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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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NOTED

August 21, 1995


INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG

THROUGH: SUSAN E. RYCE

FROM: SHAWN H. MCCORMICK *gm*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Ad Hoc Meeting on
Rwanda/Burundi, August 22, 1995, ~~1 p.m.~~
11 AM



ISSUES FOR DECISION

SITREP: You should ask the CIA to provide an update covering intensification of war in Burundi, Rwanda after the lifting of the arms embargo and Mobutu's decision to forcibly repatriate refugees to both countries.

JOE NYE: Just returned from a visit to the region. He is fired up to do more on Rwanda/Burundi. This is a posture we should encourage. Ask him to briefly summarize his conclusions from his trip. Nye will likely argue for pursuing the notion of an all African intervention force for Burundi as originally proposed by Tanzania (see Tab III). Welcome his thinking and task the IWG to continue reviewing. **DO NOT** allow this to become topic of conversation in this meeting. Agenda is too full.


TASKINGS: Acknowledge positive response to taskings in previous meeting. Mandate the Working Group to continue implementing these items under Bogosian's leadership.

Issue 1: Should the U.S. Lead a Diplomatic Effort to Promote Long-term Solutions to the Problems in Rwanda and Burundi?

Achieving our objective of restoring stability to the Great Lakes region requires that the U.S. exert maximum influence and "diplomatic reach" at a time of reduced resources and urgent problems in other parts of the world. We therefore need to decide whether the U.S. is prepared to make such an investment, particularly with respect to Burundi - the problem that will be more costly and difficult to restore.

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Declassify on: OADS



Rwanda: Zairian troops expelled more than 2,000 refugees by dumping them on the border Monday prompting at least 26,000 others to flee to the hills to escape. The situation remains unclear but remains dangerous while also presenting an opportunity to pursue long-term solutions.

Burundi: State has produced only threads of a political framework. More work needs to be done to put meat on the bones of a political framework (see paper at Tab V). We need a decision in principle to continue thinking/planning on these lines in preparation for Principals concurrence. If we are to move forward, we need: 1) principals sign-off given the required high expenditure of money and diplomatic capital.

Your Goal: A) Rwanda - Ask State to report on situation in general and efforts taken to date to respond to forced repatriation of refugees. Ask AID to brief on UNHCR's preparedness to deal with this potential humanitarian crisis. Seek agreement to pursue immediately long-term Rwanda strategy at Tab IV. This is similar to Option 1 in original NSC paper.

B) Burundi - Gain agreement that State should continue its efforts to add detail to a draft political framework that would serve as the basis of negotiations with a contact group and for an eventual regional conference. The proposed political framework should cull from relevant elements of the Convention of Government and the Arusha Peace Accords as well as from U.S. government experts on Burundi. Ask State to provide a paper by c.o.b. Friday (8/25). Authorize Bogosian in principle to consult with European allies and countries on basis of paper at Tab V. Flag need for Principals concurrence. Lead discussions on whether USG should make investment of resources and political capital to try to achieve lasting Burundi solution.

Issue 2: Should the U.S. Support an Arms Embargo on Burundi?

Burundi risks spiraling downward into widespread violence, as occurred in October 1993. Government military forces have actively pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing through terror and reported massacres. As of late, however, Burundian Hutu forces have combined efforts with Rwandan extremists in their ethnic battle against the Burundian army and possibly against a vulnerable southern Rwandan border. A classic African guerrilla war is developing. See pros/cons at Tab VI. See CIA assessment at Tab VII.

Your Goal: To gain agreement on terms of an arms embargo but hold-off introducing any such resolution.

Issue 3: Should the U.S. Support a Freeze of Assets Belonging to Burundian Extremists?

There are approximately 40 Burundian extremist leaders, both Hutu and Tutsi, to whom the United States and European countries deny visas. These individuals have limited if any holdings in the U.S. but larger amounts in Europe. A UN resolution calling on countries to freeze assets of these leaders will send an important signal that we want to isolate extremists, bolster moderates and end the cycle of impunity. Such a move could also limit funds available to purchase weapons. Although Treasury and State EB are traditionally reluctant to implement asset freezes, State AF supports such a move. We agree. If we proceed, we should expect resistance from other UNSC members, particularly several of the Europeans who resist such sanctions as a matter of policy. See pros/cons at Tab VIII.

Your Goal: To gain agreement that the U.S. support a UN resolution freezing the assets of specific Burundian extremists.

Attachment

Tab I Agenda
Tab II List of Participants
Tab III OSD Considerations on All-African Force
Tab IV Long-term Rwanda Strategy
Tab V Long-term Burundi Strategy
Tab VI Burundi Arms Embargo Pros/Cons
Tab VII CIA Report on Implications of Burundi Arms Embargo
Tab VIII Burundi Asset Freeze Pros/Cons