



The Men Who Signed the Treaty of Paris

October 3, 2008

The legacy of the Treaty of Paris, signed on September 3, 1783, has been much greater than was ever anticipated by its American and British negotiators. On October 3, A panel of historians discussed the treaty signers: Gregg L. Lint, editor of *The Adams Papers*, Massachusetts Historical Society; Carla Mulford, professor of English, Penn State University; and author of *Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire*; Walter Stahr, author of *John Jay*; and William Anthony Hay, assistant professor, Mississippi State University, representing British signer David Hartley. Former Archivist of the United States Allen Weinstein served as moderator, and the Librarian and Archivist of Canada Ian E. Wilson made opening remarks. This program was presented in partnership with the Embassy of Canada.

ALLEN WEINSTEIN: Good evening.

AUDIENCE: Good evening.

WEINSTEIN: Thank you. Good evening. Actually, can I have that a little louder? Good evening.

AUDIENCE: Good evening.

WEINSTEIN: Better. Thank you. I'm Allen Weinstein. And the last time I looked, I was Archivist of the United States. And I hope that holds true for this panel. Welcome to the National Archives and to the William G. McGowan Theater. Tonight, we will discuss the men who, 225 years ago, signed the Treaty of Paris, the subject of the exhibit that opened here today in the O'Brien gallery upstairs, an exhibit which we call "1783: Subject or Citizen?" How many of you have had a chance to go up and see the exhibit? Do. You'll enjoy it.

The treaty is arguably one of the most important documents in American history, part of the collection of documents from the Confederation period, which ended with the writing and adoption of our Constitution. By bringing to a close the Revolutionary War and establishing the United States as a sovereign nation, the Treaty posed difficult choices for those living in what was then known as British North America. It forced them to decide



whether they wanted to break with King George III and become, in quotation marks, "citizens" of the new United States or remain loyal "subjects," again in quotation marks, of the British Crown and become part of what is now Canada.

Moreover, although the treaty officially ended the war, it took decades to resolve contentious issues of borders and territory, fishing rights and compensation of losses. People who had no part in either drafting the agreement had their futures as subjects or as citizens rewritten by the lines on the map and by the terms of the Treaty written far away by a handful of men. Tonight's program focuses on the 4 signers of the Treaty--Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay representing the United States--What a powerhouse--and David Hartley, the representative of George III.

But first, before proceeding into the program, I would like to introduce a man who is no stranger here to the Archives, the National Archives of the United States--the Librarian and Archivist of Canada--my friend, my colleague, my collaborator--Ian Wilson. Ian?

[Applause]

IAN WILSON: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, friends, colleagues, distinguished historians. It's a privilege to be back here once again at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington--one of the great institutions of this country and of this continent--to continue our collaboration and our partnership focused and built around, in this instance, the Treaty of Paris of 1783--a document fundamental, key to both of our countries, and helping define our relationship. It's over the years and over the decades, the National Archives and Records Administration and the Library and Archives of Canada have collaborated on many areas in terms of professional development and professional practice. We've worked together in many areas. I think jointly we lead the world. But now we've taken this public, we've taken it beyond and put on exhibit some of our treasures that illuminate and deal with one of the key junctures of our shared history on this continent. "The Treaty of Paris, 1783, Subject or Citizen?" It reminds me of one of the famous quotations of our first prime minister--Sir John A. McDonald, who became prime minister in 1867, was prime minister pretty much through to his death--or a period of 4 years the opposition was in. But he continued as prime minister, and one of his famous quotations that was on many election posters, "A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die." And he did. He was a British subject and proud of it. And certainly the Loyalist influences had a fundamental influence on shaping the character of that great country to the north.

But we're here tonight to, I think, celebrate biography and the writing of political biography, inspired by our exhibition, certainly, but building, I think, on the work of a number of distinguished historians. Really focusing on the role of the individual in achieving and dealing with the great decisions of their time and trying to understand the great events of the past through their eyes. And the Treaty of Paris certainly is one of the, as Dr.



Weinstein has already mentioned, one of the fundamental documents of the United States. In many ways, I think it completed the Declaration of Independence, for it provided international recognition and international ratification of the dreams and the ambitions that were first articulated in the Declaration of Independence. And I think through biography, one can come to understand the issues of the day and of the decisions that had to be made. And there were many decisions that ultimately every citizen had to make.

The times at the end of the War of Independence were fraught with danger and difficult decisions for governments, for families, and for individuals. The documents that are in this exhibit, as well as the treaty itself, bring to an end the civil war, and address the issues of borders, of immigration, rebuilding communities and lives. And these were the lives of everyday North Americans white, black, British, German, French, Spanish, First Nations, Patriots or Tories, Rebels or Loyalists. The signing forced thousands of people and all families to make major life altering decisions, often painful. Many lost community, many broke with family, many lost friends, many went to seek their future elsewhere in very uncertain conditions. It's all about processes, and launched in the process nation building, and began to define national character on both sides of the new border defined by the Treaty of Paris.

I know biographers are well aware of the joys and frustrations of doing archival research and of searching for that one clue and that one detail. And I think in what we are experiencing right now as archivists across North America, as we put more and more material on-line, as we put those detailed records of population and the census, the service records and the war files of different wars, as we put immigration lists and passenger ship lists, of city directories, our citizens are discovering for the very first time themselves the depth, the extent of the records that have been preserved and maintained in our respective archives. They're finding themselves. They're finding their families and their community history is moving to first person, singular. "My history, my family, my community." And it can be done because I think citizens are discovering for the first time the innate interest that biographers and historians have known about for years. But I think our citizens in an on-line environment are discovering that and are beginning to enjoy for themselves the process of discovery, of interpretation, and of coming to understand our shared pasts through the eyes of the individuals who lived it and who had to make those difficult choices. So I invite everyone to have a look at this exhibit because it brings together resources from both our great institutions. and it uses those to show and try to shed light on the great events and on the individual choices it had to make.

So I invite everyone, explore archives. Have fun. It's enjoyable. Thank you.

[Applause]

WEINSTEIN: It's very seldom that I have 4 distinguished scholars following me, but...



[Laughter]

it's a nice feeling. OK. I would like to, before turning to our program, acknowledge the fact that we have with us tonight--in this room--you may want to chat with these folks later-- the Canadian and American, both coordinators, curators of the exhibit. Michael Eamon and Lisa Royse. I won't tell you which one is which. But one is a Empire Loyalist person, and the other one is a Child of the American Revolution person. But, Michael and Lisa, why don't you stand up and let the people see you?

