

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2014-100, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 01, 2017

Kissinger

a. Showed great concern lest we plan to spring a completed package on the NSC without careful HK review and participation.

We reassured him: We will review our work with him about Oct. 1. We aim for an NSC meeting in December.

b. Concentrated his entire interest on employment policy, scenarios, options available to President, etc. Put aside with virtually no comment issues of declaratory policy or acquisition policy or what we communicate to our allies. I gather he feels all those questions are subsequent and subordinate to working out proper employment policy.

c. Felt President, after inauguration, should spend about two days in thorough review and consideration of nuclear employment options available to him in various plausible scenarios, and of their consequences, so that he understands these things "in his bones." Felt the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should be even more thoroughly and continuously familiar with these options and scenarios. Felt that at each decision point in the scenario they had to understand what the next decision point would be.

d. Asserted that no President, "not even this one," would ever make the decision to use any of the present SIOP options. Said he had no doubt that a President, "at least this one," would be willing to take seriously the use of a nuclear option in Europe if he had a realistic option, namely one which does not do so little damage that it only serves to tempt the other side to escalate, but one which hurts the other side seriously, yet can be kept under control. Said the President would want to be a bold player, presenting the other side with tough choices.

e. Said the President's strategy has been (in the Mid-East crisis, in Vietnam, etc.) to "push so many chips into the pot" that the other side will think we may be "crazy" and might really go much further.

f. Said he agreed that our strategy must be to prevent escalation. He agreed that theatre and strategic weapons must be treated together in a common policy. He agreed with all the objectives and principles John Foster recited. But he said he could not get ahold of it until we showed him what it meant concretely and how it was to be done.

g. Asked for explicit examination of the scenario in which the Soviets "jump" the Chinese, and the President wants to "do something." Also a European scenario. Also a Mid-East scenario. Asked to have these by October 1.

Downgraded to Secret
Date: 12-1-2017
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended
Date: 11 Dec 2008
OSD F.S. 213 - Other Agency Equival: TBD
Review/Declassify On: 30 Dec 2033

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12-M-2597-A1

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

- h. Asked how much we could get done by October 1st.
John Foster said
- (1) Analysis of the recovery problem,
 - (2) Analysis of the practicality of the targeting called for,
 - (3) Some scenarios and options analysis.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE