MEMORANDUM FOR SHARON FAWCETT, ASSISTANT ARCHIVIST, OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

From: Ronald H. Walker, Chairman and President, Richard Nixon Foundation  
Date: August 2, 2010  
Subject: Response to Draft Watergate Exhibit

We appreciate the opportunity to offer review and comment on Dr. Timothy Naftali’s proposed Watergate exhibit.

When finalized, this exhibit will occupy the largest space devoted to a single issue in the Nixon Library. The content and design of the exhibit are obviously of great interest to the National Archives, the Nixon Foundation, the history community, the media, and the general public. It is likely true that no new exhibit in any presidential library will attract the level of scrutiny and attention that this new exhibit is likely to receive.

Accordingly, we have devoted considerable time and resources to reviewing the proposed material. Our goal has been to offer a specific and constructive set of comments for your consideration. To pull together such a response I asked several people to review the material. Serving on the team were Bob Bostock, Dwight Chapin, Frank Gannon, Tod Hullin, and Sandy Quinn. We also benefited from the independent submission by Geoff Shepard. The review team has spent countless hours analyzing the proposed exhibit, performing independent research, and developing the comments we present in this memo.

Our response is organized as follows:

- Identify our shared goals for the exhibit;

- Comments on the process used in drafting the exhibit;

- General comment on the proposed exhibit as a whole;

- Discussion of the “special environment” in which the Nixon Library operates;

- Suggestions for collaboration on future exhibits; and
• An alternate approach to the Watergate exhibit

We also attach our specific comments regarding the proposed exhibit text to this memo for your consideration. That section includes our concerns about the draft text and proposes revised text to address those concerns. We are sensitive to the need to keep the length of the exhibit text largely within the confines of the design scheme and our proposed revisions reflect that.

Shared Goals for the Exhibit

The Foundation concurs with Dr. Naftali’s oft-stated goal for this exhibit: to give visitors the information they need to draw their own conclusions about Watergate. That opportunity can only be offered through a fair and balanced presentation that provides visitors with information that will allow them to evaluate the actions of those involved and the historical context in which they acted.

This approach is consistent with what we believe visitors expect and want. We have found over the past 20 years that visitors come to the Nixon Library expecting to learn more about the life and career of President Nixon and about the times in which he governed. We have also found that most visitors expect the exhibits to reflect favorably on President Nixon — a feeling we believe to be true across the entire presidential library system. Nevertheless, we recognize that the credibility of the exhibits as a whole, and of each exhibit specifically, requires a certain balance.

We also know from experience that our visitors are interested in exhibits that engage their minds and their critical thinking ability – that they like exhibits that will teach them something they didn’t already know and get them to think about something in ways they might not have done previously. That is consistent with our expectation that visitors will leave the Library with a deeper understanding of the President’s life and career, his highs and lows, as well as of the historical forces that helped to shape it.

The Foundation shares your thesis of the evolution of exhibits in presidential libraries: When libraries first open they strongly reflect the point of view and perspective of the president whom they honor and whose supporters and friends have financed the creation of the facility.
That was certainly true of the Nixon Library and its treatment of Watergate when it opened. It is also true of the Clinton Library, which still treats President Clinton’s impeachment as driven by raw politics and does not, in any meaningful way, acknowledge President Clinton’s own failings that led to his impeachment.

We also agree that as time passes, the exhibits should change and evolve, not only to take advantage of the latest methods in exhibit practices and to include newly released historical information, but also to reflect a more balanced view of each presidency.

The Foundation accepts that the new exhibit on Watergate will not take the same advocacy approach the museum’s original Watergate exhibit took and will instead reflect a more balanced view of the entire matter.

**Process for Developing the Draft Exhibit**

The Foundation regrets that the process for developing the draft exhibit was not collaborative. We are convinced that had we been given the opportunity to collaborate in a meaningful way in the development of this exhibit it would be much closer to completion than it is today.

We fully recognize that, as a legal matter, the National Archives controls the exhibit space and has the right to place in that space whatever it deems appropriate. We believe, however, that in the interest of furthering the sort of cooperative and collaborative relationship that is the hallmark of the most successful examples of partnership between NARA and library foundations, the process would have benefited from consultation during the lengthy drafting process.

We were also concerned when the draft exhibit was presented to us (absent any citations and any of the various video snippets) with the request that we return our comments in one week’s time. We wanted to be certain that we would be able to respond in a thoughtful, constructive, and specific way, which is why we asked for additional time.

We appreciate your decision to grant us six weeks to undertake our review and to “stop the clock” on the process until we were in possession of the completed version. Although we have continued to receive material for review after the clock was started – and were still
receiving materials as late as July 7th – we have worked hard to meet your six-week timetable. We consider your decision to grant us additional time to be a sincere expression of your desire to build a collaborative process for this exhibit and for others going forward.

In sum, we understand some of the reasons for the dilemma in which we find ourselves, and do not consider ourselves to be blameless. But we do wish we could start over, because we believe we could contribute to a more balanced and attractive exhibit.

**General Comments on the Exhibit**

As we detail in our specific comments and suggestions on the exhibit text (which follows this memo), we have serious concerns that the draft exhibit does not meet our shared goal of giving visitors the information they need to reach their own conclusions about Watergate.

**Lack of Context:** We believe that the overall impression the exhibit leaves is that President Nixon and members of his White House staff committed a broad series of unprecedented acts in violation of the law, people’s civil rights, and the Constitution, and that they acted without any possible justification, precedent, or reason – save their own deep seated and unwarranted paranoia about imagined enemies and conspiracies against them.

By failing to include any information about acts of a similar nature undertaken by previous presidents and their administrations; by neglecting to put into historical context the times in which Watergate unfolded; by not including any of the explanations offered by the President for various actions; and, by using "snippets" of oral histories to support its interpretive point of view, the draft exhibit fails to give visitors the information they need to reach their own conclusions.

The Foundation believes that a fair and balanced presentation would include information that puts the actions undertaken by the President and members of his administration in context. Such things as warrantless wiretaps, FBI background checks, and IRS audits against political opponents ---not to mention the taping of conversations--- were neither originated by nor unique to the Nixon Administration. This context – these facts of history – should be included to provide visitors with an opportunity to reach their own conclusions about Watergate.
To be clear, we are not proposing an “everyone else did it so what’s the big deal” point of view. But for visitors to understand the context in which Watergate unfolded they must understand that such activities were not unique in nature or scope. Indeed, as the Church Committee found, prior administrations made far greater use of many such tactics than the Nixon Administration.

Visitors must also be informed about the external domestic political and geopolitical forces that were at work and the goals that were being pursued during the Nixon Administration to help them gain a richer, contextual understanding of the pressures under which the President and members of his administration were laboring. The draft exhibit is absent any such background information.

**Use of “Snippets”:** In addition, the Foundation formally objects to the use in this exhibit of “snippets” from the lengthy oral interviews conducted by Dr. Naftali or his designee. Our objection is primarily based on the fact that the intended use of such snippets was not disclosed to the participants in advance of the interviews and that consent for such use has apparently not been properly obtained.

At our request, Dr. Naftali provided us with a copy of the “Gift of Oral History Interview” document signed by participants in the oral interviews (we were provided the deed signed by George Shultz as a representative example of the form that was used to obtain consent). We note that the “Gift” document conveys the interview to NARA “for eventual deposit” with NARA and that the Donor’s wish is that the “Interview be made available for research as soon as possible, and to the fullest extent possible, following its deposit with NARA.”

This document clearly does not disclose to the donor the intention by NARA to use brief excerpts from the interview as part of a public exhibit. Indeed, it specifically states that the interview will be “deposited” with NARA “for research” and “to the fullest extent possible.” Using excerpts in a public exhibit is clearly not something contemplated by the language in the “Gift” document.

Furthermore, the Oral History Association, in its guidelines in effect when the interviews were conducted, states specifically in Section 1.3.1 Responsibility to Interviewees: “1. Interviewees should be informed of the purposes and procedures of oral history in general and of the aims and anticipated uses of the particular projects to which they are making their contributions.”
The integrity of the oral interview process depends on the interviewees being fully and fairly informed about the use of the interview. It is clear to us that both NARA’s own “Gift” document and the professional standards in place at the time the interviews were conducted do not support the use of brief “snippets” of these oral histories in this exhibit.

To remedy this significant deficiency in the process, we urge that each oral history interviewee be provided with the “snippet” that is being proposed for use, as well as the text surrounding that “snippet”. We also believe that specific informed consent should then be obtained from interviewees both for the particular “snippet” proposed for the exhibit and for its intended use in the specific context of the Watergate exhibit.

It would be a real loss to history if future potential interviewees declined to participate in any NARA-sponsored oral history project because they had concerns about whether the product of the interview would be used in an unexpected way.

The “Special Environment” in which the Nixon Library Operates

The Foundation recognizes that the fact that President Nixon resigned – the first and so far only president to do so – means that the history of his presidency as presented in the museum context will always have to include a significant discussion of the events that led to his resignation.

The Foundation also expects that the approach that NARA takes in presenting the history of the Nixon presidency should be roughly similar to that taken at other presidential libraries at similar stages in their life cycles. This means that the exhibits should be fair and balanced, neither exclusively hagiographic nor unrelentingly negative.

In an effort to better understand the context in which the Nixon Library operates, Bob Bostock, a member of our review team visited the Kennedy, Carter, and Reagan libraries, both to see the exhibits and to speak with senior leaders at their foundations or libraries. He visited the Kennedy Library to see how it covers the controversies (both contemporary and historical) of the Kennedy presidency, given the fact its permanent exhibits were redone in 1993, 14 years after its initial opening (in the mature phase of a library’s life cycle). He visited the Carter and Reagan Libraries to explore how each tackles the more
controversial aspects of its president’s time in office, and, more important, to learn more about the process for developing new exhibits. We find this particularly relevant since the Carter Library recently completely redid its permanent exhibits and the Reagan Library is in the process of doing so.

As a result of these visits, we are concerned that the draft of the Watergate exhibit represents a distinct and significant departure from the way in which the most controversial aspects of those other presidencies are treated at those libraries. It is clear to us that the tone of the proposed Watergate exhibit is decidedly and substantially more negative than that taken at the other libraries visited. The differences between the two are real, substantial, and undeniable.

But rather than discuss that in this document, we will contrast the process used at the Carter and Reagan Libraries for developing their entirely new (recently opened and soon-to-be-opened respectively) exhibits with the process used at the Nixon Library. The process undertaken by Dr. Naftali was not at all comparable to that used by his counterparts in Atlanta and Simi Valley.

Joanne Drake at the Reagan Foundation and Dave Stanhope at the Carter Library each described a highly collaborative process for developing the new exhibits at their respective institutions. From the beginning, both the Reagan Foundation and the Carter Center have been deeply involved with NARA in all aspects of the development of the new permanent exhibits.

Their process included numerous meetings over many months at which topics, design content, and tone were discussed, debated, and eventually agreed to by NARA leadership at the library and by the private, non-profit institution supporting the library. The process has been collaborative, collegial, and cooperative and was seen as such by foundation leadership at the Reagan Library and by NARA leadership at the Carter Library.

We also understand that rather than the exhibits being written by the directors of those libraries, the Reagan Foundation itself is the author of the new exhibits currently being finalized at the Reagan Library and that the Carter Library hired an outside historian, jointly agreed upon by NARA and the Carter Center, to write the text of its new exhibits.

We learned from both Ms. Drake and Mr. Stanhope that while there have been occasional disagreements between NARA and the respective
non-profit at each library, in each case the goodwill engendered by the collaborative process enabled any issues to be resolved without creating any breaches in the relationships.

In contrast, the process used in developing the Watergate exhibit was without any meaningful collaboration. The Nixon Foundation was not invited to participate in any phase of the development of this proposed exhibit. Only when the exhibit was deemed completed (the design elements at a very advanced state, the text substantially done, and the “snippets” already chosen) were we given any opportunity to review and comment (and initially that opportunity appeared to be a less than sincere attempt to engage us in a truly collaborative fashion).

Given that the Nixon Library is a part of the National Archives presidential library system, we believe that it is reasonable for us to expect that the development of new exhibits should be a collaborative process in which both NARA and the Nixon Foundation make a sincere effort to listen to and engage the other. The fact that this exhibit was developed without any meaningful collaboration calls into question the validity of the process that was used.

We are convinced that both this particular exhibit and the interests of our long-term partnership would be better served by using this draft as a launching point for more extensive collaboration, rather than considering this response to be our final review of an exhibit that was essentially completed without any input on our part. The fact that we are including specific comments and analysis of the current draft should not in any way be considered an acceptance – much less an endorsement – of it.

Rather, we are providing numerous specific factual corrections and substantive suggestions to the proposed exhibit in order to indicate the extent and degree of our very serious concerns about it.

Collaborating in the Future

With 20 years having passed since the Library was opened, we recognize the need for a comprehensive renovation of all of the gallery spaces and exhibits. Advances in technology, the natural course of events, and revised perspectives on Richard Nixon’s life and career all suggest the need to revisit what Senator Dole called “The Age of Nixon” as presented by the Nixon Library.
As we look to work together on future exhibits, we believe that the practices followed at both the Carter and Reagan libraries can provide a good model for NARA and the Nixon Foundation.

We strongly believe that the Foundation should have the opportunity to participate in the preparation of future exhibits from the earliest part of the process. We also believe that such collaboration can and should begin now, with this exhibit, and not after this exhibit has been installed.

**Specific Comments on Proposed Draft Exhibit**

The Foundation has reviewed both the proposed design scheme and proposed exhibit text. We have decided not to offer any comments regarding the design at this point because form follows content, and our concerns about the text are so much more important.

Neither are we commenting in this document on what currently exists in the Watergate gallery. Our decision not to comment on these two items does not suggest an endorsement of them.

Our comments on the proposed exhibit text and the audio/video excerpts used are made in the document that follows. We incorporate much of what Geoff Shepard has already submitted (which details the thinking behind many of our suggested changes), while adding additional reasons for changing the text along with proposed revisions to the texts for your consideration.

We look forward to continuing our dialogue after you have had the chance to review our submission.

**An Alternate Approach to the Watergate Exhibit**

Although we have made extensive comments and suggestions on the draft of the exhibit that was provided to us, we also want to comment on the approach taken by Dr. Naftali in constructing his narrative for the exhibit.

We were interested to learn from Dr. Naftali’s presentation in Charlottesville on June 23 that he considers himself obliged by statute [the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of
1974] to make the Library’s Watergate Exhibit as complete and accessible as possible a catalog of the abuses of power of the Nixon administration.

In other words: not so much a Watergate Exhibit as a broad treatment of the various so-called “White House Horrors.”

Dr. Naftali is certainly correct that PRMPA, in Sec. 104 (Regulations Relating to Public Access) charges the Archivist with

the need to provide the public with the full truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of governmental power popularly identified under the generic term “Watergate.”

It is important to note, however, that PRMPA deals specifically with the National Archives’ archival responsibility to safeguard, preserve, and promulgate these Nixon abuses of power papers and tapes by making them easily accessible to citizens and scholars. NARA has been meeting that requirement for many years; indeed, the process is ongoing, and it will be greatly facilitated by the opening of the new building at Yorba Linda that will finally house all the Nixon presidential materials together in one place.

The extrapolation of PMPRA’s “abuses of power” archival criterion to govern the Nixon Library’s Watergate Exhibit seems to be an overly broad reading by Dr. Naftali of the intent of the statute. We are concerned that this interpretation has rendered the proposed exhibit needlessly complex and confusing. It lacks a discernable narrative thread, it leaves out much of the touchstones that entered the language and the culture during the Watergate period, and nowhere does it provide President Nixon’s point of view on Watergate, either in its particulars or in its broader sense.

The tacit assumption in this Exhibit text is that Nixon’s conspiratorial mindset is self-evident; and the tacit attitude of this Exhibit text is that Nixon’s “conspiracy thinking” was paranoid. Those are hardly uncommon opinions; they may well be so; and they are certainly arguable. They are, however, far from proven.

If a case is going to be made that Nixon exhibited conspiracy thinking – and especially if that case is going to be the basis on which the National Archives’ Nixon Presidential Library’s Watergate Exhibit is going to be based – then a lot more thought and space needs to be devoted right up front to defining and explaining exactly what
conspiracy thinking was; about how and why and when it developed; and about how and why it was or wasn’t (or the degrees to which it was or wasn’t) justified and/or relevant to each of the examples that will be adduced to illustrate it.

As the saying goes, even paranoids have enemies, and if conspiracy thinking is going to be the foundation of the case against Nixon, then at the very least he deserves to have some evidence presented to explain (if not support) his view of things. The one point of view missing from this Watergate Exhibit is Richard Nixon’s.

Perhaps nothing illustrates that better than this: of the 54 video “snippets” that the draft exhibit includes, only two feature President Nixon. This seems to us to a gross imbalance for an exhibit in the Nixon Library, particularly since there is so much material of available. By contrast, the Kennedy Library tells its story “through President Kennedy’s eyes and narrated in his voice.”

Some critics believe that the original Watergate exhibit went too far in representing Richard Nixon’s version of these events; this exhibit overcompensates by going 180 degrees in the opposite direction.

The draft exhibit is infused with a comfortable confidence of tone: Everybody knows that Nixon was brought down by his unreasonable (and, ironically, unnecessary) paranoia about the Kennedys and the media and the Jews and everybody else he thought was against him. The single sentence chosen for quotation from Nixon’s long farewell speech (“always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don't win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself”) is a perfect example of this attitude and technique at work.

But shouldn’t what will almost certainly be NARA’s most visible and controversial presidential library exhibit meet a higher, more rigorous intellectual and scholarly standard?

Museum and Library exhibits (and especially permanent exhibits on controversial subjects) don’t have to be – and shouldn’t be – deadly dull. User-friendliness is a valid and important consideration and even criterion. Nor are we suggesting that the Exhibit’s content should be scholastically neutered to excuse any of the crimes and misdeeds that fall under the Watergate umbrella. We are not trying to sanitize or even deodorize the subject matter. But we are suggesting that there is a level of intellectual rigor and objectivity that shouldn’t be sacrificed.
to accessibility or for the sake of illustrating a thesis (even one that seems to be so self-evident).

Watergate was a scandal unique to the Nixon administration. The Watergate Exhibit should tell that story – factually and as fully as necessary. But many of the other abuses of power were the 1969-1973 versions of practices that were neither unique nor uncommon with other presidential administrations before – or since. If they are going to be included under the rubric of Watergate, they need to be set in historical – and contemporary – context.

A SUGGESTED TEMPLATE FOR A WATERGATE EXHIBIT:
The topics that a Watergate exhibit should cover

- The break-in
- The cover-up
- The cover-up unravels
- The investigations
  - Senate Watergate (Ervin) Committee
  - House Judiciary Committee
  - Watergate Special Prosecution Force
- The role of the media
- The resignation
- The pardon

The approach to each topic should follow the time-honored way of telling a story by supplying the facts:

Who?
What?
Where?
When?

The remaining elements must be approached more carefully because they involve elements of interpretation:

Why?
How?
To the extent that the answers to these last two questions – why? and how? – are still the subjects of dispute and controversy, these answers may necessarily seem less complete; and, to many, less satisfactory. But facts are facts. And anything that isn’t a fact is an opinion.

This approach would also be fully consistent with the approach taken at the Carter Library to cover the Iran Hostage Crisis, which we know you see as a model for a mature presidential library.

SOME WATERGATE-RELATED PHRASES AND TOPICS THAT A WATERGATE EXHIBIT SHOULD EXPLAIN

- At that point in time
- Big Enchilada
- “Cancer on the presidency”
- Dirty tricks
- 18½ Minute Gap
- Deep Six
- Deep Throat
- Executive privilege
- Expletive Deleted
- Firestorm
- Follow the money
- Great Stone Face
- “I am not a crook”
- Modified Limited Hangout
- “My mother was a saint”
- Nobody drowned at Watergate
- Our long national nightmare
- Play in Peoria
- Rosemary stretch
- Saturday Night Massacre
- Sinister Forces
- Smoking gun
- Stonewall
- Twist slowly in the wind
- What did the President know and when did he know it?
- White House horrors
- Woodstein
SOME ELEMENTS THAT A WATERGATE EXHIBIT SHOULD CONTAIN

Photographs and biographies of the principal participants

News video footage of the major public events, including: President Nixon’s major Watergate-related speeches and news conferences;

Coverage of the major events on TV newscasts; the Ervin hearings; the Cox press conference; the House Judiciary Committee Impeachment hearings and votes, including Barbara Jordan’s remarks; the Nixon resignation and farewell speeches; the departure from the South Lawn; President Ford’s Inaugural Address; President Ford’s Pardon speech.

An opportunity to listen to Watergate tapes --- particularly the “smoking gun” and the “cancer on the presidency.”

Conclusion

Again, we want to thank you for affording us the opportunity to review and comment on the draft Watergate exhibit. We believe that our concerns, though numerous and considerable, should not prove to be an impediment to reaching common ground in advancing our common goal: giving visitors the information they need to make up their own minds about Watergate.

I look forward to hearing from you and to continuing our work together, both on this exhibit and in future exhibits.
Note: For ease in identifying the Foundation’s comments and suggested alternate text are shown in red in this font.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix
Introduction Panel Title: “Watergate”

Panel Type Ai.1
G-O1-O1

Sub Head: On August 9, 1974 President Richard Nixon became the first US President to resign from office. Why? What happened?

Main Text (105 words): A generation ago, the public witnessed the long, often confusing, unraveling of revelations about illegal wiretapping, break-ins, payoffs, political dirty tricks and other governmental abuses of power. This scandal, which started when five burglars were arrested on June 17, 1972, at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate office complex, ultimately led to a constitutional crisis. This exhibit is designed to help today’s visitor make sense of the web of personalities, actions and intentions at the heart of that story. It is up to you to decide how well our system of government worked back then and what, if any lessons, there are for us today.

Main Background Image: Photo of President Nixon giving resignation speech, August 8, 1974

Overall observations:
• “A generation ago” won’t work for a long-term exhibit; it’s already been almost 40 years. Specific dates might be better, i.e.: “For more than two years beginning in June 1972...”.
• “Revelations” do not “unravel”
• Casting the Watergate scandal as a series of abuses of power introduces too many extraneous issues. For example:
The warrantless wiretaps in question were not “illegal” at the time they were installed and were never found to be so by any court of law. Delete “illegal”.

“Payoffs” is a pejorative and ambiguous term with not usually associated with Watergate. The alleged payoff that occasioned the Vesco trial, for example, resulted in acquittals. Perhaps what is being referred to is the “hush money” controversy. One must remember that the Special Prosecutor conceded in the cover-up trial that such payments—in fact—went only for invoiced legal expenses and humanitarian aid. It was Dean, however, who alleged it also was intended to buy silence. This remains a complex issue that cannot simply be referred to as ‘payoffs’.

The introduction of “political dirty tricks” will require contextual changes and additions that are beyond the scope of the Exhibit.

There was no “constitutional crisis” in the proper sense of the word—there was no defiance of a Court Order or Act of Congress. Interestingly, this term is never referred to again in the exhibit. This was a media-coined term. There is no doubt that it was widespread and is still part of the conventional wisdom; but it doesn’t meet the requirements of a USG/NARA-endorsed exhibit. There was no constitutional crisis because, in every instance, President Nixon obeyed the law --- including compliance with the Supreme Court order to turn over the tapes that led to his resignation. The result, rather, was the President’s resignation.

Could say: “...what some observers came to call a constitutional crisis.” Would be more accurate to say “ultimately led to President Nixon’s resignation.”

Use of the term “web” is deliberately pejorative and inappropriate in this context. Should read: ...make sense of the personalities, actions, and events that have come to be known as “Watergate.”

Virtually all commentators have concluded that “our system of government worked” throughout the Watergate scandal. As such, it is difficult to understand the purpose of the exhibit in raising such a question—much less as announcing that as being its purpose.

