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SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

Declassified Under Authority of
the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel,
E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP Appeal No. 2016-119,
Document 1
Declassification Date: March 15,
2026

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

FROM: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM
POLICY AND SUPPORT

Prepared by: Mr. Frank Light, (SO/LIC)CTP&S, FOIA (b)
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SUBJECT: CSG, Wednesday, August 16, 2000, 3 - 4:30 p.m.
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(U) PURPOSE: To provide background for Wednesday's CSG principals meeting (Tab A) chaired by Mr. Clarke in the White House Situation Room.

(U) DISCUSSION: Mr. Yamada will accompany you. Generals Newbolt (J-31) and Kofer (J34) will represent Joint Staff. We understand this will be their first CSG.

~~(S)~~ The first agenda item is the Sheehan-DPRK talks in Pyongyang. State's lead. Uncleared drafts reporting on the talks appear at Tab B. Sheehan told Vice Foreign Minister Kim the U.S. could remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors if it did three things for six months: 1) return four Japanese Red Army hijackers to Japan; 2) stop arms sales to terrorist organizations; and 3) cease contingency planning for terrorist operations. In response to DPRK concerns about postponing the decision to a new Administration, Sheehan indicated the six-month clock required by U.S. law (Tab C) could be set retroactively to March of this year. He and Kim agreed to continue discussions in New York and to work on a joint statement for release during the Millennium Summit at the opening of the UN General Assembly September 6-8.

~~(S)~~ At the CSG Sheehan may distribute for comment a draft joint statement, an early version of which appears at Tab D. He may also seek authorization to provide more information on North Korean arms transfers, which Kim said was untrue.

~~(S)~~ The draft report notes discussions with the press, as well as with key members of Congress, will be necessary to pave the way for removing DPRK from the list, and CSG participants at tomorrow's meeting may wish to review the overall approach. Sheehan told Kim he was committed to delinking state sponsorship from other issues in order to preserve the credibility of the process. At the same time, these other issues ratchet up the importance of the decision. State wants it on the agenda for a high-level DPRK visit that would also address other issues. The DPRK insists on removal from the list as a precondition for such a visit.

~~(S)~~ The second item is the U.S.-Russia working group on Afghanistan (Tab F). State has the lead, and U/S Pickering led the U.S. side at the Washington meetings August 1 - 2. The CIA and

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FBI also participated. Both sides agreed to work with the other Perm-5 states on the UN Security Council for additional sanctions against the Taliban. They also committed to engage with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkmenistan to pressure the Taliban into ending its support for international terrorism.

~~(S)~~ At the CSG Sheehan may distribute for comment the draft of a joint summary report. Once final, it will be presented to Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Albright for transmittal to Presidents Clinton and Putin on the margins of the Millenium Summit. RECOMMENDATION: In light of DoD's own engagement with Russia on combating terrorism, you may wish to propose greater DoD involvement, including participation in the next working group in Moscow this October.

~~(S)~~ Tab G contains a TWC paper on the final three agenda items: designation of foreign terrorist organizations; threat assessment for POTUS trips to Nigeria and Cartagena; and terrorist fundraising. State/Justice have the lead on the first, the CIA on the second, and NSC on the third.

Attachments:

- Tab A. ~~(S)~~ Agenda.
- Tab B. ~~(S)~~ Sheehan-Kim talks.
- Tab C. ~~(S)~~ Process for determining state sponsors of terrorism.
- Tab D. ~~(S)~~ Early draft of joint statement.
- Tab E. ~~(S)~~ Japanese concerns.
- Tab F. ~~(S)~~ U.S. - Russia on Afghanistan.
- Tab G. ~~(S//SI//NF)~~ TWC paper on agenda items 3-5.

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DRAFT U.S.-DPRK STATEMENT

(Place)

(Date)

The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a series of talks in March, August, (and _____) 2000, at which the two sides expressed their views on the issue of international terrorism.

At the talks, the two sides agreed that international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace, and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms, including terrorist acts involving chemical, biological, or nuclear devices or materials.

During the talks, the DPRK side affirmed that, as a matter of official policy and as its government has stated previously, it opposes all forms of terrorism. The DPRK noted that that it was the responsibility of every UN member state to refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging, or tolerating terrorist activities.

On the basis of their common concerns about the threat of terrorism to international peace and stability, the two sides underscored their commitment to support the international legal regime combatting international terrorism and to cooperate with each other in taking effective measures to fight against terrorism. The sides shared the view that such measures included not supporting terrorists and terrorist groups, bringing terrorists to justice, fighting terrorist acts against the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation. The two sides shared the view that this understanding would prohibit either side from providing material support or resources, including safehaven, to terrorists and their groups. The two sides joined in encouraging all UN member states to sign and become a party to all twelve UN counterterrorism conventions.

