


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**Burundi: Preparations for Possible Humanitarian Contingency Operation  
Principals Committee Discussion Paper**

**Purpose:** To review the status of preparations for a possible humanitarian contingency operation in Burundi and consider whether additional steps by the USG are warranted. (S)

**Recent Developments:** The recent coup in Burundi, effective suspension of the Arusha I "security assistance" plan, continuing Hutu insurgency and the impending imposition of economic sanctions against Burundi by the countries in the region combine to increase the possibility that Burundi could become more unstable. In the worst case, communal violence could escalate and spread culminating in a genocide on the scale of October 1993 in Burundi or even Rwanda in 1994. (S)

**Background:** While the United States, countries in the region and the international community at large are alert to this possibility, few concrete steps have been taken to ready the international community for an effective response should a worst case scenario ensue. (S)

Chapter VII humanitarian contingency planning at the UN is in the early stages. UN DPKO envisions a force mandated to protect innocent civilians and provide support to humanitarian assistance efforts. (S)

Thus far, UN estimates of troop requirements for such a mission appear so ambitious as to be unrealistic. While a few less capable African countries have indicated a willingness in principle to participate in a humanitarian intervention (Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Chad), none is capable of launching an effective mission without many months of intense training, substantial equipment, logistical and financial support. No western or other nation has agreed to provide ground forces for such a mission. Most critically lacking is any competent country willing to organize, command and control the force. (S)

In May, agencies participated in a political-military-humanitarian planning exercise in Carlisle, PA. That session produced a mission statement and concept for the establishment of safe areas to provide security to civilians at risk and for supporting delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. This concept remains the basis for U.S. planning to date. The Carlisle report has recently been shared with the UN and key allies. However, it does not (and was not intended to) provide a precise force template necessary to recruit specific troop contributions. (S)

**EUCOM has been tasked to produce a detailed plan, which is due shortly and which will represent the next step in the planning process. From these**

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analyses, we hope to derive notional force structures for a basic plan and excursions (i.e., with reduced mission and attendant force reductions). Excursions might include one single or two safe areas. With notional force structures available, the USG would be able, if desired, to try to recruit capable troops from targeted African, western and other countries to perform specific functions. (S)

*At this stage, we face the question of whether or not the United States should move beyond our planning to date and intensify our efforts to recruit and organize a humanitarian intervention force capable of responding swiftly to a near-term crisis in Burundi.* (S)

### Assumptions

- If a humanitarian disaster occurs, there will be substantial pressure for the international community to respond, particularly since there has been substantial media attention to the potential for crisis in Burundi. (S)
- If a crisis occurs within the next three months, only the United States or France is capable of mounting a *highly effective* humanitarian intervention. France is unlikely to do so. (S)
- If a crisis occurs in the next few months, the only practical alternative to doing nothing or doing it ourselves is to marry the most competent African and other foreign forces with a competent lead nation (or nations). This would entail providing the African countries with substantial amounts of equipment, logistics support, sustainment funds and (time-permitting) training. (S)
- No humanitarian intervention force can succeed without a "lead" nation providing, at a minimum, command, control and communications (C3). (S)
- The African countries most willing to participate in a Chapter VII force (e.g., Tanzania, Uganda) are least capable of performing effectively unless their troops have been fully trained and equipped, which will take at least six months. (S)
- The cost to the United States of helping equip, sustain and support African troops in a humanitarian mission in Burundi would be substantial. (S)

### Options:

#### *1) Current Approach*

To date, the United States has done more diplomatically to avert a humanitarian crisis in Burundi and pledged more concrete military assistance to enable a swift international response than any other outside power. For more than a year, we

have urged the UN and others to prepare for a humanitarian crisis in Burundi. We have pledged and provided detailed planning assistance both to the UN and to the Arusha process in Dar es Salaam. Further, the United States has pledged strategic airlift and an air control element to assist others to deploy. We have also pledged in principle equipment and other forms of assistance to a Chapter VI consensual regional peacekeeping effort as contemplated at Arusha I. We have made very clear to other countries that the U.S. contribution would be limited to the above and not involve U.S. combat forces or other troops stationed in Burundi. (S)

However, another genocide remains all too possible. In the worst case, a wider regional war could also ensue. As media attention to the crisis builds, the United States and others would likely face considerable criticism in some circles for not doing more to try to stop the killing. (S)

