

In the meantime, Groves and Richard Stearns, the new international affairs vice president, sought to take full control over those NSA activities and personnel [REDACTED]. They informed NSA's overseas representatives that Association headquarters would now review *in advance* all travel plans and significant expenditures.¹¹⁸ Groves continued Sherburne's policy of appealing the draft notices of NSA staffers directly to the Selective Service's Presidential Appeals Board, [REDACTED]. Finally, NSA's new leadership intensified its efforts to find independent funding for the Association's international programs.¹¹⁹ (e)

The CIA's long relationship with NSA formally ended 25X1 [REDACTED]. Groves sensed that his [REDACTED] contacts were trying to hang on to the operation as long as possible in hopes of making new and friendlier contacts in NSA, but this was not to be.¹²¹ Unfortunately for both sides, events elsewhere had already acquired a momentum that could not be halted. (e)

The previous September, Groves had implemented additional economies in the hope of trimming NSA's budget deficit. As a consequence, Michael Wood lost his job as Director of Development. *Ramparts* later claimed that Wood decided around this time to use Sherburne's revelation to force the Association to cut its CIA ties.¹²² The truth may have been simpler: Wood apparently was retaliating against the people who had fired him.¹²³ Sometime in early autumn, Wood took a 50-page memo detailing what he knew to *Ramparts* magazine, which set to work investigating his story.¹²⁴ (U)

The CIA and NSA knew nothing about *Ramparts'* investigation until New Year's Day 1967, when Groves learned from antiwar activist and former NSA president Allard Lowenstein that the magazine was

¹¹⁸Eugene Groves and Richard Stearns to NSA Overseas Representatives, 5 October 1966, 25X1 [REDACTED]

¹¹⁹Robert Wame, Far East Bureau, Department of State, memorandum of conversation, "Interests of US National Student Association in Working in Viet-Nam," 25 October 1966, 25X1 [REDACTED]

¹²⁰NSA officer Richard Stearns later suggested that NSA's independent fundraising had been successful enough to reassure the Association's leaders that NSA could survive without CIA funds; Stearns, "We Were Wrong," p. 354. (?)

¹²¹Groves testimony, pp. 137-138, 147. (U)

¹²²Stem, "NSA," p. 36. (U)

¹²³Groves, "President's Report—Part I," p. 3. (U)

¹²⁴"The CIA and 'The Kiddies,'" *Newsweek*, 27 February 1967. (U)

editing an article on NSA's ties to the CIA. Groves and other NSA officers soon learned that Michael Wood was *Ramparts'* main source. Sherburne, by then a student at Harvard Law School, persuaded Wood to fly to Washington on 22 January, where he and Groves pleaded with Wood to retract his story. Sherburne and Groves had little concern about the potential damage to the CIA and its operations, but they wanted to minimize any repercussions for NSA, as well as to ensure the safety of NSA's exchange student in Poland, Roger Pulvers.¹²⁵ Wood apparently passed this information back to *Ramparts'* editors, who now worried that Groves and NSA might pre-empt the scheduled exposé by giving the story to another publication or by briefing the press themselves.¹²⁶ (U)

For the next three weeks Groves and *Ramparts* jockeyed to be the first to go public with the story of the covert relationship. Both needed a little more time. *Ramparts'* publication schedule forced its editors to sit on the news until mid-February; they also hoped to buttress the article against potential libel suits by wringing admissions from NSA's current officers. Groves sensed what *Ramparts* needed and he refused to cooperate.¹²⁷ As he considered various ways of revealing the CIA-NSA link to the public, Groves decided that NSA had to find some way to compel the US Government to acknowledge the existence of the covert relationship. (U)

Such an acknowledgment, Groves believed, would protect NSA's tax exemption and draft deferments and would leave the Association eligible for overt government and foundation grants in the future. Groves quietly sought advice from former NSA officers and sympathetic public figures such as the Rev. William Sloane Coffin at Yale. In Washington, he called on Senator J. William Fulbright and White House aide Douglass Cater, one of the founders of NSA.¹²⁸ On 8 February Groves flew to Europe to visit the ISC and meet with Roger Pulvers in London. Groves later claimed that he had bought a little extra time for Pulvers

¹²⁵Sherburne testimony, p. 100. Groves testimony, pp. 145-146. (U)

¹²⁶Groves, "President's Report—Part I," p. 5. Groves and other officers had confided in Lowenstein in November 1966, disclosing the fact of the CIA-NSA relationship and asking his advice about ending it; Harris, *Dreams Die Hard*, p. 159. (U)

¹²⁷Stern, "NSA," p. 37. (U)