[Applause]

That's what we do instead of raises in this part of the academic world.

[Laughter]

To discuss the 4 signers of the treaty, we have with us tonight a panel of distinguished historians. I'd like to introduce them now. I'm going to ask them to speak for approximately 5 minutes. And then we'll start going back and forth on issues and questions, comments. And we'll have the microphones out there so that the audience can join in on this later. And I'm happy to say that the entire discussion will be web cast and will also be appearing in a variety of other television formats. Gregg Lint--if I mispronounce names, let me know-- editor of the papers of John Adams at the Massachusetts Historical Society. Dr. Lint. Dr. Carla Mulford associate professor at Penn State University, author of the book now in progress "Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire." Walter Stahr author of the biography "John Jay: Founding Father." And William Anthony Hay, assistant professor at Mississippi State University discussing British signer David Hartley. Let's begin.

[Applause]

OK. Mr. Lint, why don't you start, Professor Lint, with your 5 minutes?

GREGG LINT: Well, if John Adams had had his way, the treaty would have been negotiated much earlier because in 1779, he had been appointed the sole minister to negotiate a peace treaty, and also a commercial treaty. And he went to France in 1780 and actually undertook to perhaps execute his commission. The French were unhappy about that because it seemed to them kind of unnatural to be negotiating a separate treaty in the midst of a war and also a commercial treaty. So John Adams had a falling out with the French foreign minister and headed off to the Netherlands, where he spent the next 2 years. And during the 2 years, Congress in its wisdom and at the behest of France created a joint peace commission with John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, who's not represented here, and Thomas Jefferson, who never showed up.



And John Adams was willing to accept the new joint commission partly because his name came first, where you'll see in the Treaty that John Adams signs first. And in the 18th century, such things were important. But in 1782, as John Adams was negotiating a treaty with the Netherlands, he was watching from afar the initial negotiations for the treaty at Paris. And he was disturbed, which is easy for John Adams to be because he was often disturbed, and because the accounts he was getting were very sketchy. You know, he was hearing that, you know, John Jay was doing a great job and he was upholding American interests. But the person who was writing to him had some doubts about Franklin.

And this bothered Adams. But ultimately, he finished in the Netherlands, came to Paris in late October 1782, and initially refused to go and see Franklin. He was upset because he thought that Franklin had withheld the instructions whereby they were supposed to follow direction of France in the negotiation of the treaty. And, in fact, what had happened was that John Adams had gotten the instructions, and never had really been able to decipher the key instruction that they were supposed to follow the direction of France. So he arrived in Paris. You have an account in his "Peace Journal" of his big meeting with Franklin where they talked about everything. And then the next day, Franklin decides, well, the commissioners will violate their instructions and they will negotiate a treaty without telling France-- and ultimately, they will sign the preliminary treaty in November 1782 without telling France. And this was a major move. And while John Adams was surprised that Franklin would do this, Franklin knew when he was getting a good deal. And there were issues with France because France, if you dealt with France, then you also had to deal with Spain. And if you dealt with Spain, then you had to play around with the borders. And the Spanish wanted much lesser borders than the United States did.

You also had problems with fishing rights and other things. John Adams in his writings, his "Peace Journal" it's kind of an exaggeration of his role because he came very late, because by the time he arrived, John Jay had done most of the heavy lifting. And Adams was primarily responsible--or where he had his biggest impact was on fishing rights and to some degree on how the Loyalists were dealt with. On fishing rights, he brought an enormous number of documents to show what they'd done the past practice. He also brought documents on the border with Nova Scotia, but in the end, they agreed and he agreed with his colleagues, that this was the best thing they were going to get, and he ultimately signed the treaty...

WEINSTEIN: We're coming to the end.

LINT: ...signed the preliminary treaty in November of 1782. And then they—thought that they were going to be able to negotiate a much broader definitive treaty with commercial provisions. But that never happened. And for John Adams, the period between November 1782 and when David Hartley arrived in April of 1783 gave him way too much time. And



he began writing vast numbers of letters dealing with the problems with Franklin, with the French.

WEINSTEIN: One of the letters said, "Dear Dr. Lint, your time is up. You have to end this."

LINT: And ultimately, and the most recent volume that was published of the papers of John Adams, there's more invective towards other founding fathers than any previous volumes.

WEINSTEIN: We'll be coming back to everyone here. But thank you for your point-- I guess it was Adams' point about how he came first in this process. And if you have a name like Weinstein, the answer is, don't become a diplomat.

WILLIAM ANTHONY HAY: You're last.

[Laughter]

WEINSTEIN: And as for the French...the French were always complaining about one thing or another. Mark Twain spent 2 very unhappy years in his 2 years in Paris. And he produced a memo on the experience which began with the sentence, Human nature is located somewhere in the scale of evolution between the angels and the French.

[Laughter]

Now, if there's a Frenchman in the audience, I apologize. That was Mark Twain talking, not me. And you take it away, Professor Mulford.

CARLA MULFORD: Thank you. I'm actually delighted that Adams and Franklin are seated side by side, because there were many months during these negotiations when neither really wished to see the other one. And speaking about Franklin, I'm going to try to squeeze 3 different points into my comments. I'm interested in Franklin's diplomatic strategy. It was one of presumed openness. That is something, he gave the impression of being open, but he was often accused of an absence of candor, and that's accurate, too. I'm also interested in Franklin's existing relationship to the French, first among the aristocracy and diplomats, and then also his relationship to the French people. And finally I'm interested in exploring, if there's time, the prior experiences in Franklin's life that might have assisted his understanding of his diplomatic mission. And here I'm thinking especially of his treaties with the Indian peoples, his hand in developing the Albany Plan of Union, his participation in French salon culture. In terms of Franklin's diplomatic strategy, which, essentially he crafted a personal style of openness, but he wasn't very open at all. There are 2 examples here. In the case of France, Vergennes had asked the Congress to insist that the commissioners not engage in any treaty negotiations without



France's approval, that no treaty negotiations occur without France--and Vergennes especially as the diplomat negotiating for France without France also understanding what the treaty articles might be.