As a demonstration of their cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, the US and the DPRK intend to exchange information on global issues of support to terrorism and terrorist organizations.

The US side informed the DPRK that, as a result of the talks and the understandings between the two sides, the United States would (immediately) begin the six-month review that is required under US law for the removal of the DPRK from the list of terrorist supporting countries.

consider

I:\Docs\East Asia-Pacific\DPRK draft terrorism statement -
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Draft: S/CT:CEnsley

Clear: S/CT:MASheehan

:EAP:THubbard

:EAP/K:DShear/EDong

:IO/UNP:KBoesel

:C:MStorella

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 TAGS: PTER, PREL, NK
 SUBJECT: US-DPRK COUNTERTERRORISM TALKS: DAY I

CLASSIFIED BY S/CT MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, FOR REASONS 1.5 B AND D.

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: DURING DAY I OF THE SECOND ROUND OF US-DPRK COUNTERTERRORISM TALKS, AMB. SHEEHAN STATED THAT HIS GOAL FOR THESE TALKS IS TO GET THE DPRK TO UNDERSTAND THE US LAWS AND PATH FOR REMOVAL FROM THE LIST OF STATE SPONSORS. UNDERSTANDING WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR PROGRESS. SHEEHAN OUTLINED US TERRORISM LAWS, INTELLIGENCE ABOUT DPRK'S LINK TO TERRORISM, AND A PROPOSED TIMELINE FOR REMOVAL. HE NOTED THE POLITICAL RISK BOTH GOVERNMENTS MUST TAKE TO TAKE STEPS TO REMOVE DPRK FROM THE TERRORISM LIST, BUT SHOWED CONFIDENCE THAT THIS PATH COULD LEAD TO LIFTING. VFM KIM REPEATEDLY STATED DPRK'S POLICY TO OPPOSE TERRORISM, AND REJECTED US INFORMATION ABOUT DPRK'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. REMOVAL, IN HIS EYES, WAS BASED ON US WILL NOT DPRK'S ACTIONS, AND SHOULD BE COMPLETED - NOT BEGUN - AT A FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL VISIT. DPRK'S REMOVAL SHOULD BE DONE IN THIS ADMINISTRATION, WHEN THOSE OFFICIALS

- NAMELY SHEEHAN AND AMB. KARTMAN - ARE STILL IN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) ON AUGUST 9, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM SHEEHAN BEGAN TWO-DAY TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN, IN PYONGYANG. VFM KIM EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION THAT SHEEHAN TRAVELED TO PYONGYANG TO SEE THE SITUATION WITH HIS OWN EYES AND TO SHOW THE US WILL AND COMMITMENT TO SETTLE THE ISSUE OF DPRK'S STATUS ON THE TERRORISM LIST. SHEEHAN ECHOED THIS MESSAGE, NOTING THE HISTORIC NATURE OF THE TRIP AND THE IMPORTANCE THE SECRETARY PLACED ON THE VISIT.

3. ~~(C)~~ KIM BEGAN BY STATING THE DPRK HAS ALWAYS OPPOSED TERRORISM AND CONDEMNED ANY SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, AND NOTING THAT THE DPRK HAS NEVER HAD ANY LINKS TO TERRORISM. DESPITE THIS POLICY, THE US HAS GIVEN DPRK THE 'TERRORISM CAP,' WHICH ONLY THE USG HAS THE ABILITY TO TAKE OFF. SINCE THE USG WANTS BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE DPRK, THIS STUMBLING BLOCK MUST BE TAKEN AWAY BY THE USG. THIS WILL BE AN ISSUE OF US WILL, NOT OF LEGALITY. IF THE US IS FAIR, IT WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE DPRK DOES NOT SUPPORT TERRORISM AND HAS A PROVEN RECORD OF COOPERATION ON TERRORISM, AS SHOWN THROUGH ITS RECENT JOINT STATEMENT WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN.

4. ~~(C)~~ SHEEHAN SIGNALLED USG COMMITMENT TO A DIALOGUE, AND

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POINTED TO HIS VISIT AS A SYMBOL OF THIS COMMITMENT. THE US NOTED THE RUSSIAN STATEMENT, WHICH WAS VERY IMPORTANT AND GREATLY APPRECIATED. SHEEHAN HIGHLIGHTED THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF DPRK'S RECORD ON TERRORISM, INCLUDING THEIR LACK OF DIRECT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS SINCE 1987, THE DPRK'S CLEAN RECORD ON PROVIDING SANCTUARY TO TERRORISTS - WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF THE FOUR REMAINING JRA HIJACKERS, THE LACK OF POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL LINKS TO ANY TERRORIST GROUPS, AND THE FACT THAT USG DID NOT CONSIDER THE DPRK A DIRECT TERRORIST THREAT. ALL OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE DPRK MUST OVERCOME TO BE REMOVED, INCLUDING THE JRA HIJACKERS, ARE ALL SURMOUNTABLE. SHEEHAN OUTLINED THREE KEY ISSUES HE WOULD COVER IN THESE TALKS: US LAWS ON TERRORISM, US INFORMATION ABOUT DPRK'S LINK TO TERRORISM, AND A PROPOSED PATH OFF THE TERRORISM LIST.