¹²⁸Groves, "President's Report—Part I," pp. 5-6. Cord Meyer, Memorandum for the Record, "Conversation with Mr. S. Douglass Cater, Jr., Special Assistant to the President Re *Ramparts'* Article on Agency Connections with the US National Student Association (USNSA)," 25 January 1967.

by stonewalling a pair of *New Republic* writers (James Ridgeway and Andrew Kopkind) whom Michael Wood had tipped about the impending revelations.¹²⁹ (U)

During this time the Agency did what it could to minimize the impact of the impending *Ramparts* expose. ██████ knew nothing for certain about the story until 23 January, when ██████ Sherburne called to say that Michael Wood had been *Ramparts*' source. A few days later Sherburne admitted that he himself had leaked the information to Wood. It quickly became obvious that *Ramparts* had devoted considerable resources to the investigation. Contacts from around the country warned ██████ that *Ramparts* reporters had approached them, and that some of these journalists had mentioned that the investigation was co-sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a Washington think tank closely tied to the anti-war movement.¹³⁰ (U)

At the same time, *Ramparts* editor Robert Scheer did some research of his own. In late January he turned up in The Netherlands to meet with COSEC staffers. He went on to Prague to visit IUS headquarters—a fact omitted from the subsequent *Ramparts* article on NSA.¹³¹ The IUS presumably did what it could to corroborate Scheer's findings. 25x1

25x1

¹²⁹W. Eugene Groves, "NSA and the CIA: On People and Power," in Philip R. Werdell, editor, *The CIA and the Kiddies*, 1967 (this is a collection of reproduced articles and essays held at the Library of Congress; the Groves essay does not seem to have been published elsewhere). (U)

25X1

¹³¹Scheer subsequently admitted to columnist Carl Rowan that he had discussed NSA with IUS officials in Prague, but he insisted that IUS had not steered either himself or *Ramparts* in the NSA investigation; see Carl Rowan, "Miasma of Political Mistrust Grows," *Washington Star*, 24 February 1967. (U)

25X1

25X1

Eugene Groves reached his Rubicon on 13 February 1967. He had flown home from Europe the day before, satisfied that Roger Pulvers was safely out of Poland and that public disclosure would not do irreparable harm to NSA's sister student unions abroad.¹³⁵ *Ramparts*, upon learning through its own sources in NSA headquarters that a public statement was imminent, prepared a full-page advertisement trumpeting its scoop to run in the 14 February edition of the *New York Times*. Seeing the camera-ready ad laid out in the newsroom, *Times* reporter Neil Sheehan called NSA headquarters on the afternoon of the 13th and read it to Groves, who in turn called 25X1 with word that the hour of reckoning had come. 25X1

25X1

25X1

Groves thus gave the *New York Times* a story as big as the one uncovered by *Ramparts*—the first public acknowledgment by a CIA client of the Agency's role in supporting domestic anti-Communist organizations. While denying that NSA had performed intelligence missions for the CIA, Groves admitted that the Association's international program had received Agency funds since the early 1950s.¹³⁷ Scooped by

25X1

¹³⁵Groves, "President's Report—Part I," pp. 6-7. (U)

¹³⁷Neil Sheehan, "A Student Group Concedes it Took Funds from CIA," *New York Times*, 14 February 1967, p. 1. (U)

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1967.

[An Editorial Announcement]

In its March issue, Ramparts magazine will document how the CIA has infiltrated and subverted the world of American student leaders, over the past fifteen years.

It has used students to spy; it has used students to pressure international student organizations into taking Cold War positions; and it has interfered, in a most shocking manner, in the internal workings of the nation's largest and oldest student organization.*

The 10,000 word account of the operations of the CIA within America's largest student organization is a case study in the corruption of youthful idealism. It is also a singularly disquieting indication of the extent to which the government's secret intelligence apparatus wormed its way into American institutions.

The story in the March Ramparts also presents an amazing account of how the CIA bends so-called independent foundations to its clandestine financial purposes, using them as conduits for espionage money. Names are named and dollar amounts cited.

It is, additionally, the poignant story of the recent attempts by student leaders to throw off their financial shackles to the CIA, and of the highly-placed liberals in the government who tried—and failed—to help them.

Ramparts will dedicate this story to the tens of thousands of innocent American students who went abroad,

or worked hard in liberal student politics at home, unaware that their leaders had sold out their independence. When you read this extraordinary article, you will feel that the CIA owes the youth of this country an apology.

The demand for the March Ramparts is expected to be unusually heavy, so you may be well advised to ask your bookstore to reserve your copy now. If you wish, you may receive the March issue at this by entering a subscription at the special introductory rate listed below. Cash orders will receive, free, a copy of the February Ramparts on Robert Kennedy.

Also in the March Ramparts: A solid history and political evaluation of the U.S. in America's new system (with 11 pages of color photographs); the Soviet attack on John F. Kennedy; the recently laid claim of Mao's Panchen Lama; "The Death of A President"—the story behind the killing of John F. Kennedy; the CIA's role in the Vietnam War; the story behind the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King; the story behind the killing of Dr. King; the story behind the killing of Dr. King.



*Robert Kennedy in the White House, by Robert Kennedy, 1964. 12 pages, 12 color photographs.



*A solid history of the U.S. in America's new system, 11 pages, 11 color photographs.

Charge to Department _____
 Executive Director _____
 225 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038
 Please send me the March issue of Ramparts for \$2.00 (12 issues for \$18.00) plus shipping and handling charges of \$1.00. I will enclose a check for \$3.00 with this order.
 I understand that the March issue will contain the following articles:

Ramparts magazine's advertisement in the New York Times precipitated the initial disclosure. (1)

SECRET

the 14 February *Times*, the editors of *Ramparts* the following day released their own story early as "a public service." The magazine laid out a detailed and remarkably accurate sketch of the covert relationship. (U)

The Aftermath (U)

Reporters and editors across America grabbed the story immediately, barraging the Johnson administration with questions. The uproar quickly convinced the White House that a simple denial was futile. The administration later that same day had the Department of State issue a brief statement acknowledging that CIA "since 1952" had funded NSA's overseas activities as part of its efforts to offset Communist influence among unspecified foreign student groups, and adding that the President had ordered CIA to suspend its secret aid programs for student groups.¹³⁸ (U)

Groves' admission and the resulting publicity strained his relations with the NSA's headquarters staff, even though many members had known the gist of the *Ramparts* article for at least a week. The Association's National Supervisory Board immediately convened a three-day investigation (shifting its meeting room repeatedly to escape feared surveillance) and did its best to get to the bottom of the clandestine relationship. Groves, Sherburne, and other officers told almost everything they knew about the CIA's operations with NSA (while omitting a few names and details for fear of prosecution). Excited reporters hovered about, hoping that new tidbits would emerge from the Board meeting or NSA headquarters.¹³⁹ (U)

In commenting to the reporters who suddenly flocked around them, Association staffers seemed torn between the temptation to attribute the long relationship to the Agency's sinister blandishments and a contradictory desire to deny that the CIA had dictated plans and

¹³⁸Neil Sheehan, "Order by Johnson Reporting Ending CIA Student Aid," *New York Times*, 15 February 1967, p. 1. 25X1

25X1

¹³⁹Larry Rubin's "diary," released by the NSA-affiliated United States Student Press Association in mid-1967: 25X1

25X1

policies to a subservient NSA. On 16 February, Groves, Stearns, and Schwartz disclosed that six other private groups (all funded under HBEPITOME) had been CIA clients.¹⁴⁰ They named two of their Agency contacts—[redacted] and said the CIA had recruited other NSA members.¹⁴¹ The following day Sam Brown, speaking for the National Supervisory Board, publicly estimated that the Agency had provided 50 to 80 percent of NSA's budget in most years and accused the CIA of "trapping" NSA members into performing covert missions and placing them under "fantastic pressures" to keep quiet. The Board voted to suspend the credentials and freeze the funds of NSA's overseas representatives. It also promised to assist any official probe of the CIA's activities on campus.¹⁴² ~~(S)~~

The wave of public charges and the loud claims of violated innocence from current NSA staffers elicited disgust from the old team that had served in both NSA and CIA. In a final show of solidarity, 12 former NSA presidents signed a public letter admitting that they had wittingly worked with the Agency but asserting that they had exercised the "utmost vigilance and independence of judgment" in doing so. They told reporters they had no regrets about taking CIA money and quietly serving their country.¹⁴³ One of the signers of this letter, W. Dennis Shaul, separately defended the covert alliance: "If I were [NSA] president now, I would continue to accept CIA funds. CIA had nothing to do with how the money was spent; there were no strings on us."¹⁴⁴ (U)

The statement by the former NSA presidents probably helped calm the uproar, which had already begun to abate when Sen. Robert F. Kennedy quashed speculation that the student and youth programs had been a rogue CIA initiative. Pressed for comment on the affair by reporters, Senator Kennedy stated publicly that the Agency had informed him and President Kennedy of the operation.¹⁴⁵ Cord Meyer later claimed that this statement had taken much of the momentum out of the scandal.¹⁴⁶ (U)

