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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of [redacted] \*  
Date: February 11, 2004  
Special Access Issues: ~~TS~~/SCI  
Prepared by: Sarah Webb Linden  
Reviewed by: Yoel Tobin  
Team Numbers: One  
Location: FBI Headquarters  
Participants: 9-11 Commission: Yoel Tobin, Thomas Dowling, Sarah Linden  
Federal Bureau of Investigation: Robert Sinton

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-048, document no. 6  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: July 8, 2015

### Interviewee Background

(U) [redacted] \* has worked for the FBI for 17 years. He has been an analyst within the Counterterrorism Division since 1992. Initially he worked Iran and Hezbollah matters; in 1993, after the first World Trade Center bombing, he transferred to the Sunni Islamic Extremist unit. In 1996 he was temporarily assigned to the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. With the exception of the year he spent working on Khobar Towers, [redacted] \* has focused primarily on Southeast Asia fundamentalists such as Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot. [redacted] \* is currently assigned to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Operations Section, Extraterritorial Investigations Unit.

### Khobar Towers

(U) [redacted] \* did not recall many details of the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. He left the investigative team prior to the U.S. indictment of subjects. On the specific subject of Al Qaeda involvement with the plot, [redacted] \* commented that they investigated all available Al Qaeda sources and connections and realized that the facts did not support Al Qaeda involvement.

(TS) [redacted] \* had never been part of an investigation as heavily compartmentalized as Khobar. Case information was highly restricted, with as few as 20 people initially allowed access. Because the FBI agents on-scene were not allowed to conduct any unilateral interviews or investigations on Saudi soil,

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### Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

(S) [redacted] \* worked on matters concerning Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) from 1995 through 2003. He read some, though not all, of KSM's post-capture interrogation reports.

(S) [redacted] \* stated that in 1996 KSM was in Doha, Qatar. He had been there since at least 1993, working for the Ministry of Water and Electricity. After the U.S. indicted KSM for his involvement in the Manila Air case, the FBI sent a rendition team to the Gulf. Part of the team

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
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advanced to Doha, Qatar in preparation for his capture. The remainder of the team waited in [redacted] with a plane, ready to travel to Qatar and pick up KSM and his captors. After several days the Qatari government informed the U.S. that KSM had been under surveillance and had somehow escaped.

(S) [\*] did not know exactly who funded KSM's travel while he was working for the Qatar Ministry of Water and Electricity. He speculated that Qatar's Ministry for Religious Endowment paid KSM to travel around and distribute cash to organizations and Islamic charities. [\*] did not feel that UBL was the likely source of KSM's travel monies.

(S) [\*] believed that KSM did not join Al Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa bombings. As late as 1997, KSM was aligned with Abdul Rasul Sayef, who was one of UBL's adversaries. Even after he joined Al Qaeda, KSM was not considered a significant player in the organization until after 09/11/2001. Immediately following the attacks, a variety of U.S. intelligence sources pointed to KSM (or "Ramzi Yousef's cousin") as the source of the operation.



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**Bojinka**

(S) [\*] did not believe that Bojinka was an Al Qaeda plot. Wali Khan was linked to UBL (they had fought together in Afghanistan), but had never sworn bayat because Khan wanted to remain independent. Khan and KSM were part of a loose network of extremists

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who had trained in Al Qaeda camps but were not Al Qaeda operatives. As for Khalifa, there was no evidence he funded or knew of the plot, despite his close association with Wali Khan. Ramzi Yousef was brought in by Wali Khan, and had no prior affiliation with Khalifa or UBL.

(S) [redacted] did not see thousands of dollars moving to support Bojinka and considered it a fairly low-cost operation. There was no requirement for casing flights, since flight schedules could be obtained from the airlines. [redacted] was certain the operatives had little funding because Wali Khan only got bailed out of prison [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) [redacted] Khan in the Philippines. [redacted] stated that no money came from Riduan Isomuddin's/Hambali's Malaysian company Konsijoya, which had at that point only conducted one (failed) business transaction.

(S) [redacted] knew of only five operatives involved in Bojinka: KSM, Abdul Hakim Murad, Ramzi Yousef, Wali Khan, and [redacted] was not indicted with the rest because the FBI had no information on him other than aliases. [redacted] on the periphery of the Bojinka group: like Khalifa, he knew the players but not the plot.

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[redacted] CTD/ITOSI/ETIU

02/11/2004  
Bob Sinton

17 years - analyst in CTD since 92 -  
init Iran + Hezbollah

1993 after WTCI went to Sunni Islamic Extremism - present  
(with 1 yr window for Khobar) focused on SE Asia since Yousef/Bojinka

Khobar

Based on Mahabith investigations - done by Saudi Hezb  
Group of Shia muslims w/ connections to Lebanon + Saudi govt  
Indiv's in Saudi custody - interrogations - led to Saudi Hezb  
Smuggled explosives into country - built truck bomb  
Saw no AQ link

From smuggling - to players - no evidence whatsoever of AQ  
Load of explosives that was intercepted @ border - first load caught  
Explosives stored @ farm outside Doha  
May have gotten more explosives from same source - doesn't know

[redacted] person @ FBI - involved heavily @ time - [redacted]

Doesn't remember CTC report - E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