US LAWS ON TERRORISM: A PRIMER

5. (C) THE GOAL OF THESE TALKS, SHEEHAN EXPLAINED, WAS FOR THE DPRK TO UNDERSTAND - NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH - THE USG COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS OF STATE SPONSORSHIP DESIGNATION. IF THE DPRK CAN UNDERSTAND THIS PROCESS, WE CAN MOVE FORWARD. THE USG HAS DESIGNATED 28 FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (FTOS), WHICH, SHEEHAN NOTED, ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN INSURGENT GROUPS. INSURGENTS ENGAGE IN COMBAT AGAINST MILITARY COMBATANTS, AS ALLOWED UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION, WHILE FTOS USE VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS, WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS. COUNTRIES THAT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO FTOS ARE, UNDER USG LAW, ELIGIBLE TO BE DESIGNATED AS STATE SPONSORS. THE USG RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DESIGNATE FTO AND STATE SPONSORS BECAUSE PRESSURING SUCH ACTORS AND IDEALLY LIMITED OR ENDING THEIR SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IS VITAL TO INCREASING AMERICAN SECURITY.

6. (U) AFTER OUTLINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, SHEEHAN STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO GETTING STATE SPONSORS OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF TERRORISM AND MOVING COUNTRIES OFF OF THE STATE SPONSOR LIST. HE IS ALSO COMMITTED TO DELINKING THE STATE SPONSORSHIP PROCESS FROM OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES. IF THIS LIST IS SEEN AS POLITICAL OR LINKED TO OTHER ISSUES, IT LOSES ITS CREDIBILITY. SHEEHAN CLARIFIED THAT BEING DESIGNATED A STATE SPONSOR DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN A COUNTRY COMMITS TERRORIST ACTS, BUT RATHER THAT THEY PROVIDE SUPPORT, INCLUDING SANCTUARY, SAFEHOUSES, WEAPONS, DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE, AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS.

HOLDING STRONG-DPRK NOT GUILTY

7. (C) VFM KIM ENDED THE FIRST HALF OF THE DAY BY QUESTIONING THE WISDOM OF US LAWMAKERS WHO MAKE LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM, WHEN THE USG IS, IN FACT, THE 'RINGLEADER' OF TERRORISM AND PRACTICES TERRORISM FOR POLITICAL AND PERSONAL GAIN. REITERATING THE DPRK'S

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OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM, KIM RESTATED THAT BEING ON THE LIST IS A SIGN OF THE US' CONTINUED HOSTILITIES TOWARD THE DPRK. IF THE USG IS SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING HOSTILITIES AND IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS, IT SHOULD TAKE THE DPRK OFF THE LIST. DESPITE HIS HARSH OPENING, KIM REITERATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO SHEEHAN'S INFORMATION ABOUT THE

DPRK'S ALLEGED LINK TO TERRORISM. WHILE HE COULDN'T SPEAK FOR OTHER AGENCIES, HE WAS WILLING TO LOOK INTO OTHERS' BEHAVIOR. KIM NOTED THAT THE DPRK'S BEHAVIOR AT THE TIME OF ORIGINAL DESIGNATION IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT THAT TODAY'S POSITION, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE RECENT MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN MOVING THE DPRK OFF THE LIST. NOTING THAT ONE OF THE JRA MEMBERS WAS RETURNED TO JAPAN (FROM THAILAND), KIM STRESSED THAT THE JRA ISSUE CANNOT BE AN EXCUSE TO KEEP THE DPRK ON THE LIST; THIS IS AN ISSUE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE DPRK. (NOTE: KIM REFERRED TO THE JRA CASE, AS IF TO BOAST THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. END NOTE.)

