PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
FOR
SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEES
PHASE A

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THIS IS AN APPROVED POLICY GUIDANCE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN

For
SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEES

SECTION I
PROBLEM

To determine the best means under existing policy to employ, resettle, and care for current escapees from the Soviet orbit or its control.  

For the purpose of this paper, escapees are those persons from the territory or control of the USSR, the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania, who escape into Western Europe, ranging from Turkey to Sweden. East Germans, Chinese, and ethnic expellees, such as Turks and Greeks, are not included.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

1. At its fourth meeting the Psychological Strategy Board took the action set forth in Annex 1.

2. Pursuant to the Board’s direction, a panel was established on November 2, consisting of representatives of Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NATO Standing Group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, CIA, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Bureau of the Budget. The Assistant Director of PSB’s Office of Coordination acted as steering member.

3. In the light of the initial panel discussion, the PSB staff determined that the total problem, which the Board had considered, must be separated into two parts, each of which required separate study.2/

These separate studies are:

a. A study to determine the best means, under existing policy, to employ, resettle, and care for current escapees from the Soviet orbit.

2/ This separation in the problem was made for two reasons: In the first place, before the West can expect success from existing programs, let alone new and expanded programs, designed to defect or to enlist the support of persons in Iron Curtain countries, it must be able to demonstrate on the basis of present practice that the West is, after all, a desirable place to which to flee, or with which to cooperate. Thus, it is clear that the adequate handling of all bona fide escapees bears directly upon the flow and cooperation of such individuals who are qualified as sources of intelligence, intelligence agents, recruits for psychological and para-military programs, as these have been developed pursuant to NSC-10/2, 10/5, 86/1 and ID-13. In the second place, until the United States has formulated the objectives, the scope, and to some extent, the pace of the strategic plans to which are related the future programs involving escapees, present or potential, from the Iron Curtain countries, it is questionable whether any effort should be made to do more than carry out well existing programs under existing policy. These over-all strategic plans are now being developed but they are not yet far enough along to provide the guidance which is needed for the development of possible plans for future action concerning escapees.
In the light of national psychological strategy, to evaluate all existing policies and programs and to make recommendations for new policies and programs, envisaging the inducement of additional escapees or the utilization of persons residing in the Soviet orbit.

It was further determined that an issue to be covered in the course of both of these studies is the extent to which it will be desirable and necessary for the Board to recommend recourse to the hundred million dollars, authorized for expenditure for these purposes from MIA funds under the so-called Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

4. The report which follows deals with the first of these two studies. It sets forth what is known of the character and numbers of current escapees. It describes existing programs and facilities for their employment and handling, and it recommends action to be taken to improve their treatment.

5. The second of the two problems will be considered concurrent with further progress in the formulation of a strategic concept and plans which should provide a framework of requirements for the use of escapees and of persons residing behind the Iron Curtain.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Dimensions of the Escapee Problem

1. The number of escapees to be handled during the calendar year 1952 is estimated for the purposes of this study at 18,000. Included in this number are 12,000 persons who fled the Soviet orbit from 1945 to 1951 and for whom no previous disposition has been made. Based on the flow during 1951, it is estimated that 6,000 more will cross the Curtain during 1952. Although this number is considered reasonable for planning purposes, it might increase during 1952, as a result of: (1) the psychological effect of better handling; (2) a more favorable power position of the West in relation to the USSR; or (3) the impact of new programs of general or focused inducement of defection.

2. In order of importance, the existing points of escape have been and presumably will continue to be Western Germany, Berlin, Western Austria, Trieste and Greece. Sixty-five percent or more of these escapees will, on the basis of past experience, come across into Western Germany and Western Austria.

Existing Facilities for Handling of Escapees

3. Inter-government Migration Programs.

In November a Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe was established in Brussels. This Committee intends to arrange the resettlement of 115,000 migrants and for this purpose will utilize the 15 ships converted for migration purposes by the IRO. Although

The International refugee Organization, which since the end of World War II has been the agency primarily responsible for the handling of refugees, will cease to exist not later than the end of February, 1952. The IRO was established for the purpose of care and resettlement of those persons displaced by the war, but also helped with escapees. Fourteen out of every fifteen refugees were handled, including several thousand escapees. Of the 100,000 refugees not yet resettled, 12,000 are escapees from the Soviet orbit.

