

a strange coterie of quasi-intellectuals who circulate around three publications, *The New Leader*, *The Partisan Review*, [sic] and *Commentary*. I realize this is a dangerous thing to say in times when people are as sensitive on this subject as they are now, but the fact remains that these are New York ex-Communist and Socialist Jewish intellectuals in the main, constituting an in-grown and limited group who exist by taking in each other's intellectual wash.

Giniger identified the leader of this "coterie" in ACCF 25x1 Irving Kristol, the Committee's new Executive Secretary. Kristol had infuriated liberals such as Schlesinger by accusing them (in a widely read *Commentary* article on Senator McCarthy) of having given "aid and comfort to Stalinist tyranny."¹⁰ Following Schlesinger's lead, Giniger reported that the ACCF circulated divisive material such as Kristol's recent attack on "a considerable and influential group of American anti-Communist intellectuals." He added that most of the prominent American writers who attended the Paris exposition had nothing but contempt for the ACCF and its activities. 25x1

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25x1 Tom Braden tried to take matters in hand when his new division took over management of QKOPERA on 1 July 1952. CIA security had finally cleared Sidney Hook, and soon afterward Cord Meyer and Michael Josselson traveled to New York to brief him on the CIA's interest and discuss the American Committee. Hook agreed that the Committee should avoid controversy and limit its public statements to, as Braden later put it, "an occasional dignified comment on strictly academic or cultural freedom issues." 25X1

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¹⁰Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 62-63. See also O'Moile, *A Better World*, pp. 285-288. (U)

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 any plans to have the ACCF join the fight against Senator McCarthy.²⁶ ~~(S)~~
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25x1 McCarthy had so far spared CIA the brunt of his attacks, but Allen Dulles and his lieutenants could not be sure that their luck would hold. ~~(S)~~

Events soon conspired to remind Allen Dulles of the danger of exposure. In September 1953, the FBI began a loyalty investigation of Cord Meyer and called on the Agency to suspend him from his duties while the inquiry proceeded. Dulles had to concur—the President's recent Executive Order 10450 required suspension (without pay) for any employee whose retention was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national security." Meyer spent three months knowing that any day Senator McCarthy might publicly accuse him and IO Division of disloyalty. With luck and a good lawyer, however, Meyer won his case late that November (McCarthy never mentioned Meyer, although Meyer believed the Senator's seemingly ubiquitous sources learned of the case).²⁷ (U)

Sidney Hook knew of the Agency's jitters about antagonizing McCarthy, but would not or could not prevail upon his colleagues on the Committee to stay quiet about the Senator. The Executive Committee, dominated by Hook and such allies as Diana Trilling, Sol Levitas, and Norman Thomas, worried that McCarthy was giving anti-Communism a bad name. In autumn 1954, the ACCF helped publish a book by Moshe Dector and James Rorty, *McCarthy and the Communists*, which argued that McCarthy had emulated the very totalitarians he claimed to fight. The

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 August 1993 (Unclassified). 25X1 interview, 11
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²⁷Meyer, *Facing Reality*, pp. 66-81. (U)

book, ironically, angered both wings of the ACCF's broad membership. Conservatives such as journalist Charles Schuyler and James Burnham (no longer a consultant with the Agency) resigned from the ACCF in protest of its attacks on McCarthy. Liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger complained that even its faint praise for some of the Senator's actions said too much on McCarthy's behalf.²⁸ The Committee was gradually losing its claim to represent even anti-Communist American intellectuals. (U)

Hook had warned CIA that more criticism of McCarthy was imminent. He assured Meyer that no CIA money had gone into *McCarthy and the Communists*, but the affair was the last straw for IO Division. Meyer and Josselson agreed in June 1954 that the ACCF had become too controversial.^{25X1}

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in May 1955.^{30 (S)}

Josselson had his own reasons to complain of the American Committee and to urge Meyer to cut that organization adrift. The Americans had repeatedly argued with Josselson over tactics. "I had no objection to what Josselson was doing," recalled Arnold Beichman, "but he wasn't going to do it in my name."³¹ Diana Trilling complained to Sidney Hook in 1955:

I find it increasingly difficult to envision a program for our own Committee which at once satisfies Paris and my own conscience. Cultural freedom as they seem to define it—*Encounter*, Indian magazines for second-rate writers to use . . . for the improvement of their English, concerts, and parties for visiting firemen—may be all very well for the Nabokovs and Spenders, but it engages my interest not at all.³²

²⁸Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947-1954* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), p. 125. 25X1

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³⁰McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left*, p. 122. (U)

³¹Arnold Beichman, interview by Michael Warner, tape recording, McLean, VA, 17 March 1994 (hereinafter cited as Beichman interview) (Administrative-Internal Use Only). (U)

³²Diana Trilling to Sidney Hook, 15 June 1955, Hoover Institution, Sidney Hook Papers, box 124, folder 5. (U)

The ACCF's leaders rankled at Josselson's apparent tolerance of one-sided foreign criticism of the United States. From his Continental vantage point, Josselson saw little harm in letting the Paris secretariat occasionally blow off steam by issuing statements criticizing developments in America. For instance, CCF cabled President Eisenhower in April 1953 asking for clemency for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, sentenced to die for passing atomic secrets to Moscow. Such proclamations, in Josselson's view, cost nothing to issue and enhanced the Congress's reputation for integrity in the eyes of its "target" audience. (S)

The American Committee, however, denounced such criticism as misinformed and castigated Josselson for tolerating it. Acerbic comments flew back and forth across the Atlantic on these and later disputes, such as the Paris secretariat's alleged coddling of Bertrand Russell after he publicly likened the FBI to the Gestapo.³³ The secretariat defended not Russell's remarks but his person, declaring that his name as honorary chairman on CCF's letterhead made the organization more acceptable to Third World intellectuals. Josselson added a barbed explanation in his response to Sidney Hook:

I'm sorry, Sidney, but I don't [know] how a rebuke to the American Committee can be avoided As always in my work, I will try to prevent any unnecessary damage, but if the American Committee chooses to disaffiliate, well, it may be all to the good in the long run The American Committee seems to recognize only one weapon in the fight against Communism: denunciation. Our methods are different. But because of this difference the American Committee no longer trusts us and, under such conditions, perhaps we each have to go our own way.³⁴ (U)

The American Committee eventually made itself irrelevant, as far as the rest of the Congress was concerned. The ACCF Executive Committee found it increasingly difficult to hold the organization's left and right wings together. "So you had a pressure from the Left, and pressure from the Right. That they're not being anti-Communist enough, and, on the Left, we're . . . overreacting."³⁵ The ACCF's many controversies exhausted its leaders, and the American Committee eventually petered out as members and donors lost interest. In a sense the ACCF had little to

³³See, for instance, Sidney Hook to Nicolas Nabokov, 20 April 1956, in Edward S. Shapiro, editor, *Letters of Sidney Hook: Democracy, Communism and the Cold War* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 246-248. (U)

³⁴Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 71-72, 163-169. (U)

³⁵Beichman interview, 17 March 1994. (U)

offer American cultural figures beyond a negative anti-Communism that looked increasingly shallow and *passé* after Stalin died and the US Senate condemned Sen. Joseph McCarthy. The ACCF's liberals complained with increasing cogency that the Communist threat to American culture had receded and that the Executive Committee had to change with the times instead of refighting the battles of the 1930s and 1940s. A young Norman Podhoretz, elevated to the ACCF's board by his friend Diana Trilling, wondered what he was doing there:

[I was] surrounded by people most of whom were twice or even three times my age and all of whom were products of political histories very different from my own. I did not doubt that they were right in believing that Soviet Communism represented the greatest threat on the face of the earth to intellectual and cultural freedom, but I did find myself asking whether they were right in their single-minded preoccupation with that threat. In the past there had been many defenders of the Soviet Union to argue against, but against whom was the argument being conducted in the present?²⁶

Such sentiments eventually prevailed. The ACCF Executive Committee decided in January 1957 to suspend indefinitely the organization's activities—a move that prompted relief in the CIA and other quarters.” (U)

Expansion—and Decline (U)

With the de-funding of the American Committee and the ACCF's subsequent demise, the CIA greatly reduced but did not eliminate the Congress for Cultural Freedom's indirect role in American political life.

