that autonomy in the use of chemicals would occur only under specific conditions—such as NATO first use of nuclear weapons, or following an initial massed strike by the Pact.

Part of the controversy regarding the alleged autonomy of front and lower echelon commanders to employ chemicals appears to be caused by confusion concerning the Pact wartime planning cycle and associated terminology. Pact classified writings often note that a commander "made a decision on the use of" or "made a decision to use" chemical weapons (apparently in a nuclear context), or nuclear and chemical weapons, or weapons of mass destruction. Although this seems to imply that the force commander actually has the authority to employ such weapons on his own initiative, this does not appear to be the case. Rather, as part of the preliminary planning process for Pact wartime operations, commanders at each echelon make a planning decision for employment of their forces, including these weapons. This decision is based on a concept for the operation provided by higher authority—and in turn requires approval from higher authority. Thus, an army commander's "decision"—generated in response to the front's concept of the operation—must have the approval of the front commander. Moreover, the front commander's decision—incorporating what the respective army commanders are expected to do—in turn requires the approval of the VPK or the Theater of Military Operations commander.

Once the use of chemical weapons has been authorized by higher authority the evidence indicates that the actual orders for the use of chemical weapons may occur as low as the army commander—and perhaps, at least in the 1960s, even lower.
Evidence appears to assume a nuclear context, however, and to involve chemical weapons not included in an initial massed strike. For instance, a definitive Pact document from the mid-seventies, concerning the transition of the front to the offensive--after nuclear weapons have been used--notes that in sectors where the enemy has not been sufficiently neutralized with nuclear weapons, air and artillery strikes with the use of conventional and "special" munitions can be delivered on the orders of the commanders of first-echelon armies against targets on the enemy's forward defense line.

Other authoritative references to this subject to the early 1960s, when the Soviets expected hostilities to begin with nuclear strikes. Nuclear weapons were in short supply in the Soviet inventory and, as a result, most non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries might have expected to receive and use only chemical weapons. All of these references appear to refer to a nuclear context, where the use of weapons of mass destruction and an initial massed nuclear or nuclear/chemical strike already have been authorized at the highest level.

22 Which were integral to the divisions, whereas the operational-tactical Scud missiles belonged to armies or fronts.
It is doubtful how much "discretion" these force commanders would have. Some use of chemical weapons at the lower echelon could be more discretionary, but this does not imply use before nuclear weapons. CIA Statute (213)

Peacetime Control of Chemical Weapons. Soviet control of militarily significant quantities of chemical agents and munitions appears to be absolute with the USSR. CIA Statute (213)
In the early eighties, which refer to the arrangements for wartime deliveries from the Soviets of "special ammunition." In this case, evidently meaning nuclear as well as chemical ammunition for the Polish missile troops and air force. Although the Czechs apparently have produced and stored small quantities of chemical agent for R&D and training purposes, the vast bulk of information suggests that the Czechs do not have chemical munitions in their inventory and that "militarily significant" quantities of agent and munitions were produced by the USSR and would be provided in wartime by the Soviets, if and when the latter saw fit to do so. Some of this information is dated. In addition, Romania may be at least as concerned about a possible Soviet invasion as by the threat from NATO.
Importance of Deterrence

Implications of Chemical Use in Local Wars for a NATO/Pact Confrontation

We do not believe that Soviet use of chemical munitions in Afghanistan and—with their allies—in Southeast Asia against irregular forces lacking protective equipment or any significant deterrent capability is directly applicable to a NATO Warsaw Pact confrontation. In Europe, the Soviets believe NATO would respond with a wide range of nuclear and chemical weaponry.

23 For additional information on this subject, see SDVA-10005X

24 Chemical warfare by the Soviets against irregular forces is not new—that they employed chemical shells on the defenders and population of mountain villages at the end of the twenties during the suppression of an uprising in the Caucasus, and that in the thirties Soviet aircraft sprayed mustard gas during operations against tribesmen in central Asia. (U) (46a)
we judge that Soviet expectations of a NATO response would likely discourage major use of chemical munitions on the conventional battlefield. Warsaw Pact writings evidence serious concern about NATO, particularly US, chemical developments and the "enemy" chemical threat. Although US deployment of offensive chemical agents and munitions has come to a full halt since the late sixties, Pact classified writings indicate a continuing, perhaps even expanded, concern over the
chemical threat posed by NATO.

