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- **Post-war planning** went on throughout the government before NSPD-24:
 - Interagency group that dealt with reconstruction and humanitarian assistance (Abrams-Cleveland group).
 - Planning work in USAID and elsewhere on these topics.
 - IPMC working-level interagency group
 - Deputies Committee
 - CENTCOM Phase IV planning (by civil-military affairs officers)
- **State was heavily represented in ORHA.**
 - Of the three coordinators who handled the substantive work in ORHA, one was from State and one from USAID.
 - Large percentage of staff dealing with substance (i.e., non-support staff) was from State or USAID. [about 30%]
 - Senior position in ORHA held by State Dept detailees:
 - George Ward, Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator;
 - Lew Lucke, Reconstruction Coordinator (USAID),
 - Margaret Tutwiler, Public Affairs;
 - Various senior advisers: Robin Rafel, Barbara Bodein, Dunford, Carney, Limbert, etc.
- **Post-war disorder:**
 - Police turned out to be less useful than predicted: didn't realize how incompetent and corrupt they were; didn't realize they would melt away so quickly.
 - Military units didn't switch sides as expected. [Note: (S) This was a CIA failure - E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)]
 - Don't need more troops - need better, more actionable intelligence to support a policy of rooting out Baathist remnants.

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- People are intimidated from supporting us – we underestimated the extent to which fear of the Baathists would survive the fall of the regime. Also underestimated the extent to which the 1991 experience of Saddam’s unexpected survival has spooked people into believing he might come back again.
- o **De-Baathification**
 - Policy is to remove the top levels of party members only (approx. 30,000)– not all Baathists, of whom there are more than a million.
 - Initially, some mistakes made in that high-level Baathists were allowed to retain or assume positions in ministries, etc.
 - This is being corrected.
- o **Interim Administration**
 - Fundamental dilemmas on timing:
 - We wanted to move quickly, but also wanted to include “internals” – yet needed time to learn about them.
 - Also needed time for consultations with Iraqis – we didn’t want to make selections unilaterally.
 - Amb Bremer has consulted widely with Iraqis, has managed a process in which a representative group of Iraqis can be agreed upon.