THE TRUTH COMES OUT

8. (S) RETURNING FROM A WELL-NEEDED BREAK, SHEEHAN REITERATED THAT WHILE SOME CRITICIZE OR DO NOT UNDERSTAND US LAWS, THESE LAWS REMAIN VERY IMPORTANT TO MINIMIZING TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST THE US. SHEEHAN PREVIEWED THE THREE MAIN CONCERNS IN DPRK BEHAVIOR: JAPANESE ISSUES, LINKS TO FTOS, AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

9. (S) JAPAN: NOTING HOW HIGHLY VISIBLE THE JRA HIJACKING CASE IS, SHEEHAN REITERATED WHAT AN ENORMOUS SIGNAL IT WOULD SEND TO THE USG, IF THE DPRK WERE TO EXTRADITE THE REMAINING 4 JRA MEMBERS TO JAPAN. THE RECENT RETURN OF ONE JRA MEMBER AND THE LEBANESE EXTRADITIONS OF JRA MEMBERS EARLIER THIS YEAR HAVE BEEN VERY IMPORTANT INTERNATIONALLY. SHEEHAN STATED THAT FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS WITH THE DPRK HE WOULD MEET WITH THE JAPANESE TO URGE THEM TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE WITH THE DPRK. WHILE THE USG BELIEVES EXTRADITION IS THE BEST SOLUTION, WE LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE DPRK AND JAPAN TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE 'JUDICIAL SOLUTION.' ON ABDUCTIONS, SHEEHAN ADMITTED THAT THE US DOES NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION BUT THAT HE LOOKS TO THE DPRK AND JAPAN TO FIND A PATH TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

10. (S) FTOS: SHEEHAN NOTED THAT THE DPRK HAS THE RIGHT TO SELL ARMS OR PROVIDE SUPPORT TO WHOMEVER IT WANTS. HOWEVER, IF THEY PROVIDE SUPPORT TO GROUPS THAT THE USG DEEMS AS A THREAT, THE USG RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REACT. USG HAS INFORMATION THAT NORTH KOREAN COMPANIES SUPPLYING ARMS AND/OR SUPPLIES TO THE LTTE, HIZBALLAH VIA IRAN, THE

MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FOUNDATION (MILF), AND THE TALIBAN FOR ULTIMATE USE BY USAMA BIN LADIN IN CENTRAL ASIA. (NOTE: MILF IS NOT AN FTO, BUT IS NONETHELESS OF CONCERN TO THE USG. END NOTE.) THE USG IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT TIES TO THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO), WHICH ALTHOUGH

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ALMOST DEFUNCT IS STILL OPERATIONAL. RESPONDING TO KIM'S QUESTION ABOUT INTEL ON DPRK FINANCIAL LINKS, SHEEHAN OUTLINED THE US CONCERN THAT DPRK HAS FUNNELED FINANCES TO IRA AND JRA MEMBERS.

11. ~~(S)~~ CONTINGENCY PLANNING: THE USG REMAINS CONCERNED THAT THE DPRK INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS CONTINUES TO PLAN FOR TERRORIST ACTIONS, SUCH AS ASSASSINATION. RECOGNIZING A COUNTRY'S RIGHT TO CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR WAR OR OTHER SITUATIONS, SHEEHAN STRESSED THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE BOUND - EVEN IN TIME OF WAR - BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, WHICH DO NOT ALLOW TERRORISM. THE CONVENTIONS, WHICH THE DPRK HAS SIGNED, REQUIRE THAT A STATE'S ACTIONS BE DIRECTED AT COMBATANTS NOT CIVILIANS. PLANNING FOR TERRORISM QUALIFIES A STATE AS A SPONSOR, ACCORDING TO US LAWS. FOR EXAMPLE, ASSASSINATION PLANNING - EVEN OF A NORTH KOREAN CITIZEN ABROAD - IS A STEP TO TERRORISM. GIVEN THE DPRK'S PAST RECORD OF ABDUCTIONS AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIONS, THE USG REMAINS CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL PLANNING.

LEAPING TOGETHER

12. ~~(C)~~ HIGHLIGHTING THAT KEY HILL MEMBERS AND STAFF KNOW ABOUT THE DPRK'S RECORD ON TERRORISM, SHEEHAN REITERATED HOW EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IT WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A VISIBLE COOPERATION AND TRUST BETWEEN THE NATIONS SO BOTH COUNTRIES CAN, IN GOOD FAITH, NEGOTIATE TO MOVE THE DPRK OUT OF THE TERRORISM BUSINESS. ESTABLISHING TRUST IS CRUCIAL, EVEN IF OUR TWO COUNTRIES DISAGREE ON THE FACTS OR THE LOGIC OF THE PROCESS. WITH TRUST AND COMMITMENT, A PROCESS FOR REMOVAL CAN BEGIN. SHEEHAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS GREAT POLITICAL RISK ON BOTH SIDES. HE STRESSED THAT HE COULD WALK AWAY RIGHT NOW, AND STILL LOOK LIKE A 'TOUGH GUY' ON TERRORISM - AND 'WIN' IN THE EYES OF THE US CONGRESS AND PEOPLE. HOWEVER, BELIEVING THAT THERE IS A WAY AHEAD AND THAT THIS IS WORTH THE RISK, SHEEHAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO WORKING ON THIS PROCESS. AT SOME POINT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE TO 'LEAP TOGETHER OVER THE DIVIDE,' AND WORK TOGETHER.

