The SLTPS-PAC held its fifth meeting, on Wednesday, January 30, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., at the National Archives Building, 700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. John P. Fitzpatrick, Director, Information Security Oversight Office, chaired the meeting, which was open to the public. The following minutes were finalized and certified on March 20, 2013.

The following individuals were present:

- John P. Fitzpatrick (Information Security Oversight Office, Chairman)
- Terri Suit (SLTPS, Vice Chair)
- Greg Pannoni (Information Security Oversight Office, Designated Federal Officer)
- Richard (Dick) Donovan (Department of Energy, Member)
- Mark Pekrul (Department of Energy, Alternate-Member)
- Richard (Rick) Hohman (Office of Director of National Intelligence, Member)
- Dr. Patricia Holahan (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Member)
- Leo Masciana (Department of State, Member)
- Elizabeth (Beth) Hanley (Department of State, Alternate-Member)
- Harry Cooper (Central Intelligence Agency, Alternate-Member)
- Stephen F. Lewis (Department of Defense, Alternate-Member)
- Kevin Donovan (SLTPS, Member)
- Lindsey Nicole Johnson (SLTPS, Member)
- Clyde Miller (SLTPS, Member)
- Jerry Wheeler (SLTPS, Member)
- Bridger McGaw (Department of Homeland Security, Presenter)
- Carol Morehart (Office of Personnel Management, Presenter)
- Trisha Prasnikar (Office of Personnel Management, Presenter)
- Charles (Charlie) Rogers (Department of Homeland Security, Observer and Presenter)
- Adrienne Walker (Office of Director of National Intelligence, Presenter)
- Homero Navarro (Information Security Oversight Office, Staff)
- Robert Skwirot (Information Security Oversight Office, Staff)
- Mitch Apintioaei (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- Lieutenant Holly L. Barrett (SLTPS, Observer)
- Cynthia Briscoe (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- Donald (Don) A. Brittenham (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Observer)
- Thomas W. Coles II (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- Janice Cornwell (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- Latasha Daniels (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- Neal Duckworth (Office of Director of National Intelligence, Observer)
- John Haberkern (Defense Security Services, Observer)
- Julie E. King (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
- David E. Meade (Department of Transportation, Observer)
- Robert Pattering (Department of Justice, Observer)
- James Plehal (Department Of Homeland Security, Observer)
Welcome, Introductions, and Administrative Matters

The Chair called the meeting to order at 10:00 a.m., and welcomed the membership to the fifth SLTPS-PAC meeting. He stated that this was a public meeting and subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). He informed that the meeting was being recorded and minutes of the meeting were going to be made available through the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) website. He noted SLTPS Member Ronald Brooks had resigned and asked the members to submit nominees to fill the SLTPS vacancy. He encouraged the membership to nominate someone outside the Atlantic Seaboard region as current membership is geographically concentrated on the East coast. He added that SLTPS-PAC membership requirements stipulate a membership encompassing representatives from across the country.

All committee members and personnel in attendance introduced themselves. Those SLTPS Members not in attendance were Robert Maloney and Frank Taylor. The federal agency members not in attendance were: John Young, SLTPS-PAC Vice Chair, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for whom Charlie Rogers was attending; Dr. Elaine Cummins, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for whom Don A. Brittenham was attending; James Dunlap, Department of Justice (DOJ), for whom Robert Paterini was attending; Louis Widawski, Department of Transportation (DOT), for whom David E. Meade was attending; Drew Winneberger, Defense Security Service (DSS), for whom John Haberkern was attending; Tim Davis, Department of Defense (DoD), for whom Stephen F. Lewis was attending; Joseph W. Lambert, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for whom Harry Cooper was attending; and Colonel Marcus Brown, Superintendent of Maryland State Police, for whom Lieutenant Holly L. Barrett was attending.