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principally concerned with the problem of alleviating surplus populations in Europe, the Committee's charter is broad enough to provide for movement overseas of Soviet orbit escapees. However, the Committee will probably concern itself only with escapees who are capable of resettlement, and it is not expected that escapees who are of lesser interest for reasons of security, political background, health, language, or lack of required skills will be migrated under the program. None the less, since the U.S. has contributed ten million dollars to the Committee's thirty-four million dollar budget, and since the Director of the Committee will probably be a citizen of the United States, it is likely that the Department of State can influence the Committee's action in directions which will assist in solving escapee problems.

Assuming that support of the Migrant Committee envisaged in this study is affected, it is estimated that during 1952, in conjunction with other programs, 14,000 of the 15,000 escapees will be resettled under the program.

4. Assistance by European Governments and Absorption into Local Economies.

a. Virtually all escapees pass, at one time or another, through existing camps and/or hospitals maintained by Western European governments or U.S. public and private organizations. These facilities are generally inadequate and morale is low. While the majority of persons entering these camps are ultimately absorbed, about 400 per year cannot for reasons of health, age and security be adequately disposed of. Present handling of this group is entirely inadequate.

b. In addition, approximately 1200 escapees each year are absorbed into the economies of local Western European countries. These individuals usually have special skills, knowledge of language and often have relatives in Western Europe. Some of them are absorbed after a period of training and indoctrination.

5. Capabilities of the United States Voluntary Agencies.

a. Fifteen United States private organizations contribute several million dollars annually to the relief and welfare of displaced persons and refugees. Much of this has been carried out by Jewish, Catholic and other religious welfare organizations. All private United States organizations in 1951 spent approximately 31/2 million dollars for the care and resettlement of approximately 5,000 escapees. These private organizations received considerable assistance through the facilities of the IRC, which will be replaced in part by the Committee formed at Brussels. It is estimated that the private organizations with existing funds and facilities could significantly aid in the care and resettlement of 5,000 escapees during 1952.
6. Exploitation by United States Government

a. NSCID-13 Program: During 1951, 39 escapees were found to have sufficient intelligence value to be used in this program which is capable of handling up to 300 annually. It is estimated that not more than 30 will qualify for absorption during 1952.

b. Psychological Programs: Covert programs absorbed some 600 escapees during 1951. Fifteen hundred could be absorbed in 1952 if there were that many escapees with the necessary qualifications. In view of past experience and the difficulty involved in screening escapees for this purpose, it is estimated that between 500 and 1000 escapees will be utilized for these programs during 1952. Additional numbers may be defected by selective inducement but that absorption will not affect the total figure of escapees dealt with in this paper. Overt programs absorbed a small number in 1951. Additional absorption in 1952 will require the development of new programs to be considered in the second study.

g. Lodge Bill: The Lodge Bill passed in 1950 and amended in 1951 authorizes the enlistment in the United States Army of 2,500 unmarried aliens. During 1950, no escapees were enlisted. During 1951, 113 had been enlisted, 97 of whom are presently training in the United States. Four thousand escapees have applied for enlistment and of these 1,500 are in the process of security screening. Under the program as it is now being administered by the Army, it is unlikely that a significant number of the 15,000 escapees will be enlisted in the United States Army during 1952.

7. Other Capabilities of the U. S. Government

Under the Mutual Security Act in the Kersten Amendment, Congress authorized $100,000,000 which can be drawn upon for utilization in the problem of escapees. Congress apparently intended that these funds should be used primarily for training and equipping escapee forces to be added to NATO, rather than for the care of escapees. However, the authorization is sufficiently broad to permit the utilization of a portion of these funds for the latter purpose in the implementation of the program contemplated in this study. MSA and the Department of Defense may feel that this authorization is in fact a requirement for the use of some of these funds for the first purpose and it will be recommended that programs of this character be considered in the second FSB study.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

1. It is estimated that some 13-15,000 escapees can be resettled through the Migrant Committee aggressively encouraged by the U.S. and with maximum support of voluntary agencies. Some 2,000-2,500 can be absorbed into the indigenous facilities of Europe; the Lodge Bill, while it will, under present programs, absorb less than 300, has a considerably larger authorization. U.S. intelligence and psychological programs expect to absorb at least 750. While it is recognized that these programs can only satisfy those requirements if they are fully coordinated, adequately financed, and aggressively administered, it is apparent that the programs are capable of absorbing the expected flow of escapees.