THE PATH AHEAD

13. ~~(C)~~ SHEEHAN REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES CAN HAVE A HIGH LEVEL MEETING, WHICH WOULD, INTER ALIA, ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT RESTATING A TOUGH STANCE ON TERRORISM AND SHOWING UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROCESS AND WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AHEAD. WHILE A FINAL DECISION ON THE AGENDA OF A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT IS ABOVE HIS LEVEL, SHEEHAN STATED HIS INTENTION TO URGE THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS TO USE THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETING TO ANNOUNCE THE START OF A SIX-MONTH PERIOD DURING WHICH THE US WILL MONITOR WHETHER THE DPRK IS SUPPORTING TERRORISM, AND - BASED ON THE INFORMATION - ULTIMATELY REMOVE THE DPRK FROM THE STATE SPONSORSHIP LIST.

14. ~~(C)~~ SHEEHAN STRESSED THAT THIS IS A VERY BOLD STEP FOR

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A NUMBER OF REASONS. THERE HAS NOT BEEN SUCH AN EFFORT TO REMOVE A STATE SPONSOR IN THE RECENT PAST. MAKING A STATEMENT WILL PUBLICLY ILLUSTRATE US WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AT THIS ISSUE INDEPENDENT OF OTHER ISSUES, AND TO TAKE A STEP REGARDLESS OF PROGRESS ON OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES. IN ADDITION, IT WILL BE RISKY TO ANNOUNCE IN ADVANCE THAT THE US IS COMMITTED TO WORKING TO REMOVE THE DPRK, PARTICULARLY IF THERE IS RESOLUTION ON THE JRA ISSUE. DESPITE THIS RISK, SHEEHAN IS CONFIDENT THAT ALL ISSUES CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN THE SIX MONTHS WINDOW.

15. ~~(c)~~ SHEEHAN PREDICTED DPRK FRUSTRATION AT THE SIX MONTH PROCESS, AND THE FACT THAT THIS WOULD PUSH THE FINAL DECISION INTO A NEW ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE PROCESS, AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY, NOT A PROBLEM.

THE REBUTTAL: WRONG, WRONG, WRONG

16. ~~(c)~~ COMPLETELY SIDESTEPPING THE JRA ISSUE, KIM SYSTEMATICALLY REBUTTED SHEEHAN'S REPORT ON THE DPRK'S LINKS TO TERRORISM. WHILE THE DPRK DOES NOT HIDE THE FACT THAT IT SELLS ARMS, IT DENIES THAT IT HAS EVER SOLD ARMS TO THE ORGANIZATIONS SHEEHAN MENTIONED. THESE REPORTS ARE DERIVED FROM SOMEONE WHO WANTS TO DISGRACE THE DPRK, OR SIMPLY FROM A BAD SOURCE. THE DPRK DOES NOT, KIM

CONTINUED, PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN IT NEEDS FOREIGN CURRENCY SO DESPERATELY. LASTLY CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS NOT IN THE DPRK'S INTERESTS; THESE REPORTS ARE ALSO FALSE.

CHICKEN-EGG: REMOVAL BEFORE A HIGH LEVEL VISIT

17. ~~(c)~~ WHILE KIM AGREED ON THE NEED TO ESTABLISH CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE DISAGREED WITH THE SEQUENCING LAID OUT BY SHEEHAN. CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND COOPERATION DO NOT COME THROUGH THE REMOVAL PROCESS, BUT RATHER COME FROM THE USG'S 'REMOVAL OF THE DPRK'S TERRORIST CAP.' KIM STRESSED THAT A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT SHOULD BE A CULMINATION NOT COMMENCEMENT OF THE REMOVAL PROCESS. HE SHARED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE SUGGESTION THAT A CLOCK WOULD START TICKING AT A LATER DATE, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS BEEN WORKING THIS ISSUE FOR YEARS. HE'D LIKE TO FIND A SOLUTION WHILE SHEEHAN IS STILL IN OFFICE; THEREFORE WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE CLOCK TICKING SINCE MARCH 9, THE DATE OF THE LAST SHEEHAN-KIM MEETING. STRESSING THAT THERE DOESN'T NEED TO BE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CLOCK, KIM SAID 'IF THE PRESIDENT THINKS NORTH KOREA IS NOT A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, HE CAN MAKE THE DECISION ANY TIME.'

COMMENT

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18. ~~(c)~~ ALTHOUGH CANTANKEROUS AT TIMES, THE DISCUSSION SHOWED SEVERAL OPENINGS, WHICH THE USG CAN EXPLOIT. FIRST, DESPITE A SEEMINGLY FACE-SAVING DENIAL OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, THE DPRK SHOWED WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO AND BUY INTO THE US PROCESS, WHICH IS ULTIMATELY MORE IMPORTANT THAN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE SPECIFICS OF PAST INFORMATION ABOUT SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS. OUR PRIMARY CONCERNS ARE THAT THE DPRK RECTIFY THE JRA ISSUE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY FUTURE CONTACTS WITH FTOS.