I. Old Business

Updates from the Designated Federal Officer (DFO)

Greg Pannoni, DFO, addressed four points. First, Mr. Pannoni stated that the minutes of the July 25, 2012, SLTPS-PAC meeting were finalized and certified on October 23, 2012, and were included in the SLTPS-PAC meeting folders. Second, he stated that there were no action items resulting from the previous meeting. Third, he reminded the membership that Executive Order (E.O.) 13549 allows for the reimbursement of travel expenses and per diem for representatives of SLTPS entities. In order to be reimbursed, SLTPS Members must use the same system federal employees’ use for their government travel. SLTPS Members must submit travel plans to ISOO at least 30 days prior to an SLPTS-PAC meeting so reservations and other travel arrangements are properly submitted, and ISOO travel administrators can ensure that all government requirements are met. Travel vouchers are to be submitted to ISOO within five days of the meeting. Finally, he reminded federal SLTPS Members to remain after the meeting’s adjournment to discuss FACA’s requirement of the annual financial disclosure form.
II. New Business

Trisha Prasnikar, Senior Program Analyst, External Affairs, Federal Investigative Services (FIS), Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
Carol Morehart, Central Verification System Functional Lead (CVS), Technical Services, FIS OPM
Charlie Rogers, DHS SLTPS Security Management Division (SMD)

Status of SLTPS Database Development

Mr. Rogers gave brief remarks on the background of the presentation topic. He noted that a year ago DHS, in consultation with various stakeholders, discussed developing a requirements document for a state and local database with the capacity to centrally store all of the state and local personnel security clearances. After a July 2012 meeting, DHS met with representatives from key agencies: Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DoD, OPM, DHS, and other representatives who received the requirements document. Following the meeting, OPM reviewed and compared the requirements document to CVS. OPM presented the analytical results of this comparison at a January 2013 meeting convened by DHS. He noted that a working group will be formed to review these results and deliberate how to improve CVS. Then, Mr. Rogers introduced Ms. Prasnikar and Ms. Morehart and stated that they would be discussing CVS and its progression.

Ms. Prasnikar stated that they operated as a co-project management team when making changes to CVS. She stated that CVS is owned and operated by OPM FIS and it was has been operational since 1998. She outlined the presentation: what is CVS; who uses CVS; how will CVS support the SLTPS; and what are the next steps?

Continuing, she stated that CVS is the key system supporting security clearance reciprocity and information sharing throughout the federal government as designated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It is the federal government’s central repository for security clearances, background investigations, adjudications, suitability determinations, fitness determinations, and other relevant information. She explained that OPM collects the information from federal agency security offices. In turn, OPM makes the information available to the federal community so agencies can make reciprocal decisions in terms of clearance investigations. All information processed through CVS is considered sensitive but unclassified and is protected from improper use and disclosure by the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act (FOIA) of 1974.

She noted that an estimated 40 to 60 federal partners submit information to OPM on a daily or monthly basis, since agencies are required to update their respective security clearances monthly and daily in the event of clearance suspension, revocation, administrative withdrawal, or new clearance addition. Therefore, CVS reflects current information accessible to the federal agencies. She explained that DoD connects to CVS through their Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS). She added that there is a DoD community of about 4,000 federal employees who use CVS to make reciprocal decisions. She added that there are approximately 265,000 clearances in CVS with a significant percentage of those clearances being Secret. She noted that
CVS recently started storing and publishing information from the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 personal identity verification cards.

The Chair asked whether a user of CVS can access the millions of clearance records beyond the 265,000 clearances. Ms. Prasnikar replied that when a user logs into CVS he has access to the 265,000 clearances and through a separate screen has access to JPAS information; therefore, the user is able to search a larger population from CVS. Ms. Morehart added that a search is an automatic, simultaneous query in CVS and JPAS. Terrie Suit, SLTPS-PAC Vice Chair, asked how long the connectivity between CVS and JPAS has been active, and Ms. Prasnikar replied since 2001. Clyde Miller, SLTPS, asked whether DOJ and FBI were included in CVS, and also asked for an explanation of what is meant by suitability and fitness determination. Ms. Prasnikar stated that both DOJ and the FBI do participate with OPM in sending CVS related information. Both Ms. Prasnikar and the Chair explained that there are three different types of decisions made using background investigations: eligibility for access to classified information, what is typically called a clearance; suitability for federal employment for potential and current employees; and “fitness,” which is the term applied to suitability for contractors.

Alegra Woodard, ISOO, asked who has access to CVS. Ms. Prasnikar replied that to access CVS a user must have a need-to-know and have his supervisor fill out a form. Mr. Cooper asked if CVS contains only the final investigative decision or does it include the investigative and adjudicative records, and any other pertinent background information. Ms. Morehart replied that the investigative report could not be viewed through CVS. If a CVS user wanted to make a query and get a copy, they could request it through CVS. The Chair inquired if the user conducting a search has the capability to see an entire list of people who have a certain clearance or just the specific name being searched. Ms. Prasnikar stated that only the specific name being searched could be viewed. She added that OPM archived all clearances that were made known to OPM by all external federal agencies. Furthermore, Ms. Prasnikar and Mr. Rogers commented that the intent is to have all state and local individuals with clearance information in the database. Lindsey Nicole Johnson, SLTPS, asked if state-level users were going to be able to generate their own rosters of cleared individuals from CVS. Ms. Prasnikar replied that this question is suited for the working group, and the working group would be reviewing the implication of this question. Mr. Rogers added that the working group will seek to identify new fields that will be useful and if possible, determine how to incorporate those fields. Furthermore, the working group will discern what types of reports are beneficial to the SLTPS and federal communities.

Ms. Prasnikar mentioned that Mr. Rogers is the DHS point of contact (POC) and that OPM will be working with DHS to develop new data fields in CVS to support the SLTPS. She reiterated that OPM will be forming a working group to gather formal requirements that OPM will discuss with the OPM Chief Information Officer to develop a system to meet SLTPS needs. Furthermore, OPM will be providing CVS access for two or more users at every fusion center (one primary, one backup, and additional as needed). She stated that OPM will be providing a capability to DHS through CVS to query the SLTPS population and its traits. In conclusion, she stated that the working group will complete formal user requirements and obtain stakeholder signoff, and that March 31, 2013 is the target date to present final user requirements to OPM’s development team.
Ms. Johnson commented that she is the only CVS user at her fusion center; therefore, she wanted to know the process for suggesting a secondary user. Mr. Rogers stated that the working group will be deliberating this process. Ms. Johnson then asked what is the timeframe for the working group, and when will the changes be implemented. Ms. Prasnikar replied that currently there is no exact timeframe with the only set date being March 31, 2013. David E. Meade, DOT, posed the question if a person is denied a clearance, how long does the information stay in CVS. Ms. Morehart replied that CVS information stays in the system for the duration of the subject record, which is based on OPM purge criteria in accordance with FOIA. If a clearance is denied, the information will be in CVS if it is reported by the denying agency. Finally, Ms. Prasnikar stated she could be contacted at trisha.prasnikar@opm.gov and Ms. Morehart at carol.morehart@gmail.com.

Bridger McGaw, DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP)
Developments in Private Sector Engagement

Mr. McGaw addressed DHS initiatives for private sector engagement. First, he stated that the DHS private sector office created a private sector resources catalog – updated on a quarterly basis – to address questions frequently asked by the private sector. It is available for download as a PDF file on the DHS website. The catalog provides all the private sector resources and opportunities across the DHS complex that the private sector is able to access, such as Listserv, training courses, intellectual property protection, electronic crimes, and numerous other resources.\(^1\)

Second, Mr. McGaw noted that DHS started a DHS for a day program. This program introduces DHS customers to the full range of capabilities and ways in which state, local and tribal governments and the private sector can engage in the Homeland Security enterprise as constituents in their area of operations and responsibility. DHS has been hosting this program in a number of different cities across the country for the last four years. This program has allowed DHS to demonstrate to decision makers and community leaders, who are operating in their respective areas, what are they capable of and how to collaborate. The goal of the program is to create a collaborative community with information-sharing ambassadors to address all manner of questions and issues.

Third, Mr. McGaw explained that DHS has been continuing to develop an active engagement program with corporate leaders as the latter play a vital role in the financial aspects of Homeland Security concerns. He stated that DHS has conducted ten Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshops to include the private sector in DHS planning and exercises. He noted that the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, and various DHS agencies were among the federal participants at the workshops. Through the workshops, DHS has increased its understanding of the abilities and capabilities that the private sector is able to provide in defense of the Homeland. He mentioned that after the seventh workshop was held in 2011, DHS generated a summary report that was disseminated under the joint seal of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and Director of the FBI. The report highlighted key issues that arose from discussions with the law enforcement and private sector

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\(^1\) Listserv (a non-DHS program) is an e-mail distribution program utilized by different offices for varied purposes.
communities. He noted that a second summary report is being drafted but provided no date of release.

Next, he addressed the issue of active engagement on classified information sharing during times of heightened threat. He noted DHS, in collaboration with our federal partners, is developing concept of operations (CONOPS) to assist in the sharing of classified national security information (CNSI). In an effort for the CONOPS to meet the needs the private sector, DHS has created working groups in which private sector representatives participate. Continuing, Mr. McGaw stated that the private sector clearance program (PSCP) had been reauthorized by the Office of Management and Budget. He stated that DHS has resumed working on the program and within the next six months DHS would be able to fully discuss the benefits of the program. He discussed the DHS protective security advisor (PSA) program. He explained that PSAs are trained, critical infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation subject matter experts. Regional Directors are Supervisory PSAs, responsible for the activities of eight or more PSAs, and geospatial analysts, who ensure all OIP critical infrastructure protection programs and services are delivered to state, local, territorial, and tribal stakeholders and private sector owners and operators. He mentioned that the PSA program has been very successful in building a network of private sector partners across the country.

He noted that DHS continues to engage fusion centers. He explained that the level and depth of engagement between fusion centers and the private sector is dependent upon a fusion center’s capabilities. Also, a fusion center’s capabilities correlate to its reliance on PSAs or DHS intelligence specialists. Mr. McGaw stated that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in conjunction with over 250 Fortune 500 companies and other nongovernmental organizations, continues to develop a national business emergency operations center. He noted that the center concept is based on the fact that information needs to be transmitted differently at different times; therefore, a matrix-based virtual environment is the fastest way to accomplish real-time information sharing. Currently, there is an active effort by private sector stakeholders, in consultation with FEMA, to develop a proprietary virtual environment where they can actively share with each other and thus provide the government more information on private sector operations as they unfold. This proprietary undertaking is connected to the National Response Coordination Center, where the private sector has a representative that serves a 90-day rotation. He noted that DoD has similar functioning private sector representatives who actively work with the private sector during critical situations. Continuing, he stated that DHS, in facilitating and developing these projects, has garnered impressive private sector support from Wal-Mart, Target, Verizon, Citibank, and other participating entities. In conclusion, Mr. McGaw emphasized that DHS as a whole, not just specific agencies within DHS, is working to facilitate information sharing. He, then, asked the membership if there were any questions.

Kevin Donovan, SLTPS, asked if Chief Security Officers (CSO) were among the corporate executives being engaged. Mr. McGaw replied that DHS was seeking to engage with all relevant and willing corporate executive and senior positions. Ms. Suit commented about the importance

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2 The PSCP is a procedural program within the National Protection and Programs Directorate in which selected private sector personnel are nominated for access to classified information because of their expertise and knowledge relating to critical infrastructure. This process is outside the purview of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual and access is only granted in federally controlled space.
of PSAs and how PSAs assist in facilitating information sharing. Following on the commentary, Ms. Johnson inquired how DHS is reaching out to states in relation to operational or policy based concerns. Mr. McGaw stated that OIP has a liaison that works in the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, which manages OIP relationships with Homeland Security Advisors (HSA). DHS then communicates operational and policy concerns to states through HSAs and PSAs. There being no more comments, the Chair made an improvisational change to the meeting agenda and moved Mr. Rogers’ presentation to the end of the planned agenda.

Adrienne Walker, Office of the Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), ODNI
Overview of National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS)

Ms. Walker gave a brief overview of the PM-ISE and the NSISS. A hard copy of her PowerPoint presentation was included in the meeting folder. She stated that the PM-ISE was created soon after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to resolve the information sharing problems exposed from the attacks. The office is responsible not only for increasing information sharing across the federal government, but also with its SLTPS counterparts. She noted that the office works across multiple levels of government, non-government stakeholders, and industry emphasizing terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, Homeland Security, and sharing of cyber information. The office vision is national security through responsible information sharing. She voiced that the office builds upon the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Strategy. Furthermore, the office focuses on governance, policy, performance management, budget tools, standards, interoperability of systems, and stakeholder engagement. The office annually reports on these undertakings. The report methodology is to develop implementation plans with external partners (mostly federal partners), assess work plans, define any gaps, produce an annual report for Congress, and use the report to inform future strategies.

Continuing, she stated that the NSISS is built around three main principles: information is a national asset and priority; information sharing and safeguarding requires shared risk management; and information informs decision-making. She explained that the NSISS includes input and equities from SLTPS, territorial, and foreign partners. The NSISS address more than just terrorism; the 2007 Strategy fully focused on terrorism.

She discussed the five strategic goals of the NSISS. She stated that goal one is to drive collective action through collaboration and accountability. Goal two is to improve information discovery and access through common standards. Goal three is to optimize mission effectiveness through shared services and interoperability. Goal four is to strengthen information safeguarding through structural reform, policy, and technical solutions. Goal five is to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties through consistency and compliance.

Next, she covered 16 NSISS priority objectives. She stated that the National Security Staff (NSS) decided to focus on these 16 strategy priority objectives to be the basis for an implementation plan. She explained the first priority is reducing all strategic duplication and implementation. The second is developing effective and efficacious information sharing agreements. The third is incorporating metadata standards. The fourth is managing and overseeing the personnel accessing the metadata. The fifth is focused on safeguarding, to include insider threat, removable media policies, and improving audit capabilities. She noted
that the sixth priority focuses on the common requirements for interoperability. Continuing, the seventh is providing standard information sharing, safeguarding, and handling training. The eighth is defining and implementing common processes and standards to support automated ways for individuals to discover and access information.

She noted that the ninth priority focuses on private sector information sharing to improve and secure critical infrastructure and key resources. The tenth is developing a reference architecture for data discovery and correlation across disparate data. The eleventh is implementing recommendations and activities of the Federal Information Technology Shared Services Strategy (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/shared_services_strategy.pdf). The twelfth is refining standards certification and conformance processes enabling standards-based acquisition. The thirteenth is promoting adherence to existing interagency processes to coordinate information sharing initiatives with foreign partners. The fourteenth is creating common processes across all levels of government for information, alerts, warnings, and notifications requests. The fifteenth is reinforcing implementation of the national suspicious activity reporting initiative, so that it is fully incorporated across fusion centers, federal entities, and public safety community. She explained that the sixteenth priority is building on the 2007 Strategy to achieve the full operating capabilities of the national network of fusion centers. Finally, she encouraged the membership to become involved and that information regarding the NSISS can be found at http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/2012infosharingstrategy.pdf. She then asked the membership if there were any questions or comments.

Mr. Miller asked whether trade associations, both inside and outside the Beltway, are being engaged. Ms. Walker stated that both types of associations are being engaged. The Chair commented that the NSS and the PM-ISE are the two important entities driving NSISS priorities. He urged the membership to utilize the PM-ISE website to keep apprised.

Charlie Rogers, DHS SLTPS SMD

Updates on SLTPS Security Program Implementation

A). SLTPS Security Compliance Review Program

Mr. Rogers addressed the status of the SLTPS compliance review program. He stated that at the last SLTPS-PAC meeting he addressed the issue of checklists that were being developed to be part of the security compliance reviews (SCR). DHS has tested and evaluated the aforementioned checklists and the SCR process. He stated that DHS conducted three pilot SCRs this past fall and the results were excellent with no major discrepancies.

