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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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May 6, 1998


INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES E. STEINBERG

THROUGH: JOSEPH C. WILSON *JCW*

FROM: JOHN P. PRENDERGAST *JPP*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for Deputies Committee Meeting on
Countering Genocide in the Great Lakes, N² a.m. -
12:30 p.m., Thursday, May 7, 1998, Situation Room



Thousands of the soldiers and militia who carried out the 1994 genocide still destabilize Rwanda and the Great Lakes region, maintain their genocidal ideology, and seek to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus. In recent months, the *genocidaires* have expanded their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu civilians beyond their northwest stronghold. They aim their attacks primarily at schools, hospitals, prisons and other undefended, "soft" targets. Well over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone. The GOR's counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of civilian deaths, and thus is taking steps to improve its inadequate and non-transparent military justice mechanisms.

These activities greatly undermine our efforts to promote a more secure future for the Great Lakes. POTUS pledged to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes. To this end, we are significantly enhancing our diplomatic and development strategies (see Discussion Paper section on "U.S. Policy," p. 1). **Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our security engagement as an element of a broader genocide prevention strategy.** You should note that any enhancement in USG policy will necessitate two separate, further processes: 1) the development of a comprehensive public affairs and legislative strategy to explain our policy and actions; and 2) the identification of specific sources of funding required for expanded activities e.g., FMF, ESF, IMET, EDA and drawdown.

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

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INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-040, document no. 34

DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 18, 2014

ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of additional USG military aid and training for Rwanda?

We have presented two options: A) to expand our current efforts to help professionalize the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution; or B) to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. A decision by Deputies would then provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine the appropriate mix of activities, subject to requirements described below.

It is our judgment that the second option would produce the most appropriate parameters for the DOD assessment team to take to the region. The team could then recommend what specific military activities we might undertake to most effectively counter the *genocidaires*. The parameters should allow for lethal assistance and counter-insurgency training. This option would contribute to providing the GOR with adequate capacity to prevent or deter a resurgence of mass killing. Vital to countering genocidal activity is a more efficient, targeted, and professional GOR counter-insurgency operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an anti-genocide campaign could likely improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political liberalization and respect for human rights.

There are, however, serious concerns about abuses in the northwest (e.g., based on limited reporting due to limited access, Human Rights Watch believes that tens of thousands of civilians have been forcibly displaced, probably as a result of RPA counter-insurgency operations. Thus, we would have to condition Option B assistance on specific actions by the GOR, such as access to the northwest to observe human rights conditions, a code of conduct to ensure that aid and training are not used against innocent civilians, increased prosecution of human rights abusers and a system to monitor actions of troops that receive U.S. training. Moreover, we would seek to help the GOR meet these requirements as part of our Great Lakes Justice Initiative.

GOAL: Gain agreement that the objective of our security engagement with the Rwandan Government should be to directly contribute to efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires* and that the scope of our potential assistance should include lethal aid and training.

ISSUE TWO: Should we also pursue a regional strategy that might include military aid, training and contingency support to better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?

Given the limitations of ACRI (which is training for peacekeeping, not peace enforcement in the context of genocide or mass killing) and lack of desire for direct intervention, we need to begin a process for determining if and to what extent we are prepared to work with regional states to increase quickly their capacity to respond in the event of resurgent genocide or mass killing. Deputies will review whether the U.S. should create an IWG that would analyze contingencies and options regarding potential U.S. support for building regional capacity for peace enforcement. After doing the appropriate internal analysis, it is our view that the USG should embark on consultation and assessment processes with regional states and donor countries aimed at determining how we might contribute to building that capacity.

We also believe that we should explore how we might be prepared to offer airlift and logistical support to forces undertaking a peace enforcement operation or humanitarian intervention, such as the 1995 offer to provide airlift support in a Burundi intervention. We believe that the only willing volunteers to counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, we should consider how providing relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to counter such activities. We need a reliable, rapid response system to address worst-case scenarios in one of the most crisis-prone regions of the world.

GOAL: Gain agreement to embark on an assessment process with regional actors about supporting appropriate regional intervention capacity, and seek agreement to pledge airlift and logistical support for an intervention in a strictly defined crisis.

ISSUE THREE: Should the U.S. equip and train the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts?

Given the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity, it is our view that we should train and equip the Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters. We also believe that DOD should develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case contingency which might require use of USG assets to jam genocidal hate radio broadcasts. Providing equipment and training to the GOR will certainly minimize the

necessity for using our own assets to suppress transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such broadcasts with the means of doing so. Provision of training and/or equipment will be accompanied by guidelines to define the kind of "suppression" that is or is not appropriate - both in terms of the nature of the broadcasts that will be suppressed and the methods of suppression.

GOAL: Gain agreement to seek funding for the provision of training and equipment to enable the GOR to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts. Gain agreement that DOD will develop on-the-shelf contingency plans for jamming broadcasts ourselves.

Concurrences by: Mary McCarthy, Richard Ragan, Leonard Hawley, Gina Abracromie-Winstanley

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