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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

File  
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EXEMPT NLK-78-1052 + DOWNGRADED  
NLK-85-115  
NLK-91-96  
NLK-92-118 5 APR 1962  
NLK-01-022-11-4-2  
NLK-10-130A 7/10  
NLK-10-130A appeal 9/10

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Report of Dr. Cline's Meeting with President Chiang Kai-shek and General Chiang Ching-kuo Covering Contents of White House Memorandum of 31 March 1962

1. Dr. Ray Cline reported by cable on 5 April that he had met with General Chiang Ching-kuo on 4 April and with President Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April to convey the contents, orally, of the White House memorandum of 31 March. Each of the seven points in the memorandum was covered fully.

2. In general discussion Dr. Cline emphasized our government's sympathy with President Chiang's strategic objectives; however, expressed our doubts about the feasibility of these objectives. Dr. Cline stressed the need for more intelligence, for continuous joint study and for secrecy. He reiterated the contingent nature of our commitment regarding the 200-man clandestine airdrop stating clearly that a final decision would come some six months later and in light of the then existing situation.

3. Dr. Cline commented that his talk with Chiang Ching-kuo was designed to soften up President Chiang by preparing him in advance for the limited character of our commitment while assuring him that his problem was being viewed seriously in Washington. The Gimo had as evidence of this the preparation of the C-123 aircraft. (Dr. Cline believes this talk with Chiang Ching-kuo had a considerable cushioning effect on the Gimo).

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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4. The Gimo listened carefully, asked sensible questions and did not bridle over any of the points. At the conclusion of the talk the Gimo said he deeply appreciated the sympathetic American attitude and was happy with the specific responses given him. While he might have hoped for more he had not expected much more and he assumed this was as far as we could go now. He valued this opportunity of close consultation and cooperation and would continue to view the situation carefully and cautiously while avoiding rash action.

5. Finally the Gimo observed that he hoped we understood the strain this situation put on him and that we had noted his fear that prolonged frustration of the desire to recover the Mainland might bring about a junior officer revolution against the Gimo and the GRC. Dr. Cline responded that we recognized his difficulty but believed his skilled leadership would enable him to control the situation while counselling caution to his people and working closely with our government in matters of common interest. He said he would do his best and sincerely appreciated our support and understanding. The Gimo repeated his belief that 1962 was the decisive year on the Mainland and said he thought and hoped this White House response on plans and operations provided the minimum prerequisite for joint operations to meet the critical challenges ahead.

6. Dr. Cline further commented that the Gimo was deadly serious and somewhat emotional in this interview but entirely cordial. He thanked Dr. Cline for bringing the inscribed photograph and said he would like to reciprocate with one of himself.

7. Dr. Cline feels that the conversation came off as well or better than could have been expected. He feels that it is clearly understood that we are entering a six months period of waiting and preparation and if events on the Mainland or other world problems do not intervene, the next months should bring us closer to the actual details of the Gimo's operational planning and enable us to exercise a generally educational and realistic influence on key Chinese officials involved in this work.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

  
Desmond Fitzgerald

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