


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### The Reckoning (U)

How much did AFME accomplish toward promoting US interests in the Islamic world? AFME certainly enhanced America's image in the region, at least before the *Ramparts* revelations. AFME also provided an ostensibly non-governmental mechanism for aiding Arab regimes that at best were ordinarily ambivalent toward the United States. Arab leaders appreciated AFME's unique services—particularly its assistance to students hoping to study in America. In August 1959, for instance, a confidant of Egyptian President Nasser approached the American Embassy to explain that Nasser worried that Egyptian students sent to study in the Soviet Union had been subjected to political indoctrination. Nasser apparently wanted to demonstrate (for Moscow) Egypt's independent foreign policy by sending more students to the West. Could the American Government be of assistance in placing 200 Egyptian students in the United States? The Embassy cabled this request to Washington and recommended a positive response. 25X1

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AFME almost certainly made another, less visible, contribution to US foreign policy objectives. The Egyptian Government, for instance, seems to have appreciated AFME precisely because it was suspected of being a US intelligence operation that could serve as a secure conduit for sensitive messages to Washington. 25X1

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Egyptian officials, for example, seemed convinced that AFME's Elmo Hutchison was a CIA officer. Perhaps because Hutchison had shown himself a friend of the Palestinian Arabs

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through his writings, Egyptian suspicions about AFME's bona fides only seemed to heighten his access to high officials in Cairo."<sup>125</sup> ~~25X1~~

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By

the early 1950s, according to historian Peter Hahn, Israeli officials perceived that "elements in the oil industry and the State Department conspired with Arab embassies to disseminate anti-Israeli propaganda."<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>Commander Hutchison, US Naval Reserve, had written a book about his service as an observer on the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine. His *Violent Truce* criticized all sides in the conflict but complained in particular about a tendency in America to "whitewash" Israeli misbehavior. Elmo H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1951-1955* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956), pp. xv-xvi. (U)

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<sup>126</sup> Hahn, "The View from Jerusalem," n. 526. (U)

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
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Meanwhile, the old charge that AFME was a CIA front now resonated with non-Jewish commentators, even though mainstream news organizations continued to ignore it. Columnist Drew Pearson, speaking in Tel Aviv, offhandedly stated that the Agency had given AFME \$100,000 over the last two years. The *Jerusalem Post* reported a comment on this remark by Representative Thomas C. McGrath, Jr. (D-NJ), who called for an investigation. AFME did not respond to Pearson, and the story soon died.<sup>118</sup> (U)

*The Nation's* Robert G. Sherrill struck the next blow in May 1966, reporting on the findings of the Washington-based Group Research, Inc., which had scrutinized the "Patman Eight's" IRS records and surmised that the CIA had indeed channeled \$100,000 to AFME.<sup>119</sup> Whereas Drew Pearson had added little to what I.L. Kenen and the *Near East Report* alleged in 1964, Sherrill published credible evidence that the CIA had used legitimate foundations as cutouts for its subvention of AFME.<sup>120</sup> The trail leading from AFME back to the CIA was becoming ever easier to follow; 25X1

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

<sup>119</sup>Robert G. Sherrill, "Foundation Pipe Lines: The Beneficent CIA," *Nation*, 9 May 1966, pp. 544, 556. (U)



*Deputy Director for Plans Desmond FitzGerald* 25X1

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The storm generated by *Ramparts* magazine's famous exposé of the National Student Association damaged AFME as well. On 17 February the *New York Times* disclosed that AFME had received funds from two more CIA cutouts (the Hobby Foundation and the J. Frederick Brown Foundation). Pressed for comment by the *Times*' Neil Sheehan, Overton theatrically responded, "God, no!" when asked if he knew the Brown Foundation was a CIA conduit.<sup>125</sup> Chairman of the Board Earl Bunting issued yet another press release dismissing the charges as old news, and hoped that this storm, like previous ones, would soon blow over.<sup>126</sup> By now, however, this hope was bootless. 25X1

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25X1 Calling on the Johnson administration to investigate the affair, 25X1 "to terminate the CIA's funding of all domestic organizations" and to establish a joint Congressional committee to oversee Agency operations.<sup>127</sup> (S)

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<sup>125</sup>Neil Sheehan, "5 New Groups Tied to CIA Conduits," *New York Times*, February 17, 1967, p 1.

