

in Team 1,

Special Agent Ali Soufan

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"interviews/WFR's"

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1. Evolution of al-Qaida in Afghanistan after the move from Sudan up to 9-11 (Yoel)
 - a. Camps
 - b. UBL personal movements
 - c. When and how does UBL get control of all of the training camps?
 - d. WMD
 - e. Tradecraft
 - i. Operational Geographic Regions
 - ii. Distinct Operational Phases
 - f. Abu Zubaydah's evolving role
2. East Africa Bombings (Doug & Yoel)
 - a. What do we know now that we didn't know at the trial?
3. KL Meetings (Doug)
 - a. KL Meetings
 - i. Quso says he gave Khallad \$35K for a new prosthesis and other amputees – Khallad claims he was given \$10-12K – who's right and what's the money really for?
4. USS Cole (Yoel)
 - a. Roles of Nashiri, Khallad, Badawi, and Quso? *Calx UBL - planned attack, per indictment*
 - b. When did we know it was al Qaida?
 - i. Intelligence v. Law Enforcement standard?
5. Interrogations (Niki)
 - a. Ref KSM interrogators don't know anything about who he was – why do you say this?
 - b. Gitmo translators?
6. Current Threat (Niki)
 - a. Loss of Afghanistan – how has al Qaida changed?
 - i. More power to individual cell commanders?
 - ii. Unapproved attacks?
 - iii. Facilitators/couriers more important?
 - iv. UBL's role?
 - b. Distinct operational phases still the same?
 - c. Loss of masterminds affect ability to conduct large-scale ops?
 - d. Best way to attack the current threat?
 - e. Decentralized al Qaida more or less threatening?
 - f. Loss of UBL effect on al Qaida?

Dieter?