In the event of a crisis, the United States can maintain with considerable credibility that we did our best -- within the limits of our prior commitments -- to avert genocide and enable an effective international response. Moreover, we would stress yet again that Burundians themselves are responsible for their own fate. Most importantly, our current course would enable us to avoid placing U.S. forces at risk and contributing scarce resources to support a humanitarian intervention. Ultimately, however, we would still incur major costs to provide assistance (food, shelter, water) to refugees and displaced persons. (S)

## 2) *Enhanced International Donor Involvement*

Alternatively, the United States could immediately take the lead in organizing one of two hybrid African/Western to respond quickly to a major crisis: (S)

### 2 a) **Robust Arusha Model**

The Concept: The robust Arusha model would require the U.S. Government, possibly in tandem with other key western donor nations, to commit to play a greater role than previously planned in the provision of incentives for participation. In sum, the United States would provide requisite force cohesion and direction by underwriting the operation now in terms of support and organizational skill. An intense diplomatic effort would focus on a short list of most-capable African nations in order to obtain a commitment by one to lead the force. The short list would, at best, include South Africa, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Once selected, an all-out effort would be made to train and support selected country to lead the intervention force. To leverage other participation, the United States would consider a full range of tools including economic offsets and military incentives. Similar but tailored approaches would be made to the most capable donor nations to flush out headquarters, combat support and brigade structures. The immediate recruiting goals would be, in priority, a force headquarters, support elements and sufficient troops to secure two safe areas

(approximately 13,000). Once commitment to participation is obtained, the United States (and hopefully other western nations) would commence accelerated training and logistics support designed to prepare the force for mission requirements. Once the operations commence, operational and sustainment support could be phased in through a combined U.S. and/or western and MNF support group located in an offset location(s) outside of Burundi. (S)

**Pros:**

- No U.S. troop involvement in Burundi beyond the modest support committed by the President;
- Limited direct U.S. military and political liabilities;
- Positive and proactive U.S. leadership and support for the force;
- Allows the United States to shape the force (and therefore the outcome);
- Builds for interagency regional peacekeeping;
- Positive sign (domestic/international) of U.S. interest and engagement. (S)

**Cons:**

- Gap between U.S. decision and operational readiness of force;
- High cost/limited resources (however, this must be weighed relative to the cost of doing nothing or committing U.S. forces);
- Will require a major interagency effort to orchestrate legislative, fiscal, and diplomatic activities. (S)

**2 b) Direct U.S. Participation:**

The Concept: This model would involve a substantial U.S. troop commitment in Burundi beyond that pledged by the President but would rely on African forces to actually conduct the majority of operations in the contested areas, thereby reducing the risk of U.S. casualties. Even with American military and political leadership, there is no guarantee other countries will join us, although experience has shown American leadership often spurs others to follow suit. (S)

The United States would command the MNF in Burundi, provide logistics and specialized headquarters support, a capability for country-wide Quick Reaction Force operations, airport security, medical support, and aviation support. Other African donor nations would provide brigade headquarters and battalions "as is, where is" to support an MNF structure similar to the one currently envisioned. The United States would airlift these battalions into Burundi at which time they would come under U.S. command and control. Costs would remain high as the United States would still undertake to train and sustain African operational forces in addition to absorbing operational and maintenance costs related to U.S. forces. Costs related to headquarters and support training would be reduced, however. (S)

**Pros:**

- Tangible sign of U.S. commitment beyond logistics and training; could attract other donor nations;
- Enhanced efficiency in headquarters and C3I; could lower requirement for some specialized equipment. (S)

**Cons:**

- Raises a myriad of problems related to PDD-25, command of U.S. forces and force protection;
- Will raise war power issues;
- Increased likelihood of U.S. casualties, particularly if the United States provides rotary wing aviation support;
- Saddles United States with potential for major operational failure since combatant elements are not U.S.;
- Unknown level of opposition/resistance on the ground. (S)

NB: Training costs would initially be less than the option above because the United States would be drawing on existing battalions and would not be required to substantially increase the capabilities of the African donor battalions. On the other hand, training would take much longer since more units would have to be trained, and costs would skyrocket at execution due to the greatly increased U.S. involvement. (S)

**3) U.S. Intervention.**

This is the only option which will provide an effective, immediate response to a genocide in Burundi until some type of African force is trained. It is also the option with the greatest chance for success assuming success is stopping the genocide. Concomitantly, it is the option with the greatest likelihood of U.S. casualties. Such an intervention would have a major downside in terms of domestic reaction. The United States might be able to conduct this operation in tandem with other western partners to temper criticism. (S)

**Pros:**

- Provides the quickest response to a genocide in Burundi;
- Provides maximum operational efficiency (S)