(U)

<sup>126</sup>The statement was released on 20 February 1967. 25X1

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
<sup>127</sup>L.L. Kenen, "AFME and the CIA," *Near East Report* 11 (February 21, 1967), p. 15. (U)

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**Conclusion (U)**

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25X1 the Johnson administration abandoned AFME in 1967 not because it **had worked** against Israel, but because *Ramparts* implicated it, with the National Student Association, in manipulating student groups on American campuses. (S)

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## Chapter Five

### The Matchmaker

#### *The Congress for Cultural Freedom (U)*

The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was one of the CIA's more daring and effective Cold War covert operations. It published literary journals such as *Encounter*, hosted dozens of conferences that brought together eminent Western thinkers, and did what it could to help intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain. Somehow this elitist organization of scholars and artists—egotistical, freethinking, and sometimes even anti-American in their politics—managed to reach out from its Paris headquarters to demonstrate that Communism, despite its blandishments, was a deadly foe of art and thought. (U)

Getting such people to cooperate at all was a feat, but the Congress's Administrative Secretary, Michael Josselson, miraculously kept many of them working together for 17 years. Without Josselson, the Berlin Congress might not have come together at all in June 1950, and after his resignation from the Paris secretariat in 1967, the Congress slid slowly but inexorably toward dissolution. Perhaps no CIA operation of such size and delicacy depended so much on the talents of a single agent. (S)

The Congress grew from a mere idea into a relatively cohesive and prestigious body in a remarkably brief time. Soon after its founding in Paris, CCF acquired offices in Berlin and Rome, and added "national committees" in Britain, Sweden, Norway, Japan, India, and the United States. Within three years the Congress' organizers were sponsoring expositions, literary forums, speaking tours, and an impressive array of publications around the world. Given the ideological polarization of the 1950s, and the fractiousness of intellectuals and artists in any age, this accomplishment was little short of amazing. (U)

Unseen by the public, the Central Intelligence Agency meanwhile consolidated its control over the Congress. The QKOPERA project found a permanent home in the International Organizations Division, where Cord Meyer would act as the operation's institutional guardian angel until its liquidation in 1967. As the Congress grew, it found powerful patrons on both sides of the political aisle in official Washington and

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among the foundations based in New York. "There was a *cachet* associated with the Congress that far exceeded any project, at least with the possible exception of the Radios [Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty]," 25X1 [redacted] As CCF's original mission—to blunt the Soviet peace offensive—became outdated in the mid-1950s, its principals and covert sponsors smoothly shifted its focus to the Third World. (S)

Despite this record of success, CCF was always a politically dangerous operation for the CIA. Its mission was a subtle one that even critics within the Agency sometimes misunderstood; CIA officials who supported the project shuddered when they imagined what might happen should their work become a *cause celebre* in Congress or the news media. The Congress's American branch gave the Agency ample grounds for such concern. The American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF) soon foundered in political controversies. The ACCF's brief but turbulent history convinced Agency officials of the need to steer the Congress secretariat away from direct involvement in American political debates. Nevertheless, Michael Josselson insisted that CCF continue a pattern of indirect political involvement that provoked harsh criticism in 1967. (S)

#### Rapid Growth (U)

In the eyes of its overt and covert managers, the Congress for Cultural Freedom had several complementary goals. The first was to break the "peculiar fascination" that Marxism held for writers, artists, and scientists by demonstrating that Marx's ideas—when actually applied under Communism—destroyed freedom of thought and art. The second was to demonstrate "the interdependence of cultural achievement and political freedom"—to show that liberal democracy both protected and promoted the free exchange of ideas that is essential to cultural progress. Both objectives countered Moscow's massive cultural propaganda effort, which IO Division in 1952 guessed (without substantiation) was costing

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the Soviets perhaps \$200,000,000 a year.<sup>2</sup> Later, CCF case officers in Washington boiled these two missions down to a simple mission statement:

The principal objective of project QKOPERA remains to rally left-wing intellectuals to the active defense and extension of the principles of a free society and to expose totalitarian abuses of the right of free expression.<sup>3</sup> (S)

DDP Frank Wisner quietly added a third, covert goal—that of demonstrating America's commitment to cultural freedom and American artistic and intellectual contributions to the common heritage of the West. Wisner found this rationale for the QKOPERA project implied in a 1953 statement by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which had studied overseas information programs and concluded that

America must avoid appearing to be too much present physically in terms of power, overseas, and at the same time seeming to be distant and remote on the plane of common cultural and spiritual values.