2. While it is possible that the psychological effect of adequate handling of these escapees will increase the flow, it is equally likely the Communists will increase the severity of repressive measures and that this will reduce the rate of escape. However, if the flow should increase there is sufficient flexibility in the programs envisaged above to absorb some increase if they are carried out as recommended. It is therefore concluded that there is little risk that these programs will require extensive modifications or great expansion during the foreseeable future.

3. It is concluded, therefore, that the main problem to be solved in connection with escapees are those of organization, control, financing, administration and coordination. Despite the existence of IRO, there has never been an international or national or private organization with the authority and capacity to deal with the escapee problem as a whole. With the end of IRO and the expansion of U.S. psychological and intelligence programs, the establishment of an adequate agency with such authority has become critical. It is clearly necessary to center the total coordinating and administrative responsibility in one organization and provide it with the authority and funds necessary to carry out the job.
4. Such an organization should be capable of insuring or arranging the employment, resettlement, or care of all escapees from the Soviet orbit who are not otherwise used and at the same time should be capable of providing certain necessary services to assist U. S. operating programs. It should be capable of rapid creation and should be insured of the necessary funds and an experienced staff.

5. Specifically, this program should be responsible for:

a. Cooperation with foreign governments to assist them in the collection and registration of escapees. All escapees should be grouped and maintained in suitable government reception centers. U. S. government officials should assist in the registration and allocation of escapees, for the purposes of insuring maximum migration and local absorption and in order to screen all qualified escapees for placement in U. S. operational programs. European governments will cooperate with U. S. officials in these efforts because they are anxious to have the escapees disposed of.

b. Arrangements for the provision of supplemental care and maintenance. Provision of immediate and interim care and maintenance at the present inadequate and minimum level carried out by local governments should continue. However, in order to raise the standards of this care to adequate levels an average of 150 per annum must be provided by the U. S. Program. Officials administering the program should provide necessary coordination of U. S. private refugee organizations to insure maximum supplemental care from these sources in the form of additional food, clothing, medical supplies, legal advice and other material assistance to give escapees best possible care.

c. Arrangements to use available funds for part of overseas transportation costs of the ships provided by the Migrant Committee. The cost of emigration transportation for the majority of individuals under the Migrant Committee program will normally be charged to the receiving governments. In order to insures the handling of a maximum number of escapees, however, the escapee program should provide for the subsidization of a major part of the transportation costs for escapees,
It is considered that if the program provided three-fourths of this cost, sufficient inducement would be provided so that the receiving governments would give special consideration to accepting escapees on a priority basis. Full cooperation of private organizations in the refugee field should be sought to the end that they finance the transportation of as many escapees as possible with their own funds. It is important that the escapee program arrange the necessary screening of skills and job qualifications and other processing steps connected with resettlement so that qualified escapees can be brought to the attention of receiving governments as rapidly as possible.

4. Provide special consideration to insuring the adequate care and employment of escapees who cannot be migrated. This is the responsibility of the local governments. However, special assistance will be required in situations which the local governments are not handling adequately. U. S. counterpart funds will be required as an added inducement for the local governments to absorb escapees into their own economies. Private refugee organizations should also be persuaded to give special consideration to those cases for which they have special qualifications, such as escapees requiring hospitalization and old age care. There will also be a group of escapees involving criminals and political security cases who will have to be given special attention under this program in order to avoid undesirable psychological repercussions. These people will not be capable of normal migration nor will they be welcomed by the local economies.

6. Excluding the cost of programs for direct U. S. Government use of escapees (such as the Lodge Bill) and excluding the cost of care provided by local governments, it is estimated that the remaining expenses to care for and resettle escapees in 1952 will be approximately $7,200,000. This budget is admittedly generous and provides for considerably better care than has been provided by IRO. The budget breakdown is as follows: (a) $3,500,000 for inland and overseas transportation; (b) $2,700,000 for care and maintenance in Europe; (c) $1,000,000 for administrative expenses.
This would provide for care and maintenance at a standard of living equal to the particular Western European country to which the escape is made. It would also provide for the full cost of transportation for those escapees who are migrated.

7. Having in mind the requirements set forth above, consideration has been given to several different organizational means of providing the centralized administration of this operation. These are the United Nations, the U. S. Government, a private U. S. organization, NCPE and a new private organization consisting of all U. S. refugee agencies concerned with escapees.

a. United Nations: The Commissioner for refugees of the United Nations has urged that the United Nations be responsible for this program. From the standpoint of strengthening the United Nations and international cooperation of the sort obtained in NRO, this alternative has some merit. However, the Commissioner for Refugees does not currently have funds to carry out the job nor does he have full confidence of the Department of State. United States Congressional leaders interested in refugee problems have indicated that they prefer to have the United States act directly in this field. A United Nations organization probably could not provide the kind of services required by various United States operations.

b. United States Government:

(1) State Department. The State Department will presumably administer the U. S. portion of the Migrant Committee's program. Concurrent administration of the escapees program will insure that high priority is given at Brussels to the resettlement of escapees.

