



LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ/RAC 13-81 ISCAP Appeal
Document # 1

✓ The President

11


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2015-075, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: January 30, 2017

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

5 MARCH 1965
~~TOP SECRET~~



DAILY BRIEF
5 MARCH 1965

1. North Vietnam

A French foreign office official says that the North Vietnamese in Paris have told the French that negotiations on South Vietnam are not a matter for consideration at this time. The North Vietnamese reportedly said that previously Hanoi was ready to consider negotiations, but "US actions" had changed the situation. The French official added that there have been no contacts with the Chinese Communists since Couve de Murville's Washington visit, but that the French ambassador in Peiping is scheduled to see Foreign Minister Chen Yi soon.


There have been no significant new propaganda or official statements from Peiping or Moscow.

No new movements by the AN-12 transports in Irkutsk have been reported, although it is possible that most or all of them have returned to the western USSR undetected. Their failure to move past Irkutsk could reflect some Soviet policy indecision following the most recent US - South Vietnamese air strikes on North Vietnam. It is unlikely that they could have moved out of the USSR without notice.

2. Indonesia

Djakarta's military reinforcements in Sumatra--insurance against a possible British retaliation for Indonesian military actions against Malaysia--are increasing. One brigade is now deploying near Medan in the north, and another will begin reaching central Sumatra next week. Reinforcements eventually will total 7-8,000 men. (See map.)

In response to Indonesian Communist demands, Sukarno has also ordered the army commander in Sumatra to arm workers and peasants. This could be a dangerous step toward allowing the Communists to develop a paramilitary capability.



~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526

3. USSR

Soviet naval activity in the western Pacific is returning to normal. Three conventional submarines and a sub-tender which had been operating in the Philippine Sea are now approaching home port. A guided-missile destroyer which was operating south of Japan with two other subs is also nearing home. The latter two submarines will probably terminate their operations soon.

50X1, E.O.13526

4. South Vietnam

There has been no new hard information on the swarm of coup reports noted yesterday.

50X1, E.O.13526

The security situation continues to deteriorate in some of the northern provinces. In Quang Nam and Quang Tin, US civilian personnel cannot move outside the provincial capitals.

50X1, E.O.13526

Govern-
ment authorities in Kontum fear the Communists may be planning to attack Kontum town within the next two months. The government has contingency plans for complete withdrawal from Kontum to Binh Dinh Province, which is also under heavy Viet Cong pressure. (See map.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526

~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526

5. Bolivia

The Barrientos government appears to be heading for serious trouble, but the situation is far from clear.

50X1, E.O.13526

The government is aware of this, but has other problems to cope with, including the deteriorating economy and union plans for strikes.

The armed forces hold the key to stability, but their unity and loyalties are uncertain. Both Barrientos and Ovando have strong military support.

6. USSR

Additional single silo ICBM launchers have been detected in satellite photography, including eight believed to have been under construction since last summer at one older, established ICBM launch complex. The count is now 106, and new photos now under study will probably reveal more. While the difficulty in even detecting these dispersed installations has hindered our assessment of this new ICBM deployment program, its outlines are becoming clearer. A discussion is at Annex.

~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526


~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526

~~Confirmed ICBM Launch Complexes~~

Complexes begun in 1961 or earlier

Complexes begun in late 1963 or 1964 and older complexes where single silos have been identified.



~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1, E.O.13526

ANNEX

Soviet ICBM Deployment

The Brief for 29 January reported 90 single silos started since early 1964 in ten complexes--seven consisting wholly of single silos and three collocated with older operational SS-7 launch complexes. Since then, 16 additional silos have been detected, including 8 found at the established SS-7 launch complex at Perm. (See map.)

The single silos fall into two deployment patterns and are clearly intended for two new and different missile systems.

The larger single silos, positioned in groups of three, with two or three groups to a complex, are probably intended for the new SS-9 ICBM. Flight testing of this missile, which can carry a [redacted] warhead, started in December 1963 and could be nearing the end of the developmental stage. [redacted]

[redacted] some of these larger silos could be made operational this summer if flight testing is completed in the next few months.

We are less certain about Soviet intentions for the smaller single silos, which are deployed in groups of ten. They may be intended for the even newer SS-10 ICBM. Flight tests of this missile, whose capabilities we have not yet been able fully to assess, began in April of 1964. However, no firings have been detected since last October, and the SS-10 probably would not be ready for deployment until late 1965 at the earliest.

On the other hand, the smaller silos could be meant for some new as yet untested small missile, possibly with solid fuel. There are signs at the Tyuratam launch test site that at least one more new ICBM system is under development and is about to be flight tested.

The Soviet inventory of operational ICBM launchers now stands at 224, in the older complexes.

We are now examining intensively our estimates of future Soviet strategic striking power to determine how greatly the single silo deployment program will increase it.

50X1, E.O.13526

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~