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Don Greys

MSG FROM: NSTC --CPUA TO: NSSGB --CPUA
11/14/86 12:44:00 To: NSSGB --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb Subject: Thatcher Memo *** Forwarding note
from NSTC --CPUA 11/12/86 12:56 *** To: NSPRS --CPUA

25XI and 6, E.O.13526

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb
SUBJECT: Thatcher Memo Peter, I have gone back over Allied advice
and intel community assessments prior to Iceland. The CIA paper,
[redacted] in telling us what will
work with the Allies, practically provides a prescription for
what was done in Reykjavik. For example, paper notes: "A
significant INF accord....might prompt Thatcher to call an early
election", arguing that this would undercut opposition. Also
says, "ANY announcement of concrete progress toward achieving an
agreement in one of the arms control forums would be an added
plus". The assessment also cautions that, given high
expectations, if an accord on INF is NOT reached, the "meeting's
positive impact" would be reduced.

--The paper does warn that the Allies will be sensitive to INF
terms and "any agreement must not overlook Allied interests". OK,
but what? First, that no INF or SRINF agreement appear to be
compensation for Brit-UK systems (we avoided that). Second, that
Soviet SRINF must be constrained (this was done), but Kohl and
Genscher do NOT want SRINF to be an issue that blocks an
agreement!

In looking at specific advice the President received, I note that
Thatcher wrote that "ANY agreement that established equal
ceilings in Europe would meet UK approval, provided the
difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive"
(exactly what we did). Kohl and Thatcher stressed the importance
of placing constraints on Soviet SRINF (which was done). Nakasone
advised that the best solution would be a global ban on INF
altogether, but adds that Europe and Asian systems do not need to
be dropped "strictly proportionately" (thus we met his advice,
too). On strat forces, Kohl endorses RR's interim proposals, but
asks that we push for "even greater reductions". In addition, of
course, Europe has endorsed the 0-0 option for some time.

My point in this is to suggest that the President make this an
issue with Thatcher, when she starts whining that "European
interests were not taken into account". I know that RR doesn't
like to talk tough, least of all with Thatcher, but I think its
time to unload on them. They simply can't keep urging us to do
this and that, then when we do they scurry for cover. In fact, RR
should quote Mrs T. back verbatim from her letter.

cc: NSREL --CPUA
NSSFK --CPUA
NSJFM --CPUA

NSDAM --CPUA
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Don Gregg
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MSG FROM: NSTC --CPUA TO: NSSGB --CPUA
11/14/86 12:44:33 To: NSSGB --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb Subject: Speech Input *** Forwarding note
from NSTC --CPUA 11/12/86 12:11 *** To: NSPRS --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb
SUBJECT: Speech Input

"The discussions I have had this morning with the Prime Minister are representative of the extensive consultations in which we engage in order to hear thoroughly the views of our Allies. In the run-up to Reykjavik I wrote to the Allied leaders twice and received excellent counsel and advice from several of our friends. Mrs. Thatcher's recommendations were instrumental to the direction we took in my meetings with the General Secretary and she has today strongly endorsed our negotiating positions.

Of course, as good Allies, we do not always agree on every point. But there is no disagreement over the fundamental issues in East-West relations and how we deal with the Soviet Union. Mrs. Thatcher reiterated her support for our approach to relations with the USSR based on realism, strength and dialogue. She lamented the current Kremlin tactic of backing-off the progress made in Iceland, and particularly demanded that the USSR not renege on its commitment to negotiate separate agreements on INF and significant reductions in strategic weaponry.

Peter, some suggestions for speech.

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