The following possibilities were considered and rejected:

(1) A new agency of the Displaced Persons Commission. Since each of these alternatives require Congressional action, both were rejected. It is desirable to initiate this program for 1952 not later than February 1 to insure that it can be integrated with the Migrant Committee program when it starts operation. No Congressional action on this program could be realistically anticipated before the middle of 1952.

(2) An interdepartmental committee. This alternative was rejected on the ground that interdepartmental committees have great difficulty in carrying out operating programs.
The Department of State has an office responsible for maintaining liaison with and coordination of the activities of all U. S. voluntary agencies in the refugee field. Many of these agencies were represented at Brussels and are anxious to use the transportation facilities of the Migrant Committee to resettle the individuals they are assisting. Since the State Department has the authority to ascertain which people are migrated with the funds provided by the United States, it should be possible to influence the private U. S. organizations to give special attention to the escapee problem.

The State Department could also insure that U. S. covert operations receive the best possible service at the reception centers and could arrange to put back into the resettlement pipeline those escapees which can be utilized by U. S. covert operations only on a part-time basis. State is represented on the inter-agency defector committee.

The State Department can draw on all of the U. S. Government funds listed as possible for inclusion in the budgetary considerations as possible sources of financing this operation. Furthermore, the State Department is in the best position to advise the private U. S. organizations concerned with escapees in the use of their funds.

The State Department, through its experience with the IRO has more personnel trained in the work required to administer this program than any other U. S. agency, both in Washington and in the field.

A possible argument against the State Department carrying out this program might be that such an operation would conflict with the political function of the Department. However, in view of the operations currently carried out by the Department in the propaganda field, in the Point IV Program, and formerly in the MOAF Program, there is ample precedent for the assumption by State of this responsibility.
(2) MSA. The only feasible alternative to the Department of State within the United States Government is the Mutual Security Agency. From the standpoint of administration, this alternative has some advantages, particularly since the major source of funds—the $10,000,000 for the Migrant Committee and $36,000,000 of dollars and counterpart funds budgeted for this program will be MSA. MSA missions in the field have been specifically set up for operations.

However, if MSA assumed responsibility for this program, it would be important that the whole refugee-escapee program be administered by MSA, including the functions of the U. S. portion of the Migrant Committee formed at Brussels. It would also be necessary for MSA to assume the coordination of certain of the private U. S. escapee organizations now carried on by the State Department. Since the State Department is currently planning and programming for the Migrant Committee operation and for the coordination of voluntary agencies, this transfer of responsibility would appear to be undesirable.

A Single Private Refuge Organization: At the present time, no single private organization has adequate funds to handle the job and no one private organization is responsible for assisting Soviet orbit escapees. The International Rescue Committee, whose Board is chaired by General Spaatz, hopes to receive $2 million for the purpose of assisting escapees. The IRC has been the organization most active in this field and last year spent more than 1/3 of the money provided by private organizations for the assistance of escapees. The present Executive Director of IRC has not been reliable in dealing with the U. S. Government and is not fully supported by the State Department.