The commissioners, as Dr. Lint has suggested, the commissioners ended up engaging in negotiations with Britain without the knowledge of France. Vergennes knew it because he had spies. But he didn't know it. And they left it to Franklin to go and tell him that the articles not only had been agreed upon but they'd been signed and they were on their way back. They were shipboard already on their way back to Congress. Vergennes was disappointed, but Franklin nonetheless was able to negotiate yet another loan. And that is, I think, a mark of Franklin's character. In terms of Britain and Franklin's candor and absence of candor, Britain, the Rockingham Ministry had 2 people sent for negotiations. One represented the foreign side in that. The foreign secretary was sent. And another represented the Colonial side. And so a Colonial secretary was sent. Franklin pretended to be, you know, happy to see both of them. He ended up really not being at all interested in the foreign secretaries' envoy and was much more interested in Richard Oswald, who eventually became the envoy for Lord Shelburne, who was the Colonial secretary. With regard to Franklin's existing relationship to the French, he was wined and dined. He loved the French. Vergennes was connected to a circle of Liberals in France. Hewas tangentially connected to the court, but he was much more interested in the philosophes and getting to know the kinds of people that he knew Franklin would enjoy. So Franklin was very much appreciated by the people of France in--aristocratic circles, but not necessarily in court circles. And a little fun story about this is the fact that Louis XVI had a series of Sevres porcelain chamber pots made. And Franklin's image was embossed as a cameo in the bottom of the chamber pot.

WEINSTEIN: That's a very good place to end these opening remarks. But was it true, the story?

MULFORD: Pardon?

WEINSTEIN: Was it true?

MULFORD: Yeah.

WEINSTEIN: OK. Good. It was said of Franklin and various others by a British historian named Esmond Wright... who said he wore his rectitude like a banner, but stopped now and then to salute it.

[Laughter]

And it raises the whole question of whether you can afford in the diplomats in delicate negotiations--can afford to have people who are--basically better known than the



principles and more respected than the principles. It puts the diplomats in a profoundly awkward position. But it was the exact position Franklin was in and would be in in everything he did because he was the most popular man in the world.

MULFORD: Exactly.

WEINSTEIN: In the known Western world at the time. And if you get someone like Adams, it's easy. Adams was a crank. Everybody knew he was a crank.

[Laughter]

He [indistinct] his own son and grandson. And, Gregg, you can confirm that if you want to confirm. But in any event, he was a wonderful counterweight to Franklin. But let's go on to our third individual, John Jay. And that's Professor Walter Stahr.

WALTER STAHR: What did John Jay want to achieve in the Treaty of Paris? Let me mention quickly 4 things. First, most obviously, independence for the United States. He was so set on independence that he refused, when he arrived in Paris, to have any substantive negotiations with the British until they brought with them a commission that authorized them to negotiate with the United States of America, not merely with 13 colonies in revolt. Second, broad borders for the United States.

He had been discussing since his days in Philadelphia as president of the Continental Congress, with French and Spanish representatives what the borders of the United States might be. And his consistent position had been that the Western border of the United States was the Mississippi River.

Franklin, as usual, put it most pungently, saying that he would as soon sell a man his front door as give up the American right to that river. And eventually, the Americans achieved that goal, as well as the so-called line of the Lakes' northern border, the border that's now familiar to us running through the Great Lakes, ending at the Lake of the Woods, which forms the kind of starting point, if you will, for, then, the 49th parallel running all the way to the Pacific Ocean. So one can argue that the Americans through the boundaries which they got into the Treaty of Paris essentially developed the boundaries of the continental U.S. as we know them.

Third, Jay was the son of a merchant and the grandson, actually, of 2 merchants. And so he was very keen to explore the points that Dr. Lint made of a commercial treaty. He was keen to see American merchants have the right not merely to carry American goods to Britain, but to engage in the type of West Indies trade that his father and grandfather had engaged in before him, and he hoped to see Americans engage in after the war. As Gregg has mentioned, they weren't able to achieve that, at least initially, but that



remained a goal for John Jay. And he was able to achieve some of that in the Jay treaty a decade later.

Fourth, more generally, Jay had a vision, a glimmer, if you will, of what we now call the special relationship between Britain and the United States. He saw Britain as the natural ally, the natural sort of best friend of the United States, and he wanted to develop a treaty which would have "mutual advantages," as he put it, for both countries to yield--I'm not going to get the quote quite right--but a perpetual peace and intercourse between them. Of course, as we know, it didn't quite work out that way. There was the War of 1812, which he bitterly regretted in his retirement, but there are many elements of the Treaty of Paris—the boundaries, the free navigation of the Saint Lawrence and the Mississippi, the removal of British troops from the United States that did lead to good relations on balance between the United States and Britain over the next decades and ultimately down through the president. So some disappointments, particularly immediately on trade, but over the longer run, much that he wanted to achieve was achieved.

WEINSTEIN: Well, let me raise--just to raise the question, and we'll return to it later, the question of whether this was not simply--you have Jay thinking of things moving in the direction he'd like to see happen afterwards with Britain as an ally, at least as a friend, and going on from there. But could you say that the seeds of American politics after this period ends were sewn, at least initially, in the varying perspectives of the key players at the Treaty of Paris negotiations? I'm not asking whether one can make a full-blooded case, but for God's sakes, 1783. Within several years? just a few years? Even up to today so with the Constitution, what kind of constitution we should have. And so politics entered into the thing from the beginning. And politics involved, it seems to me, the different major actors' view of the American future. Maybe we'll return to it.

Now, in fairness, there are 3 of you, and you're ganging on poor Mr. Hay, William Anthony Hay.

HAY: I should get 3 times as much time...

WEINSTEIN: I'm not giving you 3 times as much. That would be unfair on the other side. But I'm giving you twice as much. You got 10 minutes.

HAY: OK. Who's David Hartley? That's the question that comes up. When you look at John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and then you have a figure--David Hartley--that even a specialist has to go look him up to figure out and to see the details of his life and career.

He's not a major figure. It's no accident that-- the representative of Hartley tonight is on the fringe. Hartley was on the fringe. He spent most of his political career as a back-bench M.P. And he was a member of the opposition for most of the time. He was really on the



outside of things. And moreover, the Treaty of Paris that he signed was negotiated by Richard Oswald. The preliminaries that Richard Oswald had negotiated with the American representatives, that was almost essentially, not just substantially, the treaty that Hartley signed. Even though he wanted to change some things in it, negotiate a more favorable commercial settlement, he wasn't able to do that. So Hartley's most interesting in terms of how he connects with other people and how he reflects the wider debates on the British side and what British policy is going through and what is going on on the British end.

Who is David Hartley? He was the son of a philosopher, David Hartley. He entered Parliament in 1774. He got most of his reputation for writing pamphlets. To say the least, David Hartley was not a good speaker. He was not a careful rhetorician. His speeches were dull; the arguments weren't very good. He delivered them in "a languid manner," as one newspaper report said. The diarist, Nathaniel Wraxall, said that David Hartley rising to speak in debate, it was like the dinner bell ringing...

