## Summary of Civil Disturbance Planning and Policies for the Washington Metropolitan Area

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The following summarizes the plans and policies for civil disturbance in the Washington metropolitan area developed by the special task force (attachment 1) appointed by the Secretary of Defense for this purpose:

I. Basic Policies

The plans which have been developed are based on the following principles:

1. Maximum application of manpower and minimum application of force, rather than vice versa. We want to avoid an indiscriminate-use-of-firepower approach while at the same time snuffing out the disturbance and providing sufficient forces to meet demands for special protection for embassies, federal buildings, etc.

2. Early alert of military forces in and for the District of Columbia. This is designed to put us in a position to bring a large amount of manpower to bear quickly.

3. Simultaneous rather than sequential commitment of the D. C. National Guard and first echelon active military forces in the District of Columbia. This is also designed to bring a large amount of manpower to bear quickly.

4. Initial reliance on the Governors of Maryland and Virginia if the disturbance starts in their states, with prearranged options for state action at Federal request if the disturbance originates in the District of Columbia. This is designed to overcome the fact that the disturbance may be no respecter of boundaries and at the same time to recognize the normal federal/state relationship.

5. Clear command and control relationships.

II. Forces Available

In the District of Columbia, approximately 800 Metropolitan and Park police would be available on a twelve-hour shift basis for concentration in areas of civil disturbance. In Virginia and Maryland the number of state, county, and municipal police which would be available for riot control in the Virginia and Maryland portions of greater Washington is 700-800 and 500-600 respectively. Virginia believes its police can probably handle any disturbance; Maryland is more likely to commit its National Guard forces early.
Relevant D. C. National Guard troops total about 1,700. Virginia and Maryland have earmarked about 1,400 and 1,500 National Guard troops respectively for civil disturbance control in their portions of the greater Washington area.

The first echelon of active forces (Army and Marine) totals about 5,000, most of them located in or near the Washington area; this force is called "Task Force Inside". The second echelon of active forces includes up to 15,000 troops and is designated "Task Force 101". The total forces are designated "Task Force Washington". At least 80% of the military forces would probably be available for concentration in riot areas; the remainder will have static protection and comparable missions. Insofar as relevant and possible troops will substitute for police forces where that will permit increased allocation of policemen to riot areas.

A tabulation of forces available and their reaction times is appended to this memorandum (attachment 2).

III. Alert, Assembly, and Commitment of Forces

(a) Civilian police forces should be relied upon as long as feasible for riot control. However, doubts as to the size and timing of commitment of military forces should be resolved in favor of larger size and quicker commitment than might be appropriate elsewhere. As the nation's capitol and an object of intense international interest, Washington can afford even less than other U. S. cities a serious or prolonged civil disturbance. Furthermore, the District of Columbia, where civil disturbance is most likely to begin, is wholly under federal control and hence there are fewer political and jurisdictional barriers to the prompt use of riot-control forces of all types. Finally, there are likely to be unpredictable but heavy demands for protection for embassies, members of Congress, federal buildings, etc. which must be honored without strict attention to actual need.

(b) Early decision to alert and assemble D. C. National Guard and Active Army units is highly desirable in order to be in a position to bring large forces to bear quickly if that should prove necessary. Four to six hours can be saved by this action without involving a decision to commit the forces involved. Alert and assembly do not require any Presidential proclamation or other formal action; the D. C. National Guard troops involved would remain in non-federal status until committed.
In the case of the earmarked Maryland and Virginia National Guard forces, an alert/assembly simultaneous with that of D. C. forces may or may not be desirable depending on the circumstances. Its achievement will in any event depend on whether we are willing to request alert action of the respective governors. We have, of course, no power to enforce such a request short of federalizing the Md./Va. Guard, but the Governors have agreed to comply with such a request, as well as any further request to commit their units.

(c) For the reasons given in (a) above, the D. C. National Guard and first echelon of Army forces should be alerted and, if later necessary, committed in the District of Columbia at approximately the same time rather than sequentially. (Commitment of further active forces would depend on the situation, but they should be alerted no later than the time first echelon forces are committed.) Accordingly, the D. C. National Guard should, if mobilized, be in federal status from the outset. This will avoid confusion in command arrangements, provide the flexibility to use the Guard across the D. C. line if necessary, and avoid the applicability of the very inadequate D. C. personal protection laws (life insurance, etc.) to the Guardsmen. Only those units of the Guard which could reasonably contribute to riot control will be mobilized.