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The Congress for Cultural Freedom continued to grow in the late 1950s. By the time the Congress's founders gathered in Berlin in June 1960 to commemorate its 10th anniversary, CCF had become perhaps

²⁶Norman Podhoretz, *Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979 edition), pp. 40–41. (U)


²⁷McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left*, pp. 126–128. (U)

the world's foremost international cultural and intellectual organization, with member committees in 19 countries, six major journals, and 10 additional journals officially associated with the organization. The Congress's future looked bright. It had demonstrated—convincingly, for many observers—that Communism threatened cultural achievement. As the direct threat from Communism diminished, moreover, the Congress had begun to address the concerns of artists and intellectuals in the Third World. The secretariat repackaged its criticism of Communism and oriented its efforts toward defending the liberties of Third World thinkers, arguing that liberal political and economic institutions could complement cultural freedom as nations developed.³⁸ Sidney Hook later explained this shift of attention a little differently, claiming that Continental thinkers gradually despaired of reversing Communist domination of Eastern Europe and turned their energies elsewhere.³⁹ (U)

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The rumors about official American sponsorship of CCF continued to circulate, but they did not seem to dampen the Congress's influence or appeal. For years CCF had operated in a gray twilight between exposure and full legitimacy. Its employees and beneficiaries, along with its public and private allies, were content to overlook CCF's oddities—such as its mysterious source of funds—as long as the rumors of US Government support did not become too loud or specific. (U)

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³⁸Cord Meyer had previewed for DCI Allen Dulles an early rationale for this shift in emphasis toward the Third World; see Cord Meyer to Allen Dulles, "The Fifth International Conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), Milan, Italy, September 12-17, 1955," 12 October 1955.

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³⁹Hook, *Out of Step*, pp. 448-449. (U)

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Operational Accomplishments (U)

Annual QKOPERA project renewals provide a series of snapshots of the Agency's evolving use of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). QKOPERA was long a showcase operation, and a particular favorite of DCI Allen Dulles. (S)

The FY 1955 project renewal stated that CCF was "designed" to counter Soviet influence among free-world intellectuals and ultimately to "win this group as a strategic asset in the struggle against Soviet world domination." In 1954 the Congress had continued its sponsorship of four internationally acclaimed reviews of literature, the arts, and politics (*Encounter*, *Preuves*, *Cuadernos*, and *Das Forum*). *Encounter* in particular had succeeded in "uniting the English-speaking people of the West and the intellectuals of Asia." CCF had convened another international conference; this one, in Rome, had explored 20th-century music. Like those preceding it, the Rome conference had been "an extremely worthwhile event, dramatizing the ideas for which the Congress stands and contributing to the growing solidarity of the free world's intellectuals." In sum, the Congress's activities and publications had "attained notable success" in "drawing intellectuals into active participation in the battle against Communism." (S)

A decade later the FY 1965 project renewal rebraced QKOPERA'S mission 25X

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Americans who sympathized with CCF's mission told themselves that the Congress was doing good work, and avoided asking embarrassing questions. A key factor in CCF's success was that many intellectually prominent (albeit technically unwitting) figures on both sides of the Atlantic regarded its mission as so important that they were willing to overlook rumors of US Government funding. Walter Laqueur, co-editor for several years of CCF's *Soviet Survey*, remembered: "Like the rest I did not know, nor did I try very hard to find out. It seemed not really a critical question at the height of the Cold War . . ." ⁴³ The ACCF's Diana Trilling once even heard chairman Norman Thomas tell the board that he would just have to "phone Allen [Dulles]" for funds for the nearly bankrupt American Committee. ⁴⁴ Even this indiscretion passed without protest. Thomas himself did his best to quash the rumors that ensued. ⁴⁵ Sidney Hook, Arnold Beichman, and William Phillips wrote to Farfield's Julius Fleischmann to ask about the rumors; Fleischmann told them nothing. ⁴⁶ Irving Kristol heard the phone call story secondhand but thought the rumors of US Government support were groundless because the CIA supposedly concentrated on espionage (instead of covert action) and because it seemed so unlikely that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would fund a bunch of social democrats. ⁴⁷ Norman Podhoretz hardly gave the matter a second thought when, in 1958, he vied for the honor of replacing Irving Kristol as American coeditor of *Encounter*:

I had heard the rumors—everyone had—that the CCF was getting money from the Department of State or perhaps the CIA, but I was inclined to think that this idea was a romantic fantasy. Anyhow, if it was true, it would do no good to ask, since the people who knew would have had to say that it wasn't But if I had been told, how much difference would it have made? Would I have turned it down on that account alone? Out of prudence, perhaps, but then perhaps not. ⁴⁸ (U)

⁴³Walter Laqueur, "The Congress of Cultural Freedom," a brief, unpublished memoir written in the summer of 1995, p. 17. Mr. Laqueur provided CIA History Staff a copy. (U)

⁴⁴Diana Trilling, *We Must March My Darlings: A Critical Debate* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1977), pp. 60-61. Kristol interview, 11 August 1993 (Unclassified) 25X1

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⁴⁵Thomas told Hook that Allen Dulles, an old friend, had simply arranged some private funding for the ACCF in its hour of need. Hook later claimed to believe this story; *Out of Step*, pp. 425-426. (U)

⁴⁶Beichman interview, 17 March 1994 (Unclassified). Hook, *Out of Step*, p. 426. (U)

⁴⁷Kristol interview, 11 August 1993 (Unclassified). See also Kristol to Macdonald, 11 April 1967. (U)

⁴⁸Podhoretz, *Breaking Ranks*, pp. 34-35. Podhoretz was ultimately spared this dilemma; the job went to Melvin Lasky. (U)

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The Congress for Cultural Freedom, to be sure, always had plenty of critics on its left and its right. Communists routinely denounced the Congress as a pawn of Washington and an obstacle to East-West understanding. On the other side of the political spectrum, Sidney Hook and others complained that the Congress had abandoned its real business—fighting the Cold War—while busying itself with pointless exercises in Western self-criticism. "It is doubtful whether the balance between the two extremes can be struck in terms of policy abstractions," 25X1

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CCF found a balance, however, although it did so not through policies set in Headquarters but through the talent of one man, agent Michael Josselson. He was the key to the Congress's operations and to CIA control of the organization. Josselson could sense the weak points of the Soviet and Communist world images, and he had a flair for devising schemes to exploit them. At the same time, he knew when to soften CCF's anti-Communism, and he endorsed the efforts, led by Edward Shils of the University of Chicago, to find "a new idiom" for the Congress in the early 1960s.⁴ Most importantly, Josselson knew how to mobilize people and institutions; in the words of one case officer, he was an "expert impresario with the literary and academic prima donnas so essential to the CCF."⁵ 25X1

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
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⁴Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 176-180. (U)

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Josselson defended and encouraged CCF's indirect involvement in American political debates. As previously noted, he insisted from the start that the Congress's credibility with the non-Communist left depended on its willingness to criticize American foreign and domestic policies. 25X1

25X1 This belief was evidently heartfelt; Josselson himself was a man of the non-Communist left,



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Michael Josselson and John C. Hunt (left) made an effective team in CCF's Paris secretariat. (c)

occasionally voicing strong opinions about American political developments. He viewed with horror the growing conservative intellectual movement, and he privately denounced William F. Buckley's magazine *National Review*. He later doubted the wisdom of America's deepening involvement in Vietnam and commended Senator George McGovern's criticism of Johnson administration policies there.⁶⁰ With Josselson in charge, the Congressional secretariat did not hesitate to criticize injustice in the United States. For instance, in the wake of civil rights protests at the University of Alabama, a CCF committee cabled anti-segregation messages to the state governor and to the university president. The Congress also petitioned California Governor Pat Brown for clemency in the widely publicized case of Caryl Chessman.⁶¹ (c)


