


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: SUSAN E. *Stice*

SUBJECT: Report on Trip to Liberia, Angola, Burundi and
Rwanda with Ambassador Albright, January 16-23,
1996

Ambassador Albright will forward separately a memo to the President on her trip to Africa. I endorse her general conclusions. Below are my personal impressions, conclusions and a summary of action items (Tab A) jointly drafted with USUN.

Albright's delegation included staff from USUN, State/AF PDAS Prudence Bushnell, BG Doc Fogelsong (J-5, Mid East/Africa/Asia/UN Director), Col. Mike Turner (J-5 Africa), NYT Columnist Tom Friedman, a CNN crew and various other journalists for portions of the trip.

Overview

The purpose of the trip was to advance the peace processes at critical stages in Liberia and Angola, to seek to deter widespread conflict in Burundi and enhance prospects for lasting peace in Rwanda. Given these lofty objectives, success can only be measured with certainty over the longer run. However, in each place, I believe Albright's visit made a positive contribution and, in Angola in particular, may have had a direct bearing on the success of the peace process.

Liberia

Key Meetings/Events: UN SRSG Nyakyi; ECOMOG Commander Ineinger and top staff along with ECOWAS Special Representative Victor Gbeho; The Council of State (Wilton Sankowolo -- chair, Oscar Quiah, Chief Tamba Tailor, Charles Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley); Roosevelt Johnson; Telcon with President Rawlings of Ghana; Lunch with UN agency reps; Visit to WFP-funded job training center for ex-combatants; Visit to UNHCR refugee center.

Impressions: We were struck by how devastated **Monrovia** is -- no electricity, bombed out buildings, key ministries are squatter camps. Yet, the population was active, the markets were bustling and there was no evidence in Monrovia of the sense of despair the

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Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)

Declassify On: 1/28/06



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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-040, document no. 17
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 18, 2014

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surroundings might indicate. As one who has always rejected as simplistic and patronizing the notion that the U.S. has some special obligation to Liberia, I was nevertheless moved by the mess that is Liberia. I noted with some shame the contrast between Cote d'Ivoire (where the French had comparative success) and Liberia -- potentially a very rich country run amok.

It is difficult to tell whether the 13th accord will be the lucky one for Liberia or whether it too will pass. There is good news and bad news. The good news is that the mixed civilian-faction leader **Council of State** (CoS) seems to be working well together. There were no signs of animosity, and many indications its members are cooperating rather effectively. All on the CoS profess commitment to peace. All also look to the U.S. for support. We stressed that Liberians made the war; they must make the peace. Some understood that message well (i.e., Taylor and the other faction leaders); the civilians, in particular, seemed to look to the U.S. as a crutch.

The bad news is it appears the faction leaders on the CoS cannot maintain full control of their respective **factions** as well as of factions not represented on the Council, such as Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J. ULIMO-J has not only been fighting in recent weeks with ULIMO-K but also with ECOMOG, undermining the fragile Abuja Accords. In addition, some are concerned that the CoS may assume powers beyond those granted in the Abuja Accord. Elections are slated for August, although no one expects them to occur so soon.

ECOMOG is managing pretty well, despite its recent losses. The Nigerian commander appears sensible, competent and determined to proceed with deployment and disarmament. ECOMOG deployed without adequate logistical support (at our urging) and took a beating. It will be reluctant to deploy further to outlying areas until it has more trucks and improved communications. The U.S. is the only country that is providing any meaningful support to ECOMOG. We pledged \$10 million in late October for **logistical support** -- trucks, helicopters. U.S. support has been slow in arriving due to the normal, glacial process of disbursing compounded by the USG shutdown. Only 20 U.S.-leased trucks are in use. Helicopters have been due for the past couple of weeks. The remaining 80+ trucks will be leased locally or from the Dutch who have trucks in Cote d'Ivoire. They are not expected in Liberia until next month. Special Envoy Dane Smith is now traveling in Europe and West Africa to try to remove some remaining roadblocks.