(d) In Maryland and/or Virginia, on the other hand, no active military forces will be committed unless the Governor has previously mobilized appropriate National Guard units and an appropriate request is received from the Governor for active forces. The National Guard units will be federalized before or at the time of commitment of active forces to Maryland or Virginia in order to centralize operational control over all forces in the Washington metropolitan area. However, use of the Md./Va. National Guard forces within the District of Columbia will not be permitted without special authority. Further, in the event no active forces are committed to Maryland or Virginia, we may be able to leave the Guard forces in state status since both Governors have tentatively agreed to put their forces, while in state status, under federal operational control if the civil disturbance disregards the District boundary.
(e) The first critical decision point involves alerting of National Guard and Active forces. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia are responsible for initiating a recommendation to the President on this question. They are also responsible for initiating any subsequent recommendation to the President with respect to commitment of military forces in the District. Except for Maryland and Virginia National Guard troops while in State status, no alert or commitment decision will be made without Presidential approval. In Maryland and Virginia, alert and commitment decisions with respect to the National Guard rest, of course, with the Governors unless and until federalization is directed. The Special Representative, described below, is responsible for recommending federalization of these forces to the President. The Senior Military Commander, also described below, will assume operational control of relevant military forces from the time of a commitment decision. The Special Representative and the Senior Military Commander should proceed to the command post as soon as possible after military forces are alerted within the District of Columbia or mobilized in Virginia or Maryland whichever is earlier.

IV. Command and Control

(a) A Special Representative of the Secretary of Defense should be appointed as in the case of Detroit. He, and an alternate, should be predesignated. He will advise the President and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the commitment of all forces, military and civilian, employed to control the civil disturbances in the District of Columbia and of military forces in a Federal status mobilized for use in controlling related situations in the Maryland and Virginia portions of the Washington area. In addition, he will advise with respect to the commitment of State National Guard forces, not in a Federal status, which are voluntarily operating under Federal guidance with the consent of the appropriate state officials. While for legal reasons the Special Representative's role can be only advisory if he is appointed from civilian life, it is expected that as a practical matter he will exercise a substantial measure of influence over operations after a decision to commit military forces has been made.

(b) In the District of Columbia, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police will have operational control of all District of Columbia civilian police forces; control of Md./Va. police elements will not be formally available, but previous cooperation has been outstanding and no difficulty is expected in coordinating their efforts with those of the D. C. police.
(c) A Senior Military Commander will have operational control over all federal military forces. Lt. General Jonathan Seaman, 1st Army Commander located at Fort Meade, has been designated for this position. At the staff level, Maryland and Virginia have agreed that they will, upon request, put those units of their National Guard earmarked for civil disturbance in the Washington area under the senior military commander's operational control upon mobilization and while still in state status.

(d) The Chief of the Metropolitan Police and the Senior Military Commander will be co-located with the Special Representative in the central command post at D. C. police headquarters. Command post planning has been completed and communications have been installed, including direct lines to the White House, Pentagon, etc.

V. Rules of Engagement

(a) Minimum force, consistent with mission accomplishment, will be used by both military and civilian personnel. Moreover, commanders and their personnel should do whatever is possible to avoid appearing as an invading, alien force rather than a force the purpose of which is to restore order with minimum loss of life and property and due respect for the great number of citizens whose involvement is purely accidental. For example, while riot control personnel should be visible, force concentrations which might tend more to excite than to calm should be avoided where possible. Personnel must be civil; the use of epithets and degrading language will not be tolerated.

(b) As far as military forces are concerned, application of force will follow this priority:

1. Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed and sheathed,
2. Unloaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed,
3. Riot control agent CS,
4. Loaded rifles, round not chambered, with bare bayonets fixed,
5. Loaded rifles, round chambered, with bare bayonets fixed.

(c) All forces will follow the current rules of the Metropolitan Police Department with respect to use of live ammunition: shoot only (1) to protect yourself or others from death or serious injury or (2) to stop a fleeing felon and effect an arrest when all other means have been exhausted. However, military personnel will not load or fire their weapons unless so ordered by an officer except where the individual's life is clearly threatened and there is no other way to avoid that threat.
(d) Looters may present a particular problem since women and children may be involved or the articles looted may be of little value. There is no satisfactory solution to the problem of when firearms should be employed to stop looting beyond continued emphasis on the absolute necessity of using minimum force and avoiding the use of firearms except as a last resort and under the rules indicated in the previous paragraph.

(e) Snipers may also present a particular problem since the normal reflex actions of the well-trained combat soldier are to respond with an overwhelming mass of fire power. Experience indicates that in general this tactic endangers innocent people more than snipers and that the preferred tactic is to enter the building from which sniper fire originates. It also indicates that darkening the streets in order to gain protection from sniper fire is counterproductive. The following general approach should accordingly be emphasized in dealing with snipers:

1. Surround the building where sniper is concealed and gain access, using APC if necessary and available.

2. Employ CS rather than small arms fire. If unable to employ CS successfully, then use well-aimed fire by expert marksmen.