*Proposed Revised Text:*

*On August 9, 1974, Richard Nixon became the first president to resign from office—and did so in the face of near certain*
impeachment by the House of Representatives and possible conviction after trial before the United States Senate. The principal reason for the President’s resignation was the Watergate scandal, which started when five burglars were arrested on June 17, 1972 at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate office complex in Washington, DC. This is the story of how the unfolding of that scandal changed America’s political landscape and forced the President—who had been re-elected by one of the biggest landslides in presidential history only 18 months before—to become the first President in history to resign. It’s up to you to decide whether the actions revealed during Watergate warranted President Nixon’s resignation or impeachment and removal from office and what, if any lessons there are for us today.

Section 1: “Road to Watergate, Conspiracy Thinking”

**Time Span:** June 1971 — September 1971

**Lead in Quote (15-25 words):**

“This is a Conspiracy,” President Nixon, July 1, 1971

This quote is taken out of context. As presented it appears to quote the President talking about Watergate, when he was, in fact, musing about a conspiracy to leak classified documents (the Pentagon Papers) for the purpose of undermining his foreign policy, specifically his efforts to bring American involvement in Vietnam to a close.

Because the visitor is neither told to whom these words were spoken, nor the context in which they were said, visitors could easily be misled into thinking that President Nixon had actually confessed to being involved in a conspiracy that led to Watergate. In addition, the use of the title, “Road to Watergate” suggests that Watergate was the product of a concern about leaks of classified material, when, the Watergate break-in was, in fact, apparently part of an effort to obtain political intelligence.

*We propose renaming the section, “The Roots of*
In June 1971 a climate of deep suspicion emerged in the White House that led to illegal activities. This subhead suggests that the entire White House staff was enveloped in a "climate of deep suspicion" that led to illegal activities. In fact, the leaking of the Pentagon Papers, and subsequent leaks about American negotiating positions in SALT talks, etc., caused the President and several of his top aides to become deeply concerned about the leaks and their potential to undermine national security. That concern led some members of the White House staff to undertake activities later found to be illegal.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Beginning in June 1971, deep concern about the leaking and publication of classified material eventually led some in the White House to commit activities that were later found to be illegal.*
Believing that he faced a dangerous conspiracy at home, President Nixon instructed his aides to form a special unit both to look for the group behind this national security leak and to discredit all of his perceived political enemies. Later known as “the Plumbers,” the Special Investigations Unit acted outside of the FBI and the CIA. Even after former Pentagon official Daniel Ellsberg made a public confession on June 28, 1971, President Nixon continued to press for action against a suspected anti-Nixon conspiracy. These presidential orders led to illegal actions and abuses of governmental power.

- Opening sentence is judgmental, conclusory and substantively incorrect.
- The White House is a building; buildings cannot act. The common usage of this term results primarily from formal announcements emanating from the White House Press Office—which is entirely appropriate. It is inappropriate, however, for others to attribute actions to “the White House” instead of to specific individuals. It is a convenient way of avoiding specificity and casts aspersions on the hundreds of people who worked in the White House without being involved in Watergate.
- Any discussion of the printing of the Pentagon Papers might better be accompanied by a full explanation of the buildup of American troop commitment to the Vietnam War; the massive protests that kept President Johnson from seeking a second term; the background and purpose of the Pentagon’s study; the devastating effect that leaks may have had on deployed assets, lives of US agents, encryption security, and the conduct of foreign affairs; and the role of Daniel Ellsberg and the fight over publication of the Papers.
- “and to discredit all of his perceived political enemies”—need to see citation to be sure it is correctly used in this context.
- “acted outside the FBI and the CIA”—statement requires clarification, since CIA did supply
disguises and other support, including Ellsberg’s psychological profile. A later quote from J. Edgar Hoover suggests the Plumbers initially sought his help. Also, the Exhibit may need to reference the Church Commission investigation into improper FBI/CIA activities under every President since FDR.

- As the Church Committee revealed, presidents from FDR forward had employed such tactics as warrantless wiretaps, covert actions, and infiltration to both uncover leaks and discredit political enemies. The Nixon Administration did not originate such tactics. In fact, there were fewer of these wiretaps during the Nixon Administration than during any since FDR’s.
- “suspected anti-Nixon conspiracy”—Documents clearly indicate that RN and Kissinger were at least equally motivated by the desire to stop leaks, even those that discredited the prior Administration, than to ferret out any “anti-Nixon conspiracy.”
- Concluding sentence is judgmental, conclusory and substantively incorrect.
- It seems appropriate to note that the self-coined informal—and humorous—moniker “plumbers” was derived from the fact that the group was intended to stop unauthorized leaks of governmental information.

Proposed Revised Text:

The publication of the top-secret Pentagon Papers led President Nixon to instruct his chief-of-staff, Bob Haldeman, to form a small group of White House staff members to both uncover the source of the illegal leaks and discredit those of his enemies who were undertaking similar efforts. This group, which humorously called itself “The Plumbers” (because its job was plugging leaks), worked outside usual law enforcement channels. Even after former Pentagon official Daniel Ellsberg confessed to being the source of the leak, President Nixon continued to press for action against others who might also have been involved. Although previous presidents had undertaken similar efforts, when the actions
undertaken as a result of this directive were later revealed, the public response was overwhelmingly negative.

BACKGROUND

Title: “Warrentless Wiretaps”
Date: May 1969-February 1971.

Body Text (140 words): The White House initiated warrantless wiretaps on three journalists and fourteen individuals on the National Security Council staff, in the State Department, in the Defense Department and on the White House staff. Some, but not all, of these wiretaps reflected concerns over national security leaks. According to a later Senate investigation, two of the wiretapped White House staffers were domestic advisers who did not have access to classified materials. And, in at least one case, the wiretaps on the NSC staff continued long after they had left government service. In June 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that warrantless wiretaps—those without a Court’s permission—violated the U.S. Constitution.

- “The White House is a building. . .” It is important to state who ordered the wiretaps and selected those whose phones were tapped. The Exhibit might also describe the circumstances of the leaks, the background on those being wiretapped, and what was discovered, if anything, from the taps. For example, the well-known journalist Joseph Kraft was believed to have had contacts with the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris.
- We need to see just which individuals are being discussed: Who were to two domestic advisors “who did not have access to classified materials?” Does this mean they did not have security clearances—or were not in contact with those who did? Which individual was tapped after leaving? What were the circumstances?
- Somehow, the idea that such taps were not considered illegal at the time is missing from the
Exhibit language. It seems appropriate to include the citation of the Supreme Court decision, as well as to point out that the taps in question were removed well before, or concurrently with, that decision.

- As the Church Committee revealed, presidents have long used warrantless wiretaps to uncover leaks or obtain information about political opponents.
- The average museum visitor will likely read the title as wiretaps without any reason. Suggest changing title as shown below

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: “Wiretaps without a Warrant”

Until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise in 1972, all administrations beginning with Franklin Roosevelt believed they had the authority to initiate wiretaps on individuals for national security purposes without a court order. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, for example, had authorized the placement of wiretaps and hidden microphones on Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s residence, two office telephones, and hotel rooms in an effort to find evidence of Communist influence on Dr. King’s civil rights activities. Attempting to uncover the sources of leaks involving national security issues from within the federal government, the Nixon Administration instituted 17 wiretaps without a court order. Fourteen were on government employees and three on journalists. When the Supreme Court ruled in 1972 that such wiretaps violated the Constitution, these wiretaps were discontinued. The Nixon Administration placed fewer national security wiretaps than any previous administration.

Title: “The Huston Plan”
Date: July 1970.

Body Text (140 words): President Nixon authorized new powers to permit the intelligence community to conduct more domestic spying. The President
believed that U.S. intelligence was not sufficiently aggressive in proving that the anti-Vietnam War movement received foreign assistance. Confronted by the immediate opposition of Attorney General John Mitchell and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the President rescinded this program a week later. This set of new powers was known as the “Huston Plan” after Tom Charles Huston, the White House aide who coordinated the effort at the request of the President. This incident undermined the President’s confidence that Mitchell, Hoover and the FBI would do what he wanted against those he considered domestic enemies.

- The Huston Plan was a non-event. If it is to be discussed at all, it seems important to describe the background and rationale of the Huston Plan in greater detail.
  - It may be helpful to point out that Nixon was elected as a law and order president and to describe a few of the events that occasioned the President’s concerns with domestic tranquility, including the SLA, the Weathermen, the Black Panthers, the break-ins into the armories, etc.
  - The Huston Plan was a memo containing a series of recommendations, which the President approved, but then reversed himself less than a week later upon learning of the objections of Hoover and Mitchell. The Huston Plan was never effectuated; no actions were ever taken; and the entire proposal was of no consequence or effect until John Dean disclosed it in an attempt to gain immunity for his own criminal acts.
- The “new powers to permit the intelligence community to conduct more domestic spying” need to be spelled out. Is this a reference to what was proposed in the Huston Plan? If so, then why is it not pointed out such authorization was rescinded?
- The last sentence is judgmental, conclusory and unsubstantiated.

Proposed Revised Text:

Frustrated by the failure of the FBI and the CIA to
uncover suspect foreign sources of funding for the organized, often violent, demonstrations opposing his efforts to end the war in Vietnam, President Nixon pushed for a more aggressive approach. On July 14, 1970 he approved what became known as “The Huston Plan,” after a proposal by Tom Charles Huston, a White House aide. Within a week, following advice provided by Attorney General John Mitchell and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, the President rescinded his approval. The Huston Plan was never implemented.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM I May 13, 2010

| Name: D. Ellsberg  
Body Text (60 words): Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon analyst in the Johnson administration, regretted his role in promoting the Vietnam War. He leaked the highly classified Pentagon study, which he had once worked on, to the U.S. Congress and the Press in the hope of bringing the conflict to an end. In late June 1971, he was charged with violating the Espionage Act. |
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<td>• The format for use of names in Dossier titles throughout the exhibit, e.g.: D. Ellsberg, appears random and inconsistent. Why not just use common names, including nicknames, throughout? Whatever format is finally adopted, it should be uniform throughout.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• It is interesting to note that much of what “the White House” did is described as illegal—in contrast to this simple description of Ellsberg’s actions,</td>
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which apparently are not so considered. Perhaps this should be the model for the exhibit: unless and until someone is formally convicted, nothing can be termed ‘illegal’ and only the specific indictment can be mentioned.

• It may be that Ellsberg provided a copy to the Soviet Embassy, too. That is certainly what President Nixon believed to be true at the time. Perhaps it is relevant to point this out.
• Use of the term “Press” is not as precise as one might expect. Actual names of the recipients should be included.
• It is also interesting that Ellsberg’s actions are characterized in a positive fashion, “in the hopes of bringing the conflict to an end”, which is a rather gratuitous and seemingly inappropriate way to characterize an illegal act involving highly classified government documents in an exhibit prepared and endorsed by the Archives of the United States.
• The exhibit fails to mention that, as a Rand Institute consultant, Ellsberg had access to another 75,000 pages of highly classified information which no one knew whether he intended to disclose or not—which may well have been the reason for the requested psychological profile and illicit entry into his psychologist’s office.

Proposed Revised Text:

Daniel Ellsberg, who briefly served as a Pentagon analyst in the Johnson administration, came to oppose the Vietnam War after leaving government service. In an effort to influence public opinion against President Nixon’s efforts to achieve an honorable end to the war,
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<th>Panel! Type</th>
<th>E1.2 - Background Information G-O1-06</th>
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He leaked a highly classified Department of Defense study, which became popularly known as "The Pentagon Papers", to certain members of Congress and to selected newspapers. Leaking classified material is illegal, and Ellsberg was later indicted for violating the Espionage Act.

**Title:** “The Pentagon Papers”  
**Body Text (60 words):** What were the Pentagon Papers? Completed in 1969, the 47-volume “United States-Vietnam, 1945-1967: A study prepared by the Department of Defense,” was written at the request of Kennedy and Johnson’s Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. When Daniel Ellsberg leaked most of these volumes to the Press in 1971, this study became known as the Pentagon Papers.

**Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:** Photograph of Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers

- It is possible that the purpose of the Pentagon Papers was “to ascertain how we got into this mess and how to avoid getting into similar messes in the future”. If so, perhaps this should be pointed out.  
- At the very least, the substantive contents of the Pentagon Papers should be described—as should the fact that they covered the period before Nixon became president.  
- This presentation somehow misses the very real threat of leaks, usually of classified information, to assets in the field, to the lives of US agents and to the conduct of foreign affairs. It is almost as though the thought that
assets might have been betrayed and lives lost is being dismissed as unworthy of comment.

Proposed Revised Text:

Completed in 1969, “the Pentagon Papers” was a 47-volume study prepared at the request of President Kennedy and Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Written to recount and analyze America’s involvement from 1945 through 1967, this top-secret document was designed to provide a comprehensive history to future policymakers who might be confronted with similar foreign policy challenges.
Date: July 1971
Title: “The Plumbers”

Body Text (what & why 140 words: The President’s Special Investigations Unit operated from July to December 1971. The members of the unit, who called themselves “the Plumbers” because they dealt with leaks, viewed the Ellsberg case as a matter of national security. Besides Ellsberg, the unit investigated unauthorized leaks of classified materials on US-Soviet arms control talks and U.S. policy during the Indo-Pakistani War. The unit also provided Charles Colson with information to discredit the President’s perceived enemies. Colson leaked confidential FBI information on Ellsberg and arranged for a forged government document to be given to Life Magazine. Designed by Plumber E. Howard Hunt, the forgery was part of a political initiative ordered by President Nixon to implicate former President John F. Kennedy in the 1963 assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

- The names of the individuals in the Plumbers Unit should be identified. It is not clear, for example, whether Hunt was a part of the Plumbers or a Colson consultant who informally assisted the Plumbers Unit on occasion. Was he present, for example, during the Fielding break-in?
- “The unit” did not provide Colson with information, an individual did—presumably Howard Hunt. If so, this needs to be stated outright.
- Use of the term, “the President’s perceived enemies” needs full citation and more precise description
- It seems appropriate to point out that when RN left office as VP in 1961, Diem was President of South Vietnam and there were US missiles in Turkey. When he returned as

Panel Type
C1.1 - Event Detail
President in 1969, Diem had been assassinated and the missiles had been removed. His efforts to obtain information regarding both actions were consistently rebuffed by the CIA’s Richard Helms. His curiosity about Diem may have led Hunt to manufacture fake cables, as he could not access the actual ones. The text might be taken to imply that interest in Diem’s assassination was an example of Nixon’s paranoid “conspiracy thinking” although most histories of that period now acknowledge that the Kennedy Administration was complacent about, if not actually compliant with, Diem’s assassination.

- If the FBI was not cooperating with the Plumbers, it is difficult to see how Colson could have come into possession of the information he leaked to *Life* Magazine. More precision here is needed.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Presidents have long been frustrated by leaks of classified information, which are usually designed to thwart their own initiatives.* To combat such illegal leaks during the Nixon administration, and particularly in response to the leak of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg, John Ehrlichman, President Nixon’s domestic policy advisor created the Special Investigations Unit – which became popularly known as the Plumbers. The unit also investigated illegal leaks of classified materials on US-Soviet arms control talks and U.S. policy during the Indo-Pakistani War. In addition, one member of the unit provided Charles Colson, a special counsel to the president for political matters, with information that could be used to discredit certain of the president’s political opponents. At Ehrlichman’s direction, the unit was disbanded at the end of 1971.
Associated Photo/Document Facsimile

: Photo of Ngo Dinh Diem

Panel Type

DL3 —

Dossier

G-O1-07

Name: C. W. Colson

Body Text (60 words):
Charles Wendell Colson served as special counsel to President Nixon from 1969 to 1973. Colson assisted the President in building a new political coalition and also supervised operations to damage the President’s opponents. After the Watergate arrests, the White House worried what the scandal might reveal about Colson’s activities. Colson pled guilty to intentionally leaking information to discredit Daniel Ellsberg and served seven months in jail.

Associated Photo:

• It would be better for the title to say “Charles ‘Chuck’ Colson”.
• The panel hardly does justice to Colson’s machinations. Every Administration has political operatives whose job it is to build the President’s image and to detract from the President’s opponents. Colson’s role should be put into this context. Kenny O’Donnell, Larry O’Brien and Carmine Bellino might be cited as appropriate counterparts in the Kennedy Administration; Bruce Lindsay, Sidney Blumenthal and Karl Rove from more recent ones.
• Colson’s defense counsel subpoenaed information about the CIA that the Administration refused to turn over. On the day he suddenly entered a guilty plea, the Administration planned to announce that it would not divulge his requested
information—and Judge Gesell was expected to make good on his threat to dismiss all charges. Colson’s guilty plea obviated this outcome.

- Colson’s conversion to evangelical Christianity might be included in his story, since it influenced all that followed.
- There is a difference between “jail” and “prison”. Colson was sentenced to prison.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

**Name: Charles W. “Chuck” Colson**

Charles Colson served as special counsel to the president for political matters from 1969 to March 1973. He oversaw coalition building in support of administration policies. He also undertook efforts to weaken some of the president’s political opponents. After the Watergate break-in, Colson and several of his colleagues grew concerned about whether his political activities might be drawn into the larger investigation. Although Colson was never convicted for taking part in the Watergate break-in or subsequent cover-up, he did plead guilty to obstruction of justice in the Ellsberg case. He served seven months in federal prison.

**Date:** June 13, 1971


Caption: New York Times published the first in a series of excerpts from “the Pentagon Papers.” The U.S. Supreme Court later overturned efforts by the Nixon Administration to halt publication.

- This panel is not located in the correct timeline. It marks the beginning of the issue, not the end.
It may have the facts somewhat confused. The administration went to court to try to stop publication ('prior restraint'), either before or immediately following the NYT's initial publication. A lower court may actually have issued a temporary restraining order while the issue was being litigated. The Administration’s effort failed—in the main—because the United States does not have an Official Secrets Act similar to that of Great Britain, so there was no right of prior restraint. The Nixon Administration reacted in two ways:

- First, it sought to declassify masses of overly classified documents, and
- Second, it sought a way to stop unauthorized leaks (hence, the Plumbers Unit).

The panels as drafted do not fairly or fully convey this response. Instead, they focus solely on illegal acts performed by Gordon Liddy, which may not have been approved in advance.

Proposed Revised Text:

Caption... Rejecting requests from the Nixon administration, the New York Times published the first in a series of excerpts from “the Pentagon Papers.” The administration went to court in an effort to prohibit publication. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the federal government had no legal authority to prevent publication in advance.

Panel Type
D1.2 - Dossier
G-O1-08

Name: J. D. Ehrlichman

Body Text (60 Words): Ehrlichman, a lawyer, became Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs in 1970. Ehrlichman first worked for Richard Nixon as an advance man in the 1960 campaign. In July 1971, President Nixon asked Ehrlichman to oversee the Plumbers. On August 11, 1971, Ehrlichman gave Krogh and Young approval for the covert action in Beverly
Hills “if done under your assurance that it is not traceable.”

- The title should be “John D. Ehrlichman.”
- It seems appropriate to point out that Ehrlichman, whose name “John” should appear in the text, was initially Counsel to President Nixon.
- The names “Krogh and Young” first appear here, seemingly out of nowhere. They have not been previously identified as co-heads of the Plumbers, nor has there been any explanation as to why they were so chosen.
- Ehrlichman’s entire defense—throughout the investigations and during the Plumbers trial itself—was that he had authorized a “covert operation”, not necessarily an illegal one. Covert, to those operating on the Domestic Council, was a CIA term that meant “unknown to the host country”. Perhaps Ehrlichman’s point deserves of some mention somewhere, at some point, in the exhibit.

Proposed Revised Text:

Name: John D. Ehrlichman

John Ehrlichman joined the White House staff in January 1969. A Seattle attorney, Ehrlichman first worked for Richard Nixon as an advance man in the 1960 presidential campaign. In response to the president’s demand to stop the leaks of classified material, Ehrlichman formed the Plumbers in July 1971. On August 11, 1971, Ehrlichman gave the two leaders of the Plumbers, Egil Krogh and David Young, approval to conduct their proposed covert operation at the office of a psychiatrist who had treated Daniel Ellsberg in California. Ehrlichman’s approval was conditioned on
his insistence that the operation only be carried out if “it is not traceable” – in other words, if remained covert.

**Panel Type**
*C1.3 —
**Event Detail**
*Photo & Caption Only

**Date:** July 2, 1971  
**Title:** “Bureau of Labor Statistics Investigation”

**Body Text (140 words):** Convinced that unfriendly civil servants were intentionally misrepresenting monthly unemployment figures, President Nixon ordered an investigation into the loyalty of this Labor Department unit in early July. The President asked specifically how many in the unit were Jewish Americans. In late July, White House staffer Frederic V. Malek reported that there were 19 in the Bureau and noted their positions. Civil service protections prevented any from being fired. Discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation is illegal.

**Name:** Frederic V. Malek

**Caption:** In 1971 Frederic V. Malek was special assistant to the President.

- The President’s request for this information was—and is—indefensible, but its inclusion in a Watergate exhibit, and particularly the prominent display of Malek’s photo, undermines the credibility and objectivity of the entire exhibit.
- The perceived problem—the purposeful leaking of information to the press in order to achieve a political purpose or to influence policy decisions—was real. If this non-Watergate-related topic is to be included in the Watergate exhibit, then that should be fully explained. So should some of the information contained in Malek’s oral history interview.
- It seems appropriate to point out that Malek headed the WH Personnel Office, which is why he was the one asked to
check into the backgrounds of the BLS employees.

*Proposed Revised Text:*

*We offer no suggested Alternate text for this portion. It is not part of Watergate story and does not warrant inclusion in this exhibit.*

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**Panel Type**  
S1.3 - Special Head Shots w/ Captions

**TITLE:** “The Plumbers”  
**Name:** Egil “Bud” Krogh  
**Caption:** The co-director of the Special Investigations Unit. In 1971, Krogh believed that national security justified illegal domestic covert action. In 1973, he pled guilty to depriving Dr. Lewis Fielding of his civil rights and served 6 months in prison. “I came to accept that I could no longer defend my conduct,” he later wrote. “[I]f I continued to justify violating rights I continued to enjoy, I would be... a traitor to the fundamental American idea of the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted government intrusion in his life.”

- Some maintain that Krogh fell afoul of the Federal Prosecutors because he lied to the grand jury about knowing the Cubans (who were arrested in the Watergate break-in, but who also had done the Fielding break-in)—and it may be that Krogh did so at the express urging of John Dean, then counsel to the president. “Lie, like you have never lied before,” may have been Dean’s legal advice to Krogh. At the time such advice was given, Krogh was not aware that Dean’s orchestration of the cover-up may have been primarily motivated by his own fear of being prosecuted for his role in helping set up Gordon Liddy’s intelligence plan—and particularly because of Dean’s presence at
the January 28\textsuperscript{th} and February 4\textsuperscript{th} meetings on Liddy’s plan held in Attorney General Mitchell’s office at the Department of Justice.

• Krogh’s pleading to the other count may have been little more than an attempt by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force (WSPF) to aid in the case they planned to make in the Plumbers trial. David Young, Krogh’s counterpart, cooperated fully with federal prosecutors from the outset and was never indicted. The only distinction between the two appears to have been Krogh’s perjured grand jury testimony.

• It would be more proper to use a quote of contrition from the actual period rather than one Krogh uttered some forty years later.

Proposed Revised Text:

As co-director of the Special Investigations Unit, Krogh believed, as many before him did, that protecting national security justified domestic covert action, even if it violated the law. In 1973, Krogh pled guilty to depriving Dr. Lewis Fielding of his civil rights for his role in the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office. At that time, Krogh told the Watergate special prosecutor: “The more I’ve thought about it, the clearer I’ve seen that even though there may well have been some damaging impacts on the national security from Ellsberg’s releasing the Pentagon Papers, those impacts simply can’t justify the invasion of Fielding’s rights.”

