

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Tony Blair, Prime Minister of

the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European

Affairs, Notetaker

Tony Blair, Prime Minister

John Holmes, Principal Private Secretary to

the Prime Minister John Sawers, Notetaker

DATE, TIME

February 5, 1998, 11:00 a.m.-12:40 p.m.

AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: We're off to a good start, Tony. Shall we turn to Northern Ireland? How do you see the prospects for peace and how can I help? (U)

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

The President: I agree, and some others do as well, but not everyone thinks the ceasefire will hold. (U)

> **DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE** INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

1.5(d)Declassify On:

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-090, document no. 14 **DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 14, 2015**

Prime Minister Blair: E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

Samuel Berger: Your efforts to develop the equality agenda seem to us a key in the effort to keep the Republicans in the process. (Z)

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

The President: I agree. We will continue our contacts and dialogue with Sinn Fein. I also intend to keep seeing Trimble and the other key Unionist leaders when they come to town.

Prime Minister Blair: /


E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

Thank you again for your continuing help on this critical dimension of the peace process. (U)

The President: Let's turn now to Iraq. What is your assessment after your trip, Madeleine? (U)

Secretary Albright: The trip worked rather well.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)



The President: I agree that their willingness to open eight sites is interesting and offers some hope that our approach could lead to an acceptable formula. Let

Samuel Berger:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

The President: Yes, that might be acceptable if a few political people were there in addition to the essential UNSCOM team. #87

Secretary Albright:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

SECRET

Samuel Berger:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

The Vice President: In the meantime, we are getting new pressures, especially from Capitol Hill, to go after Saddam's head. (8)

The President: That's right, Tony, and you just heard our press making exactly that point. But that approach is nowhere near as simple as it sounds on the surface.

Prime Minister Blair:/

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)


The President: That's what is working and will work. 187

Prime Minister Blair:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

The President:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)



<u>Prime Minister Blair</u>: Our public opinion is not the same as yours, but we are working hard to educate the public. We put out a white paper yesterday on Iraq's WMD programs. (U)

The President: I heard it is an outstanding document. (U)

Prime Minister Blair: We have to educate international opinion
so they see the real threat and choices we face. (U)

The President:		
	E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)	


Secretary Albright: If we do a white paper, it could create a panicky reaction. Her

The President: But such a paper could also give us a margin of maneuver. It would show how much UNSCOM has accomplished in reducing his stocks and capacity -- but not his future potential.

Secretary Albright:	E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)	
The President: Al, w	nat do you think? (U)	
The Vice President:		

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)





ISCAP appeal 2013-090 Document 14 Page 8 was not included as part of the materials in this appeal because it could not be found.


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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)





-- End of Conversation --

