The purpose of this Management Letter is to formally advise you as to the status of security over NARA holdings specific to, but not limited to Archives I. As you are aware, holdings security has been defined as a material weakness under the reporting provisions of the Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) since 2002. Likewise, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has consistently cited holdings security as one of this agency’s Top Ten Management Challenges in our semiannual reports to Congress. This Management Letter has been drafted to inform you that recent events have reiterated the need for this agency to take significant and profound measures to address the security deficiencies specific to NARA stack areas at Archives I and II. The general conditions defined in this management letter are pertinent to other NARA locations as well.

In recent months this agency experienced a series of apparently willful acts resulting in the destruction and attempted destruction of records to include permanent Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) records accessioned into our holdings. The OIG was able to identify a suspect and substantiate a case in a timely manner in this investigation. [DELETED – 8 LINES]

Recent incidents raise a variety of troubling issues that strike at the heart of NARA’s mission. Foremost is holding security. [DELETED – 4 LINES] Because of this practice, similar issues as to those the investigators found at Archives I would apply to Archives II. [DELETED – 3 LINES] While this may facilitate employee work processes, it has adverse security related implications that must be considered.

Therefore, we suggest that:

1. Additional security measures be developed and implemented to further restrict and document access to all stack areas at Archives I and II. NARA officials
should seek and evaluate non-cost prohibitive technologies that can be
implemented to achieve the dual goals of tightening access to stacks while
providing a detailed trail of persons accessing these areas. If successful in
identifying and implementing such a technology at Archives I and II,
consideration can then be given to rolling the product out to other locations based
upon a well defined methodology.

2. Employees be educated in stack security measures and subsequently held
responsible for execution of established internal control requirements. Specific
restrictions should be defined and enforced to restrict access to stack areas to
persons who fail to present proper card key or other identification.

We look forward to your response within 30 days as to how you plan to address these
suggestions.

-If you have any questions, please contact me on 301-837-[3000].

Paul Brachfeld
Inspector General