**Cons:**

- Will trigger significant domestic reaction;
- War powers issues will surface;

- Great likelihood of U.S. casualties;
- Far beyond stated Presidential support;
- Unknown resistance on the ground;
- High potential for sustained U.S. commitment in Burundi. (S)

Duration/Exit Strategy: A time limit would be placed on any intervention. The duration of such a mission must still be determined. It could be set arbitrarily (e.g., three months) as the French did in Rwanda or it could be tied to a political outcome -- such as a negotiated power-sharing agreement. Should technical or operational support beyond the regional force's capability be required in country, it could be provided by contract personnel. The "adopt-a-battalion" concept tried in Rwanda could also provide a means to share the cost burden. In any case, after closure of the safe areas, a smaller UN or regional follow-on peacekeeping force is likely to be required to perform more traditional functions -- either to enhance security and deter further killings (as in UNAMIR II in Rwanda) or to implement a peace agreement (as in Angola or Mozambique). The duration of the follow-on force is also uncertain but should be tied to the effective re-establishment by the government of general security throughout the country. (S)

Political Oversight: A body and process to provide political oversight to the multinational force must be designated (UN, OAU, NATO?) or developed (Arusha heads of state?). Identification or development of this body is an absolutely critical first step to building, funding, supporting and ultimately commanding the force. Most western states appear to prefer that the UN Security Council sanction for a regional body (the Arusha heads of state), along the lines of ECOWAS in Liberia. Attention and effort will have to be devoted to resolving this issue early. (U)

U.S. Recruitment Effort: The United States would have to invest equipment, money and diplomatic capital to recruit and establish an effective force. We would have to approach capable African and other troop contributors at the highest levels and urge their participation in specific roles, primarily infantry but also certain combat support functions. Those African countries most capable of participating quickly and effectively in such a force include: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, Senegal and Ethiopia. We must also be prepared to welcome limited numbers of less capable but politically important African troops such as those from Tanzania and possibly Uganda. Other traditional troop contributors such as Pakistan and India should also be asked to participate. (S)

U.S. and western partners would have to pledge substantial assistance to equip, sustain, fund and train these troops. These non-western troops could be funded through the UN peacekeeping budget, provided the UNSC authorized the mission and maintained political oversight of the mission. While this arrangement would be unorthodox and costly (particularly given U.S. budgetary constraints), it may be preferable to ad hoc funding mechanisms, which we have great difficulty sustaining over time. (S)

Western Support: The United States would also have to work to attract competent logistics support elements (e.g., transportation, engineering, signals, POL, water, etc.), primarily from other capable western countries. Among those countries that have performed similar roles elsewhere in Africa are the UK in Rwanda and Angola, Germany in Somalia, and Belgium and Canada in Rwanda. NATO/WEU countries might also contribute joint logistics/support elements. While previous efforts to solicit allied participation have failed, an enhanced U.S. contribution may well suffice to persuade some western partners to play a greater role. France, for instance, has recently said it will do no more and no less than others. To obtain such support, we would need a sustained high-level approach to our allies. (S)

Garnering Public Support: It would be difficult but not impossible to persuade our public of the wisdom of an enhanced U.S. role in Burundi along the lines suggested above. To do so, we might stress that the U.S. contribution is relatively little but enables others to do a lot. This is U.S. leadership as well as burden-sharing at its best. Moreover, as a global leader, we are in some way diminished, if we do not act to help avert another genocide when we can do so at acceptable risk and cost. (S)

Action Plan: At Tab 1 is a proposed action plan for implementing Option 2 above.

### Long-Term Alternatives

If we are fortunate to avoid a near-term crisis in Burundi, we can take steps now to enhance our readiness and flexibility to respond to future crises in Burundi or elsewhere in Africa with minimal U.S. involvement. DOD is refining a concept called the **African Crisis Response Force (ACRF)** -- (Summary at Tab 2). This concept calls for the United States and possibly others to identify, recruit, train and equip capable African troops for potential peacekeeping and humanitarian contingencies in Africa. If implemented, this proposal would enhance the quality of African troops available for peace operations and may eventually obviate the need for western "lead" country involvement. Over the long term, we might also be able to train and equip less capable African troops (i.e., Tanzania and Uganda) so they could augment a force led by more experienced African forces. (S)

Implementation would require sustained diplomatic efforts and resources -- such as FMF and/or voluntary peacekeeping funds. If this is deemed an initiative worth pursuing, we might launch the recruitment effort and incorporate the proposal into the Administration's FY 98 budget request. (S)