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WASHFAX
 Secretary of Defense
 Cover Sheet
 12/N



FROM: Deputy Secretary of Defense

PHONE NUMBER: 703-692-7000

SUBJECT: UNMOVIC +++

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: Immediate Delivery

PAGES: 12
 (Including Coversheet)

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
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11-M-032871

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REMARKS:

Please Deliver as "EYES ONLY"

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22 September, 2002
8:30PM

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: William J. Luti

Subject: UNMOVIC +++

Sir:

- First 4 slides are "lead in" to the new approach.
- Remaining 5 slides describe how to build into UNMOVIC a Disarmament and Elimination Authority (UNMOVIC +++).

Will work with Doug Feith in the morning to further refine the concept.

V/R

Bill Luti

Instructions to White House Situation Room (as directed by Eric Edelman):

FAX to Vice President in Wyoming

FAX to Scooter Libby at home

Provide Paper Copy to: Eric Edelman



UNMOVIC +++

Building in a Disarmament and WMD Elimination Authority

22 September 2002



A Decade of Defiance

- Iraq initiated deception on declarations as soon as UNSCR 687 created UNSCOM.
 - Began seven year campaign of interference with inspectors.
 - Denied access, removed material from sites.
- Iraq penetrated UNSCOM and UN Headquarters.
 - Anticipated and frustrated inspections.
 - Forced UNSCOM to create counter-concealment unit.
- Iraq successfully pressured the UN.
 - Dictated timing, access, scope of inspections.
 - Demanded vote on inspection team composition.
 - Rejected USG nationals in October 1997.
 - Rejected random/no-notice inspections August 1998.
 - Halted UNSCOM activity in October 1998.


Despite its formal powers, and some on-the-ground accomplishments, UNSCOM regime eventually failed.



Key Lessons from UNSCOM

- **UNSCOM proved inadequate to uncover and dismantle Iraqi programs.**
 - **Despite hundreds of highly intrusive inspections, UNSCOM missed significant parts of Iraqi program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup.**
 - **The defection of Hussein Kamel in August 1995, not UNSCOM inspections, forced the Iraqis to disclose weaponization of Botulinin and anthrax.**
- **A credible inspection system would require (at a minimum) a return to enforcement of existing UNSC mandates and the Gulf War ceasefire agreement.**
 - **But even the most intrusive inspection regime can only hinder Iraqi WMD/missile development, not eliminate it.**

Even highly intrusive inspections are of limited value in the absence of sufficient intelligence---and the international community has so far had no effective response to Saddam's defiance.



Current Status of UN Inspection Regime

- **UNSC RES 1284 (17 Dec 99) created UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)**
- **UNMOVIC is weaker than UNSCOM...**
 - **Lacks staff expertise to baseline/evaluate Iraqi compliance.**
 - **Knowledgeable inspectors have left.**
- **...and is structured to reduce USG influence:**
 - **Chairman and staff chosen based on Iraqi “sensitivities.”**
 - **No U.S. national in top leadership.**
- **USG unwilling to share intelligence with untrustworthy organization.**

Therefore, we assess that Saddam could accept UNMOVIC and still build WMD/missiles without detection.



The Strategic Goal -- Eliminate the Iraqi WMD Threat

- **WMD is the core of the danger that Saddam poses.**
- **Eliminating this danger is not likely to be accomplished by UN inspections aimed at *Monitoring and Verification*.**
- **More likely to be accomplished by *Disarmament and Elimination* regime:
 - based on the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC Resolution 687,
 - and incorporating the lessons of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).**
- **This regime, *not UNMOVIC as currently structured*, should assess whether (a) the WMD threat is eliminated, or (b) further action, including military action, is required.**

Ultimate question: Are we satisfied that Iraqi WMD threat has been eliminated?



Three Pillars of a Successful Disarmament Regime

- **Clear objective that makes it unambiguously clear that the purpose of disarmament is the total and complete elimination of *all* Iraqi WMD and delivery capabilities.**
- **Authorities and resources necessary to achieve that objective.**
- **Leadership and political oversight to ensure that these authorities and resources are fully used to accomplish that objective.**

*UNMOVIC as currently structured
is weak in all three of these pillars.*



Strategy: UNMOVIC +++

- **Add to UNMOVIC a superstructure managed by a *new Disarmament and Elimination authority* for UNMOVIC:**
 - **All decisions by UNMOVIC under the supervision and direction of Member States enforcing no-fly and no-drive zones--and subject to the final authority of the UN Security Council.**
 - **Any of the P-5 Member States can designate sites to be inspected and people to be interviewed.**
 - **Disarmament and Elimination personnel (incl. U.S. and UK) separate from UNMOVIC inspectors.**



Disarmament and Elimination Authority for UNMOVIC+++

- Team led by an American.
- Right to declare no-fly/no-drive zones, exclusion zones, and/or ground & air transit corridors.
- Authority to impound equipment or documents, shut down facilities or destroy WMD or delivery systems.
- Authority to import any technology (incl. GPS) or materials required for their work.
- Unrestricted ability to communicate (incl. encryption).
- Delay of or interference with teams prohibited.



Disarmament and Elimination Authority for UNMOVIC+++ (cont.)

- Unrestricted overflight rights for fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including UAVs.
- Team has authority to demand use of Iraqi military facilities as bases in northern, western, southern and central Iraq (e.g. H-3 airfield in the west).
- Team accompanied by adequate security forces.
- Team has access to any place in Iraq and to any Iraqi officials, nationals or others in Iraq--and the right and ability to interview such persons (accompanied by their families) outside Iraq in timeframe determined by the inspectors.

*Iraq to be informed that lack of cooperation
will subject it to military action.*



UNMOVIC+++ Operational Considerations

- **Staffed by mix of people now in/out of USG.**
 - may include some inspectors from selected other nations.
- **U.S. will recruit Iraqis inside and outside of Iraq.**
 - offer rewards/sponsorship/relocation.
- **List of specialties/capabilities will parallel UNSCOM.**
 - with the addition of physical security experts and counterintelligence capabilities.
- **Authority to task intelligence and call on CENTCOM-provided support.**
- **Military extraction plan for team is essential**

*Collection plan should be in place prior to
beginning of disarmament*