The Soviets have access to a broad range of information concerning virtually all facets of the US chemical program. Using the information available from the Congressional Record, unclassified military manuals, Government Printing Office materials, the mass media, leaks, and intelligence sources, the Soviets should have an accurate picture of the US stockpiles, current agent and weapon mix, future agents, production, and delivery systems. According to a classified Soviet assessment of the US requirement for binary munitions in the mid-seventies, the Soviets concluded that Savin and VX were the basis of the US Army's chemical weapons arsenal. The Soviets estimated that 15,000-30,000 tons of these agents existed, part stored outside the US. Soviet military specialists apparently believed, however, that by 1985 practically all then existing chemical weapons stockpiles in the US would be unfit for use. The storage life of existing US chemical ammunition was believed to be 15 years due to ammunition corrosion and obsolescence of the delivery means. This is a fairly accurate assessment of US chemical capabilities at the time.

Despite this assessment and accurate, readily available information, Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact classified writings routinely ascribe an extensive, credible offensive chemical capability to NATO. That estimate appears to greatly exceed existing NATO weapons capabilities and agent/munitions stockpiles. Pact planning, as reflected in classified writings also seems to be predicated upon the assumption that NATO is prepared to use chemical weapons in any major war in Europe.

Highly classified Warsaw Pact documents detailing NATO order of battle from the early seventies through the early eighties assess many NATO weapons systems as chemically capable. Although the lists vary, they portray the Pershing I, Sergeant, Lance and Honest-John missiles with chemical (i.e., Savin/VX) or chemical/biological, nuclear, or conventional warheads. In the last two years, the Soviet press has...
Warsaw Pact writings from the late seventies demonstrate a belief that the principal NATO armies possess nerve agents, extremely efficient delivery means, and large numbers of chemical warheads which enable NATO to quickly contaminate large areas. In addition, NATO was believed to have significant capabilities to use psychochemicals, including incapacitating agents such as BZ and irritants.

Soviet Assessment of Binary Munitions. Pact projected orders of battle for NATO forces for the early nineties assessed that NATO would introduce artillery shells and missile warheads with binary charges.
Other writings, both earlier and from the late seventies, ascribe a darker motive to the US binary program. Their authors asserted that, with binary munitions, the US had developed methods of producing and storing toxic agents which could evade all international conventions. In wartime, therefore, the US would not be confined by any restrictions. These writings allege that the US development of binary munitions would facilitate preparation for chemical warfare despite an eventual international prohibition on chemical warfare which the US would eventually be forced by world opinion to sign.
Pact Reflections of NATO Intentions

Based on such assessments of NATO capabilities, highly classified, authoritative Warsaw Pact writings throughout the seventies also alleged that the US and its NATO allies had significant offensive intentions. The writings noted that major NATO chemical strikes could create serious problems for the Pact, impeding successful fulfillment of front tasks. Representative samples from these writings include the following:

-- Based on Soviet calculations, NATO could attack 400 important battalion-sized targets, including troops, airfields, rear service installations, and command posts not already hit with nuclear weapons. Strikes could be conducted by 10-20 percent of the NATO strategic bombers in a theater, 20-25 percent of the NATO carrier-based aviation, and up to 30 percent of the tactical aviation in the front's zone. Missiles and artillery were deemed capable of delivering 5-7 massed strikes. Pact divisions/corps attacked with Savin or VX could suffer 50-60 percent losses, and it might be necessary to conduct partial or complete decontamination of 400 battalion-equivalents of men and equipment. Chemical contamination would cause great difficulties for the Pact troops because of high toxicity and persistency of the agents and the complexity of protection.

-- During an army's offensive operation, NATO can neutralize up to 70 battalion-sized installations;

-- During a massed initial strike, NATO could use up to 120-130 aircraft with chemical weapons (in addition to some 350 nuclear warheads). As a result, 500 square kilometers would require chemical reconnaissance and up to five regiments could require decontamination.