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SHEEHAN RECOMMENDED TWO IMMEDIATE NEXT STEPS: OPENING A CHANNEL IN NY TO DISCUSS TERRORISM CONCERNS AND PREPARING A JOINT STATEMENT FOR RELEASE AS A HIGH-LEVEL VISIT.

5. ~~(S)~~ DEFENDING US INFORMATION ABOUT NORTH KOREAN ARMS TRANSFERS, SHEEHAN ARTICULATED HIS BELIEF THAT THIS IS NOT DISINFORMATION AND THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE MORE INFORMATION ON THESE REPORTS. NOTING OUR DIALOGUE WITH ONE OTHER STATE SPONSOR, SHEEHAN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ABLE TO DIALOGUE OPENLY REGARDLESS OF DIFFERENCES OF ASSESSMENTS. (NOTE: SHEEHAN DID NOT REVEAL THE OTHER STATE SPONSOR. END NOTE.) SHEEHAN PREVIEWED THE SALIENT POINTS OF THE PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT, INCLUDING 1) PLEDGING MUTUAL OPPOSITION TO ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM, 2) ACCEPTING OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS UN STATES TO OPPOSE ALL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, 3) SHOWING THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL AVIATION AND MARITIME NAVIGATION, 4) SUPPORTING UN CONVENTIONS, 5) OPPOSING TERRORIST GROUPS AND ENSURING

TERRORISTS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE; AND 6) EXPRESSING US INTENTION TO REMOVE NORTH KOREAS FROM THE LIST OF STATE SPONSORS IF ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING, SHEEHAN PROMISED TO SEND IMMEDIATELY A DRAFT STATEMENT TO NY FOR DPRK REVIEW. ON HIS WAY BACK TO TOKYO, SHEEHAN WILL URGE THE JAPANESE TO WORK WITH THE US AND DPRK TO FIND A CREATIVE WAY TO SOLVE THE JRA ISSUE, NOTING THAT 'THREE GREAT GOVERNMENTS HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO SOLVE THIS.'

DESPITE PROTEST, DPRK AGREES

6. ~~(C)~~ RETURNING FROM THE BREAK, KIM AGREED TO BOTH NEXT STEPS, BUT ONLY AFTER LAUNCHING INTO ANOTHER ROUND OF HARD-LINE NORTH KOREAN RHETORIC. ECHOING HIS STATEMENTS FROM THE FIRST DAY, KIM SAID NORTH KOREA OPPOSED TERRORISM, THE US MUST REMOVE THE 'TERRORIST CAP STUMBLING BLOCK,' AND HE IS COMMITTED TO COOPERATE 'WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY.' HE INITIALLY OPPOSED THE NY CHANNEL BECAUSE IT WAS USELESS TO DISCUSS THE US' BASELESS ASSERTIONS OF ARMS SALES TO FTOS. THAT SAID, HE WOULD CONSIDER THE CHANNEL ONLY AS A MEANS TO RAISE NEW ISSUES, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE REVIEW PROCESS BEGINS. (NOTE: THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME KIM DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF STARTING A 'SIX MONTH CLOCK' IN THE FUTURE. END NOTE.) HE WOULD PASS OFFICIAL APPROVAL OF THIS CHANNEL THROUGH THEIR NY OFFICE.

7. ~~(C)~~ ON THE JOINT STATEMENT, KIM INITIALLY OPPOSED THE IDEA SAYING THAT NORTH KOREA'S RECENT STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM MAKE A US-DPRK STATEMENT UNNECESSARY. HE WOULD CONSIDER MAKING A STATEMENT ONLY IF IT WERE A STRONG REFLECTION OF US COMMITMENT TO REMOVE NORTH KOREA FROM THE LIST. HE WOULD REPORT BACK ON HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THIS. HE WARNED THE US NOT TO ALLOW PROGRESS ON REMOVAL TO BE STALLED BY A NORTH KOREAN-JAPANESE BILATERAL ISSUE, NAMELY THE JRA; LINKING THE TWO WOULD, IN ESSENCE, EMPOWER JAPAN TO DICTATE US-DPRK RELATIONS.