¹⁴⁰The groups were the International Student Conference, the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, the Independent Research Service, the World Assembly of Youth, the United States Youth Council, and the Independence Foundation. Only Arthur A. Houghton, president of FYSA, admitted that his organization had cooperated with "the Government." Neil Sheehan, "Funds Identified as Go-Betweens," *New York Times*, 16 February 1967, p. 26. (U)

¹⁴¹Sheehan, "Funds Identified as Go-Betweens." (U)

¹⁴²The NSB's 17 February statement was republished by Philip Werdell in "The CIA and the Kiddies." (U)

¹⁴³Steven V. Roberts, "Ex-Student Aides Defend Subsidies," *New York Times*, 26 February 1967, p. 2. The signatories were (in chronological order of their presidencies): William Dentzer, James Edwards, Harry Linn, Stan Glass, Harold Bakken, Ray Farabee, Robert Kiley, Donald Hoffman, Richard Rettig, Edward Garvey, Dennis Shaul, and Greg Gallo. (U)

¹⁴⁴"The Silent Service," p. 15. See also Shaul's comments in "We Were Right," pp. 233, 362. (U)

¹⁴⁵"Kennedy Lays CIA Financing to Executive Decisions," *New York Times*, 22 February 1967, p. 17. (U)

¹⁴⁶Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality*, p. 89. (U)

NSA's resentment toward the CIA was exacerbated by actions taken by other government agencies—actions that some NSA staffers understandably but mistakenly believed the Agency had instigated.¹⁴⁷ Shortly after the *Ramparts* story broke, the Presidential Appeals Board of the Selective Service denied NSA's appeal for "occupational" draft deferments for six Association staffers (who thus remained in "1-A" status).¹⁴⁸ A few days later, the Internal Revenue Service revoked the Association's tax-exempt status. The timing of the two rulings looked suspicious. The announcements may indeed have been prompted by the 14 February revelations, but both agencies had been preparing these decisions for some time. General Hershey, under pressure to fill rising draft quotas, resented the antidraft resolution passed by the NSA Congress in August 1966.¹⁴⁹ The IRS had begun its review of NSA's tax-exempt status in 1965 when the Association changed its incorporation to the District of Columbia. Indeed, conservatives and Southern segregationists had complained for years that NSA was playing politics and did not deserve tax-exempt status.¹⁵⁰ (e)

For a few weeks it looked as though the bitterness and mutual suspicions which the *Ramparts* article spawned might well destroy the Association. NSA's New Left minority faction—aided by sympathetic and detailed articles in the *New Republic* and the *Village Voice*—tried to use the crisis as an opportunity to re-direct the organization's policies.¹⁵¹ Groves and his fellow officers fended off the left by deliberately antagonizing the CIA 25X1 Emotionally scarred by the weeks of arguments and accusations, Groves and Sherburne turned actively hostile toward the CIA, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and even calling for a Congressional

¹⁴⁷One alleged reprisal angered Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Before the flap hit the media, Philip Sherburne had retained as his attorney Roger Fisher, professor of law at Harvard. Fisher confirmed to Senator Fulbright that an Agency officer had contacted him in early February to urge that Sherburne be advised to deny the NSA-CIA tie when the story broke (Fisher refused to pass such advice). The CIA man, whom Fisher did not name, assured Fisher that Sherburne would not be prosecuted but also asserted that he was behaving irrationally and might be mentally unbalanced. See Roger Fisher to Sen. J. William Fulbright, 15 March 1967, attached to the Groves and Stearnes testimony. Sherburne's account of the incident, and Fulbright's reaction, can be read in Sherburne testimony, pp. 122-123. (U)

¹⁴⁸Groves testimony, p. 151. (U)

25X1

¹⁴⁹Lewis, "The 1967 Crisis in Covert Action Operations," p. 146 (Secret). (U)

¹⁵¹The articles in question were "Playing it Straight," *New Republic*, 4 March 1967; and Bob Ross and Todd Gitlin, "The CIA at College: Into Twilight and Back," *Village Voice*, March 1967. (U)

probe.¹⁵² The Association broke its ties to the US Youth Council (the American representative in the World Assembly of Youth) and threatened to do the same with the International Student Conference unless the ISC purged itself of all CIA affiliations.¹⁵³ (U)

Tempers in NSA cooled, however, as its officers reasserted control over the organization. Shortly before the NSA Congress in August, Groves strengthened the Association's moderate leadership by announcing an advantageous (for NSA) outcome to the negotiations over the Association's Washington headquarters. The CIA obviously could not honor its agreement to subsidize a 15-year rent-free lease for NSA after President Johnson's order to halt all subsidies to American student groups. DDP Desmond FitzGerald hoped to "force NSA's hand," compelling the Association either to buy the building or vacate the premises.¹⁵⁴ But CIA had little leverage after NSA officers in June stated that the Association regarded the lease as "iron-clad"; Agency officials hardly wanted to file an embarrassing lawsuit that would convict NSA and quite possibly kill the Association in the bargain.¹⁵⁵ Sensing their advantage, NSA officers in early August offered to assume the existing mortgage—an arrangement that gave them title to the building at a price tag of about half its current value.¹⁵⁶ (S)

