



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20729 redo



August 5, 1996



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: MACARTHUR DESHAZER *Desha*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Principals Committee Meeting on  
Burundi and Rwanda, August 6, 2:30-3:15 p.m.

Burundi

1. **Situation Report:** Ask CIA to provide an update on recent developments and an assessment of the likelihood of a humanitarian crisis in the next six months.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

For your information, there is [redacted] reporting that Hutu rebels are planning insurgent operations before the end of August. One such report was made this weekend [redacted]

[redacted] Similarly, Burundian Armed Forces are reported to have devised a preliminary strategy for renewed counterinsurgency efforts against Hutu rebels. It is also expected to begin before the end of August.

2. **Revised Options:** Following your instructions during the JCS briefing on Saturday, **we have revised the options to include alternatives that do not involve the U.S. leading the intervention force.** We have added two sub-options (2a&b) to Option 2. Essentially, Option 2a calls for the U.S. to provide requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. We would pursue an intense diplomatic effort to identify a third world country to lead the force and mount an all-out effort to train, equip and support the selected country to lead the intervention force. Option 2b is a variation of direct U.S. participation outlined in the original paper.

**You should discuss with General Shali how he wants to present to the Principals the JCS plan for a humanitarian contingency force.** Ideally, he would give a short briefing on the safe area concept briefed to you on Saturday and likely force size and composition (by unit or function) required to perform the mission.

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INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-040, document no. 25  
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

### 3. Options for U.S. Participation

If we are to be in a position to react effectively to the impending crisis in Burundi, the only practical alternative to doing nothing or doing it all ourselves is to marry the most competent African forces with a competent lead nation and provide the Africans with substantial amounts of equipment, resources, logistics support and (time permitting) training. In any case, the U.S. should be prepared to play the role of lead nation if a crisis erupts before this plan can be implemented. You should try to gain agreement that the U.S. should:

-- Take immediate steps to identify a third world nation in order to obtain a commitment to lead a multinational intervention force for Burundi.

-- Agree to provide requisite force cohesion and direction to the selected third world country to lead a multinational intervention force by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill.

-- Pledge to commence accelerated training and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements.

-- Actively recruit targeted African, western and other troop contributors to perform specific mission tasks along the lines of the proposed action plan at Tab B(1).

-- Gain agreement for direct U.S. participation (Option 2b) in the event a crisis erupts before an intervention force can be assembled and prepared. If a crisis occurs within the next few months, only the U.S. or France is capable of mounting a highly effective humanitarian intervention. France is unlikely to do so.

You should also task JCS and OSD to finalize the force template and identify capable countries to target for recruitment. In addition, you should task OMB with NSC to lead an interagency effort to estimate the total cost of creating and sustaining this force and the appropriate form and funding sources for the U.S. contribution (vice that of allies). We will have great difficulty finding the required funds and may even have to consider a supplemental.

### 4. African Crisis Response Force

You should gain agreement in principle that DOD's proposal to establish an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) should be implemented by the U.S. Task NSC to coordinate implementation effort. Task State to craft a diplomatic strategy to sell the

proposal to selected African nations. **Task OMB** to work with State and DOD to **produce cost estimates and options for funding** to the proposal in FY 97 and FY 98.

### Rwandan Refugee Camps

Eric Schwartz and I have led an interagency effort to formulate options for dealing with the security threat posed by the continued presence of refugee camps on Rwanda's borders. NSC produced a detailed options paper that was reviewed by all concerned agencies and bureaus at the Assistant Secretary level. While the details of implementation must still be finalized, there was consensus that the U.S. should urge other donors, UNHCR and countries in the region to agree to phase out assistance to Rwandan refugee camps over a period of 180 days, starting with those camps that pose the greatest immediate security threat. Those who choose not to return would be relocated inside Zaire and Tanzania.

While there is interagency consensus on the plan (which Dan Spiegel supports), agencies may argue that the plan is unworkable (and highly risky) without --

- a beefed up security presence in the camps, a determination to neutralize ex-FAR leaders in the camps and the cooperation of Mobutu (whose acquiescence we would need in any resettlement plan);
- a willingness on the part of the Rwandan government to improve the climate for return, by providing a semblance of due process for the 80,000 detainees in Rwanda, ending reprisal killings, etc.

You should indicate that you share these concerns, and that our efforts on the refugee issue need to be coordinated closely with what we are doing on the political/security side.

You should confirm that the Principals endorse this plan and ask State to work with NSC to consult with allies and UNHCR to implement the plan.

Concurrences by: *copy provided Refs*  
Richard Clarke, Eric Schwartz

### Attachments

- Tab A Agenda
- Tab B Discussion Paper on Burundi
  - Tab 1 Proposed Action Plan for Implementation of Option 2
  - Tab 2 African Crisis Response Force
- Tab C Discussion Paper on Rwanda Refugee Camps