a Hezbollah case)

^{SAM} Val assessment in Detroit airport: ?

Joint Val Assess would have to indicate the call was there

local threat assessment ~~was~~ included

Joint VVI Ass (JVA's)

BW would feed them to FAA

FAA would come back & question before it was finalized, and put to Congress -

Salata was person the get info out of the ops file & send to FAA

FAA feed to FBI feed would filter back to ACO & he would hear about it that way

ACI relationship

Info he sent would open case files they would come back to him he would hunt up more info -

He kept files on matters that were important, what he'd talked the FBI w/ following up on

Threat info on part city reached critical man. Please invest.

↳ Good example.

Newark Young Pakistani said in jacks at 07 JFK. He was person in the middle he moved info back and forth.

Don't remember specifics

Hong Kong - 1995 R-usef plot. Al Qaeda GASTERS

He was allowed to see entire the
 case file - was in constant commun-
 w/ field agents worked real threats

He can't think of a circumstance when
 felt that the FBI hadn't fully
 vetted all the information & he was
 comfortable.

Mechanisms.

hypothesis: Threat to aviation that had
 nothing to do w/ Islamic ter,
 worked by a field office

Drugs smuggling, etc

he remembers that Beverly heard
 something about it.

Div. 6: crim division -

Aviation mechanics problem on aircraft.
 he was engaged heavily
 - Div 6 called him.

Legat Marilyn Williams was the Legat
 Miami was the field office
 to sort out that it was a threat
 to aviation from mechanics

Instructions to

Miami Field office FAA see spec agents
 on the ground thru communication
 through Bev Right @ ops @ FAA.

A "Flow" ~~local~~^{local} to FAA / FBI HQATS
gave him a call.

was a specific understanding
case file numbers ... website where
they go. Dan Furguright

"They would just know"
~~connect~~ "courtesy phone calls"
HQATS elements were best conduit

Prior to 9-11, crim matters were
decentralized.

He has confidence that as FAA
liaison he was "reasonably" confident
info flow was excellent

Phoenix memo: "learned about it in the
news paper after 9-11."
7/10 memo went to Red Ford ~~unit~~^{unit}

he doesn't know why he didn't hear
about it.

The people who looked at the memo
1st should have

legal, legally, a school pilot accidented
~~it~~ would not have been tracked.
People from everywhere come to the
USA for training

FAA had put in the initial requirements

to look at Aviation skills (Internationally)
- there was no comparable requirements.

These people @ the flight schools
- there was no req of field officers to run flight school courses.

If a call was received that suspicious activity, then it would have been looked into.

Salata does not remember the communication about flight training of Middle Easterners.

That info should have passed to him but wasn't.

He was not specifically involved, "would have been prominent in his memory."

At the time concerned into getting into issue of nationality taking interest in part. class. That would have had to have the lawyers looking at it.

Watch lists / Armen registry - Armen certificate
~~for~~ he was never involved in review of the list to compare to terrorists.

Pre-9-11 there were few natalists to speak of

Remnants

SD Ramsey vic of assoc + all

aliases were a specific SD the
primary FAA watch list

or spec cases the those that seemed
suspicious would be declared unfit
to travel - these instances were rare

no-fly
watch lists
selective } This ~~was~~ wasn't an issue

Newark Pakistani individual

had to been deemed credible he
would have been deemed No Fly
to all airlines + airports through
SD. Intel ~~to~~ could have called
Security Director w/ specific named
information

UBL/Mohamad ATEF - these names
did not appear on any lists
"to watch list + pesky"

Pri 9-11, Hasan at Fdaia, who was
wanted for a hijacking, could have
wanted a 2 to

(999) to crash plane into ~~the~~ WTC?

Credible to go in 1c - fairly low
standard to get one out

"D. credited the flight to legs to
get across the pond, so to speak
() "Opinions information" FAA could have
put something at "non countable" →
mean + SD.

Who would make determination to discount threat?

Whoever originated the information
 FAA had analysts w/ experience
 assessments would have made the
 assessments - but ~~FAA~~ insisted the
 originator to rule out threats.

He doesn't know if determination
 should have been made by originator

FAA environment is risk averse
 def of risk averse: we don't want
 to be responsible for determination.

UBL taken airplane - had been consistent

He began looking 78-85 Palestine
 & Hezbollah - al-Qanari's mujahideen
 three ~~decades~~ decades of terrorist
 threat

CAS theme was consistent for
 three decades

JR: this is inconsistent w/ Mullen & Carney
 testimony.

FAA
 Summer of '01 did risk assessment
 suggesting planes could be used by
 suicide mission manpacks - logic
 dictated that these things should have
 been looked at

He was aware that UBL looking for commercial pilots.

CIA headquarters -

SAM - Hakim Meral - he was tracking for 3 dead
 the idiom in CAS of terrorists
 > clearly talked about it. crashing into CIA.

JAM - Didn't take a great leap to see that
 the skill sets are transferable
 Skills were most important factors. --

SaCuts Clearly we were all concerned some US et
 plot about OAS threat + suicide include

SAM Never going to happen out of a US
 airport? known terrorist groups operating
 in and around US cities. ...
 The list, skill sets on the list domestic

SaLata It was in his internal thinking that
 it could happen anywhere -
 could have happened anywhere

Clearly in hindsight, they missed the pt
 of the Libyan plot
 wonders what else he missed,

Operationally UBL ^{unit} was 27 people
 struggling

"too much more wasn't enough people
 to do it." 3 alerts that summer.