National Committee for Free Europe: Although NCFE is not now concerned with escapee programs it might be possible to establish a new office in the National Committee to handle the escapee problem. An organization under NCFE would have the advantage of being able to get into action rapidly since a staff and space already exist both here and abroad. It is known that the International Rescue Committee would be willing to work closely with NCFE. The main drawbacks of such an organization are that it does not presently have a staff skilled in refugee matters and it is not likely that some of the private refugee organizations, particularly the religious ones, would be willing to tie their programs in with a recognized cold war organization such as NCFE. For the same reason, it is unlikely that the Ford Foundation would commit substantial funds to NCFE since it is known that members of the Board of the Foundation are opposed to the support of aggressive cold war operations. Furthermore, it is known that NCFE is already heavily loaded down with its present functions and it might not be desirable to add to these.
In order to utilize the existing funds and personnel of present private organizations in this field, it might be desirable to create an organization along the lines of the Community Chest, with an Executive Director and a Board of Directors representing all of the private U.S. organizations concerned with escapees from the Soviet orbit. In order to create such an organization it would be necessary to have a strong Executive Director supported by the U.S. Government, as well as by private organizations, and it would be necessary to raise a substantial sum of money to serve as a catalyst to persuade all organizations to participate and cooperate. The Ford Foundation has indicated that it is interested in exploring the possibility of the creation of such a new organization and might be willing to give its sponsorship. In addition, according to preliminary estimates, the Foundation may be willing to place up to $1 million at the disposal of such an organization. A major disadvantage would be the time required to set up such an organization and the reluctance of many private organizations to being associated with an organization apparently engaged in cold war operations. Another disadvantage of creating such an organization would be the difficulty of insuring a coordinated operation in the field, particularly since some of the private organizations have very specialized activities. For example, the American Fund for Czech Refugees concerns itself only with Czech escapees. Another possible problem would be the adequate servicing by this organization of U.S. Government covert programs. It is absolutely indispensable that any private organization established for the handling of this program cooperate with the U.S. Government, particularly in the reception centers and also in the disposal of escapees who can not be absorbed on a full-time basis by the U.S. Government operations.

After considering the advantages and disadvantages of each of those alternatives, it is concluded that the most feasible alternative is that under which the State Department would assume the overall administrative and coordinating responsibilities,
SECTION V

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the Psychological Strategy Board:

a. Request the State Department:

   (1) to accept the responsibility of administering the escapes program outlined in this study,

   (2) to develop and put into effect as a matter of urgency an operational plan under which the functions set forth in Section IV, paragraph 5 will be carried out. Among other actions this plan should provide for:

      (a) The necessary administrative action, both in Washington and in the field,

      (b) Coordination with other U. S. Government departments and agencies to insure that adequate facilities are provided for the screening of all escapes for employment in the several U. S. psychological, operational or intelligence programs,

      (c) Periodic reports to the PSB on the implementation of this program.

b. Request CIA:

   (1) to develop and put into effect all possible means of increasing the covert exploitation and absorption of Soviet orbit escapes under present programs,

   (2) to provide the necessary guidance for planning and effecting access to escapes in connection with covert U. S. programs.

c. Request the Department of Defense:

   (1) to request the Department of the Army to liberalize the conditions under which escapes may be recruited
under the authorization of the Lodge Bill and to take all feasible steps to expand such recruiting.

g. Request the Mutual Security Agency:

(1) To cooperate with the Department of State in planning and programming for the necessary use of an estimated $2 million dollars of counterpart and Carica funds.

(2) To provide an estimated $4,300,000 of the funds authorized by the Kersten Amendment for utilization in effecting the implementation of the escape program.

h. Request the Director of the PSB:

(1) To insure that arrangements be made under which the necessary interdepartmental coordination of this program will be effected.

(2) To undertake the continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of this program as a matter of National psychological interest.

(3) To continue with the immediate preparation of the additional studies and recommendations authorized in the 4th meeting of the PSB.
Action of PSB on October 25, 1951, Regarding
Defectors, Refugees and Potential Guerrillas
from and in the Soviet Orbit

At its fourth meeting, PSB took the following action:

"Action: In view of the importance to psychological strategic and
operational planning, and to obtaining intelligence necessary
thereto, of arranging for the care of escapees from the Iron
Curtain countries and of developing a program or programs therefor,
and methods of financing the same, with minimum confusion and
waste-time, the Board approved the following actions, proposed
by Mr. Webb:

"(1) That the Psychological Strategy Board call a joint
meeting of all agencies concerned with the problem of defectors,
refugees, and potential guerrillas now resident in the Iron
Curtain countries for the purpose of considering what, if any,
concrete projects and programs might be undertaken by the United
States Government with respect to such defectors, refugees and
potential guerrillas if funds therefor were available.

"(2) That the Psychological Strategy Board provide a
steering member to a panel which is directed (a) to consider
what, if any projects and programs of the foregoing character
might further national strategic objectives; (b) to monitor the
development of specific projects and programs that meet this
requirement; (c) to coordinate any such project or program with
national strategic objectives; and (d) to consider all possible
sources for the financing thereof.

"(3) In the event that the studies contemplated under (2)
above should indicate that certain specific programs and projects
having merit cannot be financed without recourse to section 101(a)
of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the Psychological Strategy
Board or such of its constituent agencies as may be primarily
involved submit such projects and programs for the consideration
of the Director of Mutual Security".
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