Name: David Young
Caption: Former assistant to Henry Kissinger, Young was co-director of the
Special Investigations Unit. He placed a sign saying “Plumbers” outside their office. He later received immunity from prosecution.

- The initial thought for the Plumbers was that the leaks involved both NSC and Domestic Council responsibilities—hence the selection of Young and Krogh.
- It seems relevant to point out how and why Young was granted immunity.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Former assistant to Henry Kissinger, Young was co-director of the Special Investigations Unit. He placed a sign saying “Plumbers” outside their office. He received immunity from prosecution in exchange for his cooperation with federal authorities from the outset of their investigation.*

**Name:** G. Gordon Liddy

**Caption (60 words)** Liddy served five years with the FBI. Bud Krogh recruited him from the Treasury Department in mid-1971 for the Plumber’s unit. Liddy, who refused to cooperate with investigators, received the longest sentence of any of the Watergate conspirators. He was paroled in September 1977 after serving 4 1/2 years in prison.

- It may be appropriate to point out that Liddy was hired onto the Domestic Council staff prior to the creation of the Plumbers Unit, so he was not “recruited” for that purpose.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Liddy was an attorney and former Congressional candidate who had served five years with the FBI. Bud Krogh recruited him from the Treasury*
Department in mid-1971 for the Domestic Council staff at the White House. Liddy, whom President Nixon once referred to as “beyond the pale,” refused to cooperate with investigators, even after he was convicted in the Watergate break-in trial and given immunity from further prosecution. He received the longest sentence of any of the Watergate conspirators and ended up serving 4½ years in the DC jail.

Name: E. Howard Hunt

Caption (60 words): Hunt joined the CIA after World War II. Hunt worked with Cuban exiles during the planning of the failed Bay of Pigs operation in 1961. Charles Colson recommended Hunt to President Nixon in 1971 for the Plumbers. From July 1971, Hunt worked on projects for Colson and recruited Cuban Americans for secret operations. Hunt served 33 months in prison for his role in the Watergate break-in.

• This may not be factually correct: Hunt may never have been a formal member of the Plumbers Unit. He was retained by Colson as a consultant prior to the creation of the Plumbers; his office was in a different location from the Plumbers’ offices, and he had different responsibilities. A citation is needed for Colson’s recommendation—as well as evidence of follow through.

Proposed Revised Text:

Pending confirmation/correction of the points raised above we offer no alternate text

Name: Bernard L. Barker

Caption: Born in Cuba, Barker worked with Hunt in the CIA’s failed Bay of Pigs
operation. When recruited by Hunt for the Plumbers in 1971, he ran a real estate office in Miami that the Cuban American team would later use as an operational headquarters. He was arrested on June 17, 1972, in the Watergate affair.

Name: Eugenio Rolando Martinez
Caption Born in Cuba and nicknamed “musculito,” Martinez participated in the CIA’s 1961 Bay of Pigs operation. Hunt recruited him in Miami in 1971 for Liddy’s operational team. He was arrested on June 17, 1972, in the Watergate affair. According to the Senate Watergate report, Martinez remained a CIA operative until his arrest.

Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez
• It may be inappropriate to include these as official members of the Plumbers Unit. They were not on any payroll and did not work in any official capacity. Instead, they were recruited by Hunt for a specific job—perhaps for two jobs—and misled as to the reasons for those operations. They should be deleted from this section.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix
Panel Type F1.1 - Timeline Bubble Date: July 1971
Title: “Firebombing the Brookings Institution”
Body Text (60 words): Believing that the conspiracy extended into the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, President Nixon repeatedly ordered the seizure of any classified materials held in a safe there. Charles Colson interpreted the President’s insistence to mean that Brookings could be firebombed to distract security while the secret papers were recovered. When John W. Dean, III, alerted Ehrlichman to Colson’s arson plan, it was abandoned. Brookings, it later turned out, had no safe.
The introductory phrase is judgmental, conclusory and unsupportable by citation.

It is appropriate to point out that Brookings was the pre-eminent liberal Washington think tank in that era.

The importance of Brookings can only be appreciated and understood in context. Supposedly, highly classified—and highly prejudicial—material prepared by officials in President Johnson’s Department of Defense had been secretly and improperly transferred after Nixon’s 1968 election, but before he assumed office, from the Pentagon to the Brookings Institution. Nixon’s fixation about what might be housed at Brookings was conditioned on his belief that whatever was there was there had been secreted there illegitimately.

One wonders how the exhibit text can state that Colson “interpreted” the President’s insistence to include authority to firebomb Brookings—instead of the more likely frustrated Nixon bombast that was familiar to—and commonly discounted by—other close Nixon aides?

It seems purely gratuitous, even if literally true, to say that there was no safe at the Brookings Institution.

Proposed Revised Text:

In response to reports that the Brookings Institution, the pre-eminent liberal Washington think tank of the era, might be illegally in possession of classified documents, President Nixon repeatedly directed that any classified materials held there be seized. The most extreme plan considered by Chuck Colson for retrieving those papers was to firebomb the Brookings building, so that in the ensuing chaos the secret papers could be recovered. When John Dean alerted Ehrlichman to Colson’s proposed scheme, it was promptly abandoned.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

Panel Type C1.4 - Event Detail Date: September 3, 1971
Title: “Fielding Break-In”

I also suggest we put one of Cheryl’s Body Text (what & why 140 words): After the Plumbers reported that Daniel Ellsberg’s former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, had refused to hand over his confidential notes to the FBI, John Ehrlichman authorized a “covert operation” to “examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg’s
psychoanalyst...” Planned by Liddy and Hunt and funded with the help of Charles Colson, the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office in Beverly Hills, California, occurred on the night of September 3, 1971. The burglars, Bernard Barker, Rolando Martinez and Filipe DeDiego, turned the office upside down but found nothing. Before leaving the crime scene, they threw prescription drugs on the floor to mislead police into thinking that an addict had committed the crime. On September 8, Ehrlichman reported to the President that the Plumbers had undertaken a “little operation” in Los Angeles that had gone wrong, “which, I think, it’s better that you don’t know about.”

- Interspersed as it is after Brookings and BLS, this panel seems woefully out of place and needlessly duplicative of what has already been proposed.
- There was “color of basis” for the admittedly illegal entry: no one was sure what Ellsberg knew, what he had or what he planned on doing. Dr. Fielding had declined to be interviewed by the FBI. There was some thought that his psychiatrist might know a good deal about Ellsberg’s intentions.
- What is missing is the thought that the proposed operation was a “black bag” job, along the lines of the surreptitious entries that the FBI had been conducting at least since WWII. The Church Committee ascertained in 1977 that the FBI had done an average of 125 such entries each year, perhaps some on far less compelling grounds than this. The use of the Cubans may have occurred because Hoover had recently begun to refuse to risk FBI agents in any more such activities. There is little question but that such an entry by the FBI, justified on grounds of national security, would not have resulted in criminal prosecutions.
- It is not at all clear that this is not what Ehrlichman thought he was authorizing in his response to the David Young memo. It also may be that Ehrlichman was infuriated when he was later informed of the forced break-in and ordered that such action never be repeated. It may also be that this was the last event in which Gordon Liddy was involved in as a member of the Plumbers Unit.
After Daniel Ellsberg’s former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, had refused to hand over his confidential notes to the FBI, John Ehrlichman approved a recommended “covert operation” to “examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg’s psychoanalyst…” Concerned that Ellsberg might possess additional classified papers or was considering additional releases of such material, Krogh and Young hoped to find evidence of such intent and of Ellsberg’s motivation in general. The break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office in Beverly Hills, California, occurred on the night of September 3, 1971. Although the operation was approved only if it was undetectable, the three burglars given the job could not pick the lock and a spot decision was made by Liddy to stage an actual forced entry. The burglars did not find what they were looking for, but before leaving, they threw prescription drugs on the floor to mislead police into thinking that an addict had committed the crime. On September 8, 1971 Ehrlichman reported to the President that the Plumbers had undertaken a “little operation” that had gone wrong, “which, I think, it’s better that you don’t know about.”

**Sidebar Quote:** “The Fielding case was our first step down the low road... Like common drinkers, Liddy and I became covert action co-dependents.” E. Howard Hunt

- We assume this is a quote from Hunt’s book. The sources of such citations need to be referenced in the exhibit itself, so visitors can evaluate the source—and to follow up should they be so inclined.

**Panel Type C1.2 - Event Detail Date: Early 1971 (Need to cut 7 words)**

**Panel Type S1.3 - Title: “The Enemies List”**

**Special Head Shots w/ Captions Body Text (what & why 140 words):** President Nixon ordered Haldeman on June 23, 1971 to have the Internal Revenue Service undertake special audits of his political opponents and suggested that Charles Colson create a list of “the ones we want.” John Dean was assigned the “Political Enemies Project” to coordinate action on
the list. After consulting with Colson, Dean presented a list of 16 names to Haldeman’s staff on September 14. The President learned about the list and assented to its use with the IRS on September 18. In 1972 Dean presented a much longer list to IRS Commissioner Johnnie M. Walters. Walters and his boss Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz refused to launch these audits, believing that they represented an improper use of the IRS. The House Judiciary Committee later identified the President’s attempt to launch these tax audits as a violation of citizens’ constitutional rights.

**Sidebar:** The September 1971 list included the conductor Leonard Bernstein, computer pioneer Thomas J. Watson, Jr., former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford, and journalists Mary McGrory and Daniel Schorr.

- It seems appropriate to point out that Nixon was audited every year between 1961 and 1968, and that many Republicans also felt that many IRS audits were politically motivated: unduly targeting prominent Republicans and Republican-leaning institutions.
- Use of the IRS by presidents to investigate and harass political opponents long predated the Nixon administration.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

**Title: Using the IRS for Political Purposes**

Presidents as far back as Franklin D. Roosevelt have used the IRS to investigate and harass political opponents. FDR’s son, Elliott, once wrote, “My father may have been the originator of the concept of employing the IRS as a weapon of political retribution.” President Nixon also fumed over the series of IRS audits he was subjected to by the Kennedy administration. In June 1971, President Nixon and his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, discussed undertaking a similar effort against some of the Nixon administration’s political opponents. Nearly three months later, John Dean presented a list of 16 names to Haldeman’s staff. The President learned about the list and assented to its use with the IRS on September 18. In 1972, Dean presented a much longer list to IRS Commissioner Johnnie M. Walters. Walters and his boss Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz refused to launch these audits, believing that they represented an improper use of the IRS. Although no such IRS audits were ever actually undertaken, the attempt to do so was included in the House
Judiciary Committee’s second article of impeachment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dean’s enemies list of September 1971</th>
<th>Caption: John Dean’s list of September 1971 with the names of 16 who were perceived to be political enemies of the President.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Title:** “Daniel Schorr’s Story”  
**Body Text (60 words):** In August 1971, the White House sought derogatory information from the FBI on CBS news correspondent Daniel Schorr. Misunderstanding the request, the FBI interviewed Schorr as if the journalist were being considered for a federal appointment. After Schorr complained, the White House halted the FBI investigation. In September 1971, Haldeman reported to the President that Schorr was on the list for harassment by the IRS.  
- The placement of the panel is out of chronological order for the exhibit  
- “The White House is a building. . .” The panel needs specifically to identify the WH official who contacted the FBI.  
- However this situation came about—and no one seems to know for certain—it was highly embarrassing. But the incident has nothing to do with the Watergate scandal itself.  
- It may be appropriate to point out that individuals serving in the Clinton White House, including Craig Livingstone, obtained raw FBI files on some 125 prominent Republicans. If no mention of this incident is made at the Clinton Library, one wonders as to the propriety of its inclusion at the Nixon Library. |
Shortly before his death on July 23, 2010, Daniel Schorr gave an interview in which recalled being the subject of an FBI investigation: “Nixon called in Bob Haldeman, his chief of staff -- we later learned, when the tapes were released -- and said, “Why is this son of a bitch allowed to make so much trouble for us? Tell J. Edgar Hoover to look into this guy and get something on him.” Haldeman called the FBI and said, “The boss wants you to look into the background of a correspondent named Daniel Schorr.” The mistake stemmed from Haldeman’s use of the term 'background', which is a term of art. To the FBI it means a check on someone about to receive a presidential appointment. As a consequence, the FBI sent agents all over the country asking for reactions about Dan Schorr.” Schorr was never audited by the IRS as a result of being on the list, and—like many—considered inclusion to be a badge of honor. In that same interview he said, "To be perfectly frank with you, getting on Richard Nixon’s enemies list was probably worth about half a million dollars to me in lecture fees.”
| Fielding Break In Bureau of Labor Statistics | • Liddy on Fielding  
• Malek on BLS |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Labor Statistics</td>
<td>• Colson on BLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Firebombing the Brookings, Daniel Schorr’s Story The Plumbers | • Caulfield on Brookings  
• Geib on Brookings  
• Schorr on being investigated  
• Nixon on the Plumbers |
| • Johnnie Walters on enemies list Tape Excerpts w/ rolling transcript: |
| Ellsberg Leaks Pentagon Papers | • WH Tape: 07/01/71: HRH and RN —“conspiracy” |
| Ellsberg Leaks Pentagon Papers | • WH Tape: 07/01/71: RN, HRH on Brookings |
| Ellsberg Leaks Pentagon Papers | • WH Tape: 09/18/71: RN and HRH on Schorr and tax list |
| Ellsberg Leaks Pentagon Papers | • WH Tape: 09/15/72: RN, HRH and Dean on Enemies List  
• WH Tape: 9/8/71 JDE and RN— “covert operation” |

576-51
For the reasons cited below, we object to this entire section as an inappropriate expansion of the Watergate exhibit, which can only be done at the expense of the core Watergate scandal story and therefore offer no Alternate Text for consideration. Nevertheless, we have made comments concerning its accuracy and fairness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Span:</th>
<th>April 1971-May 1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Head</strong> (Main Message 15-25 words)</td>
<td>President Nixon set the stage for the activities that would lead to the Watergate scandal by demanding more inside information on political rivals and supporting covert activities to disrupt other campaigns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text</strong> (105 words)</td>
<td>With the knowledge of the President, White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman initiated both secret intelligence and “dirty tricks” operations for the 1972 campaign. In June 1971, the White House hired Donald Segretti to do “dirty tricks.” In November 1971, Haldeman and Attorney General John Mitchell decided to recruit G. Gordon Liddy, formerly of the Plumbers, to run a secret espionage unit out of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Liddy then recruited Hunt and his team of Miami-based operatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The first sentence is judgmental, conclusory and unsupported by factual material
- A citation should be provided for the claim of Presidential knowledge of “dirty tricks”—and whether that phrase was actually used at the time.
Otherwise, it’s conclusory.
• “The White House is a building. . .” The text needs to identify precisely who hired Segretti.
• If Chapin is said to be involved, it is important to note that his reaction was along the lines of, “He’s a lawyer and will know precisely how far he can go without doing anything illegal.”
• It may be appropriate to point out that virtually every campaign gathers political intelligence—and tries to dig up dirt on the opposition (so called Opposition Research). In addition, RN’s many campaigns had been the object of such dirty tricks. Perhaps it might be helpful to detail a few particulars—and how, when they were practiced against Nixon, were laughed off such antics as shenanigans rather than offenses.
• Need citation for statement that Mitchell and Haldeman “decided” to hire Liddy. In Dean’s own book, as well as Liddy’s, it is John Dean who identifies Liddy and introduces him to Mitchell as his (Dean’s) choice for the “perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence plan” he was assigned by Haldeman to pull together.
• It seems clear that Liddy recruited Hunt and the Cubans for specific missions—and not as full time operatives that were an integral part of his campaign intelligence plan. One would have to check Liddy’s payroll records to be sure. Query how Hunt was initially being paid at CRP, if at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type D2. 1 - Dossier G-02-04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name:</strong> Mitchell &amp; Magruder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text</strong> (60 words): <strong>John N. Mitchell</strong> was Richard Nixon’s law partner before he served as the candidate’s campaign manager in 1968. Mitchell served as Attorney General of the United States from 1969 until he left on February 15, 1973.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1972, to run the President’s re-election campaign. Mitchell served 19 months in prison for his role in the Watergate cover-up.

**Body Text** (60 words): Jeb Stuart Magruder was an executive in the cosmetics industry before joining the White House Office of Communications in the summer of 1969. In 1971, Magruder became deputy director of the President’s re-election committee. In 1973, he pled guilty to conspiracy to unlawfully intercept wire and oral communications, to obstruct justice and to defraud the United States.

Mitchell:
- Mitchell was a senior partner of Nixon, Mudge Rose, the Wall Street firm Richard Nixon joined in 1963.
- It seems appropriate to use the same precision as with Magruder. Something like, “On January 1, 1975, Mitchell was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice and perjury for his role in the Watergate scandal. He was sentenced to 1-4 years in prison and served 19 months in a special facility at McArthur Air Force Base (or where ever he was actually incarcerated “).
- It may be inappropriate to include Mitchell in this segment without any showing that he specifically knew of and/or approved of “dirty tricks”.
- Various terms are being used to describe the Committee to Re-Elect the President, which is the official title of President Nixon’s re-election campaign. It might be appropriate to use the correct title—here and in Magruder’s segment below.
Magruder:
• Jeb is Magruder’s first name
• It might be appropriate to use Magruder’s official title when in private industry. It may be that he had substantial PR experience, which was the reason for his being hired, regardless of whether it was in the cosmetics industry.
• It seems appropriate to say that he became a witness for the prosecution, was sentenced to a term of ten months to four years and served a little over eight months in prison.

Panel Type E2.2 - Background Information

Title: Tactics

Body Text (60 words): Campaign Tactics in 1960 and 1968

John D. Ehrlichman recalled, “In the 1960 campaign, there were dirty tricks on the Nixon side and also on the John Kennedy side. But the Nixon campaign staff always felt a bit outclassed; the Kennedy fellows were really much better at the dirty stuff than we were.” The President believed his campaign had been the victim of dirty tricks by a Kennedy advancement named Dick Tuck. “In 1968,” Ehrlichman added, “Nixon demanded that his staff conduct his campaign as if we were in an all-out war... .Nixon wanted me to create some kind of flying goon squad of our own to rough up hecklers, take down their signs and silence them.”

• Need to show citation for this quote. It seems highly inappropriate to keep posting quotes without disclosing the context or the time frame.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

Panel Type C2. 1 - Event Detail
**Date:** Early 1971  
**Title:** “The White House orders Dirty Tricks”  
**Body Text (what & why 140 words):** Haldeman informed the President that planning for a dirty tricks operation was underway in May 1971. The President’s appointments secretary Dwight Chapin and Haldeman’s assistant, Gordon Strachan, hired Donald Segretti. Segretti recruited 22 operatives and received $45,000 from President Nixon’s personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach. Segretti’s group organized hecklers to disrupt opposition rallies, forged letters on Democratic campaign stationery to divide the Democrats, and infiltrated spies to collect political intelligence. In addition, President Nixon instructed Colson in December 1971 to create a false “write-in” campaign for Senator Edward M. Kennedy in the New Hampshire primary to siphon votes from then front-runner Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine.

- “The White House is a building...” it seems appropriate to use specific names or change the title  
- Need specific citation in May, 1971 to see if Haldeman actually uses term “dirty tricks” in his conversation with RN.  
- Query who specifically “hired” Segretti. If he was not on a payroll, there may be a better verb.  
- One version is that Segretti, who was active in the Young Republicans while at USC, traveled about the country and contacted similar groups and encouraged them to demonstrate when opponents came to town. Also, there needs to be a citation for “recruiting 22 operatives” since this implies they had been hired to work on a full time basis.  
- One wonders if and how Colson went about undertaking his Ted Kennedy write in campaign—and whether any such action was illegal or improper.  
- In order to convey a fair sense of the role of “dirty tricks” in modern American political campaigns, it might be possible just to adopt language from exhibits in other Presidential Libraries. For example, we might ask for materials on Lyndon Johnson’s Ballot Box #9 and JFK’s actions in the West Virginia primary against Hubert Humphrey and against RN in Illinois, Texas and Alabama in 1960. Also of some significance is the question of how candidate Ronald Reagan came up with a copy of President Carter’s debate briefing book in the 1980 election. Other examples might include Lyndon Johnson’s using the FBI to tap Goldwater’s phones in 1964, Agnew’s phones in 1968, and Nixon’s campaign plane in 1968. If there is no mention of such
matters in exhibits at those libraries, one must ask why it is appropriate to be detailed in this exhibit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel TypeF2.1 — Timeline Bubble</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Date:** April 21, 1971  
**Title:** “The President requests better Political Intelligence”  
**Body Text** (what & why 140 words):  
At a meeting with Attorney General Mitchell, the President asks for better intelligence on his political rivals.  
• This is somewhat disingenuous, suggesting that there must be something wrong with a president asking for better political intelligence. The implication seems to be that only Nixon would ask for such a thing. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inset: Ficker letter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Caption:** In February 1972, Mr. Robin Ficker, a registered Democrat, signed this letter believing that it came from representatives of Senator Kennedy. It was actually the product of President Nixon’s order to Colson.  
• Need citation. This seems so inconsequential. Are there more such letters? Is this an example or the only example? Why doesn’t the text say so?  
• One of the allegations is that ‘the White House’ was responsible for the letter about Senator Muskie’s wife that caused him to burst into tears at a campaign rally—thereby virtually assuring his campaign would come to an end. One wonders why that is not included in this Exhibit. If it is untrue, perhaps it would be appropriate to point out that all sorts of allegations have been made about the botched |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>D2.3 — Dossier G-02-06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Name:** Chapin, Strachan & Segretti  
**Body Text (60 words):** White House staffers Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan had attended the University of Southern California with Donald Segretti. Chapin contacted Segretti in April 1971 about a possible White House job. Strachan and Chapin then hired him in June 1971. Chapin remained Segretti’s main contact until Segretti and his group were absorbed into G. Gordon Liddy’s intelligence program in February 1972.  
- It is not our understanding that “Segretti and his group” were absorbed into the Liddy operation. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>E2.2 - Background Information G-02-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Title:** “GEMSTONE”  
**Body Text (60 words):** Liddy and Hunt gave the codename Gemstone to their one million dollar program of covert bugging, infiltration and counterdemonstrations. Rejected twice by John Mitchell in January and February 1972, a scaled-down version of Gemstone was funded in late March. Liddy and Hunt received a $250,000 budget from Mitchell’s staff and were to place illegal electronic surveillance equipment in three locations.  
**Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:** Facsimile of Gemstone letterhead [No caption necessary]  
- The first sentence neglects to say “Gemstone” was the name of Liddy’s proposed campaign intelligence plan.  
- Need citation on Hunt’s involvement. Was he really Liddy’s co-author and full partner --in its drafting, proposing and execution? |
• This is the first of three uses of GEMSTONE in a title: A proper exhibit would show the entire Gemstone plan in full detail; its scope and audacity are important to display.
• Amazingly, there is no mention of John Dean’s role in being assigned responsibility for developing a campaign intelligence plan, for recruiting Liddy and discussing with him the general outlines of what was expected from such a plan, for informing Liddy of the financial resources (at least a half a million dollars) that might be available for such a plan, or for his being present in the Attorney General’s office at the January and February meetings where Liddy’s plan was discussed. It is almost as though any mention of Dean’s central role has been “airbrushed” from this exhibit.
• There is no discussion of the ambiguity concerning whether Mitchell, in fact, ever gave his approval to even the scaled down version of Liddy’s plan. Mitchell and Fred LaRue consistently maintained he had not; only Magruder claimed otherwise. Indeed, Mitchell devoted one-third of his allotted defense at the cover-up trial in developing his assertion of non-approval.
• The term “Mitchell’s staff” belies the fact that Magruder was personally terrified of Liddy (who had threatened his life). Liddy had already run up considerable debts in mobilizing for his plan and it appears that Magruder may have approved the expenditures on his own volition. Indeed, the various stories from Mitchell, Liddy, Sloan and Stans all seem to point to Magruder. It is interesting to note in this regard that
Magruder had approved a $37,000 reimbursement to Liddy even before his March 30, 1972 meeting with Mitchell.