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US - NOT JAPAN - IN CHARGE

8. (C) SHEEHAN EXPRESSED US APPRECIATION FOR THE DPRK'S WILLINGNESS TO OPEN A CHANNEL AND COOPERATE ON A JOINT

STATEMENT. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE THAT A JOINT STATEMENT WOULD SEND TO TERRORISTS. IT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EMERGING POLICY OF NON-HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE US AND THE DPRK. ON THE JRA, SHEEHAN ASSURED KIM THAT THE US, NOT JAPAN, WOULD MAKE THE FINAL ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA'S BEHAVIOR. AS FOR FOLLOW-UP SHEEHAN PROMISED TO SEND LANGUAGE TO NY EARLY NEXT WEEK AND WOULD ALSO SUGGEST DATES FOR A SEPTEMBER MEETING IN NY TO FINALIZE THE JOINT STATEMENT AND TIMETABLE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THESE ISSUES SINCE TIME IS VERY SHORT.

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
USCINCPAC FOR FPA
NSC FOR CLARKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: (JAPAN-DPRK NORMALIZATION)
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINR, JA, KN, KS
SUBJECT: S/CT SHEEHAN MEETING ON DPRK TERRORISM WITH MOFA
DG MAKITA

REF: TOKYO 4641

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JAMES J. FOSTER,
EMBASSY TOKYO. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: MEETING WITH MOFA ASIA DG MAKITA ON AUGUST
11, AMBASSADOR SHEEHAN DESCRIBED HIS AUGUST 9-10 DISCUSSIONS
WITH VFM KIM GYE GWAN ON THE ACTIONS NORTH KOREA MUST TAKE TO
BE REMOVED FROM THE U.S. TERRORISM LIST. ADDRESSING THE
JAPANESE ISSUES OF ABDUCTIONS AND HARBORING OF JRA FUGITIVES
IS ONE REQUIREMENT. SHEEHAN HAD STRESSED TO KIM THAT A
BREAKTHROUGH WAS POSSIBLE ON THE LATTER. HE ASKED MAKITA TO
CONSIDER CREATIVE SOLUTIONS, SUCH AS MAKING A DEAL TO RETURN
THE HIJACKERS TO JAPAN WITH PRIOR AGREEMENT ON WHAT SENTENCES
THEY WOULD RECEIVE. 25X6



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END SUMMARY

2. (SBU) COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AMBASSADOR MICHAEL
SHEEHAN DISCUSSED NORTH KOREA TERRORISM ISSUES WITH MOFA ASIA
BUREAU DIRECTOR-GENERAL KUNHIKO MAKITA ON AUGUST 11. OTHER
JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED NORTHEAST ASIA DIVISION
DIRECTOR UMEMOTO, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ISHIZUKI, AND OFFICIAL
TANI. S/CT SPECIAL ASSISTANT NICOLE BIBBINS, NSC OFFICIAL
PAUL KURTZ, AND POLOFF ALSO JOINED THE MEETING.

BRIEFING ON PYONGYANG TALKS

3. (S) SHEEHAN CHARACTERIZED HIS AUGUST 9-10 DISCUSSIONS IN
PYONGYANG WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM GYE GWAN AS GOOD AND
RELATIVELY FREE OF POLEMICS, WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS
CONVEYED DURING A ONE-ON-ONE CONVERSATION. SHEEHAN SAID HE

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HAD RAISED THREE TOPICS IN EXPLAINING WHAT PYONGYANG MUST DO TO BE REMOVED FROM THE U.S. LIST OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM. FIRST, HE HAD TOLD KIM THAT ARMS SALES TO GROUPS CONSIDERED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BY THE U.S. PRESENT A PROBLEM AND MUST BE HALTED. SECOND, SHEEHAN HAD HIGHLIGHTED ON-GOING PLANNING BY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF ACTIVITIES SUCH AS ASSASSINATIONS, AND URGED THAT KIM TALK TO THESE GROUPS. AS A THIRD CATEGORY, SHEEHAN HAD BROUGHT UP JAPANESE ISSUES, NAMELY ABDUCTIONS AND HARBORING OF JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA) MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE 1970 'YODO-GO' HIJACKING CASE. SHEEHAN TOLD MAKITA THAT HE HAD TOUCHED ONLY BRIEFLY ON ABDUCTIONS, STRESSING TO KIM THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE MATTER BILATERALLY WITH JAPAN AND AFFIRMING HIS COMPLETE TRANSPARENCY WITH TOKYO. HE HAD ALSO UNDERLINED THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF ABDUCTIONS IN JAPAN. KIM HAD NOT RESPONDED DIRECTLY, ONLY MENTIONING THE RED CROSS TALKS.