-- During a massed initial strike against a Warsaw Pact front, NATO was portrayed using 400 nuclear warheads and delivering chemical airstrikes (with VX) against 35-40 front installations, including the Rear Command Post of the front, and contaminating sizable portions of the troops' disposition areas and movement routes.
rather than simply in nuclear concerns may increase army stores as reflected in FM 100-5 for operations on an "integrated battlefield." Warsaw Pact writings, particularly since the early-to-mid-seventies, have discussed the possible enemy use of chemicals (usually nerve agents, but sometimes irritants and psychogenic/incapacitating agents) before nuclear weapons.

Since the mid-seventies, there have been more frequent examples in Warsaw Pact writings:

We know from classified writings that the Warsaw Pact is aware of the scenarios of major NATO exercises simulating Pact first-use of chemical weapons on the conventional battlefield. Some of these writings seem to imply that the Warsaw Pact sees mirror-imaging on NATO's part, that is, that simulated Pact actions portray NATO intentions.

The Deterrent Role of NATO's Chemical Capability. Although there is little direct evidence, Soviet concern over the "enemy" or "NATO" chemical threat suggest the Pact expects NATO to be able and willing to retaliate with chemicals to some levels of

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Pact first use during conventional warfare. Their classified writings show little doubt that the US is capable of responding to limited, selective use by the Pact with US assets in theater or deployed from CONUS. Their perception of US capabilities to respond to massive, decisive use of chemical munitions by the Pact is less clear.

However, whatever the Soviet estimate of US chemical capabilities might be, as prudent planners they certainly must take into account the possibility of a NATO nuclear response to any massive use by the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets undoubtedly are aware of statements by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, and by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, that, given present inadequacies in the US chemical retaliatory capability, a significant Soviet chemical attack, force NATO into early use of theater nuclear weapons as the only response adequate to prevent total defeat. (U) (248)

Moreover, the most sensitive and authoritative Pact writings predict NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to forestall a major defeat on the conventional battlefield. These writings note that NATO is most likely to use nuclear weapons when its forces are forced by attack to withdraw, abandoning important lines territory, or when NATO's troops are on the verge of defeat. The Soviets would probably, then, expect a nuclear response to any massive, decisive use of chemicals. (249)

Pact writings clearly indicate Pact awareness that NATO exercise scenarios, from FALLEX-68 to WINTEX/CIMEX 83, have portrayed NATO initiation of the selective use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons in response to Warsaw Pact use of toxic chemical weapons. (250)

Conclusions

The role of chemicals has diminished substantially since the sixties, but not disappeared altogether, while that of nuclear weaponry and ICMs has increased on a grand scale. If the Soviets are to conduct a massive attack with weapons of mass destruction, clearly indicate that they would prefer and are far better prepared to use nuclear weapons. This is particularly evident with respect to the employment of tactical and operational-tactical missiles. In addition, Pact staffs no longer appear to regularly plan and practice--or to be fully prepared to conduct--a massive, coordinated strike with chemical weapons, as part of the initial massed, nuclear strike. The more likely Soviet use of chemicals.
would seem to be in single or grouped strikes peripheral to, or following, the initial nuclear strike. Such strikes could occur as the need arose and would not demand as extensive high-level planning and coordination as massive strikes with chemical munitions.

The extensive bulk of Pact classified writings overwhelmingly place the massive, decisive use of chemical weapons squarely in the context of nuclear warfare. Theoretically speaking, if the use of such weapons had been authorized by the Politburo—and there was even a remote chance that NATO might respond with nuclear weapons to a major chemical attack—Pact planners almost certainly would prefer to use nuclear weapons which provide a more reliable, predictable level of destruction.

On the other hand, we may see limited tactical use of chemical weapons on the nonnuclear battlefield, after the decision is made to use nuclear weapons but before they actually have been fired. Reliable evidence for such use is both sparse and generally ambiguous, which in part may reflect some uncertainty even in the minds of the Soviets, but there seems to be enough data to warrant serious concern. How "limited" such use might be, or whether it would occur at all, would evidently depend on a high-level Soviet evaluation of the relative risks—both political and military—versus benefits involved.

It is possible, at least to envision scattered chemical strikes against a handful of high priority NATO targets, including some nuclear weapons depots and delivery systems, command and control facilities, air defense installations, major ports and airfields, and rear area facilities. In addition, some strikes with highly persistent agents might well be made upon relatively uninhabited terrain—perhaps with less fear of US retaliation—in order to establish key defensive barriers and to channelize NATO forces. There also seems to be some evidence to suggest that Pact "special forces" might conduct some form of chemical operations not only during the early stages of a conventional war but even before the inception of hostilities.
Annex A

Methodology and Terminology

Interpretation of the evidence concerning Pact offensive chemical warfare is complicated because the data are often ambiguous and the context frequently unclear. This problem applies to sensitive military writings. Chemical warfare terminology is prone to translation difficulties. For instance, in some cases, a phrase translated as chemical "weapon" or "armament" could just as accurately have been translated as chemical "equipment." Even "chemical weapon," itself, can have various meanings. Without adequate context, it is virtually impossible to determine which was meant.

There are indications that even the Soviets themselves occasionally have been confused by such terminology.

The Terminology Problem. An analysis of Pact offensive chemical warfare requires an understanding of three basic terms and changes in their usage during the past two decades:

-- Weapons of Mass Destruction. This term, as used in classified military writings, has encompassed chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons, whether NATO or Pact, since at least the early sixties.

However, most writings have consistently distinguished weapons of mass destruction from incendiary munitions.

-- Special. "Special" has been used in Pact writings to refer to weapons which evidently are strictly nuclear; strictly chemical; chemical and biological; nuclear and chemical; and nuclear, chemical, and biological. (5) "Special" also...
has been contrasted with nuclear, chemical, and biological, referring exclusively or inclusively to illuminating and smoke incendiary compound rounds as well as propaganda leaflet shells. Since at least the late sixties, however, "incendiary" normally been contrasted with "special," suggesting that it is no longer routinely considered in this category.

Reputable information on the USSR's World War II chemical program indicates that at that time "chemical agent" referred not only to "chemical warfare agents" but also to chemical products, such as gun powder, explosives, incendiaries, decontamination agent, and sometimes even motor fuel. "Chemical warfare agents" included not only combat toxic agents, such as mustard and lewisite, but also incendiary agents and materials for creating fog and smoke screens.

Warsaw Pact classified writings through the late seventies and early eighties have continued to characterize chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons as "weapons of mass destruction." This term, used in the broadest sense, may still

1 The possible categorization of some types of chemical weapons as "conventional weapons"--or at least their use prior to the transition to
include incendiary weapons, but not routinely, and for this reason, when the Soviets refer to "nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction," it is not entirely clear what is meant. (13)

The current usage of "special" and "chemical" is even more confusing. In many cases, "special" is used to refer to nuclear weapons. For example, the Soviets used "special" to refer to nuclear artillery rounds for their forces in East Germany in 1982. (15) "Special," in the context of the control and handling, security and arming, and possibly servicing and repair of warheads, has a peculiar nuclear connotation. There are "special services" and "special units" involved in these activities, and the Soviet nuclear energy detection system may be referred to as the "Special Monitoring Service". (16) Warsaw Pact intelligence service reports, through at least the late seventies, have continued to refer to NATO's "special weapons (ammunition) depots," apparently meaning those containing nuclear weapons. Some of these facilities, however, may have been believed to contain chemical warheads. (17)

Military writings indicate the Soviets, since the early seventies, have shown a marked preference for using "special" rather than "chemical" to refer to their own toxic combat chemical agents. NATO's chemical weapons, in contrast, are normally termed "chemical" weapons. (18) Nevertheless, there have been occasional Soviet references to their own "chemical weapons (munitions and armament)," even into the early eighties. (19)

These "chemical weapons" may, however, refer to the flamethrowing and smoke dissemination equipment of the chemical troops. There were frequent references in Soviet sensitive writings in the seventies to the chemical troops' task of providing the front troops with "chemical (troop) weapons (armament or equipment) and protection means." These references appeared simultaneously with the reemergence of the use of smoke and flame by the chemical troops and have been in contrasted, sometimes in the same document, to the Pact's use of "special weapons"—here clearly meaning those containing toxic agents. (20) (10)
Thus, the only way to distinguish between "special" or "chemical" is to analyze the context of the reference. Without additional information, it is virtually impossible to know what is meant. Although incendiary weapons, improved conventional munitions (ICM), and fuel-air explosive ordnance usually appear to be excluded from references to "special" weapons in military writings, we cannot always be sure.