- This panel is an excellent example of how any proper portrayal of actual details from the Watergate scandal gets short shrift as a result of the restrictive interpretational approach the exhibit has been designed to support. Liddy’s plan --- the three meetings at which it was discussed, precisely how it may have been approved --- all lay at the very heart of the Watergate scandal, yet they are relegated to a mere 60 words.

### Panel Type F2.2
- **Timeline Bubble NEW**

### Panel Type F2.3
- **Timeline Bubble “Highlighted”**

**Date:** June 23, 1971  
**Title:** “The President orders round-the-clock surveillance of Senator Edward Kennedy”  
**Body Text:** At a meeting with Haldeman, the President requested increased intelligence gathering on Senator Kennedy to “get him in [a] compromising situation.” On July 1, Haldeman informed the President that his lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, would pay for this out of a special campaign fund. The White House dropped the idea later in the summer.

- It is well known that President Nixon frequently vented in the presence of Bob Haldeman. It seems disingenuous to take this directive, which was never put into effect, and suggest it somehow involved Nixon in the Watergate scandal.

- If this reaches the level of importance that deserves inclusion in a Watergate exhibit, it seems appropriate to point out that Senator Kennedy’s conduct
and reputation (and not only Nixon’s supposed “conspiracy thinking”) made the possibility of catching him in a post-Chappaquiddick “compromising situation” seem to be a not unreasonable political strategy.

**Date:** November 4, 1971  
**Title:** “Mitchell and Haldeman Decide to Create a new Political Espionage Unit”  
**Body Text:** After months of inconclusive White House discussion over how to collect more political intelligence, Mitchell and Haldeman decide to create an special espionage unit in the re-election committee and chose G. Gordon Liddy, formerly of the Plumbers, to run it.

- This section seems redundant with what has gone before—or is it intentionally so?
- Need citation. We are unsure if they used the actual term “special espionage unit”.
- One wonders why there is no mention of John Dean as the one who was given the original assignment to develop a campaign intelligence plan and ultimately recruited Liddy for that task.

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**Graphic Panel Text Matrix**  
**Panel Type C2.2 - Event Detail Date:** January 27, February 4, 1972 and March 30, 1972”  
**Title:** “Mitchell and The GEMSTONE Plan”  
**Body Text (what & why 140 words):** G. Gordon Liddy had to propose his secret intelligence plan to Attorney General Mitchell three times before it was approved. After his second unsuccessful effort, Liddy and E. Howard Hunt enlisted Special
Counsel to the President Charles Colson’s help in getting a decision. Colson, who had recommended Hunt for the Plumbers in 1971, called Deputy Campaign Director Jeb Stuart Magruder to tell him that Mitchell needed to make up his mind. A few weeks later a budget of $250,000 was approved. Colson later denied that Liddy and Hunt told him the details of the plan, which Liddy codenamed GEMSTONE. And though Mitchell allowed associates to give cash to Liddy for his operations, Mitchell later denied ever having approved Liddy’s plan.

This section seems redundant because of the GEMSTONE discussion above. That section might better be integrated with this one.

- The use of the word ‘secret’ may not be appropriate. It has been referred to by John Dean as a campaign intelligence plan. One wonders about any citation for the word ‘secret’.
- The phraseology of the first sentence seems convoluted. Liddy’s plan was rejected on two occasions—why not say so? As detailed elsewhere, there is seriously conflicting testimony as to whether Liddy’s actual plan was ever formally approved.
- Need specific citation for Colson’s call to Magruder. It is not clear that Colson demanded Mitchell’s approval at all. He may have said something like, "You need to fish or cut bait on Liddy’s plan. If you folks [at the CRP] are not going to use these fellows, then I may do so myself.”
- It seems imprecise to use the intransitive verb “was approved” without exploring the ambiguous details more closely.
- The phrase, “Mitchell allowed associates to give cash to Liddy” may be an unfair presentation of what actually happened. It may be that Sloan did not feel comfortable giving Liddy the $81,000 that Magruder had indicated to Liddy had been approved, so Sloan went to Stans, who checked with Mitchell. Mitchell’s response was something like, ”Magruder has budgetary authority to approve stuff; I don’t get into those details.” It does not seem clear from this that Mitchell gave knowing assent to expenditures for the furtherance of Liddy’s plan.
- One of the unexplored aspects of Watergate is precisely who—if anyone--gave approval to Liddy’s scaled down plan: Mitchell and LaRue deny it was Mitchell; Magruder waffles—as he does on almost every factual question; and the distinct possibility exists that Mitchell, who only recently had arrived at the CRP organization and really had his hands full with his wife Martha, assumed that it was a Colson or Haldeman operation. After all, Magruder was not exactly Mitchell’s guy. A more
concentrated focus on Watergate itself might well allow space for exploration of such important details.

These three meetings are the very core of the origins of the Watergate Scandal, yet are given cursory treatment. One would think they would deserve individual, thorough treatment.

We believe Liddy’s recruitment and proposed campaign intelligence plans are ‘ground zero’ for the Watergate scandal. It is critical that a precise and proper description be used in explaining the process by which Liddy’s proposals were encouraged, presented and acted upon—but we cannot propose specific language without agreement on the full context. Is there to be one panel or several? Are the roles of Dean and Magruder to be included or just Mitchell’s?

Proposed Revised Text:

Gordon Liddy was recruited by John Dean to develop a campaign intelligence plan—and to think expansively. Liddy’s proposal, entitled GEMSTONE, involved “mugging, bugging, kidnapping and prostitution” and a proposed budget of $1 million. It was first presented on January 27, 1972, in a meeting in Attorney General John Mitchell’s office that included Liddy, Magruder and Dean. It was rejected as “not quite what we had in mind” and Liddy was encouraged by Dean and Magruder to scale down his submission. The revisited proposal, now priced at $500,000, was presented in a meeting before the same people one week later. It also was rejected. Liddy’s third proposal, now priced at $250,000, was presented by Magruder to Mitchell, who had since become chairman of Nixon’s re-election effort, on March 30th. It is not clear if Mitchell actually approved the plan, but Magruder acted as though he had—approving the dispersal of substantial funds to Liddy. When challenged, Mitchell endorsed Magruder’s authority to approve such expenditures. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether Liddy’s campaign intelligence plans went into effect without explicit approval by anyone other than Jeb Magruder.

Panel Type F2.4 — Timeline Bubble Date: December 1971-January 1972
Title: “Liddy Prepares Budget for Covert Intelligence Ops”
Body Text (what & why 140 words): Liddy was expected to prepare an intelligence plan and budget. Attorney General Mitchell, who was about to leave the Justice Department to run the President’s campaign, had the responsibility for approving Liddy’s intelligence program.
This is out of order and also seems redundant; it is covered in the alternate suggested text immediately above and should be deleted

Need citation. Query if Liddy actually uses the term “Covert Intelligence Ops”.

Text omits any mention of John Dean’s role in recruiting Liddy or informing him of potentially available financial resources.

This text misses one of the true ironies of Watergate: Liddy shows up at the CRP, talking about how he’s been promised $1 million for his campaign intelligence plan. Magruder, who has almost no authority and is not known for making any substantive decision on his own, announces that “only John Mitchell has the authority to approve a $1 million expenditure”—so Mitchell gets sucked into listening to Liddy’s outrageous plan, not for substantive reasons, but for budgetary ones. He must have been caught completely off guard and absolutely appalled at what Liddy proposed. So much so that he declined to meet again when Magruder sought a second meeting—and Magruder had to go to John Dean to get him to get Mitchell to schedule the February 4th meeting.

Notably, there is no mention that Liddy got the CIA to prepare his Gemstone charts, thereby alerting the Agency to his proposals. It has seemed significant to some commentators that CIA personnel were so involved in the planning and execution of the break-in—yet there is no mention of this at all.

Panel Type S2.1 - Mystery Panel

Title: “What Did the White House Know?”

Body Text (100 words): One of the enduring mysteries of Watergate is how much the White House knew about GEMSTONE. White House Chief of Staff H. R. “Bob” Haldeman designated a young staffer, Gordon Strachan, as his point person for discussions about political intelligence. Although Strachan later destroyed documents at Haldeman’s request, his surviving notes indicate that Haldeman at least knew about the approval of the Liddy plan.
Although Magruder told Strachan about one of the secret attempts to enter McGovern headquarters, the available record is silent on what, if any, operational details were shared with Haldeman. President Nixon always denied knowing anything about Gemstone.

- “The White House is a building. . . .” The title needs to be changed, especially since it is such a close paraphrase of Senator Baker’s question, “What did the President know and when did he know it?”
- This panel is somewhat disingenuous: the implication is that no one knows for sure whether anyone at the White House knew the details of Liddy’s crazy Gemstone proposal. It is fairly well agreed that no one at the White House knew of the Watergate break-in in advance. It is almost as though this panel is intended to cast doubt on that well settled belief.
- Gordon Strachan probably should not be described as a “young staffer” who was Haldeman’s point person for discussions about political intelligence: (i) He had been an associate at the Mudge Rose law firm and thus earned his way onto Haldeman’s staff. (ii) He was Haldeman’s liaison with everything at the CRP, not just on campaign intelligence. Magruder makes a huge point about always channeling information and reports to Strachan, rather than directly to Haldeman. (This is what made Magruder such a less-than-hoped-for prosecution witness: his testimony simply could not connect Haldeman or
Ehrlichman to any of the wrongdoing.)
• The penultimate sentence may not be completely accurate.
• Saying “the available record is silent” is disingenuous and may be intentionally misleading:
  o “The available record is silent” as to whether I stood on the moon yesterday, too. Such a phrase has no place in this exhibit.
  o Strachan has long maintained that whenever he received anything from the CRP on political intelligence, he forwarded it—not to Haldeman but—to John Dean, since that was Dean’s area of responsibility.
• The description of how Strachan came to destroy documents received from the CRP is imprecise: It may be that, following the break-in arrests, Strachan told Haldeman that he might have files that could prove embarrassing and Haldeman agreed that Strachan should clean out his files and dispose of any that might prove difficult to explain. The sentence structure suggests that Haldeman knew the contents of the documents that Strachan chose to destroy—and that does not appear to be the case.
• Saying, “Haldeman at least knew about the approval of the Liddy plan” may not be precisely accurate. It may be that Haldeman had assigned John Dean the responsibility of developing, in Dean’s own words, “a perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence plan”. Once this assignment had been made, it ended up on a tickler file, about which Haldeman’s
staffing system would continuously inquire until the project was reported as having been completed. This is a far cry from the implication that Haldeman knew about the substance of Gemstone.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

One of the enduring mysteries of Watergate is how much the president or his senior aides knew about Liddy’s proposed GEMSTONE project. White House Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman designated a member of his staff, Gordon Strachan, as his point person for liaison with the CRP, which included matters of political intelligence. Strachan later destroyed documents he thought could be embarrassing, but his surviving notes indicate that Haldeman at least knew about the approval of a Liddy plan. Although Magruder told Strachan about one of the secret attempts to enter McGovern headquarters, no evidence has been found to show what, if any, operational details were shared with Haldeman. President Nixon always denied knowing anything about Gemstone and no evidence has ever been produced to contradict his assertion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strachan note of April 4, 1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Caption: Haldeman aide Gordon Strachan’s note after Magruder tells him on April 4, 1972 that the Liddy plan had been approved.

- Was this little more than a status report on a tickler file item. If so, it needs fuller explanation or should be omitted entirely.
- If the exhibit is going to
devote space to “damning documentary proof,” surely something less ambiguous than this can be found.

**Date:** April 4, 1972  
**Title:** “The White House Learns that Liddy’s Plan has been Approved”  
**Body Text (60 words):** Jeb Stuart Magruder told H. R. Haldeman, through his aide Gordon Strachan, that “2 of 4” of Liddy’s operations had been approved by John Mitchell. Neither the surviving documentary record, nor the tapes or trial testimony has cleared up the mystery of whether Haldeman knew that these operations involved illegal wiretapping.

- “The White House is a building. . .” The title needs to be changed
- At best, the available proof appears to be that Magruder informed Strachan. There does not appear to be any proof that Strachan informed Haldeman. Indeed, Strachan has testified that he forwarded reports involving political intelligence to John Dean and not to Haldeman. What the text identifies as a mystery is an event about which there appears to be no proof.

**Suggested Alternate Text**

**Title:** “White House Aide Learns that Liddy’s Plan has been Approved”

Jeb Stuart Magruder told Haldeman’s aide, Gordon Strachan,
2 of 4 of Liddy’s operations had been approved by John Mitchell. Neither the surviving documentary record nor the tapes or trial testimony has cleared up the mystery of whether Haldeman knew that these operations involved any illegal activity.

**Caption:** Excerpt from Gordon Strachan’s 1973 interrogation where he tells investigators that he knew about the attempted break-in at McGovern’s headquarters.

**Date:** May 26, 1972

**Title:** “The Plan to Break into George McGovern’s Headquarters”

**Body Text (60 words):** After Senator George McGovern won the Democratic primary in Wisconsin and became the likely Democratic nominee, Haldeman ordered Liddy, through Strachan, to focus his intelligence efforts on McGovern. On May 26 and May 28, Liddy’s group made two unsuccessful attempts to break into McGovern’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. Their goal was to plant illegal electronic bugs.

- These three sentences may be disingenuous:
- It is possible that Haldeman directed Strachan to have the political intelligence operation focus on McGovern. It is unlikely that Haldeman ever met Gordon Liddy or actually used his name in his directive to Strachan. As such, there could be nothing wrong whatsoever in asking that a
campaign intelligence plan focus on the opposition party’s front-runner and soon-to-be (as of June) putative nominee.  
- The phrase “Liddy’s group” is not sufficiently precise. The actual individuals need to be named.

What is so frustrating about this layout and the text’s wording is the implication that Haldeman directed illegal acts. Yet it is much more likely that he asked for political intelligence and it was Liddy who determined his best way to accomplish the task was through a series of illegal acts.

Proposed Revised Text:

After South Dakota Senator George McGovern won the Democratic primary in Wisconsin and became the likely Democratic nominee, Haldeman, through Strachan, directed CRP to have their political intelligence gathering efforts focus on the McGovern campaign. On May 26TH AND 28TH, two unsuccessful attempts were made, under Liddy’s initiative and direction, to plant illegal electronic bugs into McGovern’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media (cross referenced to above)</th>
<th>Video Clips:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dirty Tricks Dirty Tricks</td>
<td>• Chapin on Nixon and Dirty</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Hiring G. Gordon Liddy**

Liddy’s Plan has been Approved

- Tricks
  - Nixon on Dirty Tricks
  - Liddy on Politics and War
  - Silbert on “the Approval”
  - Alexander on leaving the WH in 1970

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**Tape Excerpts with rolling transcript:**

**Dirty Tricks**

- WH Tape: 5/05/71: HRF{ and Nixon on Dirty Tricks [49 1-14]
- WH Tape: Dec. 23/71: Nixon and Colson on the mailer [310-17]
- WH Tape: January 9/72: Nixon and Colson on mailer [18-19]

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**Concluding Thoughts on Section 2:**

- The Watergate break-in is seen by most as marking the beginning of the Watergate scandal—and should be explored in more substantive detail.
  - Who, if anyone, really authorized Liddy’s intelligence plan?
  - What was the rationale for tapping the phones (Spencer Oliver’s for example)?
  - What of the allegations that the DNC knew they were coming?
  - What chaos followed the initial arrests? (McCord’s listening suite, Hunt’s depositing damaging materials in his EOB office, Liddy’s efforts to get Kleindienst to spring the burglars.)
  - What of all of the other discrepancies described in Hougan’s *Secret Agenda*?
  - What was the planned prosecution strategy (wherein Hougan claims prosecutors were going to claim it was all an attempt to blackmail O’Brien?)
- The proposed exhibit’s expansive view of Watergate’s “conspiracy thinking” motivation ends up denying the visitor very much substantive information on the break-in itself.
  - The role of James McCord goes without any mention whatsoever.
John Dean’s central role throughout this stage is minimized to an indefensible extent.

The tracing of the Dahlberg and Ogarrio funds --- so important in any understanding of what each side intended and knew --- is nowhere described.

• It is these kinds of details that should form the core of any Watergate exhibit—because they are the core material of Watergate, even if many of them remain unconfirmed and controversial. If the National Archives is going to stand behind a permanent exhibit on such a controversial subject, it needs to take great care to distinguish fact from opinion.

• To reiterate, these first two sections have no firm connection to Watergate itself — yet parallels to many of the not uncommon practices that are so highly criticized in this exhibit are not even mentioned in exhibits at other Presidential Libraries.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

**Section 3:**

**G-03-02**

“The Cover-Up”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Time Span:</strong></th>
<th>June-August 1972</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheryl, Please note change in timespan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Panel Type B3.1 — Section Intro**

**G-03-02**

**Sub Head** *(Main Message 15-25 words):* The White House feared that the arrests on June 17 might reveal.

**Body Text** *(105 words)*: . much more than a simple plot to break into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee. When the arrest of Hunt and Liddy’s team at the Watergate office complex threatened to reveal other domestic covert operations and to implicate higher officials in a conspiracy to commit wrongdoing, the White House quickly initiated damage control and cover-up efforts. By using the same team
for political espionage and the Plumbers’ operations, the White House had taken a huge risk. If the team got caught in 1972, the public might also learn damaging secrets from 1971. The actions by President Nixon and his chief lieutenants to keep those secrets away from investigators in the weeks after the Watergate arrests would ultimately doom his presidency.

- “The White House is a building. . .". Opening sentence needs to be more precise in naming particular individuals.
- The first sentence is judgmental, conclusory and factually unsupported.
- It is generally agreed that initial concerns centered on possible involvement by Chuck Colson—and that John Dean assumed responsibility for getting a handle on the issue.
- Dean’s initial report that “no one on the White House staff knew of the planned break-in in advance” was possibly literally true, but hardly a complete report: Dean specifically failed to mention his presence at the two key meetings in Attorney General Mitchell’s office when Liddy first presented his campaign intelligence plan.
- The second sentence is judgmental, conclusory and factually unsupported.
- There appears to be no proof—in documents, in testimony or on the tapes—that Nixon, Haldeman or Ehrlichman were initially worried about revelations of “other domestic covert operations” or that they would “implicate
higher officials in a conspiracy to commit wrongdoing”.

- It is fairly clear from the tapes that Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman considered Watergate to be a problem for officials at the CRP and did not threaten the White House itself. Dean, on the other hand, knew far differently and conducted himself as though he were as much at risk as those at the CRP (which, in fact, he was). A simple but basic element of the Watergate story is completely absent from this exhibit: When they learned about the Watergate break-in, Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman assigned White House counsel John Dean the task of finding out and reporting to them whether anyone on the White House staff had been involved in its planning or execution. Dean, who was himself involved in the planning, assured them that no one from the White House was involved. Whatever their others degrees of knowledge and/or culpability, their dependence on John Dean for information was an ongoing and central element in their decision-making throughout the development of the cover-up from the June 17th break-in arrests until March, 1973.

- The concluding sentence is judgmental, conclusory and inappropriate for this exhibit.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*The June 17th arrests of the Watergate burglars resulted in different risks for different groups*
of Nixon supporters. Liddy and Hunt had directed the break-in and were in danger of immediate arrest. Mitchell, Magruder and Dean had been in meetings where Liddy's proposals were considered—and may have been privy to information from the illegal wiretaps. Their goal was to contain the damage at the Hunt/Liddy level—hence the cover-up. Perhaps more telling, Liddy's use of the same people who were involved in the prior break-in into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, threatened exposure of far more than a "third rate burglary". Believing no one on the White House staff was involved in the Watergate break-in itself, the initial efforts of Haldeman and Ehrlichman centered on containing the political damage to the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Mitchell was quickly terminated as CRP's chairman and Dean placed in charge of damage control. But actions taken by members of each group in the following months, when the cover-up collapsed, led to indictments and convictions of all of them—and to the resignation of President Nixon.

**Lead in Quote** *(15-25 words)*: "Well, they took a . . . .risk, and they have to be paid," President Nixon on the Watergate burglars, August 1, 1972 Cheryl, please note a slight change here. I had to edit
out a swear word.

- The panel needs to show to whom the President was addressing this remark. Was this an observation or an instruction?
- It is not at all clear that this is full and proper reflection of RN’s state of mind on the burglars.
- A contrary view can be found in the tape of the Nixon/Colson meeting of January 8, 1973—and perhaps elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type F3. 1 - Timeline Bubble</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong> May 28, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> “The First Watergate Break-in”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text (60 words):</strong> The Hunt-Liddy team broke into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate for the first time on May 28. They installed an electronic listening device on the telephone of the executive director of the state Democratic chairmen and one on the telephone of Democratic National Committee Chairman Lawrence F. O’Brien. The team left the Watergate without being detected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- The panel should identify the actual names of the burglars, particularly James McCord; it also should name Spencer Oliver.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Under Gordon Liddy’s direction, Hunt’s team of four burglars, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, Frank Sturgis, and Virgilio Gonzalez, along with James McCord, broke into the DNC Headquarters*
on the evening of May 28th. They installed electronic taps on the telephones of DNC Chairman Larry O’Brien and Spencer Oliver, executive director of state Democratic chairmen. The team left the Watergate building without being detected. O’Brien’s wiretap never worked; Spencer’s produced no useful political intelligence.

**Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:**
Photo and google map location of Watergate complex

**The Watergate office complex, home to the Democratic National Committee headquarters in 1972, is located at 2650 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type C3.1 - Event Detail</th>
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**Date:** June 17, 1972  
**Title:** “The Final Watergate Break-in and Arrests”  
**Body Text (what & why 140 words):** Magruder and Liddy pressured Hunt’s team to break into the Watergate for a second time because the bugs were not producing useful intelligence. The wiretap on O’Brien’s telephone had malfunctioned and the one on the telephone of the DNC executive director produced nothing of political value. The Cubans were reluctant, as was Hunt, but the attempt was made. Around 2:00 a.m., a Watergate security officer, Frank Wills, noticed that the doors into the stairwell were taped open long after the cleaning staff had gone home. He called the police and the five burglars—Bernard L. Barker, Virgilio R. Gonzalez, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, James W. McCord, Jr., and Frank A. Sturgis—were arrested. Hunt and Liddy, who were observing the operation from a hotel across the street, fled the scene. Alfred
Baldwin, whose job for Hunt and Liddy was to listen to the wiretaps, also eluded arrest that night and later became a government witness. **Date: June 17, 1972**

- Title should substitute “Second” for “Final” – final implies a long series of break-ins; two is more precise
- Magruder clearly pressured Liddy, but it would be more accurate to then say Liddy “ordered” Hunt’s team back in.
- The wiretap on O’Brien’s phone never worked; use of the verb “malfunctioned” suggests it had worked at one time.
- Willis removed the tape and then noticed it had been placed a second time. There remains great ambiguity about how and why the tape was placed on the door (vertically, as would be done by a burglar, since it would not be apparent—or horizontally, as would be done by the cleaning staff, just to keep the lock from catching), as well as why so many locks were taped.
- It might be more accurate to say the five burglars were caught “red handed in the DNC offices”.
- Hunt and Liddy were nearby, but not in the Howard Johnson hotel room across the street.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

**Title: “The Second Watergate Break-in and Arrests”**

*When the first break-in failed to yield any usable political intelligence, Liddy ordered Hunt’s...*
team to break into the Watergate a second time. The Cubans were reluctant, as was Hunt, but the attempt was made. Around 2:00 a.m., a building security officer, Frank Wills, noticed for a second time that evening that the doors into the stairwell were taped open, long after the cleaning staff had gone home. Having already once removed tape from a stairwell lock, Wills became suspicious and called the police. The police arrived and the five men, Bernard L. Barker, Virgilio R. Gonzalez, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, James W. McCord, Jr., and Frank A. Sturgis, were caught red-handed inside the DNC offices. Hunt and Liddy, who were observing the operation from outside, fled the scene undetected. Alfred Baldwin, whose job for McCord was to monitor the wiretaps, also eluded arrest that night and later became a government witness.