Despite an initially gloomy outlook, NSA survived its break with CIA. The NSA Congress that met at the University of Maryland in August 1967 heard loud complaints about the NSA leadership's aloofness and elitism, but delegates resisted pressures for a radical turn and elected Ed Schwartz to succeed Gene Groves as president. The Association's membership ironically increased from 330 colleges to 354 in the months after the scandal broke, and NSA found funding from the State Department, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the National Mental Health Institute, and later picked up various foundation grants.¹⁵⁷ NSA lurched further leftward during the height of the antiwar protests in the early 1970s, but turned back toward a more moderate course a few years later. In 1978 it absorbed several smaller student organizations and changed its name to the United States Student Association. As such, it

25X1

¹⁵² Herbert H. Denton, "CIA Tries to Oust Student Tenants From Their Rent-Free Headquarters," *Washington Post*, 25 June 1967. (U)

¹⁵³ "Students to Cut Last Tie to CIA," *New York Times*, 12 August 1967, p. 1. 25X1

25X1

still represents more than 400 member schools, but its Washington headquarters is now smaller and has moved from its S Street townhouses to a downtown suite on K Street, NW. (U)

Conclusion (U)

The covert relationship between the National Student Association and the Central Intelligence Agency began as a joint effort to ensure that the International Student Conference could be an effective rival to the Communist-dominated International Union of Students. CIA gave NSA roughly \$3.5 million through FY 1966 for this purpose.¹³ *Ramparts'* revelations wrecked this effort and fatally damaged the ISC, which disintegrated in April 1969. (U)

The ISC's rival, the Communist-dominated International Union of Students, survived its own troubles and emerged from the 1960s as the unchallenged colossus of world student groups. The IUS remained strong into the 1980s, cooperating with Western and Third World students on some issues and squabbling with them on others, but it too eventually fell victim to political shifts of a different order. In late 1991 the new democratic government of Czechoslovakia took steps to expel several Communist-controlled fronts that had aided and abetted the totalitarian regime in Prague. The IUS was among them. Although IUS survived this challenge and remains in Prague, it is a shadow of its former self. Its website talks of financial woes, and IUS apparently had trouble sending officers to the 14th World Youth and Students Festival in Havana in 1997. The US Student Association was not then a member of IUS. (U)

The fates of the ISC and the IUS provide some perspective on the secret CIA-NSA alliance. The Central Intelligence Agency never controlled the National Student Association. The Association's elected officers originally cooperated with the Agency to fight the Communist threat to other student organizations, and both parties soon found independent reasons to maintain the covert relationship. 25X1

25X1


25X1

CIA subsidies (as long as they remained secret) bought prestige and influence for NSA's national officers, enabling them

25X1

to perform what most regarded as a patriotic mission. This alliance dissolved, however, when the Association abandoned the anti-Communist liberalism that still pervaded the Agency—that is, when the relationship's costs began to outweigh the benefits to both sides. (C)

25X1



This divergence of outlooks 25X1

25X1 manifested itself in the growing friction and distrust that marked CIA-NSA relations after 1963. The older [redacted] maintaining a strong sense of loyalty to NSA, to the cause of international student relations, and to American foreign policies, contended that they had not let the CIA subjugate NSA. In 1967, one former NSA president told the *New York Times* that he used to advise strong-willed people to run for NSA offices so that the CIA would not finally find someone it could "run all over."¹⁵⁹ (C)

In contrast, after 1963 the new breed of NSA officers did not share this sense of the imperative to fight Communism. They also, ostensibly, set a higher priority on honesty and the integrity of relationships with friends, colleagues, and constituents. NSA's alliance with CIA, which required clandestine work with and for the government, they felt, ultimately poisoned that honesty and integrity. To NSA staffers such as Michael Wood, it seemed the US Government was trying to promote

¹⁵⁹Steven V. Roberts, "Move to End CIA Tie Held Reflection of New Campus Views," *New York Times*, 17 February 1967, p. 16. (U)

democracy abroad by anti-democratic means at home.¹⁶⁰

~~25X1~~

Dennis Shaul looked back in August 1967 to see that the new NSA leaders represented "an altogether different student generation than the one six—or even three—years ago."¹⁶¹

~~25X1~~

~~25X1~~

~~25X1~~

(S)