Disarmament and demobilization have not yet commenced, and the factions may be losing control over hungry soldiers. The Council of State is seeking to alter the disarmament plan so that ECOMOG

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goes to soldiers in the field and disarms them in place rather than soldiers gathering at designated assembly areas. The new plan may be better for faction leaders who may have difficulty persuading their soldiers to go to assembly areas, but it is all but impossible for ECOMOG and the UN to fulfill. The UN and ECOMOG are coordinating -- at least superficially -- but it is unclear whether the relevant UN agencies have an effective and viable disarmament/demobilization plan. Without one, the whole process could fall apart even if the factions try to do the right thing. This is also a key issue for Dane Smith.

Conclusions: This peace accord may fail for reasons beyond the control of the key faction leaders. One important factor will be whether ECOMOG can mobilize quickly to begin the disarmament/demobilization process and whether the international community will fashion a sufficiently attractive and efficient disarmament/demobilization program to attract and retain ex-combatants. Resources are a real problem. **There is not enough for ECOMOG to do its job. In contrast to Mozambique, there is not an attractive demobilization package for ex-combatants in Liberia.**

I am convinced (for the first time) that the U.S. can and should do more in Liberia. We have made a number of mistakes there in the past. While it is not our responsibility to make the peace, our assistance -- or lack thereof -- can make or break the peace process, even if sufficient political will exists on all sides. We ought to try to provide additional assistance to ECOMOG directly or through other means. We ought to revisit the issue of whether or not we could partially support ECOMOG on the UN peacekeeping budget in a post-UNPROFOR world. AID also should be pressed to do more on demobilization. Above all, since we cannot carry this ball alone, we must press other Western countries to share the financial burden with us on Liberia. Thus far, our appeals -- issued at a relatively low level -- have fallen on deaf ears.

Angola

Key Meetings/Events: President dos Santos, Dr. Savimbi (in Bailundo), President of the Parliament Moco, SRSB Beye, the Joint Commission, FM de Moura, Visit to Vila Nova Assembly Area, Visit to Kuito.

Impressions: In Angola, the United States is playing a crucial role in shepherding the peace process. We should relish that role and use it to the greatest advantage. Years of hard work are paying off, as both sides now clearly see the **U.S. as a fair and honest broker**. As one party leader said, "the U.S. is the only country in the world that really matters to us." In several places on our trip, our interlocutors were keen to remind us how

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powerful the U.S. is and lamented that others appear to appreciate our power more than we ourselves do. Well, in Angola, the peace process is obviously the Angolans to use or lose, but our influence is palpable and we must use it to the maximum extent possible.

Dos Santos evinced a surprising comfort in his relationship with the U.S. in the wake of his visit to Washington. He clearly wants to be given credit for largely fulfilling the pledges he made at the White House. On the whole, dos Santos seems intent on maintaining credibility in our eyes, which means keeping his word.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

Nevertheless, we should applaud his positive steps and let the GRA know we know when they are cheating.

UNITA is the real stumbling block at the moment. We arrived at Bailundo in the middle of UNITA's annual conference, which Savimbi claimed he called to build political support for the difficult decision to quarter his troops. Having secured that support, he is prepared, he says, (finally) to start quartering. At our request, Savimbi pledged to Albright and to the press to quarter 16,500 men by February 8 (when the UNAVEM mandate comes up for renewal). We told him that international patience is wearing thin, and we would not look kindly on a broken pledge. As President of the UNSC in February, we have great influence over whether or not UNAVEM III's mandate is renewed and for how long. Now, we are watching and waiting. According to Embassy Luanda, UNITA forces are gathering near 2 of the 4 open quartering areas but have yet to enter. If they try to enter en masse, there could be a logistical difficulties.

UNAVEM III is an impressive peacekeeping mission that seems to be working. The UNAVEM-run **quartering site** we visited was an impressive, if relatively empty, place. The UN seems well prepared to handle the UNITA troops -- at least at the one site we saw. All the essentials -- water, food, kit, shelter, medical supplies, in-processing mechanisms, recreation, training programs, etc. -- seem to be in place. A family site is located just down the road. The challenge will be to occupy the UNITA forces productively while they are in the camps and to get them out into the new army or civilian life promptly. The former requires completion of the military integration talks and the GRA getting its act together. The latter requires international resources, which may prove to be lacking.

