Considerations on All-African Force (AAF) for Burundi Crisis Response

BACKGROUND: While there are some highly qualified Chapter VI peacekeeping forces in Africa, the Chapter VII military capabilities of many of the proposed intervention force participants are generally poor, necessitating an almost ground-up approach to equipping, training, deploying and sustaining. PDD-25 and the Joint Staff's Concept for a Multinational Force intervention serve as the basis for this analysis.

PEACEKEEPING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: At this preliminary stage, many of the PDD-25 considerations have not yet been adequately addressed. Key issues include the lack of an analysis of mandate provisions and clearly defined peacekeeping and humanitarian objectives. Nonetheless, here is a rough analysis of the utility of an AAF based on the options for peace operations:

Chapter VI Option: The AAF would have potential as a Chapter VI force, subject to the consent of the parties involved and the establishment of realistic objectives. Given the force size of 6,000 troops, with substantial training, the AAF would have limited capability to monitor and supervise the implementation of peace settlement. However, the AAF could only be deployed after all major parties agree to forego fighting.

Chapter VII Options: By itself, the AAF would not have viable capabilities as Chapter VII force. As an ad hoc military coalition of 6,000 troops, the AAF would be entirely too small, poorly trained, ill-led, and ill-equipped to be successful performing required military operations. If the AAF were to fail as a Chapter VII force in Burundi, the U.S. could be called upon to assist and protect the UNAMIR during its extraction. Clearly, some other Chapter VII option is preferable. For instance, should a Western power such as France decide to lead a UN coalition including some 6,000 - 10,000 French troops, the AAF could augment this force with 6,000 troops and perform less demanding support missions. Another possibility would be to use the AAF as follow-on Chapter VI force, once a Chapter VII mission, performed under the direction of a major power, is complete.

FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

Ethiopia: Requested lift, NVGs, flak jackets for UNAMIR deployment, a Chapter VI operation, not Chapter VII. Our contribution would have to be sweetened considerably as CIA paper notes.

Francophone units: Battalion in UNAMIR was pushed by French, who want no part of this operation.

South Africa: As the continent's most capable force, the SANDF could be an important participant, even if they were only to provide logistical support. However, money is a major factor for even our richest partner in Africa. Further, our general policy is that we not press the South Africans to participate in PK/PF operations, allowing them time to stabilize their internal situation.

SECRET
Tanzania: The Tanzanian military's performance during the 1978 intervention in Uganda was poor (their armed forces today are even worse). Also, there are grave doubts about their neutrality if involved in Burundi.

Francophone v. Anglophone: Most of the proposed forces are Anglophone. Not only does this raise suspicions with Francophone Africans and France, but it creates major communications problems for AAF interaction with the local population.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

U.S. Troop Participation: U.S. support troops would be involved in the crisis area if TALCEs (and security teams) deployed to facilitate air movement of the AAF. Should the AAF fail, U.S. could be called upon to extract the AAF.

Equipment and logistical support required (for all forces currently named save South Africa, Ethiopia partial): Communications gear, ammunition, armored vehicles, helicopters (we have excess helos, but who will train, maintain and sustain), some personal weapons and uniforms, and equipment maintenance capacity. Intra-theater airlift would be provided for outsized/oversized equipment and then some. Inter-theater lift could be provided by many other countries.

Command and Control: With different levels of capability, no experience in working together in a combat environment, and probably incompatible communications structure, the AAF would be severely hamstrung in its ability to deploy across northern Burundi.

Operational security: Word of intervention prep will be impossible to contain as the AAF will require marrying up African troops with equipment and training prior to deployment. This may doom the operation before it gets off the ground and, worse, cause the very explosion we are hoping to avoid.

Time requirement: Deployment of African forces for other peace operations has almost never been done quickly. The force concept requires the force be ready at a moment's notice to deploy to deter ethnic violence and help prevent an explosion.

Troops Available: The Joint Staff plan calls for a Western-led force of at least 6,000 to accomplish the mission - a less capable force would require larger numbers of troops, not necessarily available from potential contributors; this would drive up transportation costs. The intervention force also requires airmobile assets which the AAF (without South Africa) would not have.

Change of Mission: A whole host of problems ensues if the Burundian military becomes hostile to AAF presence and the African forces are forced to fight. While recent reports suggest the Burundian military has only a limited capability to counter an intervention force's actions, the Burundi Ambassador warned that an intervention force "would wind up fighting Tutsi guerrillas for years."
FINANCIAL SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

State and Joint Staff Legal papers list the applicable authorities. Much of the support for this force, if not mitigated by State monies (FAA Sections 551, 552(c)(1) and (2)), would probably come out of DoD funds. An international trust fund would be a potential source of funds but might be nearly impossible to put together in advance of a crisis. Some additional notes:

- Drawdown only allows us to provide stocked items and services - no procurement is allowed and usually there is some readiness degradation.
- There is no FMF for Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Procurement authorized if done on a reimbursable basis.
- OAU FMF account for PKO?
- There is no known authority for loaning this equipment.
- Assumption: EDA is not a viable means of helping equip the AAF because of maintenance and availability drawbacks.
- Training on any new equipment will place an additional burden on available funds and time considerations.
- Leasing is a means to provide much of the equipment needed on a low cost basis.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS Congressional support to equip, train, deploy and maintain part of this force will be problematic.

Bottom Line: Even if funding for the AAF is found, there is no reasonable expectation it could deter ethnic violence in Burundi successfully, even with several months of equipping and training by Western forces. The burden of equipping, training, moving and maintaining the AAF will be tremendous. This effort helps to underline the need to develop the OAU's peacekeeping mechanism. The AAF option may have utility as a Chapter VI force, should the conditions in Burundi permit. However, the AAF could not be successful as a stand-alone Chapter VII force in Burundi.