[Laughter]

...that people started to leave when he spoke. This was not a promising thing. He did make 8 motions for reconciliation with America. Hartley was a follower friend of the Marquis of Rockingham. And the leaders of Rockingham's party, they were Whigs. And this was the foundation of the future Whig and Liberal party in Britain. But Rockingham's leaders in the House of Commons were Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox. The Rockingham Whigs later become the Foxite Whigs. And Hartley was a back-bench member in the House of Commons. Of the Rockinghams, he represented Hull, a mercantile city in Yorkshire. And in 1778, Hartley wrote a letter calling for reconciliation with America. When Rockingham came to power, he was offered a chance to negotiate, but he stepped away from that. He declined the offer. It's only later on after Oswald has been the British representative, representing from the Colonial side but working mainly on commercial issues, Lord Shelburne had recommended that Rockingham appoint Oswald as part of a committee. And Rockingham did so. When Rockingham died, Shelburne became prime minister and essentially gave Oswald carte blanche to negotiate, which he did quite well. But then the preliminaries met with a lot resistance in Britain. They gave too much to the Colonies. And I can say more about that in just a second. They gave too much. And when Shelburne fell from power, Oswald was out as well. And Hartley becomes his replacement. Hartley becomes his successor to negotiate. Hartley--oddly enough in the sense that he was a friend to the American cause, he wanted to get a fair deal for British merchants, but he wasn't able to do that. And so the final treaty we are celebrating was essentially Oswald's treaty, not Hartley's treaty. Let me briefly say something about the debate in England and the issues involved.

Britain was losing control of America. And across the spectrum, there's a sense that if "we're losing political control, "we must at least maintain commercial supremacy." Those were the stakes--commercial supremacy, meaning preventing the United States, an



independent United States, of being a French commercial satellite, that America would go into the relationship with France that it had once had with Britain. Even a hard-liner, even Lord North's adviser, Charles Jenkinson, the future earl of Liverpool--even Jenkinson thought, "Well, we don't care about governing them. We don't care about running their internal economies, but we do need to have commercial supremacy. We need to have

them as a captive market." That was Shelburne's objective all along. And that becomes a big issue and a big division going forward in American history and in British history. And one reason why the Treaty of Paris isn't a definitive settlement is that that struggle to keep Britain--keep America, rather as a commercial colony, as a commercial satellite, is never quite resolved. Independents recognized--and the Americans get a very good deal out of that, very generous concessions. But the British were playing a long game to keep America within the British commercial orbit, and that hurt American pride. It also hurt American interests.

WEINSTEIN: Professor Hay, you've given a very good and comprehensive analysis of what from your perspective was the background of the treaty. Now I'm going to let your 3 colleagues tear you apart.

[Laughter]

Two minutes, each of you. What's right and what's wrong with his analysis? Did you have a counter-argument?

LINT: Well, I think that none of the American negotiators had any doubt that, when the war over, the United States was going to go back to trading with England because the English merchants had credit. The French merchants didn't, and the French didn't have anything they wanted to buy, or much. But the other thing that I think is very interesting with, particularly Shelburne, is Shelburne and Adam Smith and his patronage of Adam Smith, the only place in the world where what Adam Smith was talking about trade was mainstream thought was in the United States because you get letters written by John Adams, who so far as I know, had never read Adam Smith. And it sounds exactly like Adam Smith talking about trade with Britain. The Americans wanted free trade, and that was their whole object, you know, why they wanted a commercial agreement.

MULFORD: The treaty, you know, with Oswald was made largely around the points that Franklin had drawn up himself. And speaking from Franklin's perspective--and we talked about this earlier--the loss of Canada for America was really a stinging loss, because Canada is something that Franklin had always wanted to have. have sometimes thought, well, maybe it's because he came from New England. And in New England, there really reigned through the 19th century this concern about the New England past and the border with Canada as being a difficult border because it went elsewhere. And so, you know, Franklin's sense of things, while he thought the treaty was a really good treaty--it was, of



course, based on notes that he had himself articulated earlier on--there were still things that bothered him, that rankled him in terms of the things he personally wished could have been made for America.

WEINSTEIN: One more comment.

STAHR: Well, actually, I wanted to come back to your comment about whether American politics got its start in the tensions...

WEINSTEIN: Go to it.

STAHR: As you look at, at least the American cast in Paris and then you look forward in their careers to the period of the Constitution and beyond, there really is very little disagreement between Franklin, Adams, and Jay about the Constitution. And I tend to suspect that even if Franklin had lived yet longer that they probably would have remained in agreement. The one with whom disagreements developed is the fifth member, who never got across the ocean--Thomas Jefferson. So I'm not sure that the disagreements can be traced all the way back to 1783. I can without too much difficulty look at the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate over the Constitution a few years later, and then say, Ah, here we begin to see the seeds of American politics.

But there's a remarkable unanimity among these very diverse people--different in ages, different in backgrounds, different in personal styles in Paris and going forward over the next few years. Clearly in Paris, Jay and Franklin, at least--and Adams as well--begin to think about the need for a stronger national government. I mean, even, you know, Jay's letters are very strong back home. "You have to start thinking about something other than the Articles."

WEINSTEIN: I'm going to respond to, Professor Stahr, briefly to your comments. But before I do that, I want to give Professor Hay an opportunity to respond to this whole--

HAY: Well, it's interesting to bring up Adam Smith, and the role of the Scottish--And, of course, Adam Smith is one of many, but one of the most famous from our point of view today of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. And Gordon Wood has a project going on about the American Enlightenment. And it would be very interesting to look at what leading American figures read, that a lot of these Scottish thinkers were very, very influential in North America. And, of course, I believe John Witherspoon, if I get his first name correctly, that he had been a Scot who came to America and brought a lot of those ideas with him. Within the English speaking Atlantic world, this really was a civil war. It was a civil conflict divided in Britain just as it divided people in the United States. And there's a whole debate--thinking of Smith again--there's a whole debate about empire and the role of empire and the nature of imperial authority. You see some of this in, of all people, Edward Gibbon, whose first volume of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman



Empire," that appeared in 1776, the first volume of it, and the same year as Smith's inquiry into the wealth of nations. So it's his figuring out how do you create an imperial system that works? Many people argued that, Let the Colonies go, and have it be, essentially an empire of trade and of consent rather than have it be an empire of rule and sovereignty and authority. And that's one of the big divisions in Britain during the period.