(21) New types of munitions—lasers and "smart" weapons or other special-purpose ordnance (for example, propaganda leaflet ammunition)—appear to be considered from time to time to be in this category by some Pact military writers or planners.

According to reliable information gathered during and after WW II, the Soviets—even before the war—assigned extreme secrecy to all matters concerning their preparations for gas warfare. Testing of chemical and biological weapons at Shikhany in the late thirties was conducted in secrecy, under the direct supervision of the NKVD. (118)

2 The Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Security (NKVD) was the predecessor of the modern Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). (U)
Moreover, as of 1974, the General Staff Academy instructors were more open and candid in their discussions of offensive use of chemicals. The information presented was quite similar to that contained in classified Part military writings dating from that same period.

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention banned all Soviet biological and toxic weapons across the board. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, on the other hand, only partially banned the use in war of chemical weapons (or biological weapons) by the Soviets; the USSR has reserved the right to retaliate in kind against any use of chemical weapons upon it (or its allies) and the Soviets, by specific reservation, are not bound by the protocol with respect to non-signatory countries. (U) (116)
We cannot accept the thesis that Soviet offensive use of chemical weapons is "super secret." Through the sixties and into the early seventies, a broad spectrum of Warsaw Pact classified military writings addressed the offensive use of chemical weapons with increasing frequency to debunk the "super secrecy" thesis.

The Soviets clearly are aware that Penkovskiy provided us with overall knowledge of their chemical program from WW II to the early sixties. In addition, a variety of sources including NATO exercises and the vast array of unclassified, official, or non-official Western literature concerning the "Soviet chemical threat" should indicate to the Soviets that the West is broadly aware of the general outline of their current chemical warfare program.
chemical warfare could be accorded more secrecy than other matters discussed in this literature. Inordinate secrecy would make the training of even high-level staffs extremely difficult and would defeat attempts to ensure adequate preparation, planning, and coordination for the successful execution of a massive, surprise chemical strike.
Finally, the uses of chemical agents and munitions in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia are inconsistent with super sensitivity, although such use has been confined to remote areas controlled by the USSR or its allies thereby lessening the likelihood of discovery, or at least acquisition of proof. The Soviets must have accepted some risk of discovery.
Annex B:

Soviet Involvement with Chemicals Prior to World War II

During World War I, the Russians were able to develop only a limited offensive chemical warfare capability. By some accounts, the Russians lost about 55,000 dead and 420,000 casualties to German gas attacks and their own lack of training. Because of these enormous losses, chemical warfare enjoyed a prominent role in the emerging Red Army. During the 1920s the Soviets (with German assistance and participation) began research and development on chemical weapons, built a test facility at Shikhany, and initiated a program for developing offensive and defensive chemical warfare equipment. [CIA] (22)

During the early thirties, Red Army soldiers started to receive practical training in chemical warfare and were equipped with up-to-date individual gas protection, while production of chemical agents began in more than two dozen plants. By 1937, the Red Army was essentially prepared for offensive and defensive chemical warfare, both ideologically and materially. In addition, responding to German development of nerve agents, the Soviets began an R&D effort in this field. [CIA] (22)

Captured Soviet materials and documents, German intelligence, and various other sources have yielded a relatively comprehensive picture of the status of Soviet chemical offensive capabilities during WW II. The Germans captured stocks of chemical agents and munitions substantiating the existence of at least 16 different Soviet toxic combat agents. These substances could be delivered by various means:

-- ground-launched: artillery and mortar, rocket launchers, mines, hand grenades, spraying devices, and vehicles; and
-- air-launched: aerial bombs and spraying apparatus on dive bombers.