3. Illuminate the area during darkness.

VI. Communications

Each force element (police, Guard, active forces, etc.) has its own communications net. These appear to be adequate. However, since they use different frequencies, integration of the nets can take place only at the command post (and in some cases at precinct level) and direct lateral radio communication at lower levels is impossible. It is not technically feasible to correct this situation; the resulting risks of confusion must be accepted, but will be partially alleviated by having a police car with military units whenever possible.

VII. Equipment and Supplies

The status of riot control equipment of the D. C. police forces has been reviewed and certain defensive items, such as helmets, have been loaned by the Army to the police.
VIII. Fire Protection

The D. C. Fire Department has plans to approximately double its capacity in an emergency by recall of men and redistribution of equipment. Because of the possibility of rioting outside D. C., it does not propose to rely on fire equipment from neighboring jurisdictions for backup. However, military fire fighting equipment in the Washington area has been surveyed and some portion, now being determined, would be available for backup. There is an already existing civil-military agreement for mutual aid (without reference to any civil disturbance) and this provides a basis for providing military fire equipment (most of which is manned by civilian employees of DoD) prior to any decision as to commitment of military forces.

The principal fire fighting problem is likely to be not capability but access. In the pre-military phase, the police forces will provide necessary protection for fire fighters and will hold policemen on longer shifts if required to accomplish this. After commitment of troops, military personnel will take over this job as much as possible in order to release police for other riot control assignments.

The gas company has been contacted and has satisfactory plans for shutting off gas.

IX. Protection of Vital Installations

In addition to the White House and the Capitol, military plans include forces to protect vital utilities (reservoirs, pumping stations, powerhouses, C&P Telephone Company central switchboard, etc.), embassies, military installations, and certain government buildings in the District of Columbia. Comparable installations in contiguous areas of Virginia and Maryland have been identified against the possibility that they will require protection.

X. Curfew, store closure, and gasoline sale policy

Papers for imposition by the Commissioners of a curfew, and of prohibitions on liquor and gasoline sales have been prepared, and compared with those used in Detroit. They are satisfactory. The curfew would not apply to persons going to and from work, government officials, etc.
XI. Arrest; Arraignment and Confinement

Arrests should be made, if possible, by the civil police. Soldiers have the arresting powers of any private citizen, and these will be adequate to detain rioters, looters, etc. until custody can be turned over to police, which should be accomplished as soon as possible. Arrest and property identification forms will be in the hands of soldiers in order to furnish a record for later prosecution. Troops and police will be jointly employed in riot control operations insofar as possible so that the police will be readily available to arrest people detained by military personnel.

Prisoners will be booked at the police precinct stations and then routed either to the Court of General Sessions (lesser crimes) or the District Court (serious crimes) for arraignment. Both courts will be in 24-hour operation and arrangements have been made to cross-deputize U. S. and municipal attorneys should that be necessary. The booking process is the most likely choke point in this system. The police are prepared to set up emergency booking facilities should the capability of the precincts be exhausted. The police are also arranging for a central booking log so that relatives may get information rapidly.

Any significant volume of prisoners will immediately swamp the 5-man investigative staff normally used to check releasability of prisoners without money bail; consequently, after arraignment prisoners will be held at the D. C. Jail (which can handle an influx of 700) or the Occoquan Workhouse (up to 2500) or as a last resort at Lorton Reformatory (up to 1000). Military plans include forces to augment the guards at detention facilities if necessary.

While detention facilities are considered to have adequate capacity, transportation through the system to the detention point could become a problem. Accordingly, substantial transportation capability has been included in the earmarked military units.

Department of Justice personnel will be placed at precincts and other significant points in order to provide protection against any allegations of brutality.

XII. Public and Congressional Relations Policy

In the event a major civil disturbance occurs, two to four thousand newsmen could be expected in the Washington area to cover all aspects of the disorder. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs will be with, and serve as Adviser to, the Special Representative at the Command Post and he will have available a small
staff of public affairs specialists. Facilities for the press will be established either in the Police Headquarters or in the Courthouse building across the street. A Congressional information center will be established in the Pentagon with lines directly to press headquarters. The policy will be to provide as rapid and as accurate a flow of information to the press and Congress as possible. Plans for this purpose have been prepared and distributed to interested agencies.

XIII. Intelligence and Incidents

Substantial intelligence coverage by several agencies of government has been and will continue to be applied in the Washington area. Interchange of information is excellent. It is typical of riots in other cities, however, that they have started over a minor incident (e.g., an arrest) and not from activities forecast by intelligence efforts or the rumor mill. Moreover, it is not clear whether a high level or an absence of rumors is more suggestive of community mood. While we should continue intelligence coverage, we cannot with confidence rely on it as a riot-risk thermometer.

