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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2015-120, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 01, 2017

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

*Barber
but my way
Plans*

Attaches


ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

28 SEPTEMBER 1962
~~TOP SECRET~~

MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CUBA, SEPTEMBER 62

Site of unidentified activity, Santa Cruz del Norte possibly missile related.



- Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
- Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
- ▲ Support facility for processing equipment
- ✳ Airfield with MIG aircraft
- Probable coastal defense cruise-missile site
- ⊖ Effective air defense perimeter (estimated radius 20-25 nautical miles)

0 100 NAUTICAL MILES

SECRET

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1. Cuba


a. Latest photographic reconnaissance confirms two more surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba and possibly a third still in the early stages of construction. This makes a total of 13 confirmed sites. The new sites are in Oriente Province, but none are within range of normal aircraft lanes serving Guantanamo.

b. We also suspect that the coastal defense cruise-missile site near Banes is now operational, with a missile observed on one of the two launchers. A closer evaluation of dimensions of this missile is under way, and we hope to learn more of its characteristics.

c. There are enough reports now from different sources for us to accept as true that there has been a new wave of arrests and executions since the discovery early this month of a plot to assassinate Castro.

2. Warsaw Pact

a. Warsaw Pact exercises began, unannounced, on Tuesday with maneuvers by Soviet and Satellite forces in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. These will be followed in the next few days with deployment of Soviet units from the western USSR.



b. Last year's exercises were announced in advance, presumably to give weight to Soviet pressures at the time on Berlin. The absence of any announcement this year suggests there will be no attempt this time to relate the exercises to the Berlin problem.

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[Redacted]

3. Yemen

a. Prince Hasan is heading home to marshal loyal tribes in the north and have it out with the rebels. King Saud and King Hussein will probably give him help, but we have seen no movement yet of their forces.

b. Meanwhile, the rebel army command has acted swiftly to consolidate its gains. It controls the major centers of Sana, Taiz, and Hudaydah and other towns, but progress in the tribal countryside, particularly in the north, will be a harder, longer task. Yemen's two strongest tribes in the north have not declared their loyalty to the rebels.

c. We have identified a key officer in the rebel group, Brigadier Abdullah al-Sallal. He was commander of Imam Badr's bodyguard at the time of the coup--which makes it a virtual certainty that Badr, as the rebels claim, has been killed. The rebels say that Badr was buried in the debris when the castle was demolished.

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d. [redacted] that Sallal has associations with Egyptian intelligence agents. Cairo's transparent delight with the turn of events betrays a complicity in them which we do not doubt. However, the key men in the UAR-sponsored Free Yemeni Movement have yet to show.

e. If the rebels can make it stick, they may, like Qasim, prove more independent than Cairo would like. [redacted]


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f. We have had no direct word from our legation in Taiz; Ambassador Hart in Jidda will try today to make contact with them.

4. Spaak on EEC

a. With pressure mounting on the EEC members to reach a decision soon on the application of the smaller European countries, Spaak--who has long been cool to admitting Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria--is now having second thoughts about Denmark, Norway, and Ireland as well.

b. Spaak thinks that these countries want to join purely for commercial reasons, and that their presence in the EEC would obstruct progress toward political union and "adulterate" the work of NATO in defense and political coordination.



North Vietnamese Withdrawal from Laos

A Summary Review

1. Souvanna has made virtually no progress toward effective government in Laos.
2. Phoumi is cooperating with Souvanna, up to a point, hoping to woo him to the conservative side. This strategy is having some effect as Souvanna is increasingly critical of Souphannouvong's intransigence. Neither Phoumi nor Souphannouvong, however, have given up control of any territory, nor have they shown a willingness to integrate their forces. The Pathet Lao have not even permitted Souvanna to enter most of their territory.
3. There has been no major fighting. However, the Communists continue trying to mop up the Meo guerrillas; and there have been some skirmishes in the south.
4. The most immediate issue, and the key to any progress by Souvanna, is the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Our most recent estimate, approved by the United States Intelligence Board on Wednesday, concludes in this regard that:

The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do with safety. Souvanna will almost certainly be unable to prevent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the Viet Cong effort in South Vietnam.

- 5. Designation of checkpoints where the International Control Commission would observe foreign troop withdrawal was delayed until 23 August as a result of Pathet Lao refusal to concede the presence of North Vietnamese forces. Although Souvanna had indicated a preference for several checkpoints in Pathet Lao territory, he-- and Phoumi--compromised on Nhommarath, which, in fact, belongs to Kong Le rather than the Pathet Lao. The Plaine des Jarres and Vientiane were the other two checkpoints established (Pakse and Savannakhet were established later).
- 6. So far, the only overt North Vietnamese withdrawal has been the 15 "technicians" who left through the Plaine des Jarres checkpoint on 27 August. Five additional North Vietnamese are scheduled to leave from Nhommarath shortly.
- 7. We are reasonably convinced, however, that some North Vietnamese troops have withdrawn clandestinely. There is also good evidence that the remaining forces have withdrawn to more inaccessible regions along the eastern border. The following is a boiled-down summary of evidence upon which our conclusions are based:
 - 25-31 July: Twenty-two Soviet airlift shuttle flights were noted between North Vietnam and Nam Tha, possibly carrying out North Vietnamese personnel and equipment.
 - early August: A North Vietnamese battalion, composed of troops from Vang Vieng, the Plaine des Jarres, and Tha Thom, moved through Ban Ban and into North Vietnam over Route 7.

- early August: The joint North Vietnamese - Pathet Lao headquarters at Khang Khay was split up, part withdrawn to North Vietnam and part regrouped in the Pathet Lao stronghold in Sam Neua province.
- mid-August: Some 200 North Vietnamese at Tchepone airfield reportedly were changing into Lao uniforms.
- 20 August: North Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Nhommarath was completed. Twenty-five trucks carrying North Vietnamese troops were seen going east on Route 12.
- 23 August: Agreement reached on Nhommarath as a check-point.
- 25 August: Soviet airlift suspends resupply flights.
- late August: Several reports were received that North Vietnamese were concealed along Route 7 between Ban Ban and the North Vietnamese border.
- 3 September: North Vietnamese forces reportedly were moving east from Kham Keut to new positions between Ban Nape and the North Vietnamese border.
- 10 September: Soviet airlift resumes resupply flights.
- 14 September: Souphannouvong admitted that "some" North Vietnamese were still in Laos but said they would be withdrawn by the end of the month.
- 15 September: 50X1, E.O.13526 the North Vietnamese had not moved out of Savannakhet and Khammouane provinces but rather were "still with the Pathet Lao and, under Pathet Lao cover, are staying concealed from the local inhabitants."

- 18 September: Souvanna Phouma admitted to the US ambassador that some North Vietnamese personnel were seeking to conceal themselves among the Pathet Lao.
- 23 September: Souvanna expressed to the US ambassador his awareness of the problem of North Vietnamese forces remaining in Laos, pointing to Sam Neua and Khammouane provinces and the Tchepone region as "problem areas" and expressing determination to press for complete North Vietnamese withdrawal.
- 26 September: North Vietnamese military communications facilities continue to operate in the Nam Tha - Muong Sai area, east of Tha Thom, and at Tchepone.

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NOTES

A. USSR We are puzzling over the comparatively near miss which occurred yesterday when an ICBM vehicle launched from Tyuratam at about 10 in the morning our time came within 500 miles of Cosmos IX which the Soviets had launched earlier in the day, also from Tyuratam.

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B. France-US France, we understand, is agreeable to letting us use Tahiti as a base for Project Mercury search and rescue operations, provided we agree to provide tracking facilities for the first French satellite which they expect to launch in 1965 with their own rocket.

C. Ecuador The move to impeach Arosemena fell flat in Congress yesterday, largely because most legislators dislike Vice President Varea even more. The rightists will now try to do what some had recommended be done in the first place, replace Varea before trying to get Arosemena.