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CS Historical Paper
No. 195

CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
<u>THE ORIGINS OF</u>
<u>CIA'S CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION</u>
<u>IN THE FAR EAST</u>
(PERIOD)
<u>1945 - 1952</u>

DO NOT DESTROY

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Written by : W. Lloyd George

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Inchon area. Between them, they established the presence of 50X1 staffers and sources 50X1 50X1 with orders to make reconnaissance of the Inchon area. From Korean sources 50X1 who had first-hand knowledge of the Inchon harbor and coastal region, together with maps and charts which these sources helped to compile, 50X1 was able to supply excellent reconnaissance information which contributed heavily toward the success of the Inchon landing on 16 September. ^{51/}

There were a number of accomplishments of CIA operations personnel in the Korean War, not the least of which was to continue to function as a relatively independent organization in a theater of war (even if it was not so declared) in the face of repeated efforts by the armed forces to take over or to exercise strong control. ^{52/} Two of the more dramatic incidents were the accomplishments of 50X1 in preparation for the Inchon landing already referred to, and the placing of Surgeon General Sams of the U.S. Army behind the North Korean lines to investigate the truth of the enemy charges that United Nations Forces were using bacteriological agents in warfare. The suspicion was that North Korea had some kind of epidemic running rife in its area and was laying it to germ warfare by the United Nations forces. General Sams

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was put ashore ^{50X1} [redacted] and there verified the American suspicion. He was exfiltrated ^{50X1} ^{50X1} [redacted] and made his report so convincingly that the germ warfare charge died out in a hurry.*

The difficulties in trying to work with the military command while avoiding being taken over by it are touched on by ^{CIA Statute} [redacted] but are covered more extensively by ^{CIA Statute} [redacted] the next commander of the combined CIA forces in Korea, in two reports, one referred to in Reference No. 52, and the other his review of the CIA effort in Korea in his report to Admiral Overesch, whom CIA Director Bedell Smith appointed in the summer of 1952 as Senior Representative heading the CIA North Asia Command,** which covered ^{50X1} [redacted] Korea, as well as activities ^{50X1} [redacted] directed toward Communist China and the Soviet Union.

* These events, as well as the trials and tribulations of the early period of the Korean War when the OSO and OPC activities were combined under one commander, are related in CS Historical Paper No. 52, The Secret War in Korea, June 1950-June 1952, by ^{CIA Statute} [redacted]

**For an account of this experiment in funneling the relations of several field components to their respective Headquarters elements through a single command point in the field, see CS Historical Paper No. 211, The North Asia Command, 1952-1956, by W. Lloyd George.

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