WEINSTEIN: Very good. I'm going to ask our two curators to go to the microphone, or a microphone. This will be Mike Lehman [sic] and Lisa Royse. And I'd like you to focus on one question in particular: What haven't these folks--What areas have these folks not yet talked about? What should we spend some time on? We do want to get your perspectives here. Now, if you have any objection to that, don't worry about it. Just leave.

MULFORD: They might, but we don't.

WEINSTEIN: Good.

ROYSE: Wow. And I missed about 3 minutes, so I'm not sure.

WEINSTEIN: I'm going to give you half a minute to catch your breath because I'm going to basically explain that my colleague over here is wrong in the sense that American politics did not develop as late as you suggest. It seems to me that you can find some--maybe seems--in the 1770s, even, not just in the 1780s. The problem was, you're in the middle of a war. You're fighting for--The colonists were defending very difficult economic positions. And that's the kind of thing that normally rational people take as a reason for coming together, for coherence, for working together. Not always, as we've seen this week in Washington, but sometimes, most of the time. Now...

ROYSE: One of the documents in the exhibit is an article that--a change to one of the articles that Franklin wanted because of the compensation for loyalists. And of course, in the treaty, it talks about compensation for loyalists, but from Franklin's point of view, he was interested in compensation for patriots, and so maybe you can talk about that and his feeling about that and if any of the other biographers know the opinions of Adams or Jay or even Hartley, because I know the British were very keen to make sure there was compensation for loyalists.

WEINSTEIN: OK. Everything gets around to money.

[Laughter]

Who'd like to tackle that one?

MULFORD: I'll go.



WEINSTEIN: Sure.

MULFORD: Franklin was...You know, initially, he thought compensation would be appropriate. He was aware of the conditions in Britain. In Britain, loyalists sort of came back over to England, and they wanted to be in England because they were loyal to Britain. But of course, they left their homesteads, and their homesteads were taken over by people who supported the American side. And so they were hammering on the Ministry that they be, you know, part of the negotiations. Franklin was aware of that very early on, and one of his initial moves was to allow for compensation to the loyalists, but then, finally--and, you know, most biographers who work with Franklin talk about the extent to which his growing ire with his own son William figured into this. He finally decided that unless Britain were going to offer reparations to all of the colonists, including Franklin, who lost--his library was burned--unless Britain were going to offer reparation to all of the colonists, he saw no need to offer reparation to the loyalists. And he was ready to leave the bargaining table over this issue. I'm so glad you brought that up.

WEINSTEIN: Anybody else care for a brief comment on this matter?

STAHR: Well, I would just say that Jay, also, less famously than Franklin, saw this division in his own family. His older brother, Sir James Jay, who initially supports the Revolution, by the end of the Revolution is supporting the British. And when John in 1784 goes over to England, he consciously does not see his brother in London. Any of us who have sons know all about this.

[Laughter]

WEINSTEIN: But seriously, it recalls the fact that this is a brothers' war, and families are divided right down the middle just as they would be divided during the Civil War some decades later. And the compensation issue is the nub of the matter, particularly at a time when older brothers got most of the money involved. So if your older brother's a scoundrel and a traitor, not on your side, better reason to check him off and go down the list. Amazingly enough--

HAY: This shows how loaded an issue it was on both sides. And it's worth pointing out in this context that the preliminaries sparked an uproar in Britain, that Oswald's preliminaries were very unpopular and very strongly criticized, and so there was some pressure behind Hartley that, "Look. Maybe we can renegotiate this a more favorable way." That, of course, did not happen, partly because Hartley's political base at home was going to be very weak with the Fox-North coalition. Essentially, the prime minister who had governed during the American War of Independence and the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons at the same time were in a coalition together. It's hard to give you a contemporary analogy of something like that. But it was a very weak government. George III opposed it, and that government fell. But along with reparations, the other issue was--or



loyalist compensation--debts, that that became--which I'm sure you've come across--debts owed to British merchants. And that would be in-- for another treaty, John Jay's treaty, so...

WEINSTEIN: Debts owed to credit card companies.

LINT: I've always thought that the provision in the treaty about loyalists sounds a lot like Jay and Adams' two lawyers getting together and coming up with language for this. Adams was kind of sympathetic to the loyalists, but he deferred to Franklin because, you know, there wasn't going to be any treaty if there was any compensation for loyalists. And later on, he gets letters from America where they're asking, "Well, what do you mean by this Article?" And he refused to interpret it for them. They had to read it on their own and deal with it.

WEINSTEIN: Michael Eamon.

MICHAEL EAMON: Hi. Maybe just something totally completely different, but as we all know that politics and opinions seem to go hand in hand, and that's as true today as it was 225 years ago, I think that perhaps there was a dissonance between--or there may not have been, and maybe this is a question I'm posing--between the negotiators--both British and the American negotiators--and public opinion at the time. Public opinion--we have some documents in the exhibition that show very harsh and quick public opinion to preliminary articles of the treaty. So the news is getting out there, and as we know, the 18th century and the time is amazing press growth and the creations of public spheres and opinion. And so do you think--and this is a general question that anyone can chime in. Do you think that the negotiators had their fingers on the pulse of that public opinion as they were negotiating, or was it fait accompli, as it has been led to believe? Some people are saying that by the time Oswald was finished, it was fait accompli and opinion really didn't have any further impact. What is your opinions on that? And also, again, to not necessarily loyalists, but of colonial opinion, not just British, because often, we talk about public opinion being 13-colony opinion and British opinion, but what about the larger British world opinion, too? If anyone has any comments on that...

WEINSTEIN: Indeed. Walter.

STAHR: I would argue that paradoxically, the Americans, although much farther away from home, had a better sense of what would be acceptable than David Hartley and Richard Oswald did, who were only sort of two days' ride away from London. That was an advantage the Americans had. The Americans appointed, really, an all-star team, but it was in particular a team that had lots of domestic political experience and respect. So, at least the letters Jay gets immediately after the treaty, I can't think of a single critical letter. Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, William Livingston--I mean, everyone writes him and says, "This is the best thing ever," after the preliminaries are signed.



WEINSTEIN: Panel, is that your perspective as well?

HAY: David Hartley was not an especially dynamic figure. As I said before, he was on the outside. He had been an opposition figure in the seventies. He lost his seat in parliament in 1780 to William Wilberforce, was reelected two years later. And Oswald, it's worth noting--Oswald was a colonial merchant. He made his money as a business contractor supplying the army, and then, working in the colonies, he was involved in the slave trade, among other colonial trades. So he didn't have a finger on the pulse of British opinion. He would have been more attuned to American opinion, actually, I would think--Oswald--or opinion, as you say, in the wider British Atlantic world. And one of the points to bring up about Oswald that's interesting-- he provided bail money for Henry Laurens.