Withheld from public release
 by National Archives and
 Records Administration
 under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.50

March 2001 - Threat of analysis.
 he was very ~~not~~ concerned. Liaised
 w/ ~~NSC~~ NSA. State Dept sent
 warnings that support.

"Common place occurrence" he talked
 to sev. times
 a week

FAA was telling him ~~of~~ from these
 things were being on all random screens

Brits / comments

↳ he was concerned about the
 threshold of security
 raising the baseline
 argument about how hard they
 could push it.

Processes: mutually supportive relationships
 Hawley might see something out of
 Paris & Oach take a look on this."

Message access services - He used
 CT links - he had constant access
 proved to be a huge benefit to
 FBI. Terminal in front of them
 Bureau is paper intensive
 Agency & state dept is right years
 ahead of them on that.

ICS + SDs was exclusive to FAA
 Interrogative - He got copies.

1997: Prescreening Profiling
 1998: automate it - ID selected ~~copy~~ ^{only} ~~was~~ ^{Baggage}

NIFE was out
FAA rulemaking docs
Baseline working group } did these things out there: why

FAA lowered the bar?

Salata:

CAPPS I } "couldn't say the word
CAPPS II } "profitable"

an advocate that we should use the
LL system of security. Factor
those aspects.

At, he worked on the 1970s,
"Security"

worked hard to have safest airplanes
but not a security.

1999 showing Salata the memo...
He remembers the circumstances
Tom Coleen - he and him worked well
together - he wanted to alert him
to the PA police dept had handled
the case - FBI tried to work it
tried to prevent him from leaving the
country. Saudis are fascinated
about ~~the~~ US ability to carry
weapons

Saudi embarrassment to
Embassy
Saudis are arrogant w/ their ability
to move people.

very upsetting to everybody.
he talked to resident agent on ~~the~~ ~~the~~

Released on his own recognizance
 Before FBI, know it, he was out of
 the country
 recalls that Tom said the

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

→ he had a fascination w/
 weapons - not affiliated w/ Faracists.

1999 "another example"
 Believes the legit did a reasonable
 check - pre May 12, 2003 the
 SA security Agency did not coop
 w/ FBI

"Huge leap" to say this person was affil
 w/ UBL. - BADLY worded -

would not agree w/ that statement
 to his knowledge, it was a presumption
 or a mistake or something he was not
 trying to

NAA Cormen - analyst

"SAW a ghost behind every bush"
 never was in intel community outside CIA.

"Pearly Gates"

"Free wheeling style not completely
 substantiated"

"he would never write that in an
 analysis to his management"

Pat Dargin comment

- Libya issue was certainly separate from
 Paris Rome; not from Libya. Sanctions
 must have 727.

MOUSSAOU

Easy for him. It was ^(1st) flight. EC
sent to member of Rad Kind Unit from
Mina Fidel office describing flight training
at the school. He read it and
evaluated whether or not it ~~was~~ was
unusual.

He thought it was highly unusual
significant amount of \$ to fly a
747 - concerned him ^{gave} ~~for~~ ^(head of unit) ~~frasca~~
to Mike Maltby & Dave ~~for~~ ^{frasca}
- run it out; run it completely to ground.

Legal issues about his laptop & getting into
it. Pre 9-11 to return him to France
method by which put him on what type
(logistics) of plane to take him
back to France. Question of
Armstrong. Some discussions
of putting him on a sat owned aircraft

he heard that after of 9-11 - - -
conclusion reached by agent was he was
going to fly plane into something.

someone w/ skill set wanting to do that
was highly unusual. Got a sick feeling in
his stomach.

He explained ~~generally~~ ^{generally} of a
matter being investigated out of him.
Verbal briefing - same phone put Dugan
& Claudius

8/19-20: then took vacation for 10 days
discussions of Moussou - determination made in
his absence to extradite him

9/4 teletype to FAA - arrested him

disagree - it went into great detail while he was on leave. Surprised by the level of detail in it. Dave Frasca was very pro moving staff to FAA.

"Moussoni"

CTC based on info involved in a larger plot aspect

↳ lang from FBI field office through a cable

Substantive desk Mike Maltby
Pete Flack would have cleared up min. desk.

Barn burners would be handled by 24 hr watch by FBI - Salata would leave forwarding info

Quickly he caught up to speed on what had transpired while he was gone

Determining of mouse larger intent & Salata never spoke to the main office

Salata's Personal assessment: that he was an individual operating by himself. He was there as an interested observer at that point.

(RECOMMENDATIONS)

always concerned operational sec. was not as high as it could have should have been

always concerned about cockpit doors + security

clearly intel sharing - had learned a lot in 1990s since PAA AM improved tremendously

Why hasn't Al Qaeda gone down
that path.

Airplanes as missiles are still the MO.
Shack -

SE Asia

Caribbean

Mexico

Canadian system of migration

Ahmed Resam can settle @ Canada
& easily get here

FBI cell - need to right mix of people
to stay in the game

Travel histories of the terrorists:
post 9-11 - not really - he was