Mr. Rogers stated that DHS has scheduled two SCRs for February 2013, and two in March 2013. He noted that DHS will be scheduling more SCRs, but recognizes the necessity to coordinate with fusion centers to minimize any DHS interference with fusion center operations. Therefore, DHS contacts fusion centers about two months in advance based on a list, created in collaboration with DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), that identifies the oldest fusion centers. In addition, DHS is seeking to conduct SCRs cross-regionally.

Mr. Brittenham, FBI, asked whether marking issues were being evaluated. Mr. Rogers replied yes, through administrative checklists containing elements of E.O. 13526, “Classified National
Security Information,” specific to markings. The DFO asked if SCR findings would be shared with all the other fusion centers. Mr. Rogers replied yes and elaborated that in after-action reports best practices are identified, along with problems. DHS will generically extract best practices and problems to provide guidance for other fusion centers. Information will be available on the community of interest website; so, security liaisons can access it there.

B) Forms

Mr. Rogers addressed two relevant forms that are being developed. He stated that the statement of understanding relative to the protection of CNSI by private sector personnel is to supplement the Standard Form (SF) 312 not to replace the SF 312. It is a form which reemphasizes to private sector personnel that their clearance was granted to them as an individual, and not to their company. The other form is a security agreement between the U. S. government and non-U.S. government entities for safeguarding CNSI, which will be primarily signed by fusion center directors or the leadership of a state for a facility that is storing CNSI. The forms are being reviewed by DHS general counsel. Once the forms are finalized, they will be provided to all appropriate private sector personnel.

C) Coordinating the Self-Inspection Program

Mr. Rogers stated that DHS had created a self-inspection checklist. The checklist was tested at a pilot site and a fact sheet was prepared. He noted that DHS is committed to having it done by the end of 2013; however, it is proving cumbersome leading to a 20-page document listing discrepancies and solutions to those discrepancies. In order to dissipate some of the complexity, additional paragraphs are being added to the fact sheet and future one-on-one meetings with security liaisons are being considered. He added that as part of scheduled SCRs time will be allocated to discuss the checklists. At this time, DHS will not be posting the self-inspection checklist on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) website. The DFO commented that ISOO has experience with self-inspections. Mr. Rogers noted that DHS has referred to ISOO on self-inspection guidance; however, the DHS self-inspections checklists developed for use by the State Local and Tribal (SLT) entities may reflect at best only 80 percent of ISOO self-inspection requirements this is because the SLT entities do not have the same scope of responsibilities and authorities as federal agencies.

D) Security Liaisons

Next, Mr. Rogers briefed on security liaisons. He stated that DHS is working to formally appoint security liaisons as this is a requirement in the Implementing Directive for E.O. 13549. He said his office, in collaboration with I&A, created a template letter that was distributed to fusion centers to formally appoint their respective security liaisons. He mentioned that many fusion centers had already appointed security liaisons, but not under the Directive’s specific requirement. He briefed that, of the 77 fusion centers that received the formal request, 52 replied back with the required appointment letters, and DHS is working with the non-responders.

Mr. Rogers stated that DHS has provided training for security liaisons over the past couple of years and has hosted two multi-day workshop conferences. He stated that the next training session is tentatively scheduled for late fall 2013. In the interim, DHS is developing temporary
liaison training for newly appointed security liaisons. Currently, there is a draft booklet which supplements the Directive security liaison training requirement. Also, Mr. Rogers stated that his office, with assistance from I&A, will either do one-on-one training or group training via video teleconferencing or through the HSIN website. Ms. Suit posed the question if security liaisons are required at any site that stores CNSI. Mr. Rogers replied that security liaisons are required at locations that store and process CNSI, which are primarily fusion centers.

