



Moving Toward NATO Expansion

We have two months to (a) refine USG thinking about our basic goals and rationale for NATO expansion; (b) conduct initial consultations with the Allies (and, subsequently, with the Russians, Ukrainians and CEEs); and (c) based on (a) and (b), prepare an initiative for the December NATO Ministerial that would kick off a formal process within the Alliance to define an agreed policy framework for NATO expansion. Holbrooke's much heralded IWG is off to a slow and acrimonious start. We should develop a consensus among ourselves about USG direction and tactics, based on our work to date and our thinking post-Yeltsin Summit, the better to help lead State, OSD and JCS. A summary of where NSC staff members stand* and unresolved issues follows:

I. Agreed elements

Objectives.

- Develop an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but going beyond NATO expansion.
- In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the more advanced CEEs, with the prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.
- In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia (and something similar between NATO and Ukraine). This could take the form of a Treaty (an alliance with the Alliance) or of associate membership.
- New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and would commit to eventual full integration in NATO's military structures, but there would be a flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces.
- NATO expansion should take place in coordination with enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable.

Rationale

- To project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE, we need to create a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to membership for some PFP members.

* This paper reflects the views of Sandy Vershbow, Nick Burns and Dan Fried. Dick Schifter favors a more cautious approach; his views are attached.

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- To make clear expansion is not seen as directed against any country, process must be developed in parallel with long-term strategy vis-à-vis Russia/Ukraine that includes continued partnership with NATO and development of other institutions (CSCE, G-8).
- Expansion process will be evolutionary and linked to a continued PFP as mechanism for relations with countries not obtaining membership in first group.
- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On contrary, possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly (pace Volker Rühle).

Criteria

- Avoid explicit checklist (e.g. military requirements); stick to "precepts" -- democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly security policies.
- On military side, general goal of "interoperability" will be refined as PFP evolves.

Timing

- For own planning purposes, anticipate earliest explicit decision on new members no sooner than first half of second Clinton term.
- Should avoid proposing specific timetable at this stage, or identifying which countries are likely to be included or excluded from the first group.
- During interim:
 - o Use PFP (reinforced by U.S. bilateral security assistance) to deepen relations with all partners, potential members and others, and to promote interoperability.
 - o Watch for progress vis-à-vis "precepts."
 - o Begin to establish the functional building blocks of the future enhanced relationships between NATO and Russia/Ukraine; consult with Moscow and Kiev on best way to institutionalize this relationship.

- o Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, both internally and with them (e.g. pace of military integration, forward deployment, "German solutions" such as temporary restrictions on stationed forces deployment on new CEE members' territory).

II. Fall Strategy

(Notional) Objectives at NAC Ministerial.

- Statement of "precepts" for potential new members.
- Affirmation that, in the context of these precepts, PFP is the path to membership, as well as an important mechanism for cooperation in its own right.
- Tasking by Ministers to the NAC to initiate a formal review to establish an Alliance policy framework for expansion, including role of PFP, evolution of relations with countries who do not seek or obtain membership.
- Statement of new, more ambitious goals for expanded NATO relationship with Russia and Ukraine in addition to PFP (implicitly foreshadowing ~~"alliance with the Alliance"~~ as alternative to membership track).
- Announcement of ambitious PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (including broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike.

Outline of discussions.

- o Road map:
 - 1) Quad (mid-to-late October);
 - 2) Unreinforced brainstorming session at NATO (late October);
 - 3) Interagency team to Quad and other key allied capitals (Rome, The Hague -- early November);
 - 4) Reinforced NAC to prepare for Ministerial (mid-November);

- 5) Interagency team to Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw and other CEE (Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Baltics -- late November)
- 6) NAC and NACC Ministerials (December 1-2).
- 7) Bilaterals to explain Ministerial decisions with Russians, Ukrainians, CEE leaders on margins of NACC Ministerial and Budapest CSCE Summit (December 5-6)

o Themes

- With Allies: seek consensus on above objectives.
- With Russia/Ukraine: continue dialogue on rationale for NATO expansion, compatibility with goal of inclusive European security system; lay groundwork for development of special relationship/alliance with the Alliance.
- With CEEs: outline way ahead; lay down precepts; review military implications (e.g. extent of integration NATO will require); make clear candidates and timetable are still open questions; stress need for them to support positive parallel track for Russia/Ukraine.