Title: “What the FBI Finds the first Day”

Body Text (60 words): In the burglars’ hotel rooms, the FBI found items that immediately connected E. Howard Hunt to the break-in. Hunt’s name and a White House telephone number appeared in two of the burglars’ address books. The FBI also found stacks of crisp $100 bills, which the Bureau would eventually track to cashier’s checks from contributors to the President’s re-election campaign.

- It may not be precise to say
the FBI “found items that immediately connected” Hunt to the break-in. It may be that the notation in the address book was “H. H.” and a White House phone number—but even this entry would not immediately connect Hunt to the break-in.
• The sources, movement and uses of the two particular campaign contributions might better be discussed and traced in detail, since they may lie at the center of the Watergate scandal.
• Is in not accurate to say “the Bureau would eventually track to cashier’s checks from contributors to the President’s re-election campaign.” Dwayne Andreas’ $25,000 contribution was in cash; it was Ken Dahlberg, one of CRP regional fundraisers, who converted Andreas’ cash into a cashier’s check. Need to confirm whether the Ogarrio checks were, in fact, cashier’s checks. The sequence of the cash may be of critical importance, since it is the key to understanding the “smoking gun” tape of 6/23/72.
• It might be more accurate to note at this point that the FBI was able to trace the crisp $100 bills to a Miami bank where Bernard Barker had cashed five checks, totaling some $114,000, that he had received from Gordon Liddy at the President’s re-election campaign.

Proposed Revised Text:

*In the burglars’ hotel rooms, the FBI found items that connected*
them to an individual at the White House. Hunt’s White House telephone number appeared in two of the burglars’ address books. The FBI also found stacks of crisp $100 bills, which the Bureau quickly tracked to a Miami bank where one of the burglars (Bernard Barker) had cashed checks, totaling $114,000, that he had received from Gordon Liddy at the President’s re-election campaign.

Panel Type C3.2 - Event Detail
Date: June 17 — July 6
Title: “The Cover-up — Early Efforts”
Body Text (what & why 140 words): The President participates in the evolving cover-up and orders the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s Investigation. Through the Justice Department, the White House learned that the FBI had already traced the money found in the hotel rooms to checks cashed by burglar Bernard Barker in Miami. Haldeman suggested, citing a recommendation from John Mitchell and John Dean, that the President use the CIA to prevent the FBI from tracing the money further from Barker to the re-election campaign. The plan involved ordering the CIA to mislead the FBI into believing that the Watergate break-in was a CIA operation. Haldeman also informed the President that his advisors had implemented a plan to get Hunt out of the country. The President approved the plan to use the CIA and raised no objection to keeping
Hunt away from criminal investigators.

- Lots happened between the arrests of June 17th and the ‘smoking gun’ conversation of June 23rd—this panel’s event date—none of which is covered in any detail in this section:
  - Dean’s initial meeting with Liddy, wherein he confirms it was a Liddy operation and that Liddy had promised financial support.
  - The evening meeting in Mitchell’s apartment, including Mitchell, Magruder, LaRue, Mardian and Dean, wherein the rough outlines of the cover-up appear to have been discussed. There is great ambiguity as to whether Mitchell was informed of and/or approved or disapproved any financial support for those arrested.
  - Dean’s meetings with Colson, Haldeman and Ehrlichman and the very contentious issue of who actually ordered Hunt out of the country.
  - Any Dean communications with Kleindienst, Petersen and Gray regarding his interest in being continuously informed of their investigations.
  - It has been alleged by Colodny that there was no possible opportunity for Dean to have run his CIA operation idea past John Mitchell before presenting it to Haldeman on or about June 23rd. Mitchell denies ever having discussed it with Dean.
- ‘The White House is a building . . .’ The same logic applies to “the Justice
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department”</th>
<th>there is a need here for more precision in the naming of names. Who was the source of Dean’s information?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The “smoking gun” transcript does not seem to show Haldeman “suggesting” a course particular action to the President. He is presenting an idea (using the CIA to head off the FBI interviews of two people) that Dean has relayed to him as coming from Mitchell —with Dean’s studied concurrence. Haldeman’s role appears more to have been that of a neutral party conveying an idea from others.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• It is not clear from the transcript that the idea Dean has presented was designed “to prevent the FBI from tracing the money further from Barker to the re-election committee”. It may be that the effort, as understood by Haldeman, was to prevent the FBI from tracing the money from Barker back to prominent Democratic contributors, who had been promised anonymity for their contributions.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The use of the word “plan” is not accurate, since that term never appears in the transcript; Haldeman calls it a “proposal”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There appears to be nothing in the “smoking gun” transcript about “his advisors had implemented a plan to get Hunt out of the country”, yet the Panel’s wording suggests this is a part of the same conversation. Need to see how the two relate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • It is interesting to note how the “smoking gun” transcript shows ___________________________
how Nixon and Haldeman had already been informed—almost certainly by John Dean—that the trail, if carefully followed, would end up at Mitchell’s door. Mitchell denied this, both at trial and to his dying day. Mitchell resigned from CRP on July 1—less than two weeks after the Watergate arrests—and does not appear to have seen or talked with the President until March 22, 1973. It certainly seems possible that Nixon returned from Key Biscayne following the break-in arrests, demanded the truth, was told by Haldeman (again, relying solely on John Dean) that Mitchell was at risk, and made the decision to fire his best friend—but to let justice run its course rather than to turn him in. The same thing would have happened to John Dean if his risk of prosecution had been known.

Regardless of how one interprets the “smoking gun” conversation, the President’s interest in keeping any record of his involvement in the CIA/FBI gambit lay at the heart of his subsequent actions—and it seems critically important to bring this out. Remember, the CIA initiatives taken by Haldeman and Ehrlichman in this regard were rather well known through Ervin Committee testimony and CIA memos; it was the President’s personal involvement that was not revealed until August 5, 1974.

Proposed Revised Text:

*In their initial investigation, the FBI*
was troubled by international implications: the use of Cubans as burglars, the $100 bills being traced through an international bank in Miami, and several of the checks having been drawn on a bank in Mexico. When John Dean learned of these concerns, he saw an opportunity to limit their investigation—and his own risk of prosecution. He urged Haldeman—alleging it was Mitchell’s idea—to get Nixon’s approval to ask the CIA to tell the FBI to avoid interviewing two individuals regarding the source of the money found on the Cubans, because it risked exposing a CIA operation. The President’s approval was obtained by Haldeman on June 23, 1972. Haldeman and Ehrlichman then met with CIA officials, who in turn contacted acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray. The CIA withdrew their hold nine days later, although Gray remained concerned about potential interference. On July 6, 1972, he called President Nixon to warn him that some of his aides were attempting to interfere with the FBI investigations into Watergate. The President assured Gray that he should “just continue to conduct your aggressive and thorough investigation.”

**Panel**

**Type D3.3**

**Dossier**

**G-03-03**

**Names:** H. R. “Bob” Haldeman

**Body Text** (60 words): Bob Haldeman was a close aide to Richard Nixon in the 1960 and 1962 campaigns. After serving as chief of staff in the 1968
Bob Haldeman was President Nixon’s closest aide. After serving in senior positions in the 1960 presidential and 1962 California gubernatorial campaigns, Nixon named him chief of staff for his 1968 campaign. Haldeman then served as White House chief of staff from January 20, 1969 until April 30, 1973 and is often credited with creating the modern White House staff structure. In announcing his resignation, President Nixon called him one of the “finest public servants it has been my privilege to know”. Haldeman was convicted on January 1, 1975 in the Watergate cover-up trial of conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice and perjury. He was sentenced to a term of 2½--8 years and served 18 months at the Federal minimum-security prison in Lompoc, California.
**Name:** J. W. Dean, III  

**Body Text** (60 words): John Dean became Counsel to the President in July 1970. With the President’s approval, Dean was made coordinator of the cover-up after the Watergate arrests. Dean testified before the Senate under immunity and was the first insider to reveal the President’s involvement in the cover-up. After pleading guilty to obstruction of justice, he was jailed for 4 months.

- Any Dean panel should be placed at the beginning of the exhibit.
- Again, there is this strange use of initials in the panel’s title.
- Dean’s responsibilities for campaign intelligence, Liddy’s recruitment and presence at the two meetings in Mitchell’s office need to be included.
- It may not be accurate to say Dean “was made coordinator” of the cover-up. He certainly took charge of overseeing the issue, keeping track of the investigations, and being sure the growing problems were “contained” at the CRP. Some authors suggest he did it more as a volunteer than as a result of a formal delegation.
- In that role, he acted as—by his own admission—the “chief desk officer” for the cover-up. In that role, he personally committed a series of illegal acts:
  - Subornation of perjury (certainly Magruder’s and perhaps others, including Krogh’s).
  - Misuse of prosecutorial investigative information (which he wrongly shared with CRP defense counsel)
  - Destruction of evidence (Hunt’s Hermes notebooks and other selected materials from Hunt’s safe—which he withheld from the FBI and, apparently, his White House superiors); Dean personally
destroyed evidence and only admitted it to prosecutors after being allowed to plead guilty to a single felony.

- Embezzlement of funds (the $4,000 of campaign funds he “borrowed” from his office safe for his honeymoon --- but failed to return.)
- Dean is also personally responsible for opposing any and all suggestions—particularly by Ehrlichman and Stans—that the only way out of the growing scandal was fuller disclosure:
  - Dean consistently maintained that individuals had based their defense on certain statements—and that disclosure of any additional information could undercut their defense.
  - He also maintained that any disclosure would inevitably lead back to the Plumbers’ break-in, but this gets mixed up with Dean’s self-interest: Any disclosure would immediately highlight his own criminal acts.
  - The essential question of Watergate — still debated to this day — is whether Nixon, Haldeman or Ehrlichman had any idea of the extent of Dean’s criminal acts during what is now called the cover-up. In essence: Was it Dean’s cover-up — or did his White House superiors know and understand what he was up to? It is disappointing, to say the least, that there is no mention of any of this in the proposed exhibit.

Proposed Revised Text:

Name: John W. Dean, III

After joining the Nixon administration in early 1969 as an associate deputy attorney general at the Department of Justice, John Dean replaced John Ehrlichman as Counsel to the President in July 1970. As White House counsel, he was responsible for liaison with the Department of Justice, particularly with regard to clemency petitions and FBI background checks on possible presidential appointees. In his effort to expand his
influence, he began to coordinate the gathering of political intelligence—particularly concerning student unrest and opposition to the Vietnam War. He also recruited and hired Gordon Liddy to prepare an intelligence plan for the 1972 campaign. Following the June 17th arrests and fearing his own risk of prosecution, he became—in his own words—“chief desk officer” for the Watergate cover-up, committing a series of personal criminal acts in furtherance of the overall effort to obstruct justice. When the cover-up collapsed at the end of March of 1972—and while still Counsel to the President—Dean approached prosecutors seeking immunity in exchange for his testimony against other Nixon aides and revelations of illicit actions by White House aides unconnected to the Watergate scandal itself. His testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee—also under grant of immunity—electrified the nation through its implication of Nixon’s own involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Dean also was the lead government witness in the Watergate Cover-up trial. While sentenced to a prison term of one to four years before that trial, he was released for ‘time served’ one week following the convictions of Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell—having spent just four months at Ft. Holabird, a witness holding facility in Maryland.

| Date: June 18-19  
| **Title:** “The Cover-up Begins”  
| **Body Text (60 words):** Liddy, Magruder and Strachan destroyed evidence of GEMSTONE planning and intelligence. Hunt disappeared. Two days later John Dean met with John Mitchell, John Ehrlichman and H. R. “Bob” Haldeman to discuss next steps.  
| - Many observers believe the cover-up began at the evening meeting in Mitchell’s  

| **Panel Type F3.3 - Timeline Bubble** |
| • Need citation to determine exactly what is meant here. The phrase, “Hunt disappeared” somehow suggests he actually left the country — which is not the case. In direct contradiction to Dean’s sworn testimony that Ehrlichman had ordered Hunt out of the country, it appears to have been established—under oath—that Dean ordered this on his own initiative—and only reversed the order when Colson pointed out to him that it constituted an obstruction of justice. Hunt and Liddy were both arrested in due course.

• Need to specify the date of this meeting. It also may be appropriate to point out that the three others in the Dean meeting (Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman) uniformly disagree with Dean’s characterization of the meeting.

• Again, a central issue in understanding the scandal is whether Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman fully understood and appreciated Dean’s cover-up actions (i.e., directed them) or were ignorant of the scope of his illegal acts and his interests in protecting his own risk of prosecution.

• Rather than try to address these numerous concerns, we request that we be provided with alternate text that addresses them.

| Quote |

“Well, they took a... risk, and they have to be paid” PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE WATERGATE BURGLARS, AUGUST 1, 1972

• Need to show context. Who was in the room? How did the discussion evolve? August 1 seems rather late in the game for any Presidential directive —yet it comes prior to the actual indictments. Was this an observation or an instruction?

• There is a good quote in RN’s January 8, 1972 conversation with Colson, wherein
he expresses astonishment at the burglars’ acts. Something like, “What were they thinking? Didn’t they think they’d get caught? Did they really believe somehow Mitchell would get them off?” Perhaps there are other comments that could be used to point out that the “evidence” from the WH tapes is frequently equivocal and at times contradictory.

- Nixon’s observations regarding Liddy on the “smoking gun” tape might be of interest here.
- Without the proper context, this quote should be deleted.
Date: June 23, 1972  
Title: “Obstruction of Justice”  

Body Text (140 words): In three different conversations, the President approved the use of the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s criminal investigation. That day Ehrlichman and Haldeman told CIA director Richard Helms and his deputy, General Vernon Walters, that the CIA should instruct the FBI to back off its investigation of the source of the burglars’ money for national security reasons. Although the CIA had not organized the Watergate break-in, Helms and Walters initially agreed to the presidential request.  

Caption: The White House did not want the FBI to investigate this political contribution from Kenneth Dahlberg. Cashed by Barker, this check linked the re-election committee to the Watergate burglars.  

- While the topic may have been discussed on three occasions, the transcripts released on August 5, 1974, suggest that Nixon only gave his approval to the proposal in one conversation,  
- The “smoking gun” tape —its meaning and disclosure— lies at the very heart of the Watergate scandal. Its treatment here is totally inappropriate for such a key aspect of the scandal.  
- At the very least, the text needs to indicate that this was Dean’s proposal—and that there is no question but that Dean had an ulterior, unannounced, motive in using the CIA to head off the FBI investigation.
(Colodny maintains that, while Dean used Mitchell’s name, Mitchell denied ever being consulted and points out that Dean could not possibly have consulted with Mitchell in the stated timeframe.)

- The phrase, “Although the CIA had not organized the Watergate break-in” seems gratuitous—especially since the exhibit nowhere contains any allusion to Hougan’s serious allegations to the contrary.
- It previously has been pointed out that the lack of any description of the Dahlberg/Ogarrio campaign contributions impedes full understanding and appreciation of Dean’s suggested use of the CIA: Ogarrio’s checks were drawn on a Mexican bank and Barker used his own account at an international bank in Miami to cash them—so there were abundant indications of foreign involvement in the movement of the cash.
- It may be relevant to note that the effort here was to get the CIA’s help in preventing FBI interviews of only two individuals: Kenneth Dahlberg and Daniel Ogarrio; that that the “hold” only lasted nine days; and that when they were interviewed, no criminality was found.
- One reading of the “smoking gun” tape — and perhaps these other tape mentions that are alluded to — is that their intent was not to protect any inquiry into the cash coming from CRP (since the connection through McCord and Liddy was already well known), but to prevent the tracing of the cash in the other direction: to the two prominent Democratic contributors, who had been assured of absolute confidentiality. This was particularly sensitive in Andreas’ case, since he had been finance chairman of Humphrey’s 1968 campaign, sole trustee of the blind trust Humphrey had established as Vice President, and fully expected to be finance chairman again should Humphrey follow through on his announced intention of
challenging Nixon again in 1972. Hence, the key phrase in the “smoking gun” tape — “the FBI investigation is going in a new direction we don’t want it to go”. Stans and Haldeman also advanced this version of the tape in their respective books.

- It is important also to note that Pat and Ed Gray’s book, *In Nixon’s Web*, describes a follow up phone call from Dean, checking to be sure that the FBI is still holding off interviewing Dahlberg and Ogarrio.
- In sum, it is possible that John Dean duped Nixon, Haldeman and Ehrlichman into asking the CIA to get the FBI to hold off two interviews, thinking they were protecting the identities of prominent Democratic contributors, when Dean himself had undisclosed ulterior motives.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

The Nixon’s ultimate downfall was precipitated with the release of the tape of his meeting with Bob Haldeman on June 23, 1972, termed “the smoking gun” tape. There was no question but there had been a cover-up; the issue was whether President Nixon had been personally involved—and this conversation showed that to be the case. In it, Nixon concurred with John Dean’s recommendation—which he represented as being John Mitchell’s proposal—that they direct the CIA to ask the FBI to not interview two individuals who had forwarded campaign contributions to the CRP—some of which had been traced to the Watergate burglars. While these two interviews were postponed for only nine days—and their actions found not to be improper at all—the inescapable conclusion from the tape was that the President had authorized an obstruction of justice.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>S3.1 —Mystery Panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Title:** “Why did the Liddy-Hunt team target the Watergate?”

**Body Text (100 words):** There is no agreement on the motive for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Jeb Magruder blamed White House pressure to get damaging information on DNC Chairman O’Brien. Liddy blamed Magruder’s demand for information on O’Brien and for any damaging information that the Democrats had on Republicans. Hunt recalled Liddy telling him that the White House wanted to know whether the North Vietnamese were funding the Democrats. The Cuban Americans believed they were looking for information on McGovem’s possible relationship to Fidel Castro. President Nixon, Mitchell, Dean, Ehrlichman and Colson claimed to know nothing about this operation ahead of time and Haldeman speculated that the President and Colson had somehow inspired it to get information on O’Brien.

- It might be better to just omit the words “White House” from the Jeb Magruder sentence.
- It is difficult to understand why, in this litany of reasons for targeting the DNC, that there is no mention of Len Colodny’s John Dean rationale or of Jim Hougan’s CIA conspiracy. It is almost as though the exhibit author is taking it upon himself to personally determine which rationales are worthy of comment. Yet, both Hougan’s and Colodny’s books were best-sellers—and have not been discredited in any substantive way.
- Here, again, might be the place to mention that Dean’s first assignment—following the burglars’ arrests—was to ascertain the extent of any White House involvement. His report—“none”—formed the basis for the entire White House defense.
Despite the passage of many years, there is still no agreement on the motive for breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Jeb Magruder blamed White House pressure to get damaging information on DNC Chairman O’Brien. Initially, Liddy blamed Magruder’s demand for information on O’Brien and for any damaging information that the Democrats had on Republicans; more recently, he has stated they went back in under orders from John Dean. Hunt recalled Liddy telling him that the White House wanted to know whether the North Vietnamese were funding the Democrats. The Cuban Americans believed they were looking for information on McGovern’s possible relationship to Fidel Castro. President Nixon has never been shown to have had advance knowledge of the break-in and Mitchell, Dean, Ehrlichman and Colson claimed to know nothing about it before it occurred. In the decades that followed Watergate, several best selling books have offered other rationales, including possible CIA involvement and highly personal motives ascribed to John Dean.

Panel

Type D3.2 — Dossier (photo and caption only)

**Name:** Lawrence Francis O’Brien, Jr.  
**Body Text** (60 words): O’Brien served as an aide to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson before becoming chairman of the DNC in 1968 and, again, in 1970. “For years,” recalled Haldeman, “Nixon had been trying to track down hot ammunition_to_discredit_O’Brien…”

- O’Brien does not really figure large in the Watergate Scandal, except that he personifies the DNC. The unasked question is, “Why O’Brien” rather than “Why the DNC?”
There is a lot more to the O’Brien/Nixon connection that might be mentioned, including the allegations surrounding the Howard Hughes loan, the exploitation.

We recommend deleting this photo and caption.

Insert: photo of Kalmbach

Caption: The White House used Herbert W. Kalmbach to give money to the Watergate burglars after their arrest.

Date: July 6, 1972
Title: “The CIA says No to the Cover-Up”
Body Text (60 words): The CIA changed its mind and informed the FBI that national security was not involved in the Watergate affair. The CIA also refused a White House request that it pay salaries and attorney’s fees to Hunt and the Cuban Americans. On July 6, Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, told President Nixon that both the FBI and the CIA were concerned that some White House staffers were attempting to use the CIA to obstruct the Watergate investigation. The President told Gray that the FBI should press on with its investigation.

It seems appropriate to point out that the CIA changed its mind within nine days and said it had no interest in preventing FBI interviews of Dahlberg and Ogarrio—and that no criminality was uncovered as a result of the two interviews.

“The White House is a building. . . “ It may be appropriate to point out that it was John Dean who took it upon himself to ask the CIA for funds.

The section about Pat Gray’s personal phone call with President Nixon seems rather significant and perhaps should not be buried within a panel about the CIA. Nixon’s direction to Gray to proceed with the investigation was claimed to be a presidential
action that belied Nixon’s participation in the cover-up. Perhaps this deserves more prominent treatment in a panel of its own.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

Within nine days, the CIA changed its mind and informed the FBI that no CIA operation would be implicated by interviews of two individuals who had forwarded contributions to the CRP. The CIA also refused a request from John Dean that it pay salaries and attorneys’ fees to Hunt and the Cuban Americans. On July 6, Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray, told President Nixon that both the FBI and the CIA were concerned that some White House staffers were attempting to use the CIA to obstruct the Watergate investigation. The President instructed Gray to press on with his FBI investigation.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: July 7-September 15</th>
<th>Title: “The Cover-up — Further Efforts”</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text (what &amp; why 140 words):</strong> With the CIA and FBI out of its control, the White House revised the cover-up scenario. The White House now hoped to shape the investigation so that federal prosecutors believed that Liddy had acted without the knowledge of campaign chief John Mitchell and his deputy Jeb Magruder. Skeptical that this would work, and certain that Magruder would have to be sacrificed to protect Mitchell, the President told aides on July 19 that he would pardon Magruder if he pled guilty. The President also said that he intended to pardon Hunt, Liddy and the burglars after the election. The President devised a plan to pair these pardons with pardons for jailed members of Vietnam</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Veterans Against the War. Meanwhile, Mitchell’s staff worked with Dean to give money to the burglars’ families. The President’s personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, started these payments on July 7 and the President expressed his approval on August 1.

- The phrase, “With the CIA and FBI out of its control”, seems gratuitous. It also is judgmental, conclusory and incapable of direct citation.
- “The White House is a building. . . “ It might be more appropriate to identify the specific actions of individuals in putting forth these allegations.
- The phrase, “The White House now hoped to shape the investigation. . .” is judgmental, conclusory and not capable of direct citation.
- The phrase, “Skeptical that this would work. . . “ is judgmental, conclusory and not capable of direct citation.
- The phrase, “Mitchell’s staff” may not be appropriate in this context. It would be far better to identify the individuals specifically involved, because the implication is that Mitchell knew about and condoned the payments. Conrad Black writes that Mitchell resisted this from the outset. Need to check this alleged action with Mitchell’s July 1st resignation from the CRP—they may no longer have been “Mitchell’s staff” at all.
- It may be appropriate to point out that the prosecution conceded at the cover-up trial that all of the payments had been made for invoiced legal expenses or for humanitarian aid. The issue was one of intent — and Dean was alleging that the true purpose was “hush money” to buy their silence.
- There should probably be a separate panel on the $400,000 of payments to the defendants, since they were so crucial to the
cover-up convictions. In that panel, it might be appropriate to point out that such payments have been made in virtually every political scandal in our lifetime — and that there is no indication that Nixon, Haldeman or Ehrlichman were aware of the surreptitious delivery methods.