¹⁶⁰Wood testimony, p. 36. (U)
¹⁶¹Shaul, "We Were Right," p. 306. (U)

Chapter Four

A Hidden Policy

The American Friends of the Middle East (S)

The CIA's relationship with the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) differed in several respects from the other projects described in this study. AFME was anti-Communist, to be sure, but its main mission was a specifically regional one. 25X1

25X1



25X1



Origins (U)

Kermit Roosevelt Jr. in the 1940s moved in a very small circle of Americans—the relative handful who knew and loved the Middle East. Grandson of one president and cousin of another, “Kim” had taught history before the war, worked under William Langer in the Research & Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and then

25X1



~~Secret~~

122

~~SECRET~~

served as an aide to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Later he worked with Stephen Penrose Jr. in the OSS station in Cairo, gathering agent reports from all over the Near East.² After the war Roosevelt helped draft the official history of OSS and then left the government to concentrate on writing and speaking on Middle Eastern affairs. (U)

During the war Stephen Penrose—and probably Kermit Roosevelt as well—had encountered an ambitious proposal for softening elite Arab opinion toward the United States. In early 1943 an OSS officer, Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, a textile company executive and a distant relative of the Dulles family, visited the Near East and subsequently tried to convince the US Government of the need for overt and covert programs aimed at spreading goodwill in the Arab world.³ Hoskins shared the concern of many American officials that the Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine could turn Arabs against America, but his specific policy suggestions—such as the notion that Washington should support a Jewish state in Italian Cyrenaica (modern-day Libya)—seem to have met with skepticism.⁴ OSS Director William Donovan declined to endorse Hoskins' ideas and did not authorize his several briefings of Congressmen and Department of State officials. Nevertheless, Penrose (and OSS' Secret Intelligence Branch) believed that Hoskins' proposal for influencing Arab religious and economic leaders merited consideration.⁵ (U)

Hoskins' plan foundered on the exigencies of the wartime Anglo-American alliance. British officials had cooperated with Hoskins during his tour of the Near East, but British diplomats and intelligence liaison officials in Washington were not amused when OSS officers indiscreetly asked their opinion of Hoskins' actual proposals. Hoskins argued that the Arabs were antagonistic toward British rule, but still respected the United States, which had no imperial past in the region. London seems to have found it impolitic, at the least, for Americans to be asking for British comment on the notion of an expanded American influence among Arabs living under British authority.⁶ (U)

²Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 125. (U)

³For an overview of Hoskins' activities and plan, see *Ibid.* (U)

⁴Harold B. Hoskins, Special Operations Branch, OSS, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, "The Present Situation in the Near East," 20 April 1943, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226, Entry 180, microfilm roll 110, (declassified). (U)

⁵For Donovan's reaction and the ultimate fate of Hoskins' scheme, see William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services, to Inspector General, OSS, "Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins," 16 June 1943, (declassified). Stephen Penrose Jr., Secret Intelligence Branch, to Whitney Shephardson, Chief, Secret Intelligence Branch, "Consensus of Desk Opinion on Colonel Hoskins' Report of January 14, 1943," 26 January 1943, (declassified). Both documents are at National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 226, Entry 180, microfilm roll 110. (U)

⁶Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Baker Street Irregular* (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 135-137. (U)

The postwar dispute over Jewish emigration to the Holy Land revived questions of America's stature in the Middle East. Kermit Roosevelt soon joined the public debate. An outspoken opponent of Zionism and critic of President Truman's support for a Jewish state, Roosevelt co-founded the short-lived Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land to oppose the partition of Palestine. Although the Committee folded when the state of Israel won its independence in 1948, several of its members and supporters continued to write and speak on the Palestine issue. More than a few committee members were friends of Kermit Roosevelt, and they would go on to become the early leaders of the American Friends of the Middle East. These people included retired Barnard College dean Virginia Gildersleeve, the Rev. Dr. Garland Evans Hopkins, diplomat Harold B. Minor, and two consultants to the Arab-American Oil Company (Aramco), James Terry Duce and William A. Eddy.⁷ (U)

Kermit Roosevelt subsequently explained his views in his book *Arabs, Oil and History* (1949). America had overlooked and misunderstood "the Orient," he complained, and he dedicated his volume to

my friends in all parts of the Middle East, with affection and hope for success in their labors to build better societies. I have written with the conviction that understanding between the Middle East and America is vital to both. Each has much to offer, and to learn.

