

Khalid, Quso, & Hibrah, were stupidly unaware

Nashiri was ^{known} ~~id~~ contact to US before Cole from smuggling Sager missiles to Saudi, & was also implicated in West Africa (his cousin was one of the suicide bomber). also heard about him in connection w/ Cole [when? from whom?]

~~these~~ ^{now} attackers in Saudi ~~did~~ did not go to Afghan camps - they are fresh recruits, so we don't know about them - on the other hand, they are ~~not~~ not as well-trained.

after lunch break:

Evolution of AQ:

mujahidin in Afghanistan after Soviets defeated - major fault in the road.

Abu was of view that US was next enemy. Gulf War gave ~~ABL~~ ^{ABL} solid basis for opposing US, which he was inclined to do anyway.

[Dan Wolman was within ABL ^{in the} ~~was~~ early days]

Qaida took form of business in Sudan's cover for Islamic Army; ~~all~~ cells in Kenya, training Somalis, AIA# made a lot of money

Abu Atta was in chase of AQ in Afghanistan - Farooq Camp is always there, always AQ.

But Sudan + UBL control membership.

most of AQ was very small - intended to help other groups do their jihad. umbrella & supporter of other groups, e.g., supports EITF/1996 attempts assassination of Mubarak. Egyptians prominent because can't go back to ^{Egypt}

Also, their main focus is kicking US out of Saudi Arabia. Sudan chosen because close to Saudi. material on Bakr computer on this (acquired in 98).

mid-96 = AQ gives people a choice to go to Afghanistan or stay behind (Libyans stay behind & leave AQ).

most jihadists had focused on military action rather than terror, e.g., Bosnia, & Chechnya

Dorson records in Bosnia ended the war there

~~still stayed~~ so jihadists need a place to go - roads blocked to Tajikistan -

UBL picks up some ~~new~~ recruits from this pool of jihadists (many of whom can't go home.)

UBL arrives in Jalalabad in 95 with his major associates.

- 5. hadical Camp in Jalalabad
 - Fareed Camp in Khost.
 - one in Gardiz
- } built up over time

move to Kandahar - because Mullah Omar was in Kandahar. Allied himself w/ Taliban.

until Taliban captured Mazar-el Sharif, only entry point is through Pakistan

96 or 97 - UBL publicly swore loyalty to Mullah Omar

UBL gave interviews in Sudan & threatened US.

96 - Big ideological statement to expel US from Arabian Peninsula.

→

question in Pekanbaru - markets' quarters

In beginning, used established routes for mujahidin to get in & out of Afghanistan.

99-00 - Taliban ordered all training camps other than AQ's to be closed -

Feroz moves to Kandahar, & becomes the camp. Abu Khalid's camp was closed, Khalid is closed.

docs in London relate to ~~some~~ some like material (possibly Fadh was involved).

Abu Khalid's prison camps were not very sophisticated. Funded by UBL but also by others.

WMD is an aspirator, but not realized (though he has not seen all detainee reports)

operational geographic regions - as of 9/11.

Nashiri - focus on Arabian Peninsula

KSM - focus on US & Southeast Asia (known Hambali, knows both regions).

Khalid - admin. guy - faces Othman & Ayman of 98; involved in Cole; involved in 11/11

†; [] tells us that Khalid is UBL's eyes & ears,

facilitates all operations.

AZ - his love is that he's not AQ. This helps him deal w/ North Africans, ~~to~~ many of whom are not interested in AQ's agenda.

AZ & al-Liby was close associate of CBL & at some point (regardless of whether they swear loyalty) started working for AQ ^{as per} al-Liby admitted. ^(FBI to) ~~to~~ train people to bomb US embassy.

AZ also involved in Jordanian millennium (for AQ? for himself).

Cole - assumed it was AQ immediately.

7, we found the safehouse where they built the Great - rents, "Abd al-Mohamed Hussein."

basically, Nashiri's ^{alias} ~~name~~ used December - ^(close to)

Yemenis ~~then confirmed~~ it was Nashiri. agreed

Found conclusive proof when they id'd Nashiri: picture at car rental. Even it was ~~AQ~~ Nashiri & AQ by Nov. 2000 at the latest.

recruiter

Al-Bahlul^(?) was CBL's personal secretary, & did Cole page that came out a couple months before 9/11. Ali interviewed him.

Ali thinks Abu Hajar was still part of AQ when arrested in 98. CBL wanted Abu Hajar's voice on the Cole page.

Saudis traveled on Yemeni passports to Pakistan - Yemeni passports carry # set - then to Redawan (a lot, Q cells solicited for Redawan).

Cole tape produced in multiple languages, esp. incl. English subtitles.

AQ today (his personal opinion)

Loss of Afghan. -

they miscalculated - expected to defeat US in a guerrilla war in Afghanistan, also thought US ~~would~~ ^{might} not react (lib. Cole).

evacuated ^{Arabs} ~~people~~ into Pak. guesthouses

- 1) one group stayed for operations
- 2) one group headed home (i.e. could go back to homeland safely, not known to the police).

tried to recreate AQ structure in Pak, e.g., media committee, travel (Abu Yasin al-Jaziri), Khalid overseeing operations.

also, some ^{AQ} ~~Arabs~~ stayed in Afghan.

Abdul Halim al-Fragi stayed to conduct guerrilla war (similar to his prior post, which was military work of Taliban)

to frag. frag big opportunity for AQ - Arabs flocking

~~Arabs~~ ~~Arabs~~ similar ops in Iraq & Afghanistan - attacking UN, ~~from~~ NGOs...

Some Arabs ~~did~~ blend well into Sunni triangle. thinks Qaeda is behind a lot of the attacks, esp.

suicide operations,

AQ more decentralized to some extent, but it's not clear-cut.

There is still some command & control, e.g., ^{we} ~~head~~ ^{whole} Chatter no: UBL approved ops in Saudi

but abilities are still degraded, e.g., bombs Abul muslim compound that they thought was American.

3 stages of ops = still doing that (though sometimes same people do all 3 stages).

degradation of AQ: a lot of top & best people are dead or captured.

affects ability to conduct another 9/11.

UBL's personal driver, bodyguards, important trainers, all in bit no.

training is much more difficult, no ~~open bases~~.
lost training infrastructure.

after 9/11, AQ changed ^{MO,} ~~MO,~~ i.e., UBL said can conduct non-spectacular ops. Before, he only wanted spectacular ops.

Iran: doesn't know exactly what's happening -
but Wyatt recently published list of departed AQ -

IRGC may be sheltering some AQ -

but remember Majdall Shafj C mass rape & killing of Shiite, & murder of Iranian diplomat, by Taliban.

Best way to attack AQ

- coordination in USG + w/ other countries -
but esp. w/in USG.

Yemen PSO ~~had~~ employed thousands of jihadis after
Yemen civil war.