
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### MOVING TOWARD NATO EXPANSION

We have less than two months to (a) refine USG thinking about our basic goals and rationale for NATO expansion; (b) conduct initial consultations with the Allies (and, subsequently, with the Russians, Ukrainians and CEEs); and (c) based on (a) and (b), prepare an initiative for the December NATO Ministerial that would kick off a formal process within the Alliance to define an agreed policy framework for NATO expansion. The following is a summary of NSC views on USG direction and tactics, based on interagency work to date and our own thinking post-Yeltsin Summit:

I. <u>Policy Framework</u>

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

Objectives

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- Develop an integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, including but going beyond NATO expansion.

In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the major CEEs who live up to our precepts, with the prospect of further expansion to those not admitted in the first tranche.

<sup>7</sup>In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia. This could take the form of a Treaty (an "alliance with the Alliance"). It should include a mechanism for consulting with Russia on NATO or NATO-led military operations as in ex-Yugoslavia, but without giving Russians a veto over NATO decisions.

Possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and Baltic States should be maintained; we should not consign them to a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence.

New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities of current members (full Article V guarantee) and would commit to eventual full integration in NATO's military structures; but full integration would not be required at the outset and there would be flexibility on operational issues such as stationing of foreign forces.

NATO expansion should take place in coordination with the enlargement of the EU, but should not be delayed to match the EU's likely timetable.

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### Rationale

- To project stability eastward and to underpin the democratic reform process in CEE, we need to create a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to Alliance membership for some PFP members.

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- To make clear expansion is not seen as directed against any country, process must be developed in parallel with long-term strategy vis-à-vis Russia that includes intensified partnership with NATO and development of other institutions (CSCE, G-8).
- Expansion process will be evolutionary and linked to a continued, robust PFP as mechanism both for preparing new members and for deepening relations with countries not likely to attain membership or, at least, not among the first group to join.
- "Insurance policy"/"strategic hedge" rationale (i.e., neo-containment of Russia) will be kept in the background only, rarely articulated. On contrary, possibility of membership in the long term for a democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly, as the President and Yeltsin agreed (*pace* Volker Rühe).

### Criteria

- -- Avoid explicit checklist (e.g. military requirements); stick to "precepts" -- democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly security policies.
- -- On military side, general goal should be interoperability with NATO forces, with precise standard to be refined as PFP evolves.
- -- Standardization with NATO forces should be longer-term objective, but need not be attained at time of accession.

### Timing

-- For own planning purposes, should anticipate earliest explicit NATO decision on new members to be taken no sooner than first half of second Clinton term.

-- But we should avoid proposing specific timetable at this stage, or identifying which countries are likely to be included or excluded from the first group.

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### During interim:

Use PFP (reinforced by U.S. bilateral security assistance) to deepen relations with all partners, potential members and others, and to promote interoperability. (Issue for decision: how to set priorities for use of \$30 million in FY95 and the expected \$100 million in FY96 for PFP support, and to meet the President's commitment of \$10 million for the Baltic Battalion in FY'95.)

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o Watch for progress vis-à-vis "precepts."

 Begin to establish the functional building blocks of the future enhanced relationships between NATO and Russia; consult with Moscow on best way to institutionalize this relationship.

Keep the membership door open for Ukraine, Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria (countering Allied inclinations to "tilt" in favor of the Visegrad countries), while stressing that all candidates must satisfy the same precepts.

Develop Allied thinking about military requirements for potential new members, both internally and with them (e.g. pace of military integration, forward deployment, "German solutions" such as temporary restrictions on stationed forces deployment on new CEE members' territory).

### II. Fall Strategy

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(Notional) Objectives at NAC Ministerial.

- -- Statement of "precepts" for potential new members.
- Affirmation that, in the context of these precepts, PFP is the path to membership, as well as an important mechanism for cooperation in its own right.
- Tasking by Ministers to NAC to initiate a formal review to establish Alliance policy framework for expansion, including political/security rationale, military requirements, role of PFP, evolution of relations with countries who do not seek or obtain membership.

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Statement of new, more ambitious goals for expanded NATO relationship with Russia in addition to PFP (implicitly foreshadowing "alliance with the Alliance" as alternative to membership track),

- Announcement of ambitious PFP and NACC work programs for 1995-96 (including broader range of field exercises, CPXes, defense planning activities, political consultations) to signify acceleration of integration process -- for future members and non-members alike.
- At CSCE Summit, seek adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE as mechanism for conflict prevention and crisis management as a key element of broader strategy of building an inclusive European security system in which Russia plays a major role.

### **Outline of discussions.**

- o Road map:
  - 1) Consultations with UK, Germany, France (mid-to-late October)
  - 2) Únreinforced brainstorming session at NATO (late October)
  - 3) Interagency team to London, Paris, Bonn and other key allied capitals (Rome, The Hague -- October-November)
  - 4) Reinforced NAC to prepare for Ministerial (mid-November)
  - 5) Interagency team to Moscow, Kiev, Warsaw and other CEE (Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Baltics and, possibly, Bratislava and Sofia -- late November)
  - NAC/NACC Ministerials (December 1-2): NAC issues communique or declaration on NATO expansion; NATO decision briefed to partners at NACC.
  - 7) CSCE Summit in Budapest (December 5-6): Adoption of U.S. initiatives to strengthen CSCE.
  - 8) Bilaterals with Russians, Ukrainians, CEEs on margins of NACC and CSCE, *and/or* dispatch high-level briefing team to Moscow, Kiev and CEE capitals as we did after NATO Summit.
- o Themes

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With Allies: seek consensus on above objectives; discuss military implications (building upon October 7 OSD/JCS briefing).

With Russia: continue dialogue on rationale for NATO expansion, compatibility with goal of inclusive European security system; lay groundwork for development of special relationship/alliance with the Alliance; consult on agenda for strengthened CSCE.

With CEEs, Baltics, Ukraine: outline way ahead; lay down precepts; review military implications (e.g. extent of integration NATO will require -- drawing on OSD/JCS briefing); make clear candidates and timetable are still open questions; stress need for them to support positive parallel track for Russia.

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