SECRET

Don Gregs

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 01, 2017

OF THE

MSG FROM: NSTC --CPUA TO: NSSGB --CPUA 11/14/86 12:44:00 To: NSSGB --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb Subject: Thatcher Memo *** Forwarding note from NSTC --CPUA 11/12/86 12:56 *** To: NSPRS --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb

SUBJECT: Thatcher Memo Peter, I have gone back over Allied advice and intel community assessments prior to Iceland. The CIA paper, in telling us what will


work with the Allies, practrically provides a prescription for what was done in Reykavik. For example, paper notes: "A significant INF accord....might prompt Thatcher to call an early election", arguing that this would undercut opposition. Also says, "ANY announcement of concrete progress toward achieving an agreement in one of the arms control forums would be an added plus". The assessment also cautions that, given high expectations, if an accord on INF is NOT reached, the "meeting's positive impact" would be reduced.

--The paper does warn that the Allies will be sensitive to INF terms and "any agreement must not overlook Allied interests". OK, but what? First, that no INF or SRINF agreement appear to be compensation for Brit-UK ystems (we avoided that). Second, that Soviet SRINF must be constrained (this was done), but Kohl and Genscher do NOT want SRINF to be an issue that blocks an agreement!

In looking at specific advice the President received, I note that Thatcher wrote that "ANY agreement that established equal ceilings in Europe would meet UK approval, provided the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive" (exactly what we did). Kohl and Thatcher stressed the importance of placing constraints on Soviet SRINF (which was done). Nakasone advised that the best solution would be a global ban on INF altogether, but adds that Europe and Asian systems do not need to be dropped "strictly proportionately" (thus we met his advice, too). On strat forces, Kohl endorses RR's interim proposals, but asks that we push for "even greater reductions". In addition, of course, Europe has endorsed the 0-0 option for some time.

My point in this is to suggest that the President make this an issue with Thatcher, when she starts whining that "European interests were not taken into account". I know that RR doesn't like to talk tough, least of all with Thatcher, but I think its time to unload on them. They simply can't keep urging us to do this and that, then when we do they scurry for cover. In fact, RR should quote Mrs T. back verbatim from her letter.

CC: NSREL --CPUA NSSFK --CPUA NSJFM --CPUA NSDAM --CPUA NSLFB --CPUA NSSES --CPUA



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MSG FROM: NSTC --CPUA TO: NSSGB --CPUA 11/14/86 12:44:33 To: NSSGB --CPUA

Don Goegg

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb Subject: Speech Input *** Forwarding note from NSTC --CPUA 11/12/86 12:11 *** To: NSPRS --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Tyrus Cobb SUBJECT: Speech Input

"The discussions I have had this morning with the Prime Minister are representative of the extensive consultations in which we engage in order to hear thoroughly the views of our Allies. In the run-up to Reykavik I wrote to the Allied leaders twice and received excellent counsel and advice from several of our friends. Mrs. Thatcher's recommendations were instrumental to the direction we took in my meetings with the General Secretary and she has today strongly endorsed our negotiating positions.

Of course, as good Allies, we do not always agree on every point. But there is no disagreement over the fundamental issues in East-West relations and how we deal with the Soviet Union.Mrs. Thatcher reiterated her support for our approach to relations with the USSR based on realism, strength and dialogue. She lamented the current Kremlin tactic of backing-off the progress made in Iceland, and particularly demanded that the USSR not renege on its commitment to negotiate separate agreements on INF and significant reductions in strategic weaponry.

Peter, some suggestions for speech.

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