Proposed Revised Text:

With the FBI continuing its full investigation, John Dean began to explore other ways to shape the investigation so that federal prosecutors believed that Liddy had acted without the knowledge of himself, campaign chief John Mitchell and his deputy Jeb Magruder. Believing that Magruder might have to be held accountable, the President discussed pardoning Magruder if he pled guilty. The President also mused about the possibility of pardoning Hunt, Liddy and the burglars after the election and talked about pairing those pardons with pardons for jailed members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Meanwhile, Dean worked to have money provided to the burglars’ families to cover legal and living expenses. The President’s personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, was recruited to orchestrate these payments on July 7 and the President expressed his approval for such payments on August 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media (cross referenced to above)</th>
<th>Video Clips:</th>
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| Second Watergate Break In Second Watergate Break In | • Liddy on the motive of the break-in  
• Magruder on the motive of the break-in |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What the FBI Finds</th>
<th>• Liddy on the arrests</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tape Excerpts w/ rolling transcript:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **The Cover-up — Early Efforts ??** | • WH Tape: June 20, 1972: HRH and Nixon discussing intentional disappearance of Hunt  
  • WH Tape: June 23, 1972 [Smoking Gun] |

**Concluding Thoughts on Section 3:**
- The Introduction is very difficult to follow because the Watergate break-ins are included as an integral part of the Cover-up Section. The ambiguity could be addressed if there were a separate section covering:
  - Dean’s assignment to develop a campaign intelligence plan
  - His initial effort regarding “Sandwedge”
  - His hiring of Liddy to do that
  - Liddy’s development and presentation of the plan—treating the three meetings separately
  - The May 28th break-in
  - The handling of information developed as a result
  - The June 17th break-in
  - The arrests and initial reactions.

Then the Cover-up Section will make more sense.
- What is now characterized as the cover-up was—in fact—an illegal enterprise and should certainly have failed. Those responsible should have been punished.
- The cover-up failed largely because of the extensive investigations by career Federal prosecutors.
- The central issue—then and now—is whether John Dean was acting outside the scope of his authority and engaging in illegal actions motivated by his desire to protect himself—or acting under the knowing leadership and control of President Nixon, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman.
- There is a series of four taped conversations, beginning with an RN/Ehrlichman meeting the evening of March 20th, including the “cancer on the presidency” meeting, another one later that afternoon, and culminating in the March 22nd meeting (containing the “stonewall” quote) that—when viewed in their entirety—may well suggest the lack of any conspiracy, any
specific knowledge of Dean’s illicit activities, and an effort by the President to steer the new disclosures that certainly were coming toward the grand jury and not the Ervin Committee. This idea is nowhere alluded to, much less developed, in the exhibit as written.

- While Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman were convicted of all counts in the Watergate cover-up trial, this does not mean that the National Archives can discount all their protestations of innocence. Put simply, the jury did not make specific findings of fact. Even Richard Ben-Veniste, in his book, Stonewall, the Real Story of the Watergate Prosecutions, was careful to say, “that Dean alleged were directed by Haldeman and Ehrlichman”.
- The truth is not at all clear, which is why the debate continues. The important thing for any Watergate exhibit is to portray both points of view as fairly as possible.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix
G-04-02
Section 4: “The Investigations”
Time Span: September 1972-July 1973

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>B4.1 — Section Intro G-04-03</th>
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Sub Head (Main Message 15-25 words) : The cover-up unravelled under the persistent pressure of

Body Text (105 words) : the Press, the FBI, the Sirica Court, Congress and federal prosecutors. During the period when the cover-up was working, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the Washington Post kept the Watergate story alive in the Press. Using tips from Associate FBI Director Mark Felt—later revealed as their source “Deep Throat”—and the products of their own reporting, the two journalists wrote articles that laid the groundwork for the Senate’s decision to initiate its own investigation. Meanwhile, Judge John J. Sirica, who presided over the Watergate Grand Jury, suspected that some of the witnesses were lying and looked for a way to get at the truth. In early 1973, some Watergate conspirators would start working with prosecutors.
Lead in Quote (15-25 words): “What did the President Know and When Did He Know it?” Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee)

- The litany of those credited for breaking the cover-up may be largely inaccurate. Some observers believe Dean’s cover-up collapsed for two principal reasons: (i) Silbert was right about defendants possibly changing their testimony once they were convicted and facing long prison terms, and (ii) the unusual behavior of Judge Sirica that denied the defendants much of their constitutional rights of Due Process of Law.
- Baker’s quote is better left for the Exhibit’s presentation on the Ervin Committee

Proposed Revised Text:

Efforts to limit the investigation of the Watergate break-in to the burglary itself began to collapse when Presiding Judge John J. Sirica, made clear to the defendants that he would sentence them to the maximum penalty if they did not reveal more about the planning, funding, and execution of the break-in. On March 19, 1973, the eve of sentencing for his role in the break-in, James McCord wrote to Judge Sirica offering to provide additional information about an alleged cover-up. Two days later, John Dean would go to the President saying he needed to know more about what had been going on, since “we have a cancer--within, close to the Presidency, that's growing. It's growing daily. It's compounding, it grows geometrically now because it compounds itself. Uh, that'll be clear as I explain you know, some of the details...”

Name: Woodward & Bernstein

Body Text (60 words): Bob Woodward (right) and Carl Bernstein (left). Between June and October 1972, these two Washington Post reporters broke the news that Hunt’s name had been found in the burglars’ address books (June 20): that some of the burglars’ money had come from a $25,000 campaign contribution from
Kenneth Dahlberg (August 1); and that the White House had funded Segretti’s “dirty tricks” operation (October 10).
Woodward and Bernstein’s reporting on the Watergate scandal earned them a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.

- The role of the media, particularly the devastating impact of leaks, is not properly developed in this exhibit. Maurice Stans’ book, *The Terrors of Justice*, goes into this in some detail.
- With the naming of Mark Felt as Deep Throat, some maintain the source of a number of Woodward’s block-buster revelations was not the result of true investigative reporting, but leaks from Felt of what was already under investigation by career Federal prosecutors.
- Deep Throat may well deserve a panel of his own.
- It may also be appropriate to point out that much of what was written by Woodward and Bernstein turned out to be factually incorrect.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Bob Woodward (right) and Carl Bernstein (left). Between June and October 1972, these two Washington Post reporters broke the news that Hunt’s contact information had been found in the burglars’ address books (June 20): that some of the burglars’ money had come from a $25,000 campaign contribution from Kenneth Dahlberg (August 1); and that the White House had funded Segretti’s “dirty tricks” operation (October 10). The second ranking official at the FBI, W. Mark Felt, who they identified as Deep Throat in 2005, secretly fed them confidential information from the FBI’s investigations. Woodward and Bernstein’s reporting on the Watergate scandal earned them a Pulitzer Prize in 1973, as well as a best selling book and blockbuster movie.*
### Date: September 15, 1972  
### Title: “The Court Only Indicts Seven”  
### Body Text (what & why 140 words): When the Watergate Grand Jury only charged Liddy, Hunt and the five burglars with complicity in the illegal bugging operation, President Nixon praised John Dean for his work in preventing any other indictments. Jeb Magruder later pled guilty to lying before the Grand Jury.  

Captions: Virgilio R. Gonzalez and Frank A. Sturgis, two of the five Watergate burglars.

- Courts don’t indict, grand juries do. The title needs to be corrected.  
- The text might better report the actual fact that seven individuals were indicted on September 15th.  
- It may be appropriate to indicate that the lead federal prosecutor, Earl Silbert, wrote a memo in connection with these indictments to Henry Petersen, head of DOJ’s Criminal Division, wherein he indicated that they did not have sufficient evidence at that time to indict anyone else—but they might obtain that evidence from those being indicted once they had been convicted and were facing prison. It is strongly felt by some observers that the original Federal prosecutors, Earl Silbert, Seymour Glanzer, and Doug Campbell, are the ones who broke the cover-up and were fully prepared to bring the wrong-doers to justice—in a timely manner—before their work was undercut by politically-motivated initiatives. Henry Petersen’s testimony before the Ervin Committee goes into some detail on this.  
- While John Dean did testify to this reading of his September 15th meeting with President Nixon, the actual transcript does not show anything of the sort. It is difficult to understand how the second sentence could possibly have been drafted. Its inaccuracy is beyond dispute.  
- This may not be the appropriate place for the
third sentence. Magruder’s perjury, its rehearsal with John Dean —indeed, Magruder’s whole role in the cover-up-- is particularly deserving of individual, detailed treatment in the exhibit.

- It may be appropriate to point out that Senator Kennedy’s own subcommittee investigation of Watergate was undertaken soon after the September 15th indictments.
- There also is a really good video clip of Attorney General Kleindienst describing the full extent of the Watergate investigation leading up to the September 15th indictments—particularly because it shows what John Dean was up against in his struggle “to contain” the investigation of those at the CRP.

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: the Grand Jury Indicts Seven in Watergate Burglary

On September 15, 1972, a Washington, D.C. Grand Jury charged Liddy, Hunt and the five burglars in the Watergate break-in, In a memo of the same date, the lead federal prosecutor, Earl Silbert, wrote to his supervisor to state that, while there wasn’t sufficient evidence to obtain any additional indictments at that time, the seven defendants might well provide such evidence once they were convicted and facing imprisonment. Silbert’s prediction turned out to be accurate.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>C4.2 - Event Detail</th>
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| **Body Text** *(what & why 140 words)*: The jury found McCord and Liddy guilty of their participation in the Watergate break-in. Hunt, Barker, Martinez, Sturgis and Gonzalez had all plead guilty during the trial. Convinced that the defendants had lied to cover-up for their superiors, Judge John J. Sirica delayed their sentencing and warned that those who did not cooperate with government prosecutors would get long prison terms.

- Many observers believe the collapse of the cover-up occurred at the end of March, 1973 — keying off either the McCord letter or the harsh sentences handed down by Judge Sirica. In either event, it was the culmination of the Federal prosecutors’ efforts.
- Regardless, it may make more sense to visitors to discuss the break-in trial at the conclusion of the cover-up section.
- The text has events backwards: Hunt and the Cubans plead guilty at the beginning of the break-in trial; McCord and Liddy were found guilty following the trial.
- Need citation regarding statement about Sirica’s sentencing postponement. It may be that the usual practice in Federal Courts for sentencing to occur a month or two month following the verdict, to allow time for preparation of pre-sentence reports.

*This should be deleted; it is redundant with the Proposed Alternate Text proposed above at Panel Type B4.1 — Section Intro G-04-03*

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**Graphic Panel Text Matrix**

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16

<table>
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<th><strong>Panel Type</strong></th>
<th><strong>Name</strong>: Judge Sirica</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>D4.1 —</strong></td>
<td><strong>Body Text</strong> <em>(60 words)</em>: John Joseph</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dossier  
G-04-05

Sirica was a Republican judge appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by President Eisenhower in 1957. As chief judge of that court between 1971 and 1974, he presided over both the Watergate burglary and cover-up trials.

- There is no such things as a Republican judge,” just judges appointed by either Democrats or Republicans. While Judge Sirica was indeed a Republican appointee, it may be appropriate to point out his real hero was Edward Bennett Williams, long-time Counsel to the Democratic National Committee, who was the godfather of Sirica’s oldest son and who he credited with saving him from starvation by getting him a job at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson when Williams left to form his own law firm.
- Judge Sirica plays such a key role throughout Watergate that he may deserve more than passing mention. In that regard, it may be appropriate to point out that
  - As Chief Judge, he exercised his own authority to take both Watergate cases out of random judicial assignment and appointed himself as presiding judge.
  - Sirica, while presiding judge, met privately with Clark Mollenhoff, a prominent Washington reporter for the *Des Moines Register*, who had been named Ombudsman in the Nixon White House, but had left in frustration over his inability to have sufficient access to President Nixon — for which he held Haldeman and Ehrlichman personally responsible, who importuned him to aggressively seek the truth about Watergate rather than merely preside
over the trial. Mollenhoff, convinced that he had succeeded in his mission with Sirica, then wrote several articles predicting and praising Sirica for such expected conduct.

- Sirica also met privately with Earl Silbert prior to the break-in trial and instructed him on how to conduct the prosecution, even going so far as to insist Silbert take with him materials that Sirica maintained would show how Sirica conducted himself under what he described as similar circumstances before a Congressional Committee.

- Sirica refused to allow any plea bargain in advance of the Watergate break-in trial, demanding that any defendant wishing to plead guilty would have to plead guilty to all counts against him — and hinting that he planned to sentence anyone so doing to the maximum allowable sentence on each such count.

- At the trial’s conclusion, Sirica announced that he did not feel the truth had come out — and expressed hope for a Senate investigation.

- Sirica was named *Time* Magazine’s Man of the Year for his work in breaking the cover-up. That praise might be contrasted with the more candid criticisms of his trampling of defendants’ rights, which appeared in his obituaries.

- Sirica is said to have been the single most reversed judge in the DC Circuit prior to Watergate, but was upheld in all thirteen appeals from the Watergate cases.

Proposed Revised Text:

Name: Judge John J. Sirica

*John J. Sirica was appointed to the U.S.*
By President Eisenhower in 1957. As Chief Judge of that court between 1971 and 1974, he exercised his authority to assign the Watergate cases to his own courtroom, rather than let them be assigned according to the usual practice of random judicial assignment. Judge Sirica received wide acclaim for presiding over both the Watergate burglary trial and the cover-up trial. Although his decisions were frequently overturned in the years before the Watergate trials, he was upheld in all thirteen appeals from the Watergate trials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated Photos: Ervin and Baker</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caption:</strong> Senators Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (left) and Howard H. Baker, Jr. (right), date.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type F4.2 - Timeline Bubble</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Date:** February 7, 1973  
**Title:** The Senate forms a Select Committee on Watergate  
**Body Text** (60 words): By a vote of 70-0, the U.S. Senate formed the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, better known as the Senate Watergate Committee. Composed of four Democrats and three Republicans, the Senate Watergate Committee was chaired by Democratic Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina. Republican Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee was the ranking minority member.  

- It is appropriate to note that  
  - The Ervin Committee came about because Senator Mike Mansfield felt Senator Kennedy’s own investigation, which had been going on since October, looked too political, so Kennedy’s staff |
and materials—particularly his Chief Investigator, Carmine Bellino — were carried over into the Ervin Committee.

- Formal creation of the Ervin Committee was preceded by three party line votes, which confirmed the idea that the inquiry was intended to embarrass this particular President rather than to address endemic problems in the electoral process:
  - One was to examine only Presidential elections, so that there was no chance of exposure of any campaign practices of sitting members of Congress.
  - Another was to examine only the 1972 Presidential election, so that there was no chance of comparing Nixon’s campaign tactics with those that had been used against him in prior elections — particularly 1960.
  - Another was to structure the Committee to reflect the strong Democratic majority in the Senate, so Republicans would only get thee seats to the Democrats’ four — and only 25% of the staffing appropriation. As Senator Ervin observed, they had no obligation to be fair or even-handed; that was the responsibility of the Minority.

Perhaps that is why 23 Senators chose to abstain on the formal vote creating the Ervin Committee: it was seen for what it was, a one-sided political attack on a recently re-elected President.

Proposed Revised Text:

By a vote of 70-0, with 23 senators abstaining, the U.S. Senate formed the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Although its name suggests that the committee would undertake a broad investigation, the committee became widely known simply
as the Senate Watergate Committee when it limited its televised hearings to activities conducted by and for President Nixon’s re-election campaign. Composed of four Democrats and three Republicans, the Committee was chaired by Democratic Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina. Republican Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., of Tennessee was the ranking Republican member.

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<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>C4.3 - Event Detail</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheryl, please note the addition of quotation marks.</td>
<td>Insert: McCord’s photo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date: March 19, 1973**  
**Title: “A Burglar Breaks His Silence”**  
**Body Text (what & why 140 words):**  
In a letter to Judge Sirica, Watergate burglar James McCord made four **explosive charges:**  
1) There was political pressure applied to the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent.  
2) Perjury occurred during the trial in matters highly material to the very structure, orientation, and impact of the government’s case, and to the motivation and intent of the defendants.  
3) Others involved in the Watergate operation were not identified during the trial, when they could have been by those testifying.  
4) The Watergate operation was not a CIA operation. The Cubans may have been misled by others into believing that it was a CIA operation.”  
Sirica read the letter aloud in court a few days later.

- The better date may be March 23rd, sentencing day for the convicted Watergate burglars, which is when the public first learned of McCord’s letter.
The panel might better be titled something like “The Collapse of the Cover-up”, which would also better align the parallel actions within the White House itself.

- There may be an incorrect presentation of the McCord’s letter. In the fourth section, the last sentence should read:

The Watergate operation was not a CIA operation. Others may have misled the Cubans into believing it was a CIA operation. I know for a fact that it was not.

- It may be appropriate to point out:
  - That substantial sentences were meted out to all the other defendants.
  - That Sirica conditioned any possibility of sentence reduction, not only on cooperation with federal prosecutors, but also on cooperation with the Ervin Committee, an unprecedented judicial action.
  - That Sirica had met privately with Sam Dash after the creation of the Ervin Committee and prior to sentencing. In his book, Dash claims credit for the idea of demanding Senate cooperation. Sirica personally invited Sam Dash to Sentencing Day.
  - That McCord immediately got Sirica’s message and sat down with Sam Dash within an hour of being sentenced.

*This should be deleted; it is redundant with the Proposed Alternate Text proposed above at Panel Type B4.1 — Section Intro G-04-03*

**Caption:**

*James W. McCord, Jr., was the first Watergate burglar to allege a cover-up.*
• The caption may be inaccurate: McCord did not reveal a cover-up -- he alleged one. When he was brought before the grand jury, he was so short on facts that the jurors simply did not believe his allegations. Of course, those actually involved in the cover-up reacted quite differently to his letter’s allegations. Accordingly, it should be used instead at Panel Type B4.1 — Section Intro G-04-03 (a copy of McCord’s letter might also make for a good document display)

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title: “A Cancer on the Presidency”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Text (what &amp; why 140 words): The White House’s management of the Watergate issue reached a turning point when John Dean approached the President with his concerns that the cover-up was getting out of hand. E. Howard Hunt’s lawyer, William Bittman, had just approached John Dean for additional payments for his client. During their meeting, Dean warned that the cover-up was “a Cancer on the Presidency.” Instead of ordering an end to the cover-up, the President told Dean that one million dollars could be found to satisfy Hunt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• “The White House is a building. . .” It seems critical to use individual names for such allegations.
• It may be appropriate to point out that:
  o It was White House Counselor Dick Moore who, when told by Dean that the President had been kept in the dark as to cover-up activities, instructed Dean that he had to properly inform the
This conversation was the first time the President had heard that Dean had been present at the two critical meetings in the Attorney General’s office when Liddy presented his campaign intelligence plan.

Dean’s description of what had transpired neglected to inform the President of any of Dean’s own illegal actions.

Dean told Federal prosecutors the following month that when he had tried to inform the President of what had been going on, “the President just didn’t get it”

A fair interpretation of the transcript is that Nixon is tossing out ideas for how to gain time to allow the Watergate scandal to unfold before a newly empanelled Grand Jury, instead of coming out before the political theater of the Ervin Committee. It would only be fair to add that that is what Nixon said he was intent on doing.

In one of Watergate’s great ironies, Dean was mistaken when he informed the President that a decision needed to be made about Hunt’s monetary demands: It turns out that Fred LaRue reached Mitchell the previous evening and got his quasi-authorization to meet a portion of Hunt’s demands (something like, “I guess I would pay only the legal expense portion”). In short, Nixon was being asked to react to a false premise. Please forgive the observation, but “the record is silent as to whether” this was an intentional act on Dean’s part.

This duplicates, in part, the Suggested Alternate Text above at Panel Type B4.1 — Section Intro G-
04-03. Accordingly, we offer the following:

Proposed Alternate Text):

Shortly before March 21, 1973, E. Howard Hunt’s lawyer, William Bittman, had approached John Dean seeking additional payments for his client. At the instruction of White House counselor Dick Moore, John Dean approached the President with his growing concerns about his ability to continue to limit the Watergate investigation to the break-in. During their meeting, Dean warned that their was “a cancer on the presidency.” After outlining for the President many of the details surrounding the cover-up efforts, Dean tells the President, “Well, I can just tell from our conversation that, you know, these are things that you have no knowledge of.” During the course of this 103-minute conversation, Dean and the President speculate about a variety of ways in which the investigation could continue to be limited to the break-in, but no actual decisions were made at this meeting.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM I May 13, 2010 17

Panel Type F4.3 - Timeline Bubble

Date: April 8-15, 1973
Title: “Dean and Magruder begin to cooperate with Federal Prosecutors”
Body Text (60 words): John Dean and Jeb Magruder approached prosecutors with information about Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mitchell’s role in the cover-up.
Magruder revealed his own role in setting up Liddy’s intelligence operation and Dean also revealed the Plumbers’ September 1971 break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office. A month later, a mistrial was declared in the Ellsberg trial and Daniel Ellsberg was released from jail.

- The “April 8-15” dates shown are incorrect. Dean’s lawyer first approached federal prosecutors on April 2nd.
- It may be appropriate to point out that Dean approached the prosecutors with the idea of obtaining immunity from prosecution.

Proposed Revised Text:

**Date: April 2-15, 1973**

**Title: “Dean and Magruder begin to cooperate with Federal Prosecutors”**

At the beginning of April 1973, and while still serving as the president’s counsel, John Dean approached prosecutors in an effort to gain immunity for providing information about Mitchell and Magruder’s roles in the cover-up. In mid-April he began making allegations against Haldeman and Ehrlichman, as well as revealing events unconnected to Watergate, including the Plumbers break-in. On May 3rd, he broadened his allegations to include some against President Nixon himself. Separately, Jeb Magruder also approached prosecutors, revealing his own role in setting up Liddy’s intelligence operation.

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**Panel Type**

F4.4 - Timeline

**Date: April 30, 1973**

**Title: “Haldeman and Ehrlichman Are Forced Out”**
Body Text (60 words): After Dean and Magruder exposed the cover-up to prosecutors, President Nixon concluded that he had to ask his two closest advisors, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, to resign. The President also fired John Dean and requested that Attorney General Richard Kleindienst leave.

- The text is somewhat inaccurate. There were various factors leading Nixon to the conclusion that he had to ask for the resignations of his aides. A more factual statement is called for.

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: The President Asks Haldeman and Ehrlichman to Resign

By April 30, 1973, President Nixon had concluded that dramatic action was required to prevent the Watergate investigation from consuming his presidency. In what he called one of the "most difficult decisions" of his presidency, he asked is two closest White House aides, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, to resign. In a nationally televised address from the Oval Office, he announced their resignations, along with those of Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and John Dean. He announced Elliott Richardson as his nominee for Attorney General and stated that he had authority to appoint a special supervising prosecutor in connection with the Watergate scandal.

Date: June 25, 1973
Title: “John Dean Testifies before the Senate Watcrgate Committecc”

Body Text (what & why 140 words): John W. Dean III began 4 days of televised testimony. The Senate, which had formed a joint Watergate investigative
committee in February, started televised hearings in May 1973. After receiving immunity from the Senate, Dean became the first White House official to claim publicly that President Nixon had participated in the Watergate cover-up. Dean revealed that the President knew about the payments to the Watergate burglars and E. Howard Hunt after they were arrested. Dean also revealed the existence of an “Enemies List” and the “Huston Plan.”