Kuito is both the same and much better than when we were there. The buildings remain bombed out, but some are starting to be repaired. The squatter camp/orphanage/WFP feeding site we visited is gone. Far fewer people are starving. The hospital

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still has many malnourished babies but not as many or as emaciated as when we were there. Halo Trust continues its demining efforts -- clearing fields. The population is right on its heels planting every new square foot the deminers clear.

Don Steinberg seems to be doing very well. He's clearly happy and in his element. He seems to have won the respect of both sides and is playing an energetic, effective role. He put on a great stop for Albright and crew.

Conclusions: I am hopeful but not sanguine about Angola. I'd give it just better than even chances of success. I think dos Santos is committed. The danger he faces is a hard-line coup. This he can guard against if UNITA shows solid commitment. At the moment, dos Santos is vulnerable because he has taken some bold steps and UNITA has not come with him. The hard-liners will pounce shortly, if Savimbi does not make good on his pledge.

Savimbi remains an enigma. My hunch is he wants peace, but I would not bet on it. We will learn a lot in the next 10 days. If UNITA fails to start quartering in earnest (the precise number is less important than momentum), we will have to conclude they are not serious. The FAA may then try to push dos Santos to finish UNITA off, and it would be hard to blame them -- twice burned. If UNITA does quarter, there is real hope. We pressed dos Santos to keep his nose clean while we pressured UNITA and not to react with force, if UNITA fails to quarter. He demurred on the latter but promised to consult with us before acting, if UNITA reneges.

Burundi

Key Meetings/Events: President Ntibantunganya; PM Nduwayo; Chief of the Army and Chief of the Gendarme; Speaker of the Parliament; UN Commission of Inquiry; Visit to Orphanage; Lunch with Human Rights activists and Parliamentarians; Drop-by Burundian Women's conference on peace and reconciliation.

Impressions: Bujumbura is one of the creepiest places I've ever been. Beautiful, lush city with people quietly going about their daily business. No overt signs of hostility or tension on the day we were there; yet fear pervades the place. As one person said to a member of our delegation: "we are all buying guns." Bujumbura is now virtually ethnically cleansed. Only Tutsis on the streets.

We delivered a very **tough message** to the military directly and to extremists via the press: "Stop the killing or you will pay a high price. We have just seen your future (Liberia, Angola). Civil war stinks. Don't go there. We will totally isolate a

regime that comes to power by force. We know the military is responsible for the bulk of the killing, and we hold the leadership responsible." We were heard. I think we even shook them up a bit, but I doubt we will be heeded.

All of the leadership blamed someone else -- the Hutu insurgency, the political leaders, the military leaders, the "hate radio," -- the international community. As Albright noted, it was "**the dog ate my homework.**" In addition, it is clear this is a power struggle among elites. The people do not share the hatred. Hutu and Tutsi women can share a crowded ballroom in a downtown hotel in a common quest for peace, but the orchestrated killing continues.

At the same time, I was struck by the sense that **the people with whom we met do not feel the same sense of urgency as we do about Burundi.** Perhaps, the killing is far away or they are used to it. No one we met advocated (or even understood the logic of) foreign intervention, including the President. They all want help in silencing the "hate radio." They also want constructive, sustained international assistance (resources). And a "super-envoy," some say. They are clearly sick of being buzzed by high-level delegations who do not understand and leave as quickly as they come. They are as frustrated with us as we are with them.

It is uncertain that the **worst case scenario** is another Rwanda-style genocide. It may be, but it may also be continued daily killing. In seeking to avert a genocide, we cannot forget the daily killings are adding up -- into the tens of thousands.