E) Other Support to SLTPS

Mr. Rogers noted that DHS is developing security bulletins to be distributed on a quarterly basis directly to the security liaison and posted on HSIN. The concept is a short, two page, bulletin with relevant information pertinent to security liaisons. Also, Mr. Rogers stated that I&A is working towards establishing a quarterly teleconference in which security liaisons, Homeland Security POCs, and clearance POCs will participate.

F) Security Management Division Staffing

Mr. Rogers noted that his Division is authorized 17 full-time equivalent positions, but the Division can get assistance from other offices in DHS. He noted that the Division was approved to hire two information technology positions. These two positions will be utilized to identify and modify the security clearance database tracking mechanism. This initiative will help DHS build a more robust tracking mechanism for security facilities and improve the practical functionality of the HSIN website. He explained that unfortunately the individuals who accepted the positions later rescinded their offers. The Division also has a policy position which has not been staffed. He noted that the positions will be re-advertised; however, he did not have specific date.

G) Processing SLTPS Security Clearances for Other Federal Agencies

Mr. Rogers discussed the issue of private sector representatives being able to use cleared facilities. He noted that DHS has several collateral certified areas throughout the country. Therefore, a room certified by FEMA is in the FEMA database and the same with other DHS agencies which certified a room.

As such, Mr. Rogers stated that he intends to meet with the CSO council, to work toward collecting the locations of the collateral rooms into a centralized database. The database will not be published or uploaded onto HSIN, but will be made available upon request. He explained that this may be a lengthy temporal endeavor that will constantly be restructured. The DFO commented that some of the larger contractors under National Industrial Security Program (NISP) have excellent classified facilities. Then, the Chair asked how can those facilities be accessed? Mr. Rogers replied that probably through internal means, referring to the NISP contractors and DHS. Also, if private sector personnel in general want access to a cleared facility, it would be prudent to contact DHS. Finally, Mr. Rogers asked if there were questions.

Mr. Haberkern, DSS, asked if DHS or the states themselves cooperated on a regional level. Ms. Suit commented that states cooperate regionally in so far as Urban Area Security Initiative grants require regional cooperation. She, also, mentioned that working regionally may be complex due to the Nation’s federal system of governance. Mr. Rogers followed that within DHS there is also
a state and local program office, with an information sharing and intelligence function that assigns intelligence analysts to all the major fusion centers, and they have a regional structure.

III. General Open Forum/Discussion

The Chair indicated that he had reached the end of the planned agenda and solicited final questions and comments from the membership and all in attendance. The membership had no questions.

The Chair mentioned that the report from the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) was added to the meeting folder (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/pidb/). He explained that PIDB is an advisory committee established by Congress to promote the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of significant U.S. national security decisions and activities. The membership is comprised of five presidential appointees and four congressional appointees. With the issuance of E.O. 13526, PIDB was tasked with making recommendations to transform the security classification system. This report contains those recommendations. The primary recommendation is to establish a steering committee to work through the rest of the recommendations. He stated that this report may be insightful to the membership in relation to their access to CNSI.

The Chair highlighted ISOO’s functional duty as the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) office and elaborated the office is responsible for developing federal level guidance for handling and safeguarding dissemination and controls of CUI (http://www.archives.gov/cui/). He further explained that the CUI office, in 2012, had been engaged in an interagency, federal policy development process that has produced a draft CUI implementing directive. The draft will be distributed for review to a number of constituencies that include federal agencies, NISP entities, public interest groups, and the SLTPS-PAC membership. The Chair stated that an email would be sent to the membership by week’s end that would contain the draft and a comment matrix to for the membership to annotate their comments. He requested that comments be submitted by March 1, 2013. Once all comments are received, they will be reviewed and considered in the final policy document. The Chair moved to adjourn the meeting.

IV. Closing Remarks and Adjournment

The Chair thanked everyone for attending the meeting and for contributing to this effort. He announced a tentative date for the next SLTPS-PAC meeting Wednesday, July 24, 2013, in the National Archives Building from 10:00 a.m. to 12 noon. The meeting was adjourned at 12:00 p.m.