Josselson showed no compunction about putting unwitting American intellectuals on Congressional platforms. Many prominent Americans served on the CCF's board, wrote for its magazines and its *Forum Service* news service, or participated in its prestigious seminars, conducted

⁶⁰Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 11, 222. (U)

⁶¹Congress for Cultural Freedom, "A Report on Ten Years of Activity," June 1960, HS/CSG 950, History Staff Job 83-00036R, box 6, p. 16. (U)

by American sociologists Daniel Bell and (later) Edward Shils. Unwitting Americans proved effective agents for the Congress; their support for its mission seemed spontaneous and sincere. For example, CCF took credit for reducing neutralism among Japanese intellectuals after it helped send a delegation of American writers (including John Steinbeck, Ralph Ellison, John Hersey, and John Dos Passos) to the 1957 P.E.N. Conference in Tokyo.⁴² The gathering received heavy coverage in the Japanese press. Coming less than a year after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the event was "worth ten years of USIS effort," said a Japanese journalist 25X1

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⁴²P.E.N. is an international writers' club; its acronym stands for Poets, Playwrights, Editors, Essayists, and Novelists. (U)

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"The USSR has demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the content appearing in various Congress for Cultural Freedom publications," particularly *Encounter* and *Soviet Survey*, one QKOPERA project renewal noted. 25X1

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Michael Josselson had powerful friends who agreed with him that America had to be self-critical in its struggle against Communism. 25X1

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Michael Josselson 25X1

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
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Events soon overtook these plans. In late 1965 the *New York Times*, intrigued by rumors of a massive CIA presence in America's institutions--allegations spread by David Wise's and David Ross' *The Invisible Government* and bolstered by the Patman revelations—put several

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reporters to work checking the story. The *Times*' lengthy investigation culminated in a series of five articles on the Agency that ran in April 1966. Unfortunately for CCF, one of the articles linked the Congress and *Encounter* to the CIA's still mysterious covert funding network.²² The story immediately caused trouble for CCF affiliates in the Middle East and India, even though the secretariat in Paris and several prominent figures associated with the Congress, such as Irving Kristol, Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Oppenheimer, and John Kenneth Galbraith, publicly proclaimed the independence and integrity of the organization's policies and officials.²³ 25X1

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The *New York Times* article gave impetus to the recently resumed talks between the Agency and the Ford Foundation. In 1966 former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, long an enthusiastic supporter of the QKOPERA project, took over at Ford. He and Shepard Stone recognized the danger to the Congress and the consequent opportunity for the Foundation. They were ready to talk when Michael Josselson asked them in early 1966 to consider taking over the entire Congress program.²⁴ *ST*

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The Agency cut its ties to CCF that September, and Josselson and Hunt 25X1 stayed on in their Congress posts. 25X1

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Not long after Ford took over CCF, however, the *Ramparts* revelations in February 1967 further damaged the Congress's fragile cover story. *Ramparts* magazine itself mentioned CCF only in passing, noting that its ostensible sponsor, the Farfield Foundation, had apparently received money from one of the foundations that had also funded known

²² "CIA Spies From 100 Miles Up; Satellites Probe Secrets of Soviet," *New York Times*, 27 April 1966, p. 1; (t)

²³ Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 222-223. (U)

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CIA clients.⁸⁷ American newspapers soon confirmed the existence of a link between Farfield and the CIA as they scrambled to catch up with *Ramparts'* scoop by investigating the various foundations named in the original article. The Congressional secretariat again issued its denials and disclaimers, but this time it seemed clear that CCF's cover had worn through. (U)

The atmosphere of speculation and hyperbole that surrounded the *Ramparts'* revelations caused still more trouble for the Agency by unnerving Farfield's board of directors. 25x1

