

P:

Thursday 3/25/71

*European
Coop*

4:30 Dr. Mansur advises that, if Tom calls in, he should be told that the Rogers memo re post-Apollo was not taken to the President but was returned to Rogers, with the understanding that the matter required more study.

The initial reactions of Kissinger and David were negative with respect to continuing the program.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

March 25, 1971

THE RECORD

European Cooperation (Telecon with Col Behr)

Mr. [redacted] concerning disposition of the memorandum
presented to the President regarding European
participation in the Apollo Space Program. I briefly repeated
the substance of the memorandum to Colonel Behr and concluded by expressing
my opinion that the Executive Office should closely
monitor the matter and that the Administration should
make a decision to support European participation.

These discussions were not very expansive but, nevertheless,
they did state that the memorandum was being returned to Secretary
Rogers with the following comments:

1. The President did not want to get "locked in" to European participation at this time.
2. That there were many issues other than INTELSAT which must be studied before a final decision is made.
3. That the Secretary of State is to continue the negotiations without establishing commitments.

I also indicated to Colonel Behr that the Post Apollo negotiations should be stretched out so that issues would not surface that would be detrimental to the INTELSAT negotiations. He agreed, but suggested this was a tactical matter to be left to the judgment of the Department of State.

G. F. Mansur

G. F. Mansur
Deputy Director

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Mr. Whitehead

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

March 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Post Apollo European Cooperation (Telecon with Col. Behr)

I spoke with Colonel Behr concerning disposition of the memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President regarding European participation in the Post Apollo Space Program. I briefly repeated our views on this matter to Colonel Behr and concluded by expressing Mr. Whitehead's opinion that the Executive Office should closely examine the many issues involved and that the Administration should not make a precipitous decision to support European participation.

Colonel Behr's comments were not very expansive but, nevertheless, he did state that the memorandum was being returned to Secretary Rogers with the following comments:

1. The President did not want to get "locked in" to European participation at this time.
2. That there were many issues other than INTELSAT which must be studied before a final decision is made.
3. That the Secretary of State is to continue the negotiations without establishing commitments.

I also indicated to Colonel Behr that the Post Apollo negotiations should be stretched out so that issues would not surface that would be detrimental to the INTELSAT negotiations. He agreed, but suggested this was a tactical matter to be left to the judgment of the Department of State.

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Deputy Director

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7104181

March 23, 1971

TO: The Secretary

FROM: J - Mr. Johnson *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Presidential Views on European Participation in the post-Apollo Program -- ACTION
MEMORANDUM

On February 22, 1971 in a meeting with the President his Science Adviser, Ed David, referred informally in the course of a wider discussion to the talks which I led on February 11-12 with the Europeans on their participation in the post-Apollo program. Messrs. Flanigan and Ehrlichman were present, but not Dr. Kissinger. The report of the meeting which subsequently leaked out was that, in light of the problems which were described to him, the President took a negative view of the efforts to engage the participation of the Europeans in the post-Apollo program.

Whether accurate or not, the existence of the report of alleged Presidential disaffection is impairing our efforts to develop US positions on which we can proceed with further negotiations with the Europeans.

The attached memorandum to the President is designed to clear the air.

I recommend that you sign it or discuss the subject orally with the President.

Attachment: *I will be glad to fill you in further on what has become a very complicated subject*

Memorandum for the President *[Signature]*

SCI:HPollack
x21554

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7104131

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: European Participation in
Post-Apollo Space Program

As you know, since late 1969 Dr. Paine and subsequently Dr. Low, on the staff of NASA, have been exploring with Western Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia the possibility of their substantial participation in the post-Apollo Space Transportation System Program. The Western European countries have expressed considerable interest. Consequently, there have been two political-level meetings with the European Space Conference represented by Theo Lefevre (former Belgian Prime Minister) and the delegation headed by Alex Johnson on our side. The last meeting was held on February 11 and 12 here in Washington, and we are now in the process of preparing a written statement of our views for transmittal within the next ten days or so to the European Space Conference.

The most difficult political issue that has emerged from these discussions is the European insistence that if they give up their own launcher program to participate in our post-Apollo program they require an assurance that we will launch regional telecommunication satellites of interest to them. On our side the problem is how to do so without derogating our responsibility to our other partners and to ourselves for the success of the single global INTELSAT system.

Much hard bargaining will be required before a basis for the resolution of this issue is reached

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and we do not underestimate the
have felt that prospects for success are reasonable
and plan to continue our efforts to engage European
participation in the program. However, before
entering the next phase of the negotiations, I have
felt it prudent to check with you to ensure our
efforts continue to be in accord with your views.

William P. Rogers