4. ~~(S)~~ SHEEHAN TOLD MAKITA HE HAD DISCUSSED THE JRA HIJACKERS AT MORE LENGTH, EMPHASIZING U.S. INTEREST IN SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION WORLDWIDE. KIM HAD COUNTERED, AS USUAL, THAT THE DPRK CONSIDERED THE CASE ONE OF POLITICAL ASYLUM. SHEEHAN HAD INFORMED KIM THAT IF NORTH KOREA WANTS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH WITH THE U.S. ON TERRORISM, RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF THE FOUR HIJACKERS STILL LIVING IN THE DPRK WOULD BE THE WAY TO ACHIEVE IT. THE RESULT WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND MORE FLEXIBILITY FOR THE SECRETARY. KIM HAD REMARKED THAT ONE HIJACKER IS ALREADY BACK IN JAPAN, AS THOUGH THE DPRK HAD PERMITTED THE RETURN. HE STATED THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE GOJ TO USE THESE ISSUES TO PUT A BRAKE ON U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS, A CONTENTION WITH WHICH SHEEHAN DISAGREED.

5. ~~(S)~~ SHEEHAN INFORMED MAKITA HE HAD TOLD KIM THAT IF THE DPRK AGREES TO MAKE A STATEMENT CONTAINING COMMITMENTS AGAINST SUPPORTING TERRORISM, IT COULD START THE CLOCK TICKING ON THE SIX MONTH PERIOD DURING WHICH THE DPRK MUST KEEP CLEAN FROM SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND FIND SOME RESOLUTION OF THE JRA ISSUE. AT THAT POINT THE USG WOULD EVALUATE ALL THREE CATEGORIES IN DECIDING WHETHER TO LIFT THE DESIGNATION. ON NEXT STEPS AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE GOJ, SHEEHAN SAID HE PLANS TO PROVIDE LANGUAGE FOR A PROPOSED STATEMENT TO THE NORTH KOREANS. THE TWO SIDES MIGHT DISCUSS IT THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER IN NEW YORK.

A DEAL WITH JAPAN ON HIJACKERS?

6. ~~(S)~~ AMBASSADOR SHEEHAN EXPLAINED TO DG MAKITA THAT HIS FOCUS WAS ON THE JRA HIJACKING BECAUSE THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT THE U.S. CITES IN ITS ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORTS. HE SAID HE IS LOOKING FOR SOME CREATIVE WAY TO PERSUADE THE NORTH KOREANS TO RETURN THE FOUR HIJACKERS TO JAPAN. SHEEHAN NOTED THAT THE ISSUE IS SOMEWHAT LESS COMPLICATED FOR THE U.S. BECAUSE NO ONE WAS KILLED IN THE HIJACKING INCIDENT. RECOGNIZING THAT HE IS UNABLE TO JUDGE JAPAN'S LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, SHEEHAN ASKED MAKITA TO CONSIDER THE IDEA OF PERHAPS HAVING THE HIJACKERS RETURNED TO TOKYO, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY, WITH PRIOR AGREEMENT ON WHAT PUNISHMENT THEY WOULD RECEIVE. HE ASKED MAKITA WHETHER

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HE SAW YOSHIMI TANAKA, ALREADY EXTRADITED TO JAPAN BY THAILAND ON JUNE 28 AND NOW FACING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (REFTEL), AS THE RINGLEADER OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE HIJACKING.

7. ~~(S)~~ SHEEHAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OTHER ACTIONS ARE ALSO NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE DPRK FROM THE LIST, AND THAT HE IS NOT SURE WHETHER KIM JONG IL WILL REALLY CHOOSE TO CRACK THE WHIP AND ENFORCE DISCIPLINE OVER THOSE INVOLVED IN ARMS SALES AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. HE STRESSED, NONETHELESS, THE IMPORTANT IMPETUS THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED IF THE DPRK WOULD RETURN THE HIJACKERS. SHEEHAN NOTED THAT JAPAN-DPRK NORMALIZATION TALKS BEGIN AUGUST 21, AND SAID THE NORTH KOREANS WILL BE LOOKING TO THE JAPANESE DELEGATION FOR SIGNALS ON WHETHER IT SHARES THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. ATTACHES TO THE JRA ISSUE.

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
COUNTERFEITING; PRESS LINE

15. ~~(S)~~ SHEEHAN THEN INFORMED MAKITA ABOUT ONE OTHER ISSUE HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH KIM IN PYONGYANG, NAMELY THE REQUIREMENT TO CEASE COUNTERFEITING CURRENCY AND FUNNELING PROCEEDS TO GROUPS LIKE THE IRA. KIM TOOK THIS ON WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. SHEEHAN SUGGESTED TO MAKITA THAT THE GOJ COULD OBTAIN MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON DPRK INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERFEITING FROM THE U.S. IN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.

16. (SBU) ON HOW THE GOJ WOULD RESPOND TO ANY PRESS INQUIRIES, 25X6 ASSURED SHEEHAN THAT MOFA WOULD STATE ONLY THAT IT RECEIVED A BRIEFING. HE NOTED THAT THE FACT THE MEETING TOOK PLACE WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED HERE.

COMMENT

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18. (U) AMBASSADOR SHEEHAN CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.
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