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
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While the Agency worried about protecting Farfield, the now independent Congress for Cultural Freedom reeled under another blow—Thomas Braden's sensational article "I'm Glad the CIA Is 'Immoral,'" which hit the newsstands in May. Braden cheerfully explained the rationale behind CIA's 1952 creation of the International Organizations Division. He also divulged the Agency's placement of agents in the Congress secretariat and *Encounter's* editorial offices.⁸⁸ (U)

⁸⁷Sol Stern, "NSA: A Short Account of the International Student Politics & the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.," *Ramparts*, March 1967, p. 32. (U)

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⁸⁸Thomas W. Braden, "I'm Glad the CIA Is 'Immoral,'" *Saturday Evening Post*, 20 May 1967, p. 11. (U)



Tom Braden's 1967 article inadvertently prompted worldwide attacks on CCF. (U)

Wide World ©

Braden's testimony sparked criticism and debate around the world. Ugandan authorities jailed the editor of a Congress-affiliated journal as "a CIA agent." A CCF-affiliated editor in Japan saw his house firebombed. The Indian Government ordered an investigation of CCF. Arguments in Britain centered around *Encounter*; the magazine's British co-editor, Stephen Spender, one of the journal's founders, resigned in protest against CCF's links to the CIA. Although CCF's longtime allies, such as Sidney Hook, Arthur Schlesinger, Diana Trilling, and Daniel Bell stood by the Congress, American critics of CCF and several conservative members of the old American Committee had a field day. James Burnham lambasted Allen Dulles's strategy of wooing the fickle non-Communist left, while Christopher Lasch and others on the Left gloated over CCF's "corruption."¹¹ (U)

Michael Josselson and John Hunt offered their resignations to the Congress's General Assembly, admitting their CIA connections but claiming the Congress had always kept its independence and integrity. The Assembly merely "noted" the resignations, but publicly condemned the CIA while defending CCF's achievements. Unwitting leaders and associates of the Congress naturally felt torn in explaining themselves to

¹¹Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 228-231. (U)

the public. They faced two unpalatable alternatives. If they claimed to have suspected an official American hand in CCF, they opened themselves to the question of why they did not follow this hunch and investigate the Congress. At the same time, no one wanted to admit to having been naive enough to have never noticed anything odd about CCF's funding. This dilemma sapped the Congress's morale and led the Assembly to endorse sweeping reforms in September 1967. The Assembly named Shepard Stone as President and Chief Executive and rechristened CCF the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF). This time Josselson and Hunt resigned for good.⁹² (U)

Stone soon found that Michael Josselson's shoes were too big for him to fill. Richard Krygier, Secretary of the Congress's Australian affiliate, endorsed a description of Stone as "a non-ideological businessman who wants to run a successful enterprise." Krygier in 1969 seemed almost to miss the old disputes with Josselson:

. . . we have enjoyed much more freedom under Stone than before in the sense that before Mike [Josselson] & Company were concerned in our political outlook in the sense that we should not be too 'right wing' tough, etc. The new dispensation is quite different—they don't seem to give a damn.⁹³ (U)

The renamed International Association lived on for a few more years with Ford Foundation money. With Stone came a new team of leaders sharing a detached, "Parisian" attitude toward the struggle to uphold cultural freedom against Communism—precisely the haughty neutrality that had prompted CCF's founders to hold their original gathering in Berlin rather than Paris in that June of 1950. Although the International Association made occasional headlines under Stone, it lost its edge, and its principals seemed more interested in criticizing bourgeois Western society than Communist repression of thought and expression. (U)

Ford Foundation money ran out at the end of 1972, and Stone left as President in 1974. By the mid-1970s, the IACF was moribund, although it did not formally dissolve itself until early 1979.⁹⁴ The IACF's

⁹²Ibid., pp. 232-233. (U)

⁹³Richard Krygier to Sidney Hook, letters of 16 January and 3 March 1969, Hoover Institution, Sidney Hook Papers, box 124, folder 5. (U)

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 235-240. (U)