Americans, according to Roosevelt, had to recognize that Arabs regarded Washington's talk about democracy and self-determination as hypocritical as long as America allied itself with the French and British empires and indulged Israel (which Roosevelt called the region's "newest so-called democracy"). Moscow was just waiting for the withdrawal of the Western imperial powers and the likely failure of American leadership. Such a failure was inevitable, said Roosevelt, if Washington did not recognize that its interest lay in nurturing the indigenous humanistic values of the region rather than imposing political and social ideas that had developed in specifically Western contexts. Washington's assessment of Palestine particularly vexed Roosevelt, who argued that Congress, the White House, and the news media had all been swayed by aggressive Zionist propaganda. While acknowledging that both the Arabs and the

⁷L.L. Kenen, "Arab Propaganda: Line and Apparatus," *Near East Report*, October 1964, pp. 13-15.



Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. joined OPC in 1949. (U)

Chase Studios ©

Zionists had a measure of justice on their sides. Roosevelt complained that Americans who had tried to engage in responsible debate over the nation's Palestine policy had been tarred by unfounded charges of anti-Semitism. As a result, he contended, America had weakened its friends in the region—moderate Jews as well as progressive Arabs—and now had no coherent policy for the Middle East.⁸ (U)

⁸Kermit Roosevelt, *Arabs, Oil and History: The Story of the Middle East* (New York: Harper & Row, 1949), pp. 260-262, 256-271. (U)

Roosevelt's thoughts on Palestine hardly broke new ground. Many American diplomatic and military leaders had quietly opposed President Truman's recognition of Israel. Anti-Semitism was not the principal root of this opposition, which stemmed rather from the belief that the Jewish immigrants in Palestine were hopelessly outnumbered by their Arab foes, and that American support for the quixotic ideal of a Jewish state needlessly provoked Arab anger, could endanger Western oil supplies, and might enable Moscow to gain new influence in the region. President Truman and his advisers might also have conceded the truth of Kermit Roosevelt's complaint that Zionism's proponents could (and did) bring significant public pressure to bear on American leaders even though many American Jews had not made up their own minds about the wisdom of a Jewish state in Palestine.⁹ (U)

At roughly the same time that he finished *Arabs, Oil and History*, Roosevelt applied for a position with Frank Wisner's new Office of Policy Coordination and began working as a consultant while the CIA processed his paperwork. By this point he seems to have been one of a number of American officials who concluded that US policies—and perhaps some US diplomats as well—had become entirely too friendly toward the new state of Israel. Wisner's deputy, Merritt Ruddock, received and carefully filed a letter written by a "Mrs. Kimball" discussing the attitudes of prominent Americans in Beirut in that March of 1949:

Mrs. Bowie took me for an Hour's drive and to her apartment, up five flights of stairs. Her husband, K. Roosevelt, Sands—all [American] Legation people there. [Stephen] Penrose came here for supper with me and all cocktailing in the bar with the Roosevelts. Met a Frenchman of the Peace Commission trying to settle things with Israel—Lebanon, etc. Jews won't sign anything, want everything. Everybody is mad and exhausted with them. They laid waste one village—women, men, children a la [L]idice only bigger and it has never been in the newspapers. No one understands why the Jews are given an Embassy—indeed everything just so Arabs are insulted. [James G.] McDonald is now Ambassador and so pro-Jew he allowed the CIA man who was on the track of

⁹For the Truman administration's debates over Israel, see Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Volume 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 149-165; Clark Clifford, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 3-25. (U)

Russian spies to be recalled. All of this I get from Steve. I asked him to write all he could to Wiz or Merritt, it will be the truth told better than I can tell it secondhand [spelling and punctuation in original].¹⁰ (U)

Soon after this meeting in Beirut, Kermit Roosevelt proposed an OPC psychological warfare project to exacerbate "the fundamental conflict between the world of Islam and Soviet Communism." Roosevelt's idea resembled Lt. Col. Hoskins' plan of 1943, with Communism substituted for fascism as the alien ideology supposedly on the verge of gaining new adherents in the Near East. 25x1

25x1

25x1

Some-
one in OPC wrote up Roosevelt's idea 25x1, but nothing was done to implement it.^{12(s)}

Roosevelt himself modified the plan after he joined OPC full-time in November 1949. The following April he drafted another proposal for an 25X1 a program of action breathtaking in its scope and ambitiousness. With some well-placed agents and timely propaganda, Roosevelt argued, OPC could exploit the "latent religious fervor of the Orient" and convince people from North Africa to Japan that their prophets and holy men had seen anti-Communist visions and portents. "The atmosphere is right for a new revelation," one that could unite the peoples of the East, perhaps even under a combined leadership, in a common struggle against atheistic Communism. OPC could set this plan in motion by creating a small steering group 25X1 for detailed information on Eastern doctrines and customs. Scouts would find and recruit "live talent" in the field, the OPC-inspired

¹⁰"Extracts from letters from Mrs. Kimball," 24 March 1949, Information Management Staff Job 78-04938R, box 1, folder 1 (Unclassified). Mrs. Kimball may well have been Hazel Monona Kimball, wife of the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Administration Arthur A. Kimball. Stephen Penrose had moved on from OSS to serve as President of the American University of Beirut. (U)

25X1

visions would begin to come, propaganda operations would promote the strange "signs," and soon a wave of imitators would surge forward to confirm the new revelation.¹³ (U)

With Frank Wisner's apparently puzzled endorsement, Roosevelt's newly created Near East and Africa Division (NEA) set to work on [REDACTED] but progress was slow.¹⁴ Roosevelt noted in October 1950 that any project of such magnitude had to proceed carefully, adding that NEA had taken only preliminary steps toward "the creation of an Islamic cultural organization for cover purposes."¹⁵ This interim step would become the American Friends of the Middle East: in February 1951 NEA resolved to concentrate first on Islamic anti-Communism, waiting until later to apply the lessons learned to similar projects among the other Eastern faiths.¹⁶ (S)

Additional impetus soon came from the White House in the form of NSC 47/5 (approved by President Truman on 17 March 1951), which proposed to reverse the regional trend toward neutralism by strengthening several Arab states (and Israel) to make them more resistant to Soviet designs. NSC 47/5 did not mention covert action as such, but it did call for an expanded and intensified psychological effort. OPC planners understood this to apply to themselves.¹⁷ (S)

Early in 1951 NEA began organizing "a committee of persons interested in the cultural and spiritual aspects of Middle Eastern affairs." The committee would serve as the 25X1

25X1

Roosevelt soon

reunited his team 25X1

25X1

joined by journalist and pundit Dorothy Thompson, who had recently returned from a tour of the Middle East

25X1

25X1 The NSC gave a similarly general endorsement in NSC 29/1 the next year; see "United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Arab States and Israel," 24 April 1952, in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IX, The Near and Middle East, Part I* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 224. (Unclassified)

25X1

(underwritten by the Department of State). Thompson had advised OSS chief William Donovan on Germany during the war, and in 1946 she became interested in the Palestine issue. She applied the same gritty independence to this controversy that she employed in all of her writings on world affairs, refusing to back away from controversy even after the *New York Post* dropped her "On the Record" column because of her opposition to Zionism.¹⁹ (S)


In May 1951, [REDACTED] Thompson hosted a meeting of Middle East experts in her New York City apartment.²⁰ Most of those present signed on to become charter members of a new, nonprofit organization to be called the American Friends of the Middle East, 25X1

25X1

25X1 Full-page ads in the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*
25X1 soon announced the group's formation and solicited

new members. (S)

25X1




According to the ZRTINDER project proposal, no American groups in the region were opposing the Communists or presenting the United States in a favorable light. NEA wanted to convince Islam of the need for ecumenical unity against Communism, and to foster "a broader understanding among the American public of the importance of the area and of its

¹⁹Peter Kurth, *American Cassandra: The Life of Dorothy Thompson* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1990), pp. 331, 359, 382-385. Marion K. Sanders, *Dorothy Thompson: A Legend in Her Time* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 335. (U)

25X1





Columnist Dorothy Thompson was one of AFME's most prominent early members. (U)

©

spiritual and cultural values." AFME would pass itself off as a private, non-profit organization dedicated to demonstrating the interest and friendliness of America and its people. 25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1



AFME's Early Years (#)

By the end of 1951, the American Friends of the Middle East was off and running. AFME opened its New York headquarters on East 57th Street with Dorothy Thompson as President. She soon hired Kermit Roosevelt's friend Garland Hopkins, who had become an associate editor of the *Christian Century*, to run AFME's affairs as its Executive Vice President. 25X1

25X1



25X1





Clergyman and writer Garland Evans Hopkins brought energy and controversy to AFME. (U)

25X1

AFME's Executive Vice President, Garland Hopkins, the chance to make a name for his young organization. Energetic and enthusiastic, Hopkins constantly suggested plans and initiatives to AFME's board [REDACTED]

25X1 He had long taken a partisan line on the Palestine issue, convincing officials in the United States and Israel that his sympathies lay with the Arabs.²² (S)

Under Hopkins's direction, AFME undertook a bewildering variety of activities, many of them dedicated to enhancing understanding between Christian and Muslim commentators. The organization produced pamphlets and films; sent prominent Americans and Arabs on exchange visits; opened overseas offices where it advised foreign students interested in studying in the United States; sponsored lecture tours,

²²US Embassy Tel Aviv cable 140, 7 June 1949. (S)