WEINSTEIN: Hmm.

HAY: Henry Laurens was the American representative who didn't make it. He was captured by the Royal Navy on a ship. And Oswald was his friend and bailed him out of jail, so...

WEINSTEIN: Ms. Mulford? Anything to add or...

MULFORD: Yeah. I think that's a wonderful question. I think there were significant pamphlet wars over most of these issues, and I have not had the opportunity to see the exhibit. It sounds wonderful. And I'm so glad that you actually have some of these pamphlets and this sort of cross-purposes discussion on display. Franklin helped feed the pamphlet war, and so Franklin would send anonymous letters to press, sometimes from his own press at Passy. And so, Franklin was quite interested in fanning the flames in support of his opinion. Of course, he had regular people--you know, sort of regular correspondents--also creating their own pamphlets, also anonymously, who tried to defeat Franklin's positions. But Franklin was very much involved in the public sphere as a printer and did understand the extent to which this burst of print on the scene made it possible for different positions to be made available to the general populace.

WEINSTEIN: You're not saying that Franklin was a self-promoter, are you?

[Laughter]

MULFORD: I haven't said that.

WEINSTEIN: Dr. Lint?

LINT: John Adams said that quite often.



[Laughter]

WEINSTEIN: Dr. Hay would like that one.

HAY: But Adams also was involved in trying to influence public opinion in England. In 1780, in his efforts to try to negotiate a treaty in 1780, had several newspaper articles published in London, and he also wrote his "Letters from a Distinguished American" in 1780. What is interesting about those, they're an effort to convince the British that it's in their best interests to make peace with America. They're not published until 1782, which is probably a good thing for Adams because in the course of these letters, he says, "Well, you know, the French alliance "lasts no longer than war." And saying that in 1780, you know, might have created a problem. And he was very--Ultimately, these were getting back to America, and he was afraid people were going to read them, because they would notice that, just as he was proposing in 1780 to sign a separate treaty, they had signed a separate treaty in 1782. And they have the thing about, "Well, this doesn't go into effect until the--there's an Anglo-French treaty," but in fact, they were signing a separate peace.

WEINSTEIN: Dr. Hay, any final comments on this?

ROYSE: I want to ask one more question. I think interpersonal relationships—

WEINSTEIN: I'd ask our guest to respond to this, then your question.

EAMON: Oh, and if I--Not at this moment, thanks.

WEINSTEIN: It's all yours.

ROYSE: On interpersonal relationships between the negotiators, we came across a lot of letters between David Hartley and Benjamin Franklin. They were regular correspondents. And of course, many people, I'm sure, are aware that there was a little bit of tension between Adams and Franklin and an apparent friendship between Jay and Adams. Is there anything that you feel that their interpersonal relationships affected how the treaty was negotiated or the outcomes?

WEINSTEIN: Do they hate each other or simply dislike each other?

STAHR: Well...Adams and Jay, once Adams gets to Paris in October, get along famously. But you can tell from both the contemporary and later notes that Adams leaves that he was quite surprised to like Jay when he got to Paris. They really didn't like one another very well in the fall of 1774, when they first met in the Continental Congress. And going forward, Adams saw Jay as one of these wishy-washy conservative New York lawyers who couldn't see his way to independence. And it's true that if John Jay had been in



Philadelphia in July of 1776, he probably would have argued until the very last day against the Declaration of Independence. So although Jay and Adams get along quite well in Paris, it was, I think, to both of them a surprise that they liked one another. And Jay found himself and was successful in keeping the 3 of them working together amicably, which, given the past relationship between Franklin and Adams, was a minor miracle.

WEINSTEIN: Now, we've gone at this subject from a variety of angles over the last half-hour or more. One angle we haven't touched yet which I'd like us to—In fact, I also wasn't planning on doing this, and I don't want to put you on the spot, but I'd like my colleague to think--Ian Wilson-- whether he'd care to come to the microphone and respond to my question. My question is why haven't any of you mentioned the word "Canada" since we began this? Why have you not mentioned the concept of the two new entities being created out of this treaty?

Basically, whatever the heck we want to call it--British North America--remaining loyal and the new American republic. I was going to ask another question, but I think I'll pass on this one for now. Thank you both for joining us. I would like you to try to identify, based on what they've said so far, who is the empire loyalist and who's the American revolutionary? But you can wait till afterwards for--We'll check it out. I'm not sure myself sometimes. Ian? Canada. Where does that come in in this whole process?

WILSON: I think at that point, the notion of Canada really did not exist. It was Quebec. It was a place, a colony, that had been conquered in 1763, was the peace treaty. And the British were still trying to figure out how to accommodate a French-Catholic population. And the Quebec Act of 1774 went a long way. The fascinating thing I found in--it's not just Canada, but in listening to what each of them brought to the negotiation discussion--compensation for either patriots or loyalists, debt and dealing with debt and continuing commerce, borders--I'd be curious, because I'm not a scholar in this period, whether any of them in any discussion, any letter, any document that you found, mentions some others on whom this had phenomenal impact--aboriginal peoples, Indians, whose lands south of Lake Ontario the British give away, in effect--their allies gave away, unconquered peoples, allied separate nations, their lands were given away in this treaty--and the slaves, who had fled under promises of support from the British. And Simon Schama's recent book "Rough Crossings" has explored this issue. Were they ever mentioned? Did anybody give any thought to them, much less Canada and Quebec and French Canadians and French-Catholic population, but what about the others on who this treaty ultimately had phenomenal impact?

WEINSTEIN: Who wants to start?

STAHR: I'll talk about the slaves. At the very last minute of the 1782 negotiation, Henry Laurens, who we mentioned had been imprisoned in the Tower of London, and then had



been recuperating in the south of France--and there's some letters sort of saying, "Could you get up here? Could you get up here?"

[Laughter]

Finally arrives, and he makes one contribution. The clause which says that the British troops will leave forthwith, he says, "Could we just add a little parenthetical saying, "taking away no slaves or other property?" And for reasons that are a little mysterious to me, Franklin and Adams and Jay, all of whom have nascent anti-slavery feelings, go along with it. As best I can tell, they go along because they realize that--coming back to the comments about the political situation--that this treaty may be controversial in the United States and that they may need the support of Laurens and other southerners to get the treaty through Congress. So the slaves are indeed mentioned in both the 1782 preliminaries and in the final 1783 thing, and that actually leads to very uncomfortable issues for John Jay when he serves as both the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the President of the New York Manumission Society and he has the tension between these two roles and this clause and how it's to be interpreted.

LINT: They do get--and on that very clause, they do get an instruction back from Congress to protest to the British negotiators about the slaves that were taken away. And you're talking about when John Jay was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Well, when John Jay was Minister to England, he had to deliver a protest over the--

STAHR: John Adams was Minister to England. Minister to England, yeah.

LINT: Someone else want to talk about the Indians?

MULFORD: I'd love to. Franklin was quite knowledgeable about Indian affairs, really from the 1740s onward. He was involved in treaties with Indian peoples. These were Pennsylvania Iroquois. He was very much interested in the way Indian peoples, especially the Iroquoian peoples, went about their negotiations. During the meetings in the 1750s, as they were trying to figure out how there could be a colonial union, Franklin argues based on what the Iroquoian peoples have done. They had made a--and they retain today--a collaborative system. They are 5 Nations, and really, in this era, they were called the 6 Nations, were the Iroquois and French. And they had regular councils and agreed-upon land use and agreed with one another, after, actually, ancestrally, they weren't always in agreement. So Franklin was interested in the fact that the colonists couldn't bring their colonies together and yet the Indians could. So Franklin was quite observant of Indian issues. During the time when the Treaty of Paris was being negotiated, Franklin was engaged in imaginative writings about Native Americans. And certainly, in his interest in wanting to retain Canada, he would have known that the issues with regard to Canada would have been unhappy for the Indian peoples. Franklin often talked about the settlement of the Ohio, and so the negotiation--that they get the land all the way to the



Mississippi River--Franklin was well aware that this would impact Indian people's lives. He makes a few comparative statements in his letters between the situation of taking over American Indian lands if one does it in a friendly gesture as opposed to taking over the lands of the East Indies, what was happening in East India at the time. And so he's there, he's reading the "London Chronicle." "London Chronicle" is having articles about American affairs, but they're all surrounded by articles about East India. So Franklin is attempting to be attentive to what's going around in the globe, but he's much more interested in what's going on in the empire because he has to be.

WEINSTEIN: Let me raise a hypothetical. They're all sitting around, all the negotiators, and the subject emerges of the--of the what? What's the language used? What do they call them? Do they talk about the Indian problem? Do they talk about aboriginals? Do they talk about...Language is often a key to--what the value placed on Indians.

MULFORD: In the Albany Plan of Union, he says essentially, "How can 6 nations of ignorant savages come together and make a union?" During the treaties, they would have talked about Indian people, not calling them savages. Franklin doesn't call Indian people savages by the--you know, except in these little polished gestures, remarks concerning the savages of North America, which appears in the 1780s. And this is actually a pamphlet that he published in his press at Passy, and it is a pamphlet favoring the Indians' notions of civility and finding a negative comparison of European civility toward one another.

WEINSTEIN: Seeing nobody over there, let you-- What haven't we talked about that will flesh out some of the issues that you've been concerned about?

HAY: One point in response to Ian Wilson's question and the comments about the other issues involved--It's fascinating to see both the American representatives and particularly the British being almost monomaniacal in focusing on each other, that the native peoples, slaves, the French, the Spanish--they weren't issues here. It was, how do we deal with--The American negotiators were very shrewd in cutting the French and Spanish out. How do we secure our objectives? And the British were very careful to secure their objectives. There was a real fear within the British establishment that--and real glee among other European governments that now the British had gotten theirs, that Britain would follow the path that Sweden had after Charles XII. Sweden had been a great power in the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, but it collapsed when Charles XII lost his wars with Russia and all this sort of thing. And now the British had gotten their turn. They'd been top dog since the 7 Years War, and now they were going to be a third-rate or a second-rate power. And so British leaders were very, very concerned to rebuild their commercial ties with America, to save some brands from the burning, to save Canada, to save the West Indies. It's worth noting that during the negotiations, before Hartley arrived, but during the negotiations, they suspended aggressive operations against the Americans, but they were still fighting the French because they wanted to get back the



Indies. The Caribbean sugar islands were very, very important. So that's the real--The Americans want independence. The British want...American dependence commercially but also want to rebuild their position.

WEINSTEIN: Do you agree with that?

MULFORD: Actually, something that hasn't come up that I think is probably an important distinction--Britain wouldn't negotiate with the commissioners for some time. The condition on the part of the commissioners is that, you know, Britain wanted to grant independence as an article of negotiation. Britain wanted to say, "Well, you know, we grant independence." And the fact is, the commissioners were unwilling to go to any kind of treaty where England would be granting to the Americans something that the Americans assumed already to be true. And so, some of the--Negotiations take months, anyway, but one of the key issues that was a stopping point for the American commissioners had to do with issues in sovereignty and dominion over the land. From Americans' perspective, independence had already been achieved at the Battle of Yorktown, and so for England to want to pull back and say, "Well, we still are dominant over you," was unacceptable to the Americans. And they refused to go to the treaty table.

WEINSTEIN: But surely, there was a complexity here, because the Americans had not yet created their own nation.

MULFORD: That's right.

WEINSTEIN: And John Adams refers to--Adams and Jay were really...He refers to the place where Massachusetts has its meetings in Philadelphia as "our embassy." There was still--You go into the first draft of the--talking about the U.S. Constitution, and you find people referring to--find a draft referring to, "We the people of the states of..." So sovereignty is a bit muddled in this day.

LINT: For John Adams, anyway, independence is the signing of the Declaration of Independence, and it's also where the United States today dates independence from, because presidential proclamations, for example, deal with independence since 1776. And the British certainly had no problem with that, because when John Adams became the first Minister to Great Britain, his commission was dated from 1776. So this is--But that was also--There was absolute unanimity on the fact that there were going to be no negotiations without Britain negotiating with the United States of America.

MULFORD: On its own as an independent agent.

LINT: Mm-hmm. Yeah.



WEINSTEIN: What have you learned about this subject, based upon your own readings, that you feel is perhaps the major contribution that you've made thus far to our understanding this process? What should I go ahead and read before I go to bed tonight?

HAY: Oh, what should we go ahead and read before you go to bed tonight?

WEINSTEIN: Unless you've got a CD of it.

HAY: Ha ha ha! The...One book that I think is a very useful book for understanding that's not as well read in the United States as it should be--Piers Mackesy wrote a book called "The War for America," and it's the American War of Independence from a British perspective. And looking at that study, you can see how policy changes and how attitudes change and how the British lost control of the conflict. And that's a worthwhile book to pick up. It's an older volume, but it gives the British perspective on the war that I think most Americans have not read.

LINT: I always thought that was one of the best treatments of the American Revolution that there is. It covers the fighting of the war and the problems the British had in fighting the war.

STAHR: Um...I'm not plugging my own book, but Thomas Fleming has a wonderful new book basically after Yorktown, in which he talks both about the peace process but also about the fighting and emphasizes that as--There's nothing to prevent--Other than perhaps popular opinion or war-weariness, there's nothing to prevent the British from going on after Yorktown. We all have heard this famous quote, "It's over, it's over, it's over." But that's just one overexcited politician's immediate reaction. They could have kept on. And the American negotiating position if the British had chosen to fight on would have gotten weaker and we would not have gotten such a good deal. So he cuts back and forth between the United States and the Paris peace process in a way that shows the interaction of the two. Quite interesting.

MULFORD: The best biographical writings on Franklin--I'll speak just to Franklin--really occur in the papers of Benjamin Franklin. And the Franklin papers are available online, also. So if you just want to do a search, you can search a whole database at franklinpapers.org.

This is a product of the Packard Humanities Institute in conjunction with the papers of Benjamin Franklin. The editorial matter in the single volumes of the papers of Benjamin Franklin are brilliant. For scholars, if you're interested in this sort of minute detail about Franklin, you would want to read J.A. Leo Lemay's ongoing biographical volumes on Franklin, but I have to say, I find Walter Isaacson's biography of Franklin really quite astute and informed. He's read the scholarship. If you're interested, especially, in these characters around the treaty negotiations, you might want to read Stacey Schiff's very



engaging book, came out in 2005, "A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America." It does sound like it's centering Franklin, and it does, and she snipes at Adams and some others, but, uh...

[Laughter]

But it's very engaging, and she's done a lot of work in the French national archives working with the original documents in French. Let me ask you to return to something you mentioned at the very beginning, the papers of Benjamin Franklin. Those papers are done where? Those papers are--They're being edited at Yale University. A scholar named Ellen Cohn is the general editor.

WEINSTEIN: Paid for by whom? Paid for by a bunch of grants by the NEH. NEH. NEH and NHPRC, National Historic Publication--

MULFORD: I think the point is that these are our archives that these editors are working on. They're brilliant. They're doing a wonderful editorial job. The papers of John Adams--wonderful editorial work goes into these, really. It's the lifework of the scholars who are engaged in editing these materials.

WEINSTEIN: We want to thank all of you for this rather remarkable discussion. And if you do a...

[Applause]

MULFORD: Thank you for coming.

WEINSTEIN: Please raise your right hand and promise to go to see the exhibit.

[Laughter]

And we have a little token for each of you. A little quiz.

MULFORD: Oh, is this cool or what?

STAHR: This is the...

MULFORD: Thank you.

HAY: Oh, thank you so much. Ian, we have a copy of this for you as well.

MULFORD: This is what we're looking at.



[Applause]

WEINSTEIN: I hope you can see it all. It's the first page of the final treaty and the last signature page of the final treaty. And this, we just had to have here because how can you talk about the treaty without showing how miserable the British were, not finishing the painting?

STAHR: Does someone want to just go through and tell people who's who here?

WEINSTEIN: Why don't you do that and also explain what happened, why everything didn't get done?

STAHR: From left to right, you've got John Jay there with the huge nose, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin--whom everyone recognizes--Henry Laurens sort of looming there in the red, and then the figure who looks like George Washington is actually Franklin's grandson Temple, who served as secretary of the commission. And then, the right-hand side is blank. The painter had hoped to paint a grand historical canvas of everyone involved in the negotiation, but apparently the British declined to sit for him, and so he was left with this sort of half-finished picture of just the Americans. But even--

MULFORD: They got more than half, though.

STAHR: Yeah, they get more than half the canvas, but even in this form, it's a valuable portrait of the American side.

WEINSTEIN: We want to thank the 4 of you for sitting for us tonight. And are there any other final thoughts? Anybody want to shout something at our friends? Something they should write or read that they haven't done before? Some untouched subject? Go ahead.

MAN: Would you comment on the logistics of negotiations? For example, did the delegations sit opposite each other at a table or something like that?

MULFORD: At the end, they did. You know, they were sort of passing notes back and forth. But, yeah, toward the end, the negotiation with Britain, they were wrangling over issues related to Canada, issues related to the Mississippi, what the border would be. John Jay was really quite clear that he wanted navigation of the Mississippi. And that was sort of an all-day thing. Franklin was ill for much of the time, and he would come when he could, but these guys were wrangling... you know, dawn to dusk in the last stages of negotiation, to my understanding.



LINT: You have constant meetings between them, and it's very detailed. But when you're going over what the border's going to be, you know, this is a very--Do you want it to this lake, or do you want it North? Or, you know, for example, in the separate article to the treaty that was never ratified, if the British took West Florida, the border was north; if the British didn't get West Florida and the Spanish had West Florida, the border was down to the 31st parallel. So, you know, there were differences here.

MULFORD: Perhaps you'd like to tell them about the map you told us about.

MAN: [Indistinct].

WEINSTEIN: Oh, OK. The exhibition is the key to understanding everything about this subject, so... do go up there. And I think it's quite--Did somebody say there was another question? There's a question up here in the center. In the center.

WOMAN: I'm curious to why Adams was given the right to sign [indistinct] when it seems that Jay did the hard work [indistinct].

LINT: Well, it was--how they were--John Adams had been appointed to negotiate the treaty in 1779, and then they had formed this joint commission. If in the joint commission John Adams had not been seen as appointed first, before Franklin and Jay, Adams most likely would not have accepted the commission.

[Laughter]

But that really has nothing-- That's really not saying anything about John Adams. It's saying about how people like Adams or Franklin or Jay reacted to these sorts of things at the time. This was an 18th-century thing. Your appointment is... For example, in the first commission with Silas Deane, Franklin, and Lee, there was some question over what place--when John Adams replaced Silas Deane, where he should go in the names of the commissioners because he was replacing Deane, which would have put him before Lee.

WEINSTEIN: There's an alternate variation of that, that set of facts. Some of you may know the famous quote of the people waiting to talk to him--Franklin, who's a delegate to the convention. When he came out, they said, "Well, what's going on inside, Mr. Franklin?" "Have they settled on a form of government?" And he allegedly is supposed to have said, "A republic, man, if you can keep it." What he actually said was, "Seniority, man, if I can keep it." Thank you very much.

MULFORD: Thank you very much.

[Applause]



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