Wisner liked this thought and suggested to DCI-designate Allen Dulles that it matched the intentions behind the Agency's support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom:

You will recall that [QK]OPERA was designed to accomplish the objective, among others, of providing a tangible demonstration of the vitality and fruitfulness of Western culture—and by the same token to spike the Soviet line that the West is dead culturally and intellectually. Another objective was to bring home to the Europeans the fact that America is not a cultural desert or a land of barbarians interested only in materialism.<sup>4</sup> (S)

In 1951, OPC organized its management of the QKOPERA project to pursue these goals. The Western Europe Division initially handled CCF through LCPIPIT in Paris 25X1

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QKOPERA 25X1

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<sup>2</sup>Frank Wisner to Allen Dulles, "Support for QKOPERA Concept," 6 February 1953, 25X1

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Former *Encounter* co-editor Irving Kristol remembered in 1967:

... the Fairfield Foundation was no shadowy entity. Julius Fleischman [*sic*] was very much in evidence, yacht and all, and there was little question that he and his fellow trustees would have ... no trouble meeting *Encounter's* deficit if they so desired. Nor were Fleischman's [*sic*] fellow trustees shadowy figures—they were rich financiers, and I recall meeting them all once at some cocktail party in London, and knowing, by just looking at them, that they were fearfully rich. Finally, the Fairfield Foundation was engaged in other cultural activities, including support for the Shakespeare Festival at Stratford, in Connecticut.

So it seemed eminently plausible to me that Fairfield was in fact the benign sponsor of *Encounter*. Perhaps I should observe that *Encounter's* annual deficit was in the vicinity of \$40,000 a year—not so large a sum even for a small foundation!" (U)

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did not end speculation about CCF's real source of funding. Rumors of covert funding by the American "secret services" had cropped up in West Berlin in 1950, and some of those accounts went beyond the perfunctory accusations leveled by the Communist press.<sup>9</sup> Such hearsay touched a sensitive point for many artists and intellectuals—especially in Europe—who feared appearing to be apologists for America. CCF Secretary General Nicolas Nabokov stressed for James Burnham the importance of convincing French intellectuals that the organization was "not an American secret service agency." English thinkers, Nabokov noted, "think of our Congress as some kind of semiclandestine [*sic*] American organization controlled by you [Burnham], [Arthur] Koestler, and ... [Franz] Borkenau."<sup>10</sup> (S)

<sup>9</sup>Irving Kristol to Dwight Macdonald, 11 April 1967, Mugar Memorial Library, Boston University, *Encounter* Papers, Letter and Memo Box (Uncatalogued), Special Collections. (U)

<sup>10</sup>Note, for instance, the denunciation of Melvin Lasky as an agent of the US Army's Counterintelligence Corps in the "Open Letter" addressed to participants in the Congress for Cultural Freedom by the League of Culture for the Democratic Regeneration of Germany; no date, Hoover Institution, Sidney Hook Papers, box 125, folder 3. (U)

<sup>11</sup>Colaninno quotes this 1951 letter in *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 49. (U)

The Congress's leaders worked hard to dispel these rumors in Britain and France. A tactful silence on the part of Congress participants aided this effort. Indeed, few if any of CCF's foreign adherents tried to learn whether the rumors of a CIA subvention were true. In the context of the times, such an attitude could hardly be surprising. Moscow covertly but obviously spent vast sums on the Cominform and its extravagant "peace" conferences for writers and artists, and respectable anti-Communist thinkers had publicly called for Washington to take up its side of the fight and provide leadership in the cultural struggle. Given this background, most foreign thinkers associated with the Congress tacitly rationalized covert American support for the organization as an awkward but ultimately essential contribution to freedom." (U)

The rumors, in any event, did not deter spontaneous enthusiasm for the Congress abroad. Despite the widespread assumption that the Congress received the bulk of its funds from somewhere in America, intellectuals in Europe, Asia, and South America soon established member branches and sponsored a variety of activities. The Congress used CIA money in the early 1950s to help found the Free Europe University in Exile, to publish anti-Communist writings in many languages, and to participate in a multitude of assemblies in Europe and Asia.<sup>12</sup> Each national branch published its own bulletin, and several branches also produced formidable journals of commentary and criticism, such as *Encounter* in Great Britain and *Preuves* in France. *Encounter*, first published in October 1953 and initially aimed primarily at Asian audiences, rapidly became one of the foremost cultural reviews in the English-speaking world." 25X1

25X1 *Encounter* remained the feather in the Congress's cap until CCF divested it in 1964." (S)

<sup>12</sup>Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, n. 49. (U)

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By late 1953 American sponsorship of the Congress, and *Encounter*, was taken for granted in England; see Stephen Spender to Michael Jusselson, 22 October 1953, Mugar Memorial Library, Boston University, *Encounter* Collection, Correspondence box, folder 71, (Unclassified). (S)

<sup>13</sup>For *Encounter*'s early Asian focus, see Stephen Spender to Winston Churchill, 1 October 1953, Mugar Memorial Library, Boston University, *Encounter* Collection, Correspondence box, folder 71. The Congress also briefly subsidized the British magazine *Twentieth Century* before the launching of *Encounter*; Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, p. 60. (U)

<sup>14</sup>Irving Kristol, interview by Michael Warner, tape recording, Washington, DC, 11 August 1993 (hereinafter cited as Kristol interview) (Unclassified). OKOPERA 25X1