XIV. Current Status

Detailed plans implementing the concepts outlined above have been developed. General Seaman and his staff have participated in the planning, visited the Command Post, and met the other senior officials involved. Military and civil planning for the District of Columbia is substantially completed except for designation of the Special Representative. However, there are certain aspects of planning for the total Washington area which are not satisfactory as yet:

(1) Virginia has done relatively little, either at the county or state level, to prepare plans for a major civil disturbance in the Washington area. While police coordination and reaction time are good and the National Guard mobilization and movement plan appears adequate, no detailed operational planning for joint police/National Guard operations, including command and control, has been accomplished. On the civil side, the potential problems of arrest, arraignment, and detention have only begun to be recognized and curfew and store closure policy is in a similar state. We can prod and suggest but we cannot solve these problems. A beginning has been made through a meeting sponsored by the Army which state and local police and fire officials, and Virginia National Guard representatives attended. In addition, Alexandria, Arlington and Fairfax have set up a joint planning group.
(2) Maryland, probably because of its experience at Cambridge, is in relatively good shape. Weekly meetings are held between police and National Guard officials. To date Montgomery and Prince Georges County officials have not been included but this has been corrected.

(3) Little has yet been done to establish procedures for coordination of curfew, liquor store closure, and comparable policies between D. C. and neighboring jurisdictions. Commissioner Tobriner is working on this. Furthermore, we have not yet given adequate thought to the possibility of mass exodus from the District and how it should be handled. The military planners are now considering this from their point of view and Mr. Tobriner and the D. C. Police plan to work with neighboring jurisdictions on the civil aspects of this question.

(4) Our military planning for federal forces, having been nearly completed for the District of Columbia, must now be extended to contiguous areas of Maryland and Virginia.
Task Force on Civil Disturbances

Members

Mr. David E. McGiffert, Under Secretary of the Army - Chairman
Mr. Stephen J. Pollak, White House
Mr. Walter N. Tobriner, D. C. Commissioner
Mr. Carl Belcher, Justice Department
Mr. Richard Fryklund, Deputy (ASD(PA))
Mr. Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Army
Chief John B. Layton, Chief of Police, Washington, D. C.
Maj. General F. S. Greenlief, Deputy Chief, NGB
Brig. General H. W. Hollis, Director Operations, Army
Col. George M. Bush, Secretary

Other Contributors

Lt. General Jonathan O. Seaman, 1st Army Commander, Ft. Meade
Maj. General Carl C. Turner, TPMG, Army
Maj. General L. J. Fuller, Deputy JAG, Army
Maj. General W. P. Wilson, Chief, NGB
Maj. General Howard W. Penney, CLL, Army
Maj. General C. J. O'Malley, CG, MDW
Mr. Rufus Youngblood, Secret Service
Mr. Edward I. Selig, Justice Dept.
Mr. Martin D. Richman, Justice Dept.
Mr. Robert E. Jordan, Deputy General Counsel, Army
Mr. Bland West, OGC, Army
Colonel C. A. Peterson, 1st Army
Colonel C. Y. Talbott, 1st Army
Colonel C. B. Boswell, 1st Army
Mr. Henry Galotta, Fire Chief, D. C.
Lt. Colonel C. D. O'Connor, Plans & Programs, OASD(PA)
Lt. Colonel Corcoran, ASGS

Attachment 1

SENSITIVE
### SUMMARY
FORCES AVAILABLE
FOR USE IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Force Description</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Available for Commitment</th>
<th>Reaction Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVIL PHASE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. C. Metropolitan Police</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>0-2 Hr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park Police</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0-2 Hr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Police (state and local)</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0-2 Hr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland Police (state and local)</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0-2 Hr</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total - Civilian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MILITARY PHASE</strong></td>
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<td>National Guard, D. C.</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>2-7 Hr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force Inside</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2-4 Hr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Augmentation Force</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>6-24 Hr</td>
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<td>National Guard, Va.</td>
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<td>1,400</td>
<td>3-6 Hr</td>
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<td>National Guard, Md.</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>4-7 Hr</td>
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<td><strong>Total - Military</strong></td>
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<td>24,600</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ In assessing the capability of these forces it should be recognized that only 1/2 of these men would be available if divided in 12-hour shifts.

2/ Time spreads indicate the earliest time at which some units at reduced strength would be at assembly point vs. time at which all units at strength shown in column 2 would be at the assembly point. Time from assembly point to riot area depends on location of latter; for D. C. Guard and Task Force Inside this time would probably average about one hour.

3/ Excludes secret service, capitol police, and GSA guards, all of whom have protection missions, and certain municipal police in Md./Va.

4/ Assumes aircraft availability.