JCS SENDS

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR

REF: JCSM-270-69, 2. MAY 69 [ATTACHMENT TO JCS 177(b)/6/7]

1. THIS THE REFERENCE PROVIDED CONTINGENCY PLANS TO SECDEF FOR AIRFIELD TARGETS. IN ADDITION TO CONSIDERATION OF THESE PLANS INTEREST HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN ONE ADDITIONAL OPTION INVOLVING A LIMITED NUMBER OF B-52S, POSSIBLY 2 OR 3, AGAINST A SINGLE MILITARY TARGET, PROBABLY AN AIRFIELD.

2. IT IS DESIRED THAT A PLAN BE PREPARED FOR ATTACK OF AIRFIELD OF YOUR CHOICE USING NOT REPEAT NOT TO EXCEED 3 B-52S.
THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING THE PLAN:

A. PURPOSE OF THE ATTACK WOULD BE [REDACTED]

B. [REDACTED]

C. THERE WOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT TO RENDER THE AIRFIELD INOPERATIVE OVER A SUSTAINED PERIOD. DESIRE IS TO INFLECT A REASONABLE LEVEL OF DAMAGE WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE.

D. STRIKE WOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH MAXIMUM TACTICAL SURPRISE AND MINIMUM PROBABILITY OF SUSTAINING FRIENDLY LOSSES.

E. MINIMUM IMPACT ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS DESIRED.
1. A minimum reaction time from a day to day posture with no prior warning is desired.

2. The plan should also include the rationale for the selection of the target airfield you choose.

3. This plan is needed by 0800 EST, 13 May 1969.

GP-1
TO: CINCPAC
CINCSAC

INFO: CINCPACAF
CINCPACFLT
DINSA

SUBJECT: RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS [U]

1. [U] REFS A AND B PROVIDE OPERATIONAL AND RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY. REF C CONTAINS CINCPAC COMMENTS ON RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.

2. [U] CONDUCT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS AT THE FREQUENCY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS ALONG THE COASTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA, AND THE USSR IN THE SEA OF JAPAN. FLIGHTS WILL
MAINTAIN A CPA OF TO THE COAST OF CHINA TO THE COAST OF THE USSR, AND WILL BE FLOWN UP TO THESE CPAS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE INTELLIGENCE RETURN CONSISTENT WITH THESE CPA RESTRICTIONS. RISK CATEGORY FOR CHINA REMAINS AS SPECIFIED IN REF B.

3. FIGHTER ESCORT/CAP WILL NOT BE REQUIRED EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN REF A. HOWEVER, MAXIMUM STRIP ALERT PROTECTION WILL BE PROVIDED WHEREVER FEASIBLE, AND WARNING PLANS ARE REQUIRED. GP 3.
IMMEDIATE

FROM: JCS
TO: CINCPAC

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENT - CHINA

REFS: A. JCS 8414/031714Z MAY 69; B. CINCPAC

052006Z MAY 69

1. REF A REQUESTED THE PREPARATION OF A TWO-OPTION PLAN FOR THE CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. REF B LISTED THE TARGETS SELECTED FOR THE PLANNING REQUESTED IN REF A.

2. TWO ADDITIONAL TARGETS LISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED HERE AS RELATED TO THE CHINESE NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPABILITY:

A. 
B. 

8701

052006Z IS JCS IN 70707

50XS, E.O.13526
3. INFORMATION IS DESIRED AS TO WHETHER THESE TARGETS WERE CONSIDERED IN YOUR TARGET SELECTION AND IF NOT WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED. GP-1
TOP SECRET - NOFORN - LIMDIS - IVY TREE

JCS 8232

J-3 SENDS

SUBJ: TASK FORCE OPERATIONS (U)

REF: JCS 8095/2922332 APR 69

1. TSZ REFERENCE REQUESTED MOVEMENT OF A GCI CAPABLE SHIP WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING SHIPS TO THE SEA OF JAPAN FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

2. TSZ THE GCI CAPABLE AND SUPPORTING SHIPS WILL REMAIN OUTSIDE THE FOLLOWING AREA:

THAT AREA INSIDE A LINE DRAWN FROM THE USSR COASTLINE SOUTH ALONG THE 132 DEGREE MERIDIAN TO 4100N; THENCE WEST ALONG THE 41 DEGREE PARALLEL
TO A POINT 50 NM FROM THE NORTH KOREAN COASTLINE.
THENCE ALONG A LINE 50 NM FROM THE SOVEREIGN
TERRITORY OF NORTH KOREA AND TERMINATING AT THE
EAST SIDE OF THE SOUTH KOREAN COASTLINE AT A
POINT 50 NM SOUTH OF THE KOREAN DMZ. GP-3
T O P S E C R E T  S P E C A T  E X C L U S I V E
S P E C A T  E X C L U S I V E  F O R  G E N  B O N E S T E E L
I N F O  G E N  W H E E L E R  F R O M  A D M  M C C A I N