- This panel is out of place in the appropriate time sequence.
- It might be appropriate to note the following:
  - It is conventional wisdom that Dean’s testimony accused President Nixon of orchestrating the cover-up, but this is not at all apparent from his actual testimony. It would be an interesting effort to try to isolate a video clip of such an allegation. The closest I could find was Dean’s response to a question posed by Sam Dash—which was hardly a definitive accusation.
  - While Dean was lauded for his impressive memory for detail, when the White House tapes were released on April 30, 1974 — partially to refute Dean’s assertions, the White House also issued an itemization of some nineteen instances where Dean’s sworn testimony either differed or was not supported by the tapes. A parallel study undertaken by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force produced a somewhat separate list of almost two dozen discrepancies.

Proposed Revised Text:

*John Dean began four days of televised testimony before the Senate Watergate*
Committee. After receiving immunity from the Senate, Dean became the first and was to be the only White House official to suggest publicly that President Nixon had participated in the Watergate cover-up. He offered no proof, but Dean did reveal the payments to the Watergate burglars and E. Howard Hunt after they were arrested. Dean also revealed the existence of an “Enemies List” and the “Huston Plan.” At the time, Dean was widely hailed for his impressive memory and near-perfect recall. However, once transcripts of White House tapes were released, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force produced an internal list of almost two-dozen substantive discrepancies between his testimony and transcripts of his actual meetings with the President.

**Panel Type**
F4.5 - Timeline
**Timeline Bubble (Need to cut 10 words)**

**Date:** May 22, 1973
**Title:** “President’s Denial”

**Body Text (60 words):** With his lieutenants now implicated in the scandal, the President issued his most sweeping denial of any personal involvement. He declared that he knew nothing about the cover-up before the March 21 meeting with Dean, that he knew nothing about any payments to the convicted burglars, that he never authorized any pardons, and that he played no role in using the CIA to block the FBI investigation of the break-in.

**Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:** An excerpt from the text of the May 22 statement.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

With senior members of the White House staff and the Committee to Re-elect the
President now implicated in the scandal, the President issued his most sweeping denial of any personal involvement. He declared that he knew nothing about the cover-up before the March 21 meeting with Dean, that he knew nothing about any payments to the convicted burglars, that he never authorized any pardons, and that he played no role in using the CIA to block the FBI investigation of the break-in. None of these denials would turn out to be true.

EXEMPLARY FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'S MAY 22 STATEMENT ON HIS INVOLVEMENT IN WATERGATE EVENTS
With regard to the specific allegations that have been made, I can and do state categorically:
1. I had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2. I took no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent efforts that may have been made to cover up Watergate.
3. At no time did I authorize any offer of executive clemency for the Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.
4. I did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort to provide the Watergate defendants with funds.
5. At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others to attempt, to implicate the CIA in the Watergate matter.
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically authorized the furnishing of this
information to Judge Byrne.
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal or improper campaign tactics.

Concluding Thoughts on Section 4

- There was a criminal investigation by career federal prosecutors that resulted in the convictions of all the Watergate burglars and in the collapse of the cover-up. On the eve of the creation of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, the US Attorney’s office issued a press release predicting comprehensive indictments in about 60 days. In essence, the Watergate cover-up had been broken and those responsible were facing certain indictment.
- Three highly partisan groups, with their own agendas, intervened:
  - The Ervin Committee, which exposed the wrongdoing in a partisan political setting. It is unfortunate that nowhere in the Exhibit is there any mention of the Minority concerns, particularly those raised in Fred Thompson’s book, *At That Point in Time*.
  - The Watergate Special Prosecution Force, which promptly fired the career prosecutors, postponed the promised indictments, and re-directed their investigations into virtually every aspect of the Nixon Presidency, including
    - Investigations of some twenty-five agency decisions seeking to show improper influence (none of which resulted in any prosecutions)
    - Sending the IRS and the FBI out to question some 150 prominent Republican financial contributors, and
    - Undertaking personal investigations of all perceived Presidential opponents in 1976, including Gerald Ford, Nelson Rockefeller, Robert Dole, and Ronald Reagan.
  - The House Judiciary Impeachment Inquiry, which purposely undertook no real investigation for its first six months of existence in order to allow pressure to build and then suppressed a requested study of allegations of abuse of power made against each of Nixon’s predecessors.
- These are the factors, along with their attendant media coverage, that contributed to the conditions that led to the first
resignation of a President. The exhibit ignores these factors, or skips lightly over them.
Title: “Watergate Special Prosecutor is Hired”

Body Text (60 words): Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox was sworn in as the first Watergate Special Prosecutor. A former Solicitor General under President Kennedy, Cox was the fifth man asked by Attorney General Elliot Richardson to take the job. The Senate had made the appointment of an independent prosecutor a condition for confirming Richardson to replace Richard Kleindienst.

- We note that:
  - The Senate Judiciary Committee, under the leadership of Senator Edward Kennedy, required Elliot Richardson to appoint Archibald Cox as Special Prosecutor and to give him “full and complete independence” from any oversight from the Department of Justice in his investigations. It is later claimed by Kennedy’s staff that the Guidelines drafted to limit any Richardson
oversight of the Office of Special Prosecutor were so intentionally restrictive that they led directly to his resignation in the Saturday Night Massacre. Cox reported, if to anyone at all, to the leadership of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

- Cox’s lieutenants soon grew the office to almost a hundred employees, who were housed in offices separate from the Department of Justice. Ultimately, some sixty attorneys worked for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force.

- Cox and seven of his eight top reports had previously worked together in Robert Kennedy’s Department of Justice.

Proposed Revised Text:

Nixon’s nominee for Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, soon learned that his own confirmation would be conditioned on his appointment of a Special Prosecutor—who would operate with total and absolute independence from the Department of Justice. Resistance turned to enthusiasm when he agreed to appoint Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox, who had served as Solicitor General under Attorney General Robert Kennedy during the Kennedy administration and was a long-time intimate of the Kennedy
Both Richardson and Cox were sworn in on May 25, 1973.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel Type D4.3—</th>
<th>Photo</th>
<th>Photo of Cox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Media** (cross referenced to above)

**Video Clips:**

- Haldeman and Ehrlichman Resign  Video Clip of President Nixon announcing their resignations
- Cancer on the Presidency • Tape of Dean telling Nixon that "there was a Cancer on the Presidency."
- ?? • D. Todd Christofferson [Sirica’s law clerk] on Sirica’s belief that there had been lying in his court (move to video)

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**Graphic Panel Text Matrix**

**G-05-02 G-05-03**

Section 5: “The Fight Over The Tapes”

**Time Span:** July 1973 — July 1974

**Panel Type B5.1 — Section Intro Sub Head** (Main Message 15-25 words): A White House Assistant Reveals the Secret Presidential Taping

**G-05-04 System**

**Body Text** (105 words): Once Alexander Butterfield revealed
the existence of a two-year old White House taping system to the Senate Watergate Committee on July 16, 1973, the Watergate scandal entered a new phase. From that moment, the nation viewed the White House tapes as the key to figuring out whether the President was telling the truth. The President, however, refused to hand them over, citing the doctrine of “executive privilege.” In a tumultuous year, Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox would be fired, the public would learn about unexplained gaps in tapes, and read some startling transcripts. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would settle the fight over the tapes.

**Lead in Quote (15-25 words):** “Richard Nixon and the Nation have passed a tragic point of no return.” Time Magazine, November 12, 1973

- Absent any data support this assertion, it is inappropriate for the exhibit text to assert that, “From that moment, the nation viewed...”
- In point of fact, the courts consistently held that the Senate Watergate Committee had no legal claim to the White House tapes—based on their upholding of a Separation of Powers argument.
- It was the Special Prosecutor’s subpoena that caused so much legal maneuvering: Ordinarily, the President, as leader of the Executive Branch, could make the decision as to whether to turn over subpoenaed materials — or to decide their protection was worth having the case thrown out for lack of prosecution. The Guidelines imposed on Elliot Richardson by the Senate Judiciary Committee were seen as effectively preventing Nixon’s Attorney General from removing the Special Prosecutor, so he was caught in a legal no-man’s land.
- It was far from an easy question, which is why the Court of Appeals made the extraordinary request that the parties try anew to achieve a compromise so they would not have to rule on such a challenging question.
- The date of the lead in quote from *Time* Magazine (November 12, 1973) may make it inappropriate for use in the introduction to this Section.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*Once Alexander Butterfield revealed the existence of a two-year old White House taping system to the Senate Watergate Committee on July 16, 1973, the investigation into Watergate*
entered a new phase. Although every president since Franklin Roosevelt had secretly taped selected White House conversations, many were surprised when the existence of the taping system was revealed. The Special Prosecutor, as well as certain leaders in Congress and members of the Nixon administration, viewed the tapes as having the potential to understanding whether the President was telling the truth about his own involvement. The President, however, refused to hand them over, citing the doctrine of “executive privilege.” In a tumultuous year, Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox would be fired, the public would learn about unexplained gaps on at least one of the tapes, and would read some startling transcripts. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would settle the fight over whether the tapes were, in fact, protected under Executive Privilege. 

Date: July 23, 1973
Title: “The Special Prosecutor Demands Tapes”
Body Text (60 words): Judge Sirica, on behalf of Cox, and the Senate Watergate Committee issued subpoenae — formal demands—for nine White House tapes.

• This is quite complicated: It may be appropriate to point out that Cox’s original subpoena was for eight tapes — and was based on John Dean’s Ervin Committee testimony. It then developed that one subpoenaed conversation was actually two separate meetings. Cox immediately clarified his subpoena to request both — but the ninth conversation is the one containing the 18½ minute gap, so when Rose Mary Woods first informed
the President of her inadvertent three minute erasure, it seemed inconsequential because it was not a subpoenaed tape.

- Again, somewhere it is appropriate to point out that the Senate consistently lost in its legal battle for the tapes.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

At the request of Special Prosecutor Cox, the Grand Jury issued subpoenas – formal demands – for nine White House tapes. While the Supreme Court eventually ruled that the tapes should be provided by the White House to Judge Sirica for his review, the Senate Watergate Committee, which had also demanded access to White House, consistently lost its own legal battle for access to these same tapes (because of the doctrine of Separation of Powers.).

**Panel Type F5.2 - Timeline Bubble**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date: August 28, 1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title: “Sirica’s Decision”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Text (60 words): Judge Sirica ruled that President Nixon had to turn over the tapes to the Special Prosecutor. The President appealed to the US Circuit Court of Appeals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- What Sirica actually ruled was that the subpoenaed conversations had to be turned over to him for review of claims of executive privilege and national security, so he could decide what should be turned over to the Special Prosecutor.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

Judge Sirica ruled against White House arguments that the tapes were
protected by a broad assertion of Executive Privilege and held that the subpoenaed conversations had to be turned over to him for review of claims of executive privilege and national security, so he could decide what then should be turned over to the Special Prosecutor.

**Panel Type D5.1 — Dossier (Photo and caption only)**

**Name:** Alexander P. Butterfield  
**Body Text** (60 words): Butterfield had a career in the Air Force before joining the White House in 1969. As deputy assistant to the President from 1969 to 1973, Butterfield handled the daily preparation of briefing materials for the President and oversaw the U.S. Secret Service. Butterfield supervised the Secret Service’s installation of the secret White House taping system in mid-February 1971.

**Panel Type E5.1 - Background Information G-05-05**

**Title:** A Good Question  
**Body Text** (60 words): “Why didn’t President Nixon destroy the tapes?” President Nixon assumed, like the five presidents who secretly taped in the Oval Office before him, that he owned his White House tapes and could control them forever. After Butterfield disclosed the taping system, the President, who was recuperating from pneumonia, received conflicting advice. Vice President Spiro Agnew advised the President to “build a bonfire.” Haldeman believed the tapes would defend them. The President wavered. White House Chief of Staff, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. later recalled being asked by the President if he would destroy them and Haig refused.

- It may have been Treasury
Secretary John Connolly who advised the President to have a Rose Garden bonfire.
- Len Garment isn’t mentioned, but his advice against destroying the tapes may have carried the most weight.
- Haldeman was gone from the WH staff at the time, so any use of this statement requires a citation showing that he actually spoke to the President on this issue.
- There are several additional reasons the President may have chosen not to destroy the tapes
  - It wasn’t just that he owned them (which was settled law at that time), it was that he believed that the President’s most intimate conversations would never be required to be turned over.
  - It is possible he was not sure of the taping system and whether there was an additional set of copies.
  - It is possible that he felt he had done nothing truly wrong and did not think himself at risk, even if they were disclosed.
  - It is possible he was relying on the tapes as an accurate set of notes about what he had done as President, upon which he planned to rely when writing books in his retirement. If so, destroying the tapes would be like ripping up his own pension.
- A careful review of the citation is needed for the concluding observation about Haig. The phraseology suggests the President actually asked Haig to destroy the tapes and he refused — which may not be completely accurate. It could have been a hypothetical question, in which event the proper response would be that “Haig said he would refuse”.

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Proposed Revised Text:

“Why didn’t President Nixon destroy the tapes?” President Nixon assumed that, like the five presidents who secretly taped in the Oval Office before him, he owned his White House tapes and could control them forever. After Butterfield disclosed the taping system, the President, who was recuperating from pneumonia, received conflicting advice. Vice President Spiro Agnew advised the President to “build a bonfire.” Haldeman believed the tapes would defend their actions. His former law partner and White House aide, Leonard Garment, argued destroying them could be seen as destroying evidence. In the end President Nixon decided to preserve the tapes and assert Executive Privilege to protect them from disclosure.

Title: “The Stennis Compromise”

Body Text (60 words): On October 19, the White House announced that instead of appealing to the Supreme Court, the President would give transcripts of the nine requested tapes to Cox. Only Senator John C. Stennis, a Democrat from Mississippi, would be allowed to verify them. Cox rejected this plan on the grounds that the Court had to listen to the actual tapes.

- The text might better read, ‘the following day, Cox publicly rejected the plan at a press conference held at the National Press Club’.
- It may be that Cox’s actual comments were more assertive and

Panel Type E5.2 — Background Information

G-05-06
provocative than is indicated here.

Proposed Revised Text:

In an effort to avoid further legal battles, President Nixon proposed designating Senator John Stennis, a Democrat from Mississippi, to listen to the tapes and to verify the accuracy of transcripts prepared by the White House. Senator Sam Ervin, chair of the Senate Watergate Committee, announced that both he and Senator Baker supported the proposal as a "reasonable method of settling the controversy...." The following day, Cox publicly rejected the plan at a press conference at the National Press Club, issuing what one observer later called "his declaration of war." Cox announced he would subpoena any and all conversations he believed were important.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

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Panel Type F5.3 - Timeline Bubble

Date: October 10, 1973
Title: Vice President Agnew Resigns
Body Text (60 words): Vice President Agnew resigned, pleading no contest to several counts of accepting bribes. The bribes were unrelated to the Watergate scandal, but the Vice President’s plea was a blow to public trust in the Nixon administration. Two days later, President Nixon nominated Congressman Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, the House minority
leader, to be the 40th Vice President of the United States.

- As the text admits, this event really has no connection to Watergate.

**Date:** October 12, 1973  
**Title:** — The Court of Appeals upholds Sirica ’s Tapes  
**Decision**

**Body Text (60 words):** The US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the President must hand over the tapes to the Special Prosecutor. The White House had until October 19 to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

- Again, the Court ruled the subpoenaed conversations had to be turned over to Judge Sirica, for review of specific claims of executive privilege and national security, before being turned over to the Special Prosecutor.  
- It may be appropriate to point out that Cox as a possible compromise apparently first suggested the idea of third party authentication when the Court of Appeals requested that the parties try again to find an area of agreement. Nothing came of the compromise discussions, so the Court was asked to rule on the merits. When it did —against Nixon— his lawyers decided perhaps Cox’s idea had merit.

**Proposed Revised Text:**

*The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the subpoenaed conversations had to be turned over to Judge Sirica for review of specific claims of executive privilege and national security, before being turned over to the Special Prosecutor. The President was given a week to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.*
The President set off a wave of public anxiety by ordering the firing of the Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. After the Court of Appeals upheld Cox’s demand for nine White House tapes on October 12, the Attorney General and the White House scrambled to find a compromise that would satisfy the President and Cox. When Cox announced on October 20 that he could not accept the so-called Stennis Compromise because it did not allow access to the actual tapes, the President instructed the Justice Department to fire him. Attorney General Elliott Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelshaus chose to resign rather than follow the President’s order. Solicitor General Robert H. Bork, who was next in line, agreed to fire Cox. Bork did not dissolve the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, but the White House ordered the FBI to seal their offices.

- The text may not be completely accurate.
  - In his book Not Above the Law, the Battles of Prosecutors Cox and Jaworski, Cox Assistant Prosecutor James Doyle seems to suggest that Richardson had led the President’s staff to believe that he could deliver Cox to the Stennis Compromise, and they went ahead and announced it.
  - Again, according to Doyle, it was Cox who changed his mind — after reading an Op-Ed piece by Anthony Lewis in the New York Times and speaking with his daughter, who was then in law school. At a hastily called press conference at the National Press Club, he announced that he would not accept the Stennis Compromise.
  - Richardson decided to meet with the
President to tell him in person of his failure. Nixon urged that Cox be fired for his conduct. Richardson felt he was without the authority to do so because of the Guidelines he had agreed to as a condition of his confirmation and asked to resign instead.

- William Ruckelshaus, then Deputy Attorney General, automatically became Acting Attorney General. Alexander Haig, Nixon’s chief of staff, ordered him to fire Cox. When he refused, he was fired. He was not offered the option of resigning as the text states.

- Next in line in seniority at the Department of Justice was Robert Bork, then Solicitor General. Bork realized he might be the first of many who would be needlessly fired until the President found someone willing to do his bidding. He also had opposed the idea of a totally independent prosecutor as unconstitutional, so he agreed to fire Cox. He also collapsed the Watergate Special Prosecution Force back into the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and agreed to post FBI agents at their off-site offices to be sure no records were lost.

- Media coverage of the President’s actions set off what Alexander Haig later described as a “firestorm” of protest. The President decided to capitulate and instead of appealing the ruling to the US Supreme Court, sent his lawyers into Sirica’s courtroom on October 23rd to announce that they would turn over the tapes of the subpoenaed conversations.

- The Saturday Night Massacre also led the House of Representatives to authorize an Impeachment Inquiry by special staff of the House Judiciary Committee.

Proposed Revised Text:
In announcing his refusal to accept the Stennis Compromise, Special Prosecutor Cox also stated that he could not be fired by the President for rejecting the compromise. Nonetheless, the President asked Attorney General Elliott Richardson to relieve Cox from his post. In a private meeting with the President, Richardson, who had agreed during his Senate confirmation hearings not to interfere with the Special Prosecutor, chose to resign rather than to fire Cox. Richardson’s deputy William Ruckelshaus also refused and was, himself, dismissed. Solicitor General Robert H. Bork, who was next in line, agreed to the President’s demand, terminated Cox and directed that the Watergate Special Prosecution Force be merged into DOJ’s Criminal Division. Bork had the FBI seal the special prosecutor’s office so that no records would be lost in the transition.

**Associated Photo/Document Facsimile:** Time magazine’s editorial of November 12, 1973

**Caption:** In the wake of the Saturday Night Massacre, *TIME* magazine, in its first editorial ever, calls for the resignation of President Nixon.

**Panel Type S5.2 — Special Panel Caption Only**

**Title:** “An 18 - Minute Gap”

**Body Text (60 words):** The President’s decision to turn over the nine tapes ultimately weakened his defence. One, dated October 20, 1972, had a mysterious 18 1/2 minute gap. Another included the March 21, 1973, “Cancer on the Presidency” conversation with Dean. Once Judge Sirica and Leon Jaworski heard this conversation, they concluded that the
President had participated in the cover-up.

- The usual phraseology is "18½ minute gap", which might make for a better title
- The first sentence is judgmental, conclusory, and not supportable by citation
- It seems relevant to point out that it developed that two of the nine subpoenaed conversations were never recorded: one because the machine ran out of tape and the other because it occurred in a location that was not being taped.
- There is a huge amount that could be said about this gap, not the least of which is:
  - When Buzhardt discovered the gap on November 21, 1973, it, he immediately informed Jaworski and asked for time to ascertain who was responsible (he suspected Rose Mary Woods, the President’s long-time personal secretary). Jaworski insisted that they inform Judge Sirica immediately. Instead of allowing Buzhardt and Jaworski the time to investigate the source, Sirica called for a hearing that very afternoon, so the existence of the gap could be publicly announced—and thereby ending any thought of an investigation.
  - There followed a Evidentiary Hearing lasting seventy-eight days, presided over by Judge Sirica, where the Special Prosecutor got to cross-examine all sorts of witnesses about the tape system and the security of the taped conversations. It was this Evidentiary Hearing, more than almost anything else, that seems to have turned public opinion against the President.
  - At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, Judge Sirica referred the matter to the Grand Jury. A Grand Jury Report
was issued, but no indictments were ever forthcoming.

- There is no good reason to include materials unrelated to the 18½-minute gap in this Special Panel. The “cancer on the presidency” observations are rather telling and might better be in a panel of their own. In such a separate panel, it might be appropriate to include:
  - The last sentence is both conclusory and highly inaccurate:
    - The President’s lawyers carefully analyzed the March 21st tape prior to release and found an embarrassing focus on possible payment of Hunt’s demands, but no indication of criminal conduct.
    - Jaworski’s staff concluded differently, as well described in Ben-Veniste’s book: While Mitchell had authorized LaRue to make partial payment in a March 20th conversation, LaRue did not actually make the cash delivery to Bittman until the evening of March 21 — after Dean’s meeting with the President. What they surmised was that, following the Dean meeting, when Haldeman called Mitchell to ask him to come down for a meeting the following day (March 22nd), what Haldeman actually did was to convey to Mitchell the President’s instruction that Hunt be paid, which Mitchell must then have conveyed to LaRue. For Jaworski and his Watergate Task Force to be right, would require that all parties to the transaction were lying —even their own witness, Fred LaRue. Not an impossible case for them to make, but certainly a difficult one.
    - The statement about Sirica’s views appears to have been derived from Dr. Naftali’s recent oral history by Todd Christoffersen, which may not be the most accurate source. It would be far better if this could be cited to Sirica’s own writings.
Proposed Revised Text:

Title: The 18½ Minute Gap

When the president agreed to turn the nine subpoenaed tapes over to Judge Sirica, two of the subpoenaed conversations turned out never to have been recorded and one of the tapes – from October 20, 1972 -- was found to include an 18½-minute gap. Some suspected that this gap was caused by a deliberate erasure. Following a 78-day evidentiary hearing held to try to find out how the gap occurred, Judge Sirica referred the matter to the Grand Jury. While the Grand Jury issued a report, no one was ever indicted for causing the 18 ½ minute gap. Its source remains a mystery to this day.

| Panel Type F5.5 - Timeline Bubble | Date: October 23, 1973  
Title: “The President Turns over Some Tapes”  
Body Text (60 words): Responding to the public furor caused by the Saturday Night Massacre, the President agreed to turn over the nine requested tapes to the Court and the Special Prosecutor. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| Quote                             | “Richard Nixon and the nation have passed a tragic point of no return.” *TIME,* NOVEMBER 12, 1973  
• This may be the proper place for this quote, but it should not appear twice, here and in the Section’s introduction. |
| Panel Type D5.3 — Dossier         | Name: Richardson, Ruckelshaus and Bork  
Body Text (60 words): When the President ordered that Cox be fired, three |
| G-05-08 | Justice Department officials faced a fateful decision. Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson (top left), who had assured Congress that he would protect Cox’s independence, would not fire Cox. Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus (right center), who had been Acting FBI Director, had seen evidence of the President’s role in the cover-up and refused to obstruct the Watergate investigation. Solicitor General Robert H. Bork (right, bottom) agreed to fire Cox for President Nixon because he believed that a president had the authority to fire any subordinate.

- Alternate views of the roles played by each of these three have already been presented.
- The statement that Ruckelshaus, while Acting FBI Director, had seen evidence of the President’s role in the cover-up probably comes from Dr. Naftali’s recent oral history. It would be far better if there were any contemporary source, especially with more detail for this rather startling allegation.

_Proposed Revised Text:

_When the President ordered that Cox be fired, three Justice Department officials faced a fateful decision. Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson (top left), who had assured Congress that he would protect Cox’s independence, chose to resign instead. Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus (right center), also refused and was himself dismissed. Solicitor General Robert H. Bork (right, bottom) agreed to terminate Cox for President Nixon because he believed that a president had the authority to fire any appointee in_
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Panel Type</strong></th>
<th><strong>D5.2 — Dossier G-05-09</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name:</strong></td>
<td>Gerald R. Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text</strong></td>
<td>(60 words): After encountering opposition from his own party to his first choice to replace Spiro Agnew—former Democratic Governor of Texas and U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally—President Nixon chose House Minority Leader Gerald Ford. The Senate confirmed Vice President Ford in November 1973. Less than a year later, he became the first person to become U.S. President without being elected president or vice president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The text is accurate but misleading: under the 25th Amendment, Ford had to be confirmed by both the House and the Senate. Ford became VP when the House followed the Senate on 6 December 1973.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like the Agnew panel, this panel doesn’t really add much to the story — other than to emphasize the continuing need for context in the entire exhibit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposed Revised Text:</strong></td>
<td>After being informed that his personal choice to replace Spiro Agnew — former Democratic Governor of Texas and U.S. Treasury Secretary John Connally — could</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
not be confirmed, President Nixon chose House Minority Leader Gerald Ford. Under the provisions of the 25th amendment to the Constitution, both the House of Representatives and the Senate confirmed Vice President Ford in late 1973. Less than a year later, he became the first President of the United States to assume the office without being elected either president or vice president.

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<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>F5. 7-Timeline Bubble</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong></td>
<td>November 1, 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
<td>ON NOV 1, 1973, A NEW SPECIAL PROSECUTER IS NAMED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text (60 words):</strong></td>
<td>Acting Attorney General Bork named Leon Jaworski, a Texas Democrat, as Cox’s replacement. The President assured Jaworski of his independence.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
<th>F5. 6-Timeline Bubble</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date:</strong></td>
<td>late October 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong></td>
<td>“House Judiciary Committee Begins its Impeachment Investigation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text (60 words):</strong></td>
<td>The Democratic leadership in the House assigned responsibility to the Judiciary Committee for considering articles of Impeachment. In February, with only four dissenting votes, the entire House assigned broad investigative powers to the Judiciary Committee. On March 26, 1974, Judge Sirica handed over Grand Jury materials, including the “Cancer on the Presidency” tape, to the House for its investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>The title is inaccurate: It might better read “Impeachment Inquiry”. The House voted to authorize its Judiciary Committee in October to begin gathering information that might lead it to decide to impeach. The Impeachment Inquiry itself did not actually get underway until much later. John Doar, for example, was not hired until December 23rd. Some (including the House Judiciary</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Committee’s Chief Counsel Jerry Zeifman) claim there never was an actual investigation at all.

- The “handing over of Grand Jury materials” is of far more consequence then implied by this text. The whole subject is deserving of greater scrutiny.
  - The House Judiciary Committee was not inclined to undertake its own investigation—and the Special Prosecutor’s office was eager to help, but needed to find a constitutional way to do so.
  - What they hit upon, which needs to be highlighted and explored, was for them to prepare a comprehensive “Roadmap”; claim it was done under the auspices of the grand jury, such that it was a grand jury report; and then convince Judge Sirica to refer it, unopened, to the House of Representatives.
  - It was a cute legal maneuver to try to skirt the Separation of Powers clause of the Constitution—and appears to have occasioned extensive consultation between Jaworski and Sirica.

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: House Judiciary Committee Begins Its Impeachment Inquiry

The Democratic leadership in the House assigned responsibility to the Judiciary Committee for considering articles of impeachment. In February 1974, with only four dissenting votes, the entire House formally assigned broad investigative powers to the Judiciary Committee. On March 26, 1974, Judge Sirica handed over sealed Grand Jury materials, including the “Cancer on the Presidency” tape, to the Committee for its investigation.
**Title:** “Jaworski wants more Tapes”  
**Body Text (60 words):** The new Watergate Special Prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, requested 64 more tapes, seven times as many tapes as Cox had wanted.

- The specific date for this subpoena is April 16th. The text still needs to provide a better explanation of triggering events and why these tapes were not deemed relevant.
- We request that the author of the exhibit provide a revised text that addresses these concerns.

**Title:** “Unindicted Co-Conspirator”  
**Body Text (60 words):** The Watergate Grand Jury, which heard the “Cancer on the Presidency” tape, named President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.

- This item is wrongly located—and lots of relevant information is missing:
  - This actually occurred in connection with the comprehensive Watergate cover-up indictments of March 1, 1974. Nixon’s inclusion was sealed and only transmitted to the House as a part of the “Roadmap”
  - Cox had vehemently opposed the idea of naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator, because he would stand accused but have no way to defend himself.
  - The naming of the President appears to have been negotiated between Jaworski and Sirica, a highly improper *ex parte* action for each. Jaworski, for example, informs his staff at one point that Sirica will not tolerate including the President as an unindicted co-conspirator; Doyle’s book flatly states that Jaworski was meeting privately with Sirica at this time.

*Proposed Revised Text:*
On March 1, 1974, the Watergate Grand Jury named President Nixon as an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the Watergate cover-up. This designation was sealed by the Grand Jury but provided to the House Judiciary Committee under Sirica’s order. When the idea of naming the President as an unindicted co-conspirator was first raised, Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox opposed it since the President would stand accused but would have no means to defend himself.

**Date:** April 30, 1974

**Title:** White House Releases Some Transcripts

**Body Text** (60 words): The White House released 1,308 pages of edited transcripts in April; but without including the key tapes that the Special Prosecutor wanted. Judge Sirica ruled that the actual tapes were required and Jaworski’s request headed to the Supreme Court.

- Need citation for claimed Sirica ruling on the tapes. Presumably this was his ruling of May 20th, upholding Jaworski’s subpoena for the 64 tapes. It would have to be shown that the President’s lawyers actually argued that their release of transcripts was sufficient—since the opposite was already settled law from the Court of Appeals.
- The text is not accurate and is mixing up two separate events:
  - As a formal matter, White House release of the tape transcripts was in response to actions taken by the House of Representatives: on April 11, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee had subpoenaed forty-two Presidential Conversations. The President made the decision instead to submit a fifty-page Memorandum, along with an Appendix of forty-nine items, most
of which were transcripts of Presidential Conversations. At the same time, this material was made available to the public. Remember, there is a Separation of Powers issue here: The Courts will not enforce a Congressional subpoena against the Executive Branch, but the House reserves the right of impeachment.

- The actual transcripts ran 1,258 pages, but it may be more accurate to speak in terms of transcripts of forty-six conversations (meetings and telephone calls), one Press Briefing and two Presidential Statements.
- While it is accurate that the transcripts were “edited”, this suggests deliberate changes. In fact, there were only two sorts of edits, along with notations of ‘unintelligible’ and ‘inaudible’:
  - The infamous ‘Expletive Deleted’, which were Presidential oaths (almost exclusively of the adjective “god damn”), and
  - Sections identified as “MATERIAL UNRELATED TO PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS DELETED”. There were about eight of these sections.
- While the release of these transcripts, along with the fifty page accompanying analysis, was expected to put matters to rest, the opposite occurred: Dean’s specific accusations were refuted, but the media’s focus on Nixon’s fallibilities was hugely damaging. Put simply, in private discussions within the White House itself, the President had not acted in what was considered to be a Presidential manner — and those revelations dwarfed any idea that Dean’s testimony had been factually incorrect.
- The President’s lawyers appealed Sirica’s ruling on the Special Prosecutor’s
subpoena of 64 conversations to the Court of Appeals; it was the Special Prosecutor who took the highly unusual step of asking the Supreme Court to hear the case without it being heard at the appellate level first—but this separate event should be treated in a separate panel.

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: President Nixon Releases Tape Transcripts

In a nationally televised address, President Nixon announced the release to the House Judiciary Committee of 1,308 pages of transcripts of White House conversations—edited only to remove expletives and material unrelated to Watergate. The transcripts covered forty-six different meetings and telephone conversations and were provided to the Judiciary Committee in partial response to its April 11, 1974 subpoena. In a separate subpoena, Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski had requested sixty-four conversations. On May 20, 1974, Judge Sirica upheld Jaworski’s subpoena and ordered the White House to turn over those tapes for his review. The President intended to appeal the ruling to the Court of Appeals, but Mr. Jaworski urged the Supreme Court to bypass the Court of Appeals and to take the case directly.

Event Detail Date: July 24, 1974
Tide: “The Supreme Courts Rules against The President”

Body Text (what & why 140 words): In a unanimous decision, the US Supreme Court upheld Judge Sirica’s order that the President hand over the 64 recordings requested by the Special Prosecutor. President Nixon immediately agreed to the
decision and had his defense team prepare transcripts of the key conversations. Over the next two weeks, as some White House aides and Congressional allies of the President began to see these transcripts, support for resignation grew around the President. The President, however, decided to await the public’s response to the new transcripts.

- The text is not accurate
  - The specific ruling was that the tapes had to be turned over to Judge Sirica for review of claims of executive privilege and national security, after which they would be made available to the Special Prosecutor.
  - President Nixon did not “immediately agree to the decision”. The President’s spokesmen had consistently refused to confirm that the President would adhere to any decision by the Supreme Court. In fact, there was a heated debate—which consumed eight hours--among the President’s staff over what actions to take following the Court’s decision. It was not until late in the afternoon—at the Western White House—that the President’s lawyer stated that the tapes would be turned over.
  - Over the next two weeks, transcripts were prepared of those subpoenaed conversations not previously released, but a citation is needed to show that any actual transcripts were shown to any member of Congress.

Proposed Revised Text:

In an 8-0 decision, the US Supreme Court upheld Judge Sirica’s order that the President hand over to him for his review all sixty-four recordings requested by the Grand Jury. Late that afternoon, President
Nixon agreed to abide by the decision. He directed that his legal team prepare transcripts of those as-of-yet unreleased conversations. Over the next two weeks, as some White House aides and Congressional allies of the President began to learn of what was in these transcripts, the President’s last level of support began to erode. The President, however, decided to await the public’s response to the release of the new transcripts before deciding how to proceed.

- **Timeline Bubble Date:** July 27, 29 and 30, 1974  
  **Title:** “The Judiciary Committee has a bipartisan majority to Impeach”  
  **Body Text (60 words):** With support from all Democrats and nearly half of the Republicans, the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of Impeachment. The first covered presidential obstruction of justice; the second abuse of governmental power; and, the third, the President’s rejection of Court demands for the tapes.

- It might be more accurate for the title to read: House Judiciary Committee Votes Three Articles of Impeachment  
- The text is not accurate. The actual actions were:
  - July 27: House Judiciary Committee votes to adopt Article I of the Impeachment Resolution, obstruction of justice.  
  - July 29: House Judiciary Committee votes to adopt Article II of the Impeachment Resolution, misuse of powers  
  - July 30: House Judiciary Committee votes to adopt Article III of the Impeachment Resolution, failure to comply
with House subpoenas

Proposed Revised Text:

Title: House Judiciary Committee Approves Three Articles of Impeachment

With the support of every Democrat and of nearly half of the Republicans, the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of Impeachment. The first covered presidential obstruction of justice; the second misuse of powers; and, the third, failure fully to comply with House subpoenas. By bipartisan majorities, the Committee also rejected two other proposed Articles of Impeachment.

Pane! Type C5.3 - Event Detail Date: August 5, 1974
Title: “The Effect of the ‘Smoking Gun’ Conversations”
Body Text (what & why 140 words):
When the White House released transcripts of three conversations from June 23, 1972, the public learned for the first time that the President had ordered the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation. These three transcripts, popularly known as “the Smoking Gun,” contradicted the heart of the President’s public defence and undermined his remaining support on Capitol Hill. Every Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee who had voted for the President in committee announced that they would now switch their vote and support impeachment when the entire House took up the matter. At the same time, the President’s support in the Senate, where he would be put on trial once the House
recommended Impeachment, collapsed. The President’s public approval rating also fell to 24%.

- Most observers believe there is only one "smoking gun" conversation—the one of June 23, 1972, authorizing Bob Haldeman to contact the CIA and ask them to tell the FBI that their interviews of two witnesses may interfere with a CIA operation. The President did not order it; he approved a proposal forwarded by John Dean that recommended this approach.

Proposed Revised Text:

*When the White House released the transcript of the June 23, 1972, conversation in which the President approved John Dean’s proposal to urge the CIA to tell the FBI that their Watergate investigation may interfere with a CIA operation, any support for the President rapidly eroded in the Congress and in public opinion polls. Popularly known as “the smoking gun,” this transcript contradicted the heart of the President’s public defense. Every Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee who had voted against the three adopted Articles of Impeachment in Committee announced that they would now switch their vote and support impeachment when the entire House took up the matter. Three veteran Republican leaders and past supporters of the President -- Senators Hugh Scott and Barry Goldwater and Congressman John Rhodes --- met with the President to advise him that his support on Capitol Hill had all but disappeared.*
Concluding Thoughts on Section 5:

- This section needs to be re-titled. While called “The Fight Over the Tapes,” there is very little discussion about the tapes themselves:
  - The disclosure of the WH taping system led all participants to hope that the truth about “What did the President know and when did he know it” could be fully resolved by access to the tapes. But there were any number of problems with this—and there should be some detail given:
    - The taping system was rudimentary at best, so many of the tapes were unintelligible—particularly those from the President’s office in the Executive Office Building (EOB).
    - There remains an ongoing battle over the accuracy of tape transcripts. The real evidence is the tapes themselves, not the transcripts—especially since their quality is such that different people hear different things.
    - Even if you are sure of what is actually being said, the tapes are ambiguous at best, do not cover all of the President’s involvement—he clearly had conversations that were not recorded—and do not cover any conversations where he was not a participant.
    - Moreover, transcripts cannot convey the “demeanor credibility” that is thought to be so critical in the judicial process.
    - Since the tape system was automatic, it also recorded conversations where there was a legitimate claim for national security, executive privilege, and/or items of a purely personal nature. Even if one concludes that conversations that might tend to show a conspiracy to obstruct justice should be turned over to prosecutors, there is a legitimate question about who is to make the decisions. The courts decided that was a proper task for the Judiciary Branch, but it was not an easy question. Everywhere else, at all other times, this is a responsibility that has been left to the Executive Branch. For example, the Executive Branch gets to decide if national security reasons force
it to forego a prosecution—and no court has yet ruled that a judge gets to review the material to possibly reach a different conclusion.

- It omits any mention of the visit from the Republican leadership that preceded the President’s resignation.
- It omits any mention of the President’s resignation speech of August 8th and his farewell address of August 9th.
- It should show his brief, formal letter of resignation.
- It omits any mention of the trade-off between continuing to fight and the losses the GOP would surely suffer in November.
- It neglects to mention that an impeachment trial would most likely have taken well over a year—and that if Nixon had mounted a serious defense, he might have been able to show that many of the charges, however serious, did not reach a sufficient level of legal proof to result in a conviction. While impeachment in the short term was very real, conviction in the long term was not nearly as certain.
- It lacks any mention or analysis of the political forces at play and coordination between the three principal investigative bodies: the Senate’s Ervin Committee, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and the House Judiciary Impeachment Inquiry.
- The role of the media is nowhere analyzed or discussed—particularly the role of leaks and the printing of undocumented rumor. Nor is there any mention of the impact of televised hearings in both Houses of Congress—and the daily drumbeat of adverse disclosures from the Evidentiary Hearing.
- There also is a highly questionable attempt running throughout several of the panels to indicate that Dean’s “cancer on the presidency” speech is what triggered the President’s demise. It is almost as though the exhibit Author is crediting John Dean with a heroic act: he tries to inform the President of wrong-doing, but the President’s only reaction is to urge payment of Hunt’s requested blackmail. The difficulty is that there were many levels of intention in play in that conversation and this single, simplified version—although it provides a neatly tied-up narrative with a hero and a villain emerging at the end--is not even remotely close to the truth.
- The core of the Watergate scandal is skipped over for expediency.
- The televised Ervin Committee hearings ---from which the public learned about Watergate--- are given short shrift. Why no coverage of the appearances of the President’s top advisors:
Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Stans—or the dramatic testimony of Pat Buchanan?
- Why did the President resign?
  - Was it because he no longer had the moral authority to govern?
  - Was it because he faced certain impeachment by the House in the short term—and perhaps conviction in the Senate after a lengthy trial?
  - Did he know all along that the “smoking gun” conversation would sink him, so once the tape system was announced, he had to oppose their release at all costs? If so, why didn’t he destroy the tapes?
- There is no coverage whatsoever of the Watergate cover-up trial, which is an integral part of the resolution of the Watergate scandal.
- There is no coverage of the seizure of President Nixon’s presidential papers, which also constitute a most appropriate topic.

**Graphic Panel Text Matrix**

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**Section 6:**

**G-06-02**

*Why Watergate Matters*
Panel Type S5.3 - Resignation
Pane!
G-06-02

**Title:** “The President Resigns”

**Body Text** (60 words): President Nixon announced on August 8, 1974, that he would resign at noon the next day. At a tearful farewell to his staff the next morning in the East Room, the President observed, “always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don’t win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself.”

- The “hate” quote certainly serves the interpretative agenda of this exhibit, but there was a great deal more to Nixon’s farewell speech.
- The world famous photograph of President Nixon as he boarded the helicopter on the South Lawn surely needs to be in the exhibit.
- The Air Force One flight detail card given to President Nixon when he boarded the plane to fly to San Clemente, and on which he wrote across the top, “Last Flight” should also be displayed.
- Perhaps there ought to be something about the President going west into exile at La Casa Pacifica.

*Proposed Revised Text:*

*On August 8, 1974, President Nixon spoke to the nation from the Oval Office for the last time--to announce that he would resign as president at noon the next day. Citing his loss of political support, the President said that he did not want to draw the*
nation through the long ordeal of impeachment in the House and a probable trial in the Senate.

Addressing his White House staff in the East Room the following morning he said, "We think that when someone dear to us dies, we think that when we lose an election, we think that when we suffer defeat, that all is ended.... Not true. It is only a beginning always. The young must know it; the old must know it. It must always sustain us because the greatness comes not when things go always good for you, but the greatness comes when you are really tested, when you take some knocks, some disappointments, when sadness comes, because only if you have been in the deepest valley can you ever know how magnificent it is to be at the highest mountain.” He then left the White House for his home in San Clemente, where he would begin an effort he continued for this rest of his life: to rebuild his reputation.

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<th>Panel Type S5.4 — Pardon Panel ADD.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Title:</strong> “Ford Pardons Nixon”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Body Text (60 words):</strong> On September 8, 1974, President Gerald Ford granted former President Nixon “a full, free and absolute pardon” for “all offences against the United States” that he “has committed or may have committed” as president. President Ford believed that putting Richard Nixon on trial would only prolong the trauma of Watergate and the country needed to start healing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Perhaps the full pardon could be quoted, instead of these three segments. One wonders what has</td>
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</table>
• If there is any inclination to show political context:
  o It might be appropriate to mention that the Ford pardon generated huge adverse reaction, ended his popularity and occasioned the only Presidential appearance before a Congressional Committee to be questioned (under oath?) in the nation’s history.
  o It might be pointed out that most observers believe the pardon was the single overwhelming reason for Ford’s loss to Carter in 1976.

Proposed Revised Text:

On September 8, 1974, President Gerald Ford granted former President Nixon “a full, free and absolute pardon” for “all offences against the United States” that he “has committed or may have committed” as president. President Ford believed that putting Richard Nixon on trial would only prolong the trauma of Watergate and the country needed to start healing. Many observers believed that President Ford’s decision cost him the election in 1976. In 2001, President Ford was given the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award. In presenting the award, President Kennedy’s daughter, Caroline, praised President Ford, saying that in pardoning President Nixon, President Ford “placed his love of country ahead of his own political future.”

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<tr>
<th>Panel Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>S5.5 Legacy Panel</td>
<td>“Why Watergate Matters”</td>
<td>Since the 1970s, the public</td>
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</table>
Cheryl, Please note corrected Dole and Lott quotes and sorry to have a sixth quotation but we needed something from President Nixon and the other quotes are strong.

and the Media have attached the suffix “Gate” to major American political scandals. Why did Watergate sear itself onto the public imagination and our history? And what is its legacy for us today? What, if anything, can it teach us about our rights as citizens and the workings of our Constitution?

**Body Text (quotes):**

1. “I didn’t want to make myself believe that [President] Nixon did this, that he actually participated.. .It was a tragic chapter in political history,” Senator Bob Dole [R-Kansas], Chairman of the Republican National Committee, 1971-1973.
3. “I do think that there was more of a constitutional crisis with [President] Nixon than there was with [President William J.] Clinton,” Congressman Trent Lott [R-Mississippi], 1973-89.
5. “Without the tapes, it would have been very hard to get convictions,” Jill Volner Wine-Banks, Watergate prosecutor, 1973-75.
6. “I came away feeling much better, frankly, about... [our] system of government and the Constitution and the people in general. We came through a crisis because of that,” D. Todd Christofferson, law clerk to Judge John Sirica, 1972-1974.

- The timing and context of these
quotations needs to be explored. If they all come from recent oral histories, there might be far better material available from other, more contemporary sources.

- The Lott quote needs to include the language in which he says he did vote to convict President Clinton in the Senate impeachment trial.
- The 5th and 6th quotes are from persons generally unknown to the public and who played ancillary roles in Watergate; they should be deleted.

We propose adding one additional quote:

“May the day of judging President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and career come to a close.”
President Bill Clinton in his eulogy for President Nixon, April 26, 1994.

Graphic Panel Text Matrix

Tape Excerpts w/ rolling transcript:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media (cross referenced to above)</th>
<th>Video Clips:</th>
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<tr>
<td>??</td>
<td>• Alexander Haig on the origins of the Stennis Compromise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday Night Massacre</td>
<td>• William Ruckeishaus on why he decided to resign</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Saturday Night Massacre</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Smoking Gun Conversations</strong></td>
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<td>Sirica’s Decision</td>
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<td>Sirica’s Decision</td>
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<td>Sirica’s Decision</td>
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**Concluding Thoughts on Section 6:**

The first three panels in this section are misplaced: since they have nothing to do with “Why Watergate Matters”, they belong in the prior section.

One is left with a feeling the exhibit has ended, “not with a bang, but a whimper”.

This section does not include any analysis of Why Watergate Matters. Such analysis might include:

- A discussion of all the post-Watergate reforms (War Powers Act, Campaign Reform, Independent Prosecutor Act, etc) and how they have fared over time.
- A discussion of possibly negative fallout, including the fall of South Vietnam, the collapse of the war against drugs, the retreat from any aggressive foreign policy.
- An analysis of the political ramifications, both in the 1974 mid-term elections and in the 1976 election, as well as the pattern of quasi-impeachments that have affected every second term President since then.
- Presidential efforts since Watergate to conduct warrantless wiretaps, especially after 9-11.
- The impact of leaks of classified material and presidential efforts to combat such leaks and respond to them, up until the present day.
• It might also raise the question of whether the Clinton impeachment was a form of payback for what had been done to President Nixon.