Conclusions: We must continue to exert all the pressure we can to keep the lid on things and shine the light. Warnings of the type we've recently issued, possible UNSC sanctions, preventive planning -- all must continue. **If we can reach a plateau in the crisis, we then need to throw all our energies behind finding a lasting solution to the problem in Burundi -- a negotiated power-sharing formula that works.** We have talked about this before but not acted. We will need a high-level, sustained effort. The risk of failure is real, but the costs of inaction are greater. I think we must try.

To do so, we must clear the decks of all the miscellaneous, half-hearted initiatives out there (Carter, Ogata, OAU, French Great Lakes Conference) and, with the rest of the international community, back one horse fully. **Nyerere** may be that horse. We then need to support him with a top-rate U.S. envoy who spends lots of time on the ground in Burundi -- a la Paul Hare in Angola. [redacted] If Nyerere won't step up to the plate, we may have to do it ourselves. Otherwise, it won't get done.

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Finally, we must do something about our **embassy**.

-- polar opposite of Krueger (perhaps by design). We have reduced staff for security reasons, which may be short-sighted. Burundi needs more U.S. involvement, not less. We urgently need to get **Krueger** back briefly so we are not perceived as cutting and running. We then need to get a **new ambassador** out asap. One is chosen --Rusty Hughes. He has got a good reputation. He must still go through D-Committee and then we ought to consider getting both he and Krueger out through recess appointments this coming month.

Rwanda

Key Meetings/Events: President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame; Lunch with UN officials; Visit to Kibuye near Zaire border (War Crimes exhumation site, killing stadium, discussions with recently returned refugees); Kigali Women's Prison; Orphanage in Kigali.

Impressions: Rwanda is coming back to life. It is quite amazing. Infrastructure is being repaired. The roads are fixed, buildings rehabilitated. There is a good quality hotel in the city. The President lives in a decent place. The electricity works. Ministries are being repaired. The city is clean, flowers in the city center. The bodies are gone from the churches and the stench is all but gone. This Government is determined to rebuild the country, and is doing so.

At the same time, the **burden of psychological reconstruction** seems incredibly daunting. How do you forgive? How can you bring justice to tens of thousands and do justice to hundreds of thousand more? How can people kill their own family members and neighbors? How do you begin?

The GOR has made great strides and yet is severely lacking in certain respects. There is a sense of pride, stubbornness and determination that reminds me of the Eritreans. It gives me hope that these people will at least try to reconstruct their country -- mentally and physically. Yet, they also do stupid things that drive us crazy -- the prisons, the NGO expulsions, etc. The risk is either that hard-liners gain ascendancy or that our patience runs out before the current leadership can persuade us they really want to do the right thing.

I come away from Rwanda more hopeful than cynical. Yet so much depends on the justice system. The **War Crimes Tribunal** is just getting started, and its method of work appears impressive. They need our sustained support. The men's jail (although not the



women's) is by all accounts abysmal. The GOR needs to stop messing around and do something real. We hit them hard on this. They want our political and technical support for a domestic Tribunal to triage and try those of the 60,000+ prisoners who must be punished. They are frustrated by the refugee issue. While we pressed them for innovative solutions, the reality is there is nothing they are doing deliberately to dissuade refugees from returning. UNHCR also needs to be pressed to drop its rigid opposition to anything other than purely voluntary repatriation (i.e., ordered camp closings).

Conclusions: We need to do all we can to support the War Crimes Tribunal, UN human rights monitors, etc. A post-UNAMIR UN presence will remain. The GOR is amenable to UN police to protect the Tribunal. The biggest threat to the international presence may be lack of coordination and lack of funds. We plan to make available an additional \$1 million for the human rights monitors. However, both the Tribunal and the HR monitors need to be put on a firmer financial footing. We ought to consider funding the post-UNAMIR UN presence on the UN regular budget rather than through voluntary contributions, which are unpredictable and often inadequate.

We also need to continue impressing upon the GOR that our support is not unconditional. While we should laud the progress made, we must be firm in conditioning continued support on specific judicial reforms and genuine adherence to a policy of reconciliation.

Attachment
Tab A Action Items

cc: Richard Clarke