[redacted] so they wouldn't tell us

Also there's no reliability characterization of source

Could be anonymous email

If entire basis for UBL link is one unknown source, there's little credence

If 10 add'l sources corroborate, then we've got credence

FBI would rarely (never) get access to CIA sources

@ Khobar - little FBI compartmentalization (Iran unit part of CTS, NSS)

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her experts: ↓

[redacted]

Khobar worked  
by ITOSI

Job WFO case  
agent - used  
to be [redacted]

[redacted]

She [redacted] was [redacted]  
in East Dist VA

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Investigate all leads - worked everything

Everyone thought it was Sunni extremist at first based on bombing +  
look @ AQ sources + connections and realized nothing supported AQ theory where happened

Followed all leads until found facts added up

Info was highly compartmentalized - if you didn't work Khobar

you had no access to info - all was kept by [redacted] ("bigot list")

Initially, investigators had no access to it - only higher-ups

@ FBIHQ + WFO

(-20)  
At first very restricted - then

He was never out of reporting - but high controls (name on list, couldn't take notes)

Khobar was only investigations he worked on that was restricted  
Saudi's not very cooperative - FBI couldn't interview anyone outside Khobar complex (that was only US mil, TCNs)

Basic intel - [redacted]

they know - KSA had 4-5 people in custody

Over time got clearer picture of what they knew + what was happening (mentions "John Doe" a Lebanese Hezbollah member who helped)

Saudi's' material-sharing was limited by politics - Kingdom was in denial that it had Shia prob, vs. unfriendly to US.

Eventually got interrogations + reports - took a while to

Car seized at border made KSA think it'd disrupted plot

KSA didn't tell USG about seized car/explosives or prior knowledge of Khobar targeting until well afterward

Puzzle pieces falling into place - Saudi interrogations + [redacted]

Followed facts to conclusion

Don't remember if other countries provided intel

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Fadel - cooperation btw AQ + Hezbollah

Doesn't remember hearing Fadel info

Doesn't appear from the facts that AQ + Saudi Hezls

KSM - worked him 95-2003 and has read KSM detainee rpts

Ab was in Doha - been there for number of years - since at least 93 working for Ministry of HED + Electricity


we knew b/c sent \$600 to Youssef in NY

indicted - had <sup>prearrangement</sup> Kam in [redacted] waiting to grab

him (some went forward to Doha) - plane ready on 2-3 hrs notice

Sheik Abdallah Khalid bin Fami

Qatari's said was under surveillance and somehow "escaped"



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KSM + Youssef aligned w/ Abdul Rasul Sayeef, who was AAPL adversary  
definitely not AQ as 95-96-97  
Sunni extremist but not AQ

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Bojinka - no evidence Khalifa funded/knew of Bojinka  
 Khalifa close to players - brought Wali Khan n, WK brought Yousef  
 Wali Khan linked to UBL - fought w/him in Afghanistan  
 Didn't want to swear bayat b/c wanted to be independence  
 Not a lot of \$ for Bojinka - flight schedules pulled from  
 computer - not necessarily easy flights  
 Not seeing \$100,000's coming in  
 WK has to call someone to send him \$ after escaping Philippines jail  
 He calls [redacted] who borrows \$ from CC to send to WK  
 5 op's - KSM, Murad, Yousef, Khan, [redacted]

Sandof Dir's  
 [redacted]  
 (Wali Khan  
 Hambali

No \$ came from Kansijaya (ph)  
 Amin was in Malaysia working - had  
 one bus transaction + lost \$ (vegetable oil stuck in Park)

[redacted]  
 by not indicted b/c had no  
 info except aliases - he's  
 there (FBI still working on case  
 to indict) Later Murad talks

[redacted]

- like Khalifa, on periphery but not necessarily chieftain  
 - [redacted] + Wali Khan opened business (rest?) [redacted]  
 KSM gets visa for Brazil - writes visa letter on Kansijaya letterhead  
 [redacted] claims didn't know of letterhead - FSM + WK typed @ Koko's + type  
 and forged signature

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Bojinka - AQ plot? No - KSM + WK not working for UBL  
 Loose network of extremists w/UBL connections (trained in AQ camps)  
 Who funded KSM travel?  
 - Qatar (Ministry Religious Endowment) to distribute \$ to org's + Islamic charities  
 - Prob not UBL  
 WTC 1 not AQ op - Yousef goes from Khalden to NY mosque  
 (Disputes phone # theory) Not hard to believe imam hookup @ mosque  
 Came w/plan - recruited one of NY guys

WTC 1 manuals - say Qaeda (Osama can't confirm); has never heard that Yousef's Khalifa's fingerprints on manual - neither surprising b/c manual is stolen from training camp

KSM joining AQ - after 98 E Africa bombings

Not significant in AQ until 9/12/01 - on run; was fugitive; FBI talked to

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Close friend of KSM) to find him - big gap

in what he's doing btw 98 and 2000

Early after 9/11 everyone's mind pointed to KSM right away ("Yousef's cousin")

Could be either AQ x affiliate groups -



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[Redacted]

FBI - CT Div., ETOS I,

Ex veteris investigati vit

Bob Sinton, ASST. GC,

17 years w/ Bureau, analyst in CT since 92

First Hes. / train -

1993 - worked on  
off the vtc II.

+ since then, semi Islamic Extremism -  
w/ exception of Kholm (thought it was  
AQ).

Focused on SE Asia

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