These chemical agents and weapons were to be used only upon explicit order of the Soviet High Command. The tactics for their employment had been promulgated in at least two documents, a 1939

1 For additional information on the evolution of the Soviet chemical warfare program, and particularly on the development and categorization of various types of agents and defensive equipment, see SW 82-10001CX January 1983, Warsaw Pact Chemical Warfare Research and Development. [CIA] (13)

It is likely that the Germans, even at their lowest ebb in WW II, were at least partly deterred from using chemical weapons by the depth and breadth of Soviet preparations. The West's retaliatory capabilities almost certainly also played a part in German calculations. In 1943 the Soviet High Command, having concluded that the Germans would resort to chemical in order to halt the Soviet advance, shifted chemical munitions depots to the front lines and equipped forward operational airfields with chemical agents. These preparations evidently were observed and evaluated by the Germans. There was no use of lethal chemicals, however, by either side. (24)

We believe it is important, in this regard, to note that not even during critical battles in 1941 and 1942 when the survival of the Soviet state was threatened, did the Soviets resort to the use of chemical weapons.
R&D and Field Testing of Chemical Agents and Munitions

We believe the Warsaw Pact chemical warfare research and development program is well-planned, comprehensive, and of high scientific quality. The effort is led and coordinated by the Soviet Chief of Chemical Troops. Soviet research on chemical agents is guided by the criterion of developing stable chemicals with a variable degree of persistence, and includes efforts to synthesize various new classes of extremely toxic compounds and naturally-occurring toxins. The Soviets clearly are interested in binary munitions, and there is evidence that they have tested such weapons. (37)

The Soviet chemical warfare program, as a whole, has been characterized by modest, evolutionary improvements occurring over at least the past three decades. Overall, the Warsaw Pact chemical defensive warfare program has also been marked by steady improvements. These improvements, however, have been made well within the constraints of a modest budget and there is no indication of a sudden, large increase in research and development over the past decade. (37)

For many years, the Soviets have had active R&D programs to support the development of new NBC equipment needed for a chemical environment and have increased the number and types of equipment in the field. For example, collective protection devices have been installed on most newer combat and service vehicles, as well as in command control centers. In addition to developing and fielding a new gas mask and an improved protective suit, the Soviets have issued upgraded agent detection tubes, antidote auto-injectors, and a new antidote to their troops. The Soviets have increased their inventory of the jet engine-equipped decontamination vehicle used for rapid decontamination of large items of equipment, and Czechoslovakia is upgrading its version of these vehicles. In addition, the Soviets have recently introduced a tracked amphibious NBC reconnaissance vehicle and have continued to field new automatic detection-alarms. (37a)

According to information received in the late sixties the Soviets had monopolized Pact development of

1 See source in footnote #6 for additional information on Pact CW R&D. (U)

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new toxic substances and methods for using them. Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact countries were relegated to research in essentially
the defensive aspects of chemical warfare and were discouraged by
the Soviets from work in the offensive arena. There is little
indication that this situation has changed markedly. CIA

25X1 The growth in Soviet R&D during the last decade may
represent attempts to correct perceived deficiencies during the
mid-to-late sixties and, to an extent catch up with the West.
25X1 In the mid-sixties, the Soviet army, mainly for economic reasons, lagged behind the West in critical
areas of R&D, particularly in the development of Vx (nerve)
agents and psychochemicals (incapacitants). While the Soviet
army's resources are large, they are not unlimited and some
weapons are given priority. The preferred weapons were, and
apparently still are, nuclear. Thus in the mid-sixties,
relatively little money was spent on the USSR for the development
of chemical weapons compared to that spent on nuclear weapons.
This is indicated by the relatively low level of financial
support and poor equipment of the chemical research institutes as
well as the Shikhany testing complex which deals with toxic
substances. CIA The USSR's established
chemical warfare experts would work out the high-level,
theoretical questions concerning chemical weapons, but generally
lacked funds for further development, weaponization, and serial
production. (38)

25X1 In 1969, the KGB did a study of US R&D
in chemical and biological warfare, concluded that the US was
"definitely ahead" in this field, and launched a crash R&D
project to catch up. CIA (38a)

The test program at the Shikhany central chemical warfare
proving ground indicates continuing Soviet involvement in
offensive as well as defensive chemical warfare. This facility
is used by the Military Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow,
the focal point of the Soviet R&D effort, to test new chemical
warfare concepts, agents, and equipment. 25X1
25X1 Agent testing at other
locations in the USSR. Shikhany is the only major test facility
known to exist. CIA Statute (39)