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"Project OKOPERA," 25X1

CCF gained early acclaim in Europe by sponsoring a grand exhibition of the "Masterworks of the Twentieth Century" in Paris in 1952. A few months earlier, the *New York Times* had complained about "America's foolish disregard of the importance of the 'cultural offensive'" and reported that Moscow spent more on cultural propaganda in France alone than Washington did in the whole world. 25X1

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Amidst crowds and complaints, Paris saw its first productions of several important works and heard compositions by Prokofiev and Shostakovich that Stalin had banned in the Soviet Union. As one critic put it, the festival was "an extremely popular fiasco."<sup>15</sup> (S)

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"OKOPERA" 25X1



DCI Walter B. Smith sent his aide to Paris to check on CCF. (c)

#### The American Committee for Cultural Freedom (U)

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25X1 After the Berlin conference in 1950, the 25X1 founders of the Congress for Cultural Freedom had briefly argued over the wisdom of allowing their organization to become more directly involved in political debates. Arthur Koestler urged the Congress to become a militant political organization.<sup>17</sup> Koestler's idea did not persuade the Congress' leaders

<sup>17</sup>Cohen, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 35-36. (U)

in Europe, but it came closer to realization during the brief life of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF), the Congress's factious New York branch office. Unlike the Congress in Paris, which was distinctly left of center in its sympathies, the American Committee was more centrist and included a wide range of political opinion among its several hundred members. American intellectuals had constructed an unlikely coalition of public figures united chiefly by their opposition to Stalinism. This political diversity, however, fatally complicated the ACCF Executive Committee's efforts to reach consensus on contentious public issues. (U)

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The American Committee had hardly gained its footing when it lurched into the first of many disputes over domestic political issues. The ACCF made a point of protesting incidents of political and artistic censorship in the United States, but could not always make up its collective mind on what constituted a true threat to intellectual freedom. In March 1952, the ACCF tangled itself in knots over the question of whether and how to respond to the anti-Communist campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI). While no one on the Committee openly condoned McCarthy's methods, the members passionately disagreed over the nature of the threat that the Senator posed to civil liberties. At its root, this argument involved a deeper dispute over the best way in which to defend a free society—a dispute that would later echo in the international discussions of the Congress itself. (U)

The dispute over McCarthy broke into the open at a public meeting of the ACCF held, ironically, at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York—the site of the notorious Communist-inspired peace conference three years

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earlier. Some Committee members, led by Richard Rovere, Dwight Macdonald, Elmer Rice, and Mary McCarthy, denounced Senator McCarthy's tactics as a threat to American freedoms. Max Eastman and others counterattacked, hardly defending the Senator but contending nonetheless that liberal coddling of American Communists in the 1930s and 1940s had made McCarthyism possible and that the current "Red Scare," despite its excesses, did not compare with its infamous 1919 namesake. Eastman apparently had the better of the debate until he lost his-temper and declared (to laughter and jeers) that Senator McCarthy's chief faults were his excessive honesty and overly delicate sense of fair play!<sup>20</sup> (U)

This rift alarmed Frank Wisner when he learned of it from his informal contact in ACCF, Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Wisner viewed the Committee as a cover vehicle for the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Paris and maintained that domestic political partisanship compromised and embarrassed the Congress abroad. He feared that the dispute could split the Committee and might even provoke retaliation by Senator McCarthy. Wisner telephoned Schlesinger and urged him to remind all sides that the dispute jeopardized the future of the entire Congress.<sup>21</sup> (U)

For his own part, Schlesinger sided with the anti-McCarthy sentiment and feared that the Senator's defenders (the "genuine hysterics" such as James Burnham) might take control of the ACCF. He promised to get Wisner's points across somehow at the ACCF's upcoming April meeting. At that gathering, Sidney Hook and the Committee's leadership were able to restrain the debates and hammer out a compromise statement. The ACCF declared that Communism and demagogic anti-Communism fed on one another. It called on Senator McCarthy to apologize to critic Edmund Wilson for calling one of his books pro-Communist.<sup>22</sup>

(c)

The critics of Senator McCarthy had clearly won the debate, but feelings still ran high when Captain Giniger attended the Paris exposition in May 1952. Giniger concluded that the American Committee had been taken over by

<sup>20</sup>William L. O'Neill, *A Better World: The Great Schism—Stalinism and the American Intellectuals* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 298-302. (U)

<sup>21</sup>Frank Wisner to Gerald F. Miller, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, "Reported Crisis in the American Committee for Cultural Freedom," 7 April 1952, reprinted in Warner, ed., *The CIA under Harry Truman*, p. 455. (U)

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