

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5216

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 16, 1993

*SRB/
JW - let's
discuss.
R*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: CHARLES KUPCHAN AND BARRY LOWENKRON

SUBJECT: NACC Summit



Issue: Whether to hold a NACC summit immediately following the NATO summit planned for early December.

PROS:

The central theme of the NATO summit will be NATO's adaptation and its relevance to security problems in the East. NACC is the principal symbol and instrument of NATO's eastward evolution; to have a NATO summit without a NACC summit would undercut the central message we are trying to send.

We need not only to develop a host of new programs in the East, but also to demonstrate that NATO countries see the states of CEE and the NIS as partners, not objects, in a new security relationship. We cannot have it both ways -- that is, declare NATO's adaptation to Europe's new security landscape and announce major initiatives toward the East, but do it in a Western "club" of 16. If we do want to unveil major initiatives (e.g., a NACC Charter, joint peacekeeping exercises, a peacekeeping training center in the East, establishment of a NACC Military Coordinating Committee), we need to do it with our partners to the East.

Bold initiatives are bound to touch neuralgic chords among some of our allies. A NACC summit would put pressure on them to address these issues now; it would combat the inertia and procrastination that have already constrained NATO's adaptation. Without the driving force provided by a NACC summit, a NATO gathering might only commission studies to be completed in anticipation of some future NACC meeting.

A NACC summit would be strongly supported by the new democracies in the East. Their enthusiasm would provide a further source of momentum behind our efforts to gain support for a robust package of initiatives among key NATO allies.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2016-140, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 05, 2018

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- If many of our key allies in NATO remain opposed to public discussion of NATO enlargement, strengthening NACC and its concrete functions in the East represents the most realistic way of dealing with security problems in CEE and the NIS. If we are not prepared to move ahead on expansion (a question that needs further study), then a NACC summit is essential to demonstrate that the body is evolving into a meaningful security structure.
- The President's trip to Europe represents an important opportunity for him to exercise international leadership. Although a NATO summit offers a good platform for Presidential leadership, a first-ever NACC summit at which the President unveils a bold package of initiatives will cut an even sharper image.
- As a rule, NACC ministerials follow immediately upon NATO-NAC ministerials. Before the decision to hold a NATO summit, the December NAC-NACC ministerials were going to be held back-to-back in Brussels. If we decide only on a NATO summit, we would either have to cancel the NACC ministerial or have it take place after the NATO summit leaders leave Brussels. Either option only reinforces the perception among states in the East that their security concerns are being neglected and are of low priority. Either option also sends a powerful signal to our critics in Congress and in the press that NATO is carrying on "business as usual."
- State/Eur proposes that the NATO summit announce a NACC summit to be held next spring. The President, however, is already committed to a CSCE summit in Budapest next fall (the endgame of the next CSCE Review Conference). To plan on a NACC summit in 1994 would commit him to two multilateral security summits within six months.
- If the President decides to go to Moscow after the NATO summit without having seen CEE leaders at a NACC summit, he will have reaffirmed our links to our European allies and advanced our partnership with Russia, but bypassed the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
- A NACC summit would not place a heavy additional burden on the President's schedule. Assuming one day for the NATO summit, the following day for the NACC summit, and that evening for the EC summit, a NACC summit would add one-half days to the President's time in Brussels.

CONS:

- Our West European allies are looking to us to reaffirm the strength of the transatlantic link as embodied in NATO. A NACC summit would blur and divert attention from that central message.
- The proposals we are fleshing out for giving concrete meaning to our programs in the East need a great deal of

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~₃

work and close consultations with our key allies. In light of this burden, State/Eur believes we should lay out our ideas in broad terms at a NATO summit and use the first half of 1994 to refine them and rally support for them in preparation for a substantive NACC summit later next year.

- A NACC summit could raise expectations in the East that we are prepared to tackle the NATO expansion issue. CEE states in particular would be disappointed and disillusioned should we then fail to do so.
- If NATO summit results are more modest than we would like, a NACC summit could fuel rather than dispel the perception that NATO members are serious about their engagement in the East.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COLLETON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY