

“COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS: ENDING THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRAFFIC”

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Two centuries ago, on the first day of this month, the United States of America joined the United Kingdom of Great Britain in outlawing the further importation of African slaves. That William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, great grandson of African slaves should produce the first scholarly account of the federal ban on the importation of slaves into the United States was variously noticed with critical surprise, satisfaction, and annoyance. *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United State, 1638-1870* was successfully defended as a Harvard doctoral dissertation on June 1, 1895. The 27 year-old scholar attained the unique distinction of being selected as the initial author in Harvard Historical Studies, one of the earliest series of university-sponsored scholarly publications in the United States. After he transformed “a dry historical treatise into readable prose,” as Du Bois put it later, the monograph was published by the firm of Longman Green & Company the following year. (Harvard University Press was yet to be incorporated.)

The Suppression of the African Slave Trade was beyond reproach in its sweeping use of published materials and archival digging---an outstanding example of the new historiography the illustrious Albert Bushnell Hart demanded of his students. Du Bois constructed the evidence, document by damning document, for his thesis that the grand

constitutional achievement at Philadelphia twenty years earlier had been fatally flawed by political expediency. At the very moment when the new nation could have terminated the Trans-Atlantic slave traffic, the Founders had basely compromised. The “bargain” struck between the North’s ten commercial states and the South’s three agrarian states over the closing of the Atlantic trade had created a Frankenstein’s monster. "It is neither profitable nor in accordance with the scientific truth to consider that whatever the constitutional fathers did was right," the young professor scolded. By precluding Congress from prohibiting “the importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit . . . prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight,"_the new nation had granted the monster two unimpeded decades in which to grow too large to be destroyed short of civil war.

To be sure, in Du Bois’ monumental study considerably less attention was paid to the antislavery qualms of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, or to the likes of crusaders Anthony Benezet and John Woolman, than to the realpolitik of the American oligarchy’s meeting at Philadelphia. For Du Bois, the decision to end the oceanic traffic had less to do with humanitarian ideals than with Haitian revolutionaries. Shock waves from the greatest racial upheaval of the 18th century that decimated invading French and British armies and threw up defiant regimes of black Jacobins and emperors dismayed Europe and alarmed North Americans. “It would hardly be too much to say,” Du Bois insisted,” that the Haytian revolution. . . was one of the main causes that rendered the accomplishment of this aim possible at the earliest constitutional moment”---a capital insight of his *Suppression of the African Slave Trade*.

The unsigned *Atlantic Monthly* reviewer reproached Du Bois for moralizing about the wages of original sin.ⁱ Admittedly, *Suppression* moralizes. Loaded phrases indict "the cupidity and carelessness of our ancestors." Kantian imperatives flash out. "Instead of calling the whole moral energy of the people into action, so as gradually to crush this potential evil," the young Calvinist finds only temporizing, cowardice, horsetrading, and complicity. Du Bois doubted "if ever before such political mistakes as the slavery compromises of the Constitutional Convention had such serious results." *Suppression* ends with an admonition which the otherwise favorable reviewer (unsigned) in the *American Historical Review* regretted as more characteristic of "the advocate rather than the historian." "From this," Du Bois sternly declared, "we may conclude that it behooves nations as well as men to do things at the very moment when they ought to be done."ⁱⁱ

In his magnum opus, *Black Reconstruction in America*, published four decades later, Du Bois described the Trans-Atlantic slave trade as "the most magnificent drama in the last thousand years." By "magnificent", Du Bois must have meant titanic in the sense of a global repositioning of demography and the rise of a new European economic system. The immense numbers involved remain contested among historians---steadily rising from Philip Curtin's once authoritative 1969 census of nine million Africans transported to the Western Hemisphere from the mid-15th century to the early 19th. Pick a number: a definitive ten millions for Roger Antsey and David Eltis; eleven millions for James Rawley; twelve millions for Joseph Inikori.ⁱⁱⁱ Increase that number by at least 1/3rd to account for those who perished on the march to the coast, expired in the holding pens, died in the Middle Passage, or succumbed during the seasoning period in the Americas.

On the low side, a total of 15 million Africans must have been captured during a 400-year supply-and-demand transaction between African wholesalers and European retailers.^{iv}

On the high side, the figure may exceed twenty million men, women, and children.

What this long vacuuming of people meant to the cultural anthropology and political economy of the African Subcontinent is the subject of academic investigation and dispute yielding verdicts that range from minimal impact (John Thornton) and reparable depletion (Hugh Thomas) to holocaustic catastrophe (Basil Davidson, Paul Lovejoy, and Walter Rodney). Hugh Thomas's grand Eurocentric account, *The Slave Trade*, breezily speculates that "a fast growing population might even have found relief from the inevitable pressure on resources through the export of some of its members." Walter Rodney, the brilliant young West Indian polemicist, firmly demurs and claims to calculate precisely the scope of the holocaust. In his popular monograph, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Rodney claims that Africa had 100 million people in 1650; Europe numbered 103 millions, Asia 257 millions. Two centuries later, there were still 100 million Africans; but 144 million Europeans and 656 million Asians. Fifty years later---1900---Rodney's world census yielded 120 million Africans, 423 million Europeans, and 857 million Asians---disparities he attributes to no other cause but the inhumane Atlantic slave traffic.^v

Much recent scholarship tends to undermine Walter Rodney's monocausal explanation. In his interpretive tour de force, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World* (1998), historian John Thornton offers this judgment: "In the end, then," he asserts categorically, "the European trade with Africa can scarcely be seen as disruptive in itself, for it did not oust any line of African production, nor did it thwart

[economic] development. . . .”^{vi} In this line of reasoning, European participation in the slave trade was first and foremost at the instigation of Africans. Definitive explanations still await the historic realities of Africa’s skewed sex ratios, increased polygyny, perpetual warfare, ubiquity of internal enslavement, and regional depopulation. The debate is far from settled, but that famous plaint in 1526 of King Afonso I of the Kongo to his brother royal, Manuel I of Portugal, certainly appears to corroborate the catastrophists. “Merchants are taking every day our natives, sons of the land, and our sons of our noblemen and vassals and our relatives,” protested King Afonso. “So great, Sire, is the corruption and licentiousness that our country is being completely depopulated.”^{vii}

Whether or not black Africa was irreparably damaged by four centuries of involuntary population out-migration, the great majority of the enslaved departed the continent in Anglo-American bottoms. By the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, the defeated Spanish granted the victorious British a monopoly (*el Asiento*) on the transport and sale of slaves to their Latin American possessions. Britain’s near-monopoly on the traffic was the 18th century’s equivalent of OPEC. As the canonical trade theorist of the day, Malachy Postlethwayt, rejoiced, “the Negro trade and the natural consequences resulting from it may be justly esteemed an inexhaustible fund of wealth and naval power to this nation.” During the traffic’s so-called “golden age” from 1700 to 1808, when 2/3rds of the total number of chattels was shipped from Senegambia, the Windward Coast, the Gold Coast, the Bight of Biafra, Kongo, and Angola to the Western hemisphere, about 40 percent was unloaded from English and American vessels.^{viii} “Many thousands gone,” indeed, as Ira Berlin entitled his instant classic: with 35 percent of these bewildered

captives consumed in Brazil's fatal sugar plantations; 50 percent in the Caribbean slaughterhouse; five percent absorbed by North America's far less lethal tobacco, rice, and cotton plantations.

Fifty years ago, the great majority of historians (although probably not Du Bois) would have found counter-intuitive and factually surprising the claim that the extraordinary prosperity derived from the British Caribbean plantations was not declining at the beginning of the 19th century. Indeed, as recent massaging of the numbers reveals, the Atlantic slave trade attained maximum size and profitability in the very decade in which the British parliament and the American Congress abolished the traffic. In recent calculations by Joseph Inikori, a leading numbers man, the average rate of profit from 1765 to 1806 on some 240 Atlantic slave shipments amounted to a hefty 27 percent. Postlethway's pronouncements were still holding fifteen years after the Haitian revolution.^{ix} What was true before the Declaration of Independence persisted as a crucial economic fact of life a quarter century afterward.

Nearly sixty years after Longman Green & Company published *The Suppression of the African Slave*, a Columbia University graduate student surprised Du Bois with a proposal to republish the book. Du Bois gratefully accepted Eugene Genovese's offer and agreed to write an "Apologia".^x What *Suppression* had needed, Du Bois decided in the "Apologia," "was to add to my terribly conscientious search into the facts . . . the clear concepts of Marx on the class struggle for income and power, beneath which all considerations of right or morals were twisted or utterly crushed."^{xi} John Hope Franklin gently demurred from the Apologia in his *Journal of Negro History* tribute to the second edition, writing that the absence of a Marxist framework in the original edition

was a “most fortunate dereliction.” As Franklin astutely noted, however, Du Bois’s 60 year-old monograph had recognized not only economic considerations, but had joined them with political and moral considerations.

If much of his 1896 monograph reduces social and political conduct to a matter of character, numerous economic pronouncements still have a distinctly modern, we might say proto-Marxist, ring. At bottom, Du Bois believed the source and force of slavery in the United States to lie in an indissoluble link between profits from unfree labor and the financing of modern capitalism. In a paper read before the American Historical Association while still completing his pioneering slave-trade monograph, Du Bois had advanced an insight of considerable saliency:

If slave labor was an economic god, then the slave trade was its strong right arm; and with Southern planters recognizing this and Northern capital unfettered by a conscience it was almost like legislating against economic laws to attempt to abolish the slave trade by statutes. Northern greed joined to Southern credulity was a combination calculated to circumvent any law, human or divine.^{xii}

"Apologia" would end on the moderately forgiving note that, "at the beginning of my career, I made no more mistakes than apparently I did."^{xiii} Almost certainly an 87 year-old Du Bois reaching the end of his career must have derived considerable satisfaction from the then fairly recent turn taken by slavery and emancipation studies. Indeed, it would have been altogether reasonable for him to believe that the paradigm-

shifting scholarship of the brilliant Trinidadian, Eric Williams, flowed to some extent from sophisticated amplifications of some of his own economic insights. Although I recall only generalities pertinent to the issue of intellectual mentoring in the vast Du Bois correspondence, one can surely speculate that these two extraordinary intellectuals---Du Bois in the sociology chair at Atlanta, Williams in economics at Howard---critically devoured each other's writings.

The 1955 edition of *Suppression* with its Marxian "Apologia" appeared eleven years after the publication of Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944). *Capitalism and Slavery* appeared nine years after *Black Reconstruction in America*. That the 18th-century profits from the Atlantic slave trade had financed the steel production and textile manufacture of the British and French maritime bourgeoisies came as a matter of logic to the author of *Suppression* as he steeped himself in Marx to write *Black Reconstruction*. That book's opening chapter, "The Black Worker", made the sweeping assertion that black labor "became the foundation stone not only of the southern social structure, but of northern manufacture and commerce, of the English factory system, of European commerce, of buying and selling on a world-wide scale."^{xiv}

With a nod to Du Bois and a deep bow to economic historian Lowell Ragatz, Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* served up a two-pronged thesis in which the slave-trade---understood as a totality of activities and products---financed the industrial revolution, which in turn liquidated chattel slavery as economical enterprise. Professor Thomas Holt served up a superlatively succinct recapitulation of Eric Williams's brilliant two-pronged argument in a 1986 review essay in the *Journal of Social History*, writing that "the Atlantic slave trade had played midwife at the birth of British

capitalism, which in turn played pallbearer to the slave trade and slavery.” Williams’s seminal book documented an economy of inefficient slave labor, white population loss, chronic indebtedness, soil exhaustion, and plantation bankruptcy on a life support of outdated mercantilist tariffs and subsidies. With all due credit to the abolitionist activism of Quaker, Evangelical, and Whig elites in London and Philadelphia---men and women, Britons and Africans, who deployed one of the “greatest propaganda movements of all time”---Williams sought to demonstrate that chattel slavery succumbed to the irrepressible advance of industrial capitalism.^{xv}

In a work of remarkable revisionism, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition*, historian Seymour Drescher purported thirty years ago to demonstrate the absence of objective economic reasons for the success of British and American abolitionism---a position the cliometrician Robert Fogel fully endorsed. “Far from declining,” Fogel asserts in *Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery* (1989), “slave imports were higher in this period than in any previous 20-year period of U.S. history.”^{xvi} Drescher’s *Econocide* insists that in 1790 “the metropole had little reason to regret its economic relationship with the West Indies,” in consequence of which he maintains that Britain and the United States abolished the slave trade despite their economic interests, not because of them. In the playbill of this rather recent scholarship, thriving Caribbean sugar and coffee plantations enriched the metropole to such a degree that only the prospect of overproduction should have concerned his majesty’s exchequer. As Rutgers historian Christopher Brown reiterates in a thoughtful article reviewing the literature in *William and Mary Quarterly*, “most historians now reject interpretations that reduce British abolitionism to economic motives.”^{xvii}

So much, then, it would seem for those historians who had embraced the argument offered by *Capitalism and Slavery*, stipulating the relative economic decline of the Caribbean as a major cause for abolition. Did American and British opponents of the Atlantic slave trade somehow persuade their people to commit an act of economic masochism or, to employ Professor Drescher's neologism, econocide? Does acceptance of the disconcerting Drescherian economic conclusions constrain us to acknowledge an even more disconcerting conundrum as we commemorate the bicentenary of the closing of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade? For if there were compelling economic reasons not to do so, then what must have been the non-economic reasons that trumped common sense in an age where, as Adam Hochschild and Seymour Drescher remind us, "freedom, not slavery, was the peculiar institution."^{xviii} How, to put the question starkly, does one explain the sudden decision (in historical time) to curtail an institution coeval with civilization?

To be sure, Victorian–Age historians had no doubt as to what was the ennoblingly correct answer. But, no contemporary scholar would subscribe to the effusions of William Lecky's *A History of European Morals*, in which it was said that "the unweary, unostentatious, and inglorious crusade of England against slavery may probably be regarded as among the three or four virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations." As late as 1933, Oxford's Regius Professor, Sir Reginald Coupland, concurred in his arbitral *The British Anti-Slavery Movement*.^{xix} This was historical explanation by celebration that barely advanced the abolition story beyond where Thomas Clarkson himself left it with his 1808 autobiographical history or Wilberforce's two sons in their five-volume *Life of William*

Wilberforce. This was the time when John Newton's hymn, *Amazing Grace*, almost expunged from memory a life as a slave ship captain; when Ouladah Equiano's autobiography became a bestseller; when Josiah Wedgwood designed his seal for stamping envelopes----"Am I Not a Man and Brother?"; and when William Wilberforce shocked the House of Commons with the image of the *Brookes* slave ship.

Writing years later of his spectacular reinterpretive impact, Williams demystified Quaker abolitionism with almost disingenuous casualness by explaining that "the view was that a band of humanitarians---the Saints, they had been nicknamed---had got together to abolish slavery, and had after many years succeeded in arousing the conscience of the British people against man's greatest inhumanity to man."** As the popular success of the recent film *Amazing Grace* signals, abolitionism is still a subject made for hagiographic packaging, but academic concerns are of a different order, for, while they embrace Williams's abolitionist dymystification, debate rages among them as to how to explain the sudden termination of the Atlantic slave trade.

The question as posed by David Brion Davis some forty years ago still begs a definitive answer: why did men and women suddenly define as immoral an institution that had been for several centuries accepted as integral to European religion and law? One puts away with perplexity the excellent collection of essay edited by my NYU colleague, Thomas Bender. As David Eltis wearily observed in his review of *The Anti-Slavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation* (1992), "the missing element is not a resolution of the issues so much as any hint that reconciliation is possible."^{xx} The distinguished colonialist, Barbara Solow finds Drescher's interpretations "important and exciting" but "fundamentally mistaken." Solow, Gavin Wright, and Thomas

Holt join with other scholars to salvage a modified version of Eric Williams's economic decline thesis by insisting that the Haitian implosion and relative decline in the value of the Caribbean gradually undercut the stranglehold on political power by the North American and British slavocracy.

And so it goes. David Brion Davis's *chef d'oeuvre*, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (2006), serves up a compelling synthesis of the best of Williams's critics (Antsey, Eltis, Drescher, Haskell) and the best of Williams. According to Davis, the sugar, coffee, and tobacco grown by efficient, profitable slave labor transformed the dreary lives of the common Englishman and American, and in doing so created the appetites that undergirded a new consumer mentality increasingly inimical to the indignity of wageless work. Malthus and Ricardo and Manchester economics notwithstanding, businessmen grasped the enormous potential of a working class incentivised by wages and wanting more and more of the finer things of life. The rapture of revisionism is endemic to scholarship. Explanations for the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade are likely to sustain historiography for years to come.

The rapture of revisionism is endemic to scholarship. Explanations for the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade are likely to sustain historiography long after the close of today's symposium and for years to come. In that case, why not exercise the prerogative of offering one's personal preference among the welter of theoretical alternatives? I find Thomas Holt's superb 1987 review essay in the *Journal of Social History* to offer a satisfactory penultimate, if not last, word. Of Williams and his critics and the best sense to be made of a complex historical problem, Holt writes this:

Why, after all, is it necessary to choose between workers' initiatives and elite controls. Is there really an inherent contradiction between an explanation of abolition in terms of a broadly based transformation of moral perception and the machinations of elite classes? It would appear, then, that Williams is correct: the advent of slavery abolition was a function of the rise of capitalism. Capitalism promoted a new psychology, new social relations, and new relations of state and citizen.

One final observation. Historical reasoning by analogy may serve us. Slaves were yesterday's energy source. Fossil fuels are today's. If the suppression of the Atlantic traffic was economically irrational, will historians tell future generations that the rush to wean ourselves of petroleum dependence was economically irrational? New oil sources are coming on line across the planet. New technologies of automotive efficiency abound. Profits for Exxon and Shell are almost incommensurable. Vast industries depend upon oil. How then explain the Kyoto Accords---today's equivalent of the 1808 traffic ban---and Al Gore our 21st---century Wilberforce? David Brion Davis's new book, *Inhuman Bondage*, describes a world turned into an immense concentration camp had New World slavery not been terminated, a dismal picture hypothesized in the *New York Times* by Eric Foner two Sundays ago. Our ancestors somehow realized that slave labor---efficient and abundant---would, nevertheless, be ruinous morally, socially, and, in the long run, technologically inferior. Such a mindset now seeps through the developed world apparently and mercifully hell bent on committing a new version of econocide. One hundred twelve years ago, Du Bois set the interpretive bar high for historians of the slave trade. The challenge continues.

i "... **eliminated in due time.**": Suppression, pp. 197-98, and pp. 169, 171, 173, and 154.

ii "... **when they ought to be done.**": ibid., p. 197, and pp. 198, 199.

"... **historical treatise into readable prose.**": Dusk, p. 269.

iii **Suppression**: The original dissertation clearly suggests eleventh-hour typing problems - "The Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the United States of America, 1638-1871." A Thesis for the Degree of Philosophiae Doctor et Magister Artum at Harvard University by W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, 2vols., Pusey Library/Harvard University. **Harvard Historical Studies** was not, as has sometimes been stated, the first such series; see, "Introduction," by Herbert Aptheker, ed., The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870 (Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited, 1973), p. 11.

iii "... **abolition of slavery.**": Suppression, p. 198.

iii "... **when they ought to be done.**": ibid., p. 197, and pp. 198, 199.

iii **Genovese's edition of Suppression**: Du Bois, "Apologia," Suppression of the African Slave Trade ... (N.Y.: Social Science Press, 1954) [Reproduced in the Aptheker 1973 Kraus-Thomson edition, pp. 327-29.]

iii "... **twisted or utterly crushed.**": ibid., p. 329.

iii "... **more mistakes than apparently I did.**": ibid., p. 329.

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- iii **"... law, human or divine.":** Du Bois, "The Enforcement of the Slave Trade Laws," AHA Annual Report for 1891; also, Aptheker, Periodical Literature, I., p. 27.
- iii **"... of income than morals.":** "Apologia," p. 329.
- iii **"... eliminated in due time.":** Suppression, pp. 197-98, and pp. 169, 171, 173, and 154.
- iii **"... abolition of slavery.":** Suppression, p. 198.
- iii **"... when they ought to be done.":** ibid., p. 197, and pp. 198, 199.
- iii **Genovese's edition of Suppression:** Du Bois, "Apologia," Suppression of the African Slave Trade ... (N.Y.: Social Science Press, 1954) [Reproduced in the Aptheker 1973 Kraus-Thomson edition, pp. 327-29.]
- iii **"... twisted or utterly crushed.":** ibid., p. 329.
- iii **"... more mistakes than apparently I did.":** ibid., p. 329.
- iii **"... law, human or divine.":** Du Bois, "The Enforcement of the Slave Trade Laws," AHA Annual Report for 1891; also, Aptheker, Periodical Literature, I., p. 27.
- iii **"... of income than morals.":** "Apologia," p. 329.

ⁱⁱⁱ Indicative citations on the numbers thicket: William Darity, Jr., "The Numbers Game and the Profitability of the British Trade in Slaves", *Journal of Economic History* (Sept. 1985): 693-703; *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-Rom* (Cambridge and N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), reviewed by Lorena S. Walsh for EH.NET; Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800* (London: Verso, 1997).

^{iv} Estimates reported in Marcus Rediker, *The Slave Ship: A Human History* (N.Y.: Viking, 2007), p. 5.

^v Hugh Thomas, *The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440-1870* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 795. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1972), p. 97. John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800* (London: Cambridge,

1992), ch.2. Paul Lovejoy, "The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of African History*, XXX (1989): 365-94.

^{vi} Thornton, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

^{vii} Afonso I quoted, David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (NY: Oxford, 2006), p. 91.

^{viii} Postlethwayt quoted, Christopher Leslie Bown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), p. 209. Figures taken from Du Bois, *Suppression*, pp. 3, 5; and Rediker, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

^{ix} Cf., William Darity, "The Numbers Game and the Profitability of the British Trade in Slaves," *Journal of Economic History* (Sept. 1985): 693-703, p. 694.

^x **Genovese's edition of Suppression**: Du Bois, "Apologia," Suppression of the African Slave Trade ... (N.Y.: Social Science Press, 1954) [Reproduced in the Aptheker 1973 Kraus-Thomson edition, pp. 327-29.]

^{xi} **"... twisted or utterly crushed."**: *ibid.*, p. 329. [John Hope Franklin, review, *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1683-1870*. *Journal of Negro History* (///// 1955): 182-84, p. 184.]

^{xii} **"... law, human or divine."**: Du Bois, "The Enforcement of the Slave Trade Laws," AHA Annual Report for 1891; also, Aptheker, Periodical Literature, I., p. 27.

^{xiii} **"... more mistakes than apparently I did."**: *ibid.*, p. 329.

^{xiv} Lewis, *Du Bois*, II., p. 369.

^{xv} Thomas C. Holt, "Explaining Abolition," *Journal of Social History* (/////): 371-78, p. 371. On Williams's argument, see, Seymour Drescher, "Eric Williams: British Capitalism and British Slavery," *Review of Reviews* ??? 180-96; David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage*, pp. 240-41. Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); and of more than antiquarian interest, Carter G. Woodson, "Capitalism and Slavery," *Journal of Negro History* (?????): 94-5 .

^{xvi} Seymour Drescher, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolitionism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977). Robert William Fogel, *Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery* (NY: Norton, 1989), p. 32.

^{xvii} Drescher, quoted, Barbara Solow, review, *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition*. By Seymour Drescher. *Journal of Economic Literature* (June 1979):550-52, p.

550. Christopher L. Brown, review, *From Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery*. By Seymour Drescher. *William and Mary Quarterly* (?????): 692-96, pp. 692-93.

^{xviii} Drescher, quoted, Adam Hochschild, *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire's Slaves* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), p. 2.

^{xix} W.E. H. Lecky, *A History of European Morals*. 2vols (London: Logmans, ????), II, p. 153. Reginald Coupland, *The British Anti-Slavery Movement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1833). See, F. O. Folarin, "British Historians and Capitalism and Slavery," *Transaction* 50. ??? 100-102.

***Du Bois, *Suppression*, p. 94]

**[Williams, *Inward Hunger; The Education of a Prime Minister* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1969), pp. 49-50.]

***[See Hochschild's caveats (whose *Bury the Chains* some saw as somewhat retro) about the film: "English Abolition: The Movie," *The New York Review of Books* (June 14, 2007): 73-75]

^{xx} David Eltis, review, *The Anti-Slavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation* (1